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Krishan Chand And Others Petitioners v. State Of Haryana And Another S
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners are Inspectors employed in Haryana Roadways, State Transport, Haryana. They filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-State to grant them the same grade pay as Inspectors working in other State departments. The petitioners' claim is premised on an asserted parity of status, qualifications and the nature of duties between them and Inspectors in other departments. They allege that pay scales of Inspectors across departments were almost equal up to 01.01.2006, but an anomaly arose when pay scales were revised with effect from 01.01.2006; accordingly they complain that they were assigned a grade pay of Rs. 3,200 whereas Inspectors in departments such as Excise, Forest and Labour were granted Rs. 3,600.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners, being Inspectors in State Transport with the same qualifications and similar duties as Inspectors in other State departments, are entitled to the same grade pay on the principle of equal pay for equal work.
- Whether a court sitting under Article 226 may direct parity of pay/grade pay between the petitioners and Inspectors in other departments, or whether such matters of equation of posts and pay fall within the exclusive domain of the executive and expert bodies (e.g., Pay Commissions) and are therefore ordinarily not amenable to judicial direction.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contend that their qualifications and the nature of duties are identical to those of Inspectors in other State departments and thus, on the principle of "equal pay for equal work," they are entitled to the same grade pay.
- They assert that until 01.01.2006 the pay scale of Inspectors across departments was almost equal, and that a subsequent revision w.e.f. 01.01.2006 produced an anomaly resulting in discriminatory lower grade pay (Rs. 3,200) for the petitioners compared to Rs. 3,600 for Inspectors in Excise, Forest and Labour departments.
- The petitioners relied on Supreme Court observations in Randhir Singh v. Union of India and Inder Singh v. Vyas Muni Mishra to support their claim to parity in pay.
The opinion does not provide a detailed account of arguments advanced by the respondent-State in opposition within the text of the judgment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 879 | Where all relevant considerations are the same and posts are identical, persons holding identical posts are entitled to the same pay ("equal pay for equal work"); but equation of posts/pay is primarily for the executive and expert bodies, not the courts. | The court acknowledged the principle but held that this authority would not assist the petitioners in view of later Supreme Court decisions emphasizing executive primacy in pay fixation. |
| Inder Singh v. Vyas Muni Mishra, 1987 (4) S.L.R. 550 | Courts should generally not implement equal pay between promotional and feeder posts (because that would amount to amalgamation of posts), but where groups perform the same work in same or different departments courts may direct equal pay to remove unreasonable discrimination. | The court noted the principle but concluded it was not decisive for the petitioners because subsequent case-law confines pay-equation to the executive domain. |
| State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 | Equation of posts or pay falls within the domain of the executive and should be left to expert bodies. | Relied upon as later authority supporting the proposition that courts should ordinarily not interfere in pay fixation; used to justify refusal to grant the petitioners' relief. |
| State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72 | Fixation of pay and determination of parity is a complex executive function; courts should interfere only where government decision is patently irrational, unjust, prejudicial, or ignores material factors; courts should avoid directing a particular scale of pay and compelling implementation. | Used as a principal precedent to hold that the petitioners must seek remedy from the Competent Authority and that judicial direction to fix specific pay is inappropriate in the circumstances. |
| Secy., Finance Deptt. case, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 153 | Identifies several relevant factors to be considered by the executive when fixing pay, as noted in later Supreme Court reasoning. | Cited within the quotation from State of Haryana v. Civil Secretariat to illustrate the types of factors the executive must consider; court relied on that framework to justify restraint in judicial intervention. |
| Union of India v. Arun Jyoti Kundu, (2007) 7 SCC 472 | Government may extend benefits to some employees on the basis of anomaly reports; Pay Commission recommendations are subject to acceptance or rejection by the Government; courts cannot compel retrospective effect or force acceptance of Pay Commission recommendations. | Relied on to reinforce that the Government has discretion in implementing Pay Commission recommendations and that extending benefits to some categories does not necessarily amount to unlawful discrimination; supports leaving the matter to the executive. |
| State of West Bengal v. Subhas Kumar Chatterjee, (2010) 11 SCC 694 | Parity cannot be claimed merely because posts previously shared the same pay; Pay Commissions may upgrade/downgrade posts; courts should avoid directing particular pay scales — pay fixation is for the executive/expert bodies. | Applied to hold that petitioners are not entitled to claim the same revised grade pay merely because of past parity; used to support dismissal of the petition. |
| Rameshwar Dayal v. Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 11 SCC 733 | Reiterates that courts should not direct a particular scale of pay or compel government to implement Pay Commission recommendations; pay fixation is an executive function. | Reiterated by the court as supporting authority for restraining judicial interference in pay/grade fixation and for dismissing the petition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by summarising the petitioners' factual case and the legal contention of their counsel: that equal qualifications and similar duties entitle the petitioners to the same grade pay as Inspectors in other departments (the principle of "equal pay for equal work"), and that an anomaly arose following pay revision w.e.f. 01.01.2006 resulting in a lower grade pay for the petitioners.
The court reviewed the authorities relied upon by the petitioners (Randhir Singh and Inder Singh) which recognise the principle of equal pay for equal work but also acknowledge the primary role of the executive and expert bodies in fixing pay and equating posts. However, the court found those authorities insufficient for the petitioners' case in light of later Supreme Court decisions.
The court placed decisive reliance on subsequent Supreme Court rulings, including State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia and State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, which emphasise that fixation of pay and determination of parity is fundamentally an executive function involving complex considerations (such as financial capacity, policy priorities and other relevant factors). These rulings counsel judicial restraint: courts should interfere only where the government's decision is patently irrational, unjust, prejudicial, or ignores material factors, and ordinarily should direct reconsideration rather than prescribe a specific scale of pay.
The court also cited Union of India v. Arun Jyoti Kundu and later cases (State of West Bengal v. Subhas Kumar Chatterjee; Rameshwar Dayal) which reinforce that Pay Commission recommendations are subject to the Government's acceptance and that courts cannot compel retrