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Ganesharam v. State Of Rajasthan

Rajasthan High Court
Mar 5, 1968
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, named in the opinion variously as Ganesbaram / Ganesharam / Ganesha Bam, filed an application under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner was prosecuted in the Court of the Additional Munsif‑Magistrate, Bikaner, for an offence under Section 335 of the Penal Code and was acquitted by that learned Magistrate by a judgment dated 28th March, 1966. The State preferred an appeal against that acquittal. This Court (High Court) by its judgment dated 18th January, 1968 set aside the acquittal, convicted the petitioner under Section 325 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year.

After conviction by this Court, the petitioner moved an application under Section 561‑A, Criminal P.C. praying that the order of conviction be set aside and that his counsel (who could not attend the Court when the appeal was decided) be allowed to argue the appeal. By a separate application dated 18th February, 1968, it was prayed that the Court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, extend the benefit of Section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act to the petitioner on the ground that he was below 21 years of age when the trial Court's judgment was pronounced.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561‑A, Criminal P.C., to secure the ends of justice and set aside its conviction order in the circumstances presented.
  2. Whether the provisions of Section 6 (and related provisions) of the Probation of Offenders Act are mandatory and must be applied by the Court even if the accused or counsel did not bring them to the Court's notice at earlier stages.
  3. Whether the crucial date for determining entitlement to Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act is the date of the trial Court's judgment (when the trial Court should have afforded the benefit) or a later date (such as the date of appellate conviction).
  4. Whether laches on the part of the petitioner (or his absence from Court) or the availability of an appeal to the Supreme Court precludes invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 561‑A in this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mrs. Chatterji)

  • It was the duty of the Deputy Government Advocate (representing the State) to bring to the Court's notice that the petitioner was below 21 years and entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act when the appeal was heard ex parte.
  • If the Court had been informed that the petitioner was below 21 years at the time the trial Court's judgment was pronounced, it was obliged to order release under Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation Act; Section 6(1) is mandatory and the Court had no competence to sentence him to imprisonment contrary to that provision.
  • The petitioner's age was patent on the record because the trial Magistrate recorded his age as 20 years when taking his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C., so the Court should have applied Section 6 irrespective of whether the point was pressed by counsel earlier.
  • Relying on inherent jurisdiction under Section 561‑A is appropriate because other remedies (for example, appeal to the Supreme Court) may be practically inaccessible to a financially unsound petitioner.

Respondent / State's Arguments (Deputy Government Advocate)

  • Relief under Section 561‑A is not available because the petitioner himself was at fault for not appearing before the Court to point out his entitlement to Section 6(1) of the Probation Act (i.e., laches and procedural default by the accused).
  • On the date when the petitioner was ordered sent to jail by this Court he had crossed the age of 21, and therefore Section 6(1) of the Probation Act does not apply to him.
  • The petitioner had an alternate remedy of appeal to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Procedure Code, so invocation of inherent jurisdiction was not appropriate.
  • Relied on authority of the Mysore High Court in Dasappa v. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 Mys 224) to support the contention that the petition was misconceived and that finality of earlier orders should be respected in those circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raj Narain v. The State (AIR 1953 All 815) The scope of the High Court's inherent power (in context of Section 561‑A) — inherent power exists to do justice but is curtailed where statute provides a specific procedure. The Court relied on the reasoning to frame the limits and nature of inherent jurisdiction under Section 561‑A and to assess whether the present circumstances warranted its exercise.
State of Bombay v. Nilkanth Sripad (observations of Chagla, C.J.) Section 561‑A emphasises the High Court's widest jurisdiction to secure ends of justice; High Court may entertain applications not contemplated by the Code if necessary to secure ends of justice. The Court invoked the Chagla, C.J. observation to justify entertaining the application under Section 561‑A to secure the ends of justice in the present case.
Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State of Punjab (Supreme Court) The provisions of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act are mandatory; a Court must apply them even if the accused did not bring them to the Court's notice before disposal of the case. The Court relied on this authority to hold that failure of the accused (or counsel) to press the point does not absolve the Court of its duty to apply Section 6 when attracted.
Dasappa v. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 Mys 224) In that case the Mysore High Court held a review petition (seeking Section 6 relief after final disposal) to be misconceived and emphasised finality of orders; suggested alternative remedy under Chapter 29 (remission) for juvenile claim. The Deputy Government Advocate cited this decision to oppose the petition, but the Court in the present opinion declined to follow its reasoning as applicable to these circumstances.
Chopra, U.J.S. v. State of Bombay (AIR 1955 SC 688) Supreme Court observations on finality of orders relevant to the reasoning adopted in Dasappa. The Court noted that the Mysore decision relied on Chopra but held that those observations were made in a different context and were not controlling in the present case.
Ramji Misser v. State of Bihar (Supreme Court) The crucial date for reckoning the age for the purpose of Section 6 is the date when the trial Court had to deal with the offender (i.e., the trial Court's judgment date), not the date when an appellate Court subsequently alters the outcome. The Court applied this principle to conclude that because the petitioner was below 21 on the date the trial Court pronounced judgment, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 6 despite being over 21 at the time of the appellate conviction.
AIR 1965 SC. 444 (as cited in the opinion) Authority cited for the mandatory nature of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act (the opinion refers to a Supreme Court statement in AIR 1965 SC.444 to that effect). The Court invoked this Supreme Court formulation to support its conclusion that Section 6 is mandatory and must be applied when attracted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step‑by‑step manner, framed by a limited set of statutory and precedent principles expressly cited in the opinion:

  1. The Court first examined the scope and ambit of Section 561‑A, Criminal P.C., noting that the provision envisages three specific circumstances for exercising inherent power: (1) securing the ends of justice, (2) preventing abuse of the process of Court, and (3) giving effect to any order under the Code. The Court relied on Raj Narain to articulate the nature of inherent power and on Chagla C.J.'s observations in State of Bombay v. Nilkanth Sripad to emphasise that Section 561‑A enables the High Court to entertain applications necessary to secure justice, even those not expressly contemplated by the Code.
  2. The Court considered the mandatory character of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State of Punjab and the opinion's citation of a Supreme Court pronouncement in AIR 1965 SC.444. From those authorities the Court treated Section 6 as mandatory: even if the accused or counsel had not drawn the Court's attention to the point earlier, the Court is not absolved from applying the statute when its conditions are attracted.
  3. Addressing the respondent's arguments of laches and non‑availability of Section 6 because the petitioner was over 21 at the time of the appellate conviction, the Court analysed which date is decisive for age reckoning. The Court adopted and applied the principle announced in Ramji Misser v. State of Bihar: the crucial date is the date when the trial Court had to deal with the offender (i.e., the trial Court's judgment date). Because the petitioner's age was recorded as 20 in the trial Court's proceedings (statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C.), he was below 21 on that crucial date.
  4. The Court rejected the contention that the petitioner's absence or the State's ability to seek finality via appeal to the Supreme Court should bar relief. The Court observed that invoking the appellate remedy was not an adequate substitute in the circumstances because the petitioner was financially unsound and appeal to the Supreme Court might be practically out of reach; thus it would not serve the ends of justice to deny relief under Section 561‑A on that ground.
  5. The Court also considered the authority cited by the Deputy Government Advocate (Dasappa v. State of Mysore) and concluded that the Mysore decision rested on different contextual observations and could not be accepted as controlling in the present case. The Court therefore declined to follow it where it conflicted with the duty to apply Section 6 when attracted.
  6. On the facts established in the record (notably the trial Court's recording of the petitioner's age as 20 in the Section 342 statement), and in light of the mandatory statutory duty and the Ramji Misser principle about the relevant date, the Court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act and that the sentencing to imprisonment by this Court was therefore ex facie illegal.
  7. For these reasons, and relying on the inherent jurisdiction conferred (or recognised) by Section 561‑A to secure the ends of justice, the Court allowed the petition and set aside the sentence imposed by the appellate judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed. The sentence of imprisonment passed against the petitioner by this Court vide judgment dated 12th January, 1968, is set aside.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The petitioner is ordered to be released from jail provided he executes a bond in the sum of Rs. 2,000 and furnishes a surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Munsiff‑Magistrate, Bikaner, for keeping peace and being of good behaviour for a period of two years.

Broader Implications: The Court applied established Supreme Court authority and relevant High Court jurisprudence to reaffirm that (a) Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act is mandatory where its conditions are satisfied, (b) the crucial date for reckoning age for Section 6 is the date on which the trial Court had to deal with the offender, and (c) Section 561‑A may be invoked to secure the ends of justice where statutory obligations (such as mandatory application of Section 6) have not been discharged by earlier tribunals. The opinion itself does not state that it is creating a new precedent; it applies and reconciles existing authorities to the facts before the Court.

Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond what the opinion contains.

Show all summary ...

1. Ganesbaram has filed this application under Section 561-A, Criminal P.C. and it arises out of the following circumstances:

2. Ganesharam petitioner, who was prosecuted in the Court of the Additional Munsif-Magistrate, Bikaner for an offence under Section 335, Penal Code, was acquitted by the learned Magistrate vide his judgment dated 28th March, 1966. An appeal was preferred by the State against the said judgment and this Court vide its judgment dated 18th January, 1968, set aside the acquittal and convicted the petitioner under Section 325, Penal Code and awarded him rigorous imprisonment for one year. Then an application under Section 561-A, Criminal P.C. was moved on behalf of the petitioner praying that the order of conviction passed by this Court be set aside and his counsel who could not attend the Court on the day when the appeal was decided be allowed to argue the appeal. By another application dated 18th February, 1968, it was further prayed that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the Court may extend the benefit of Section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act (hereinafter called the Act) to the petitioner who was below 21 years of age when the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced.

3. Mrs. Chatterji who represents the petitioner did not press the first application for setting aside the conviction, but she strenuously argued that it was the duty of the learned Deputy Government Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the State when the appeal was heard and decided ex parte by this Court, to have brought this fact to the notice of the Court that the petitioner was below 21 years of age and that he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. If this fact had not escaped the notice of the Court at the time of the hearing of the appeal, then, according to Mrs. Chatterji, the Court had no alternative but to order for the release of the accused under the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It was further argued that this Court by Bending the petitioner to jail has pissed an order which was not within the competence of the Court as the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act are mandatory in nature and the Court was bound to comply with the requirements of those provisions.

4. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has vehemently opposed this application. His argument is that the jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Criminal P.C. is not available to the petitioner because he himself was guilty of not appearing before the Court to point out that he was entitled to the benefit of Section 6(1) of the Act. It was also contended that on the date when he was ordered to be sent to jail he had crossed the age of 21 and therefore the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act were not attracted to his case.

5. The question about the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A, Criminal P.C. came before the full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Narain v. The State AIR 1953 All 815. The point to be discussed in that case was whether the High Court has a power to revoke, review, recall or alter its own earlier decision passed in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and rehear the same. The majority (with Mootham C.J. differing), held that an inherent power implies by its very nature a power cannot be expressed in terms but which must reside in a Court for achieving the higher and the main purpose of a Court, namely, the purpose of doing justice in a case before it and for seeing that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors. The learned Judges were of the opinion that the circumstances requiring the use of such a power cannot be foreseen. The Legislature according to them, enacts provisions to meet such circumstances which can be foreseen, and once provision has been made in the statute about a certain circumstance the occasion to invoke inherent power in that circumstance practically vanishes. An occasion to invoke the inherent power will, not then arise for the simple reason that when the Code has provided for the contingency, that provided method must be considered to be the just method to meet that contingency and any other method thought of by the Court cannot then be said to be a method which would advance the interest of justice. It is in this sense that no occasion for the exercise of any inherent power arises when the statute expressly or by necessary implication provides for what is to be done in that situation.

6. Section 561-A, Criminal P.C. envisages three circumstances in which the Court can exercise that power, namely, when it is necessary (1) for securing the ends of justice, (2) for preventing abuse of the process of Court, and (3) to give effect to any order under this Code.

7. It is bow well settled that this section does not confer any power on the High Court, it only Eaves such inherent power which the Court possessed before the Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted. If such a power is so included it can be exercised for the purposes mentioned in the section and it would be a matter for determination by the Court in each individual case whether the circumstances obtaining in that case make out that purpose and make it incumbent on the Court to exercise such a power to achieve the objects mentioned in the section.

8. Chagla, C.J. in the State of Bombay v. Nilkanth Sripad while dealing with the scope of Section 561-A, Criminal P.C. observed as follows:

As Section 561-A was enacted to emphasise the fact that the High Court has the widest jurisdiction to pass orders to secure the ends of justice, Section 561-A must give the power to the High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated by Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, if the High Court feels that ends of justice require that an order should be made in an application, although the application is not contemplated by the Code, the High Court will entertain the application and make the necessary orders to secure the ends of justice.

9. In view of the above observations, it is to be seen whether the circumstances of this case are of such nature which make it incumbent on this Court to exercise its inherent powers to dispose of the application filed before it.

10. The Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State Of Punjab. has ob. served that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are mandatory in nature and even if the accused did not bring the provisions of the Act to the notice of the Court till after the case of the accused was disposed of, it does not absolve the Court from discharging its duty under the Act and apply the provisions of the Act to the circumstances of the case if they are attracted to them.

11. In that case, appellant Rattan Lal was convicted under Sections 451 and 354 of the Penal Code and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment on each count and also sentence of the fine wag imposed on him under Section 451. The appellant was 16 years of age at the time of his conviction but when the order of conviction was recorded by the learned Magistrate, the Probation of Offenders Act was not extended to the District of Gurgaon where the appellant used to live. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge upheld the conviction as well as the sentence. A revision application was then filed before the High Court of Punjab but it was dismissed in limine. It may be mentioned that by that time the appellant did not urge before any of these Courts to apply the provisions of Section 6 of the Act to his case, as he did not know that the Act had been extended to the Gurgaon District. After the revision petition disposed of by the High Court, it appears that the appellant filed criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act and to pass orders under Sections 3, 4 or 6 thereof. That application was also dismissed by the High Court and it was against that order that an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court held that in the circumstances of that case the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. An argument was raised on behalf of the prosecution that at such a late stage of the proceedings the Supreme Court should not allow a party to raise a point for the first time before it about the application of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. While dealing with that question, the learned Judges observed as follows:

But in this case both the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court ignored the mandatory provisions of the Act. It is true that the accused did not bring the provisions of the Act to the notice of the Court till after the revision was disposed of. But that does not absolve the Court from discharging its duty under the Act. The observations made by the Additional Sessions Judge in sentencing the accused were made de hors the provisions of the Act....

12. The learned Judges, however, did not themselves give the benefit of the provisions of Section 8(1) of the Act to the appellant but sent back the case to the High Court with a direction that the High Court may make an order under Section 6 of the Act or if it so desires to remand it to the Sessions Court for doing so.

13. Learned Deputy Government Advocate in support of his argument that at this late stage the petitioner should not be allowed to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court particularly when he was himself guilty of laches of not attending the Court when the appeal of the State was heard by this Court cited on authority of the Mysore High Court in Dasappa v. State of Mysore AIR 1965 Mys 224. In that case, the accused were convicted under Section 380, Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four months. Appeal and revision petitions were preferred by the accused in the Sessions and the High Court and they were also dismissed. Thereafter review application was filed by the abused persons praying that one of them was 17 years of age and, therefore, he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. It was argued by learned Counsel for the convict that it was through oversight that that submission could not be made before the Courts when the sentence was passed and upheld in appeal or revision and, therefore, be urged that the Court should consider this new plea to secure the ends of justice under the inherent powers. The learned Judge, after relying on certain observations of the Supreme Court in Chopra, U.J.S. v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 688 observed that the case of the petitioner did not fall under any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the review petition was therefore misconceived, as in his opinion such a review would clearly be against the principle of finality of orders of dismissal passed by the High Court and that the petitioner were to blame themselves for not having apprised their Advocate of all material facts. The learned Judge, however, remarked that the petitioner No. 2 who claimed to be below 21 years may approach the State Government under Chapter 29 of Criminal Procedure Code for remission of the sentence.

14. I regret that, with all due respect to the learned Judge, I cannot agree with the decision in that case because the observations of the Supreme Court on which he placed reliance in dismissing the petition about the finality of the orders passed by the Court were entirely in the context of different circumstances which had absolutely no bearing on the circumstance obtainable in that case.

15. There is no dispute that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are mandatory in nature as the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC. 444 have clearly mentioned that whether a plea is raised or not it is the duty of the Court to extend those provisions if the accused is found to be below 21 years of age. The arguments advanced by Mrs. Chatterji cannot be said to be without force when she states that it was the duty of the learned Deputy Government Advocate to have brought it to the notice of this Court when the appeal of the States was decided by the Court in the absence of the accused that the accused was below 21 years of age. She further submits that it was the duty of the Court also before sentencing the petitioner to imprisonment to find out if he were entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. Her contention is that the age of the accused was patent on the face of the record because the learned Magistrate, while recording his statement under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code had entered the age of the accused as 20 years and, therefore, in these circumstances, this Court has also failed to discharge its duty which was cast on it by the Legislature by enacting the provisions of Section 8 of the Act under which the normal penal law is superseded and the accused, instead of being sentenced to imprisonment, was entitled to be released on bail under the mandate of the said law. These submissions of Mrs. Chatterji are not without force. The petitioner was undoubtedly below 21 years of age and as such, even if he were found to be guilty of an offence under Section 325, I.P.C., he could not be sentenced to imprisonment by this Court without violating the mandate of the legislature contained in Section 6 of the Act. The observations of Chagla C.J. in the Bombay case are very much attracted to the circumstances of this case, as I find that the petitioner cannot seek redress in any other manner except to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. I feel that in order to secure the ends of justice I must allow the petitioner to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. Even if the learned Deputy Government Advocate did not bring this fact to the notice of the Court that the petitioner was below 21 years of age, the Court was not absolved from discharging its duty to apply the mandatory provision of Section 6 of the Act when the age of the petitioner was recorded as 20 years when his statement was taken down by the trial Court. The order of sentencing such an accused for whom the legislature has superseded the ordinary penal law is ex facie illegal and the Court should not deny to rectify such an error under the pretext of the non availability of any specific provision to do be in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

16. Learned Deputy Advocate further argued that the remedy by way of appeal to the Supreme Court was open to the petitioner under the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the inherent jurisdiction should not be allowed to be invoked by him. I regret, I cannot accept this contention of the learned Deputy Government Advocate as everyone knows that filing of an appeal to Supreme Court is not as easy as it was urged by the learned Deputy Government Advocate. For the reasons mentioned above it will not be in the interest of justice to reject the petition under Section 561.A and direct the petitioner to adopt a course which in the opinion of Mrs. Chatterji is beyond the means of the petitioner who is financially unsound.

17. The next question urged by learned Deputy Government Advocate is that the question of the application of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act in this case arose only when the petitioner was convicted by this Court after setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court and at that time the petitioner was not below 21 years and therefore, he cannot now claim any benefit under the said provision.

18. It is not disputed by learned Deputy Government Advocate that on the day when the order of acquittal was passed by the trial Court, petitioner was below 21 years of age. The question that therefore arises is as to which is the crucial date for reckoning the age when the petitioner can claim the benefit of the provisions of the Act. In my opinion this controversy is now well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramji Misser v. State of Bihar . The question that was mooted out in that case before the learned Judges of the Supreme Court was whether the age of the offender to be reckoned is as at the date of the judgment of the trial Judge or when the accused for the first time was in a position to claim the benefit of Section 6 of the Act. Their Lordships, while deciding this controversy, observed as follows:

We consider that on the terms of the section, on grounds of logic as well as on the theory that the order passed by an appellate Court is the correct order which the trial court should have passed, the crucial date must be that upon which the trial Court had to deal with the offender.

19. In view of this observation, the Court shall have to see whether on the date the judgment was passed by the trial Court, the accused was or was not of 21 years of age. The principle that their Lordships of the Supreme Court invoked to decide this question was that the order which the appellate or re-visional Court ultimately passes is the correct order which the trial Court should have pasted and if the trial Court had passed that order when the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are attracted, then to see whether such a benefit could be claimed by him at that time or not. In this case, the correct order of conviction was passed by this Court when the petitioner had crossed the age of 21, but, according to the theory and the logic relied upon by the Supreme Court this order of conviction ought to have seen passed by the trial Court on which date the petitioner admittedly did not attain the age of 21 and as such the benefit of Section 6 of the Act must be extended to him as he could have got this benefit if he were rightly convicted by the trial Court. In these circumstances, I do not find any force in the contention raised by the learned Deputy Government Advocate.

20. The result is that the petition of the petitioner Ganesha Bam is allowed, the sentence of imprisonment passed against him by this Court vide judgment dated 12th January, 1968, is set aside and it is hereby ordered that the petitioner shall be released from the jail provided he executes a bond in the sum of Rs. 2,000 and furnishes a surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Munsiff-Magistrate, Bikaner, for keeping peace and be of good behaviour for a period of two years.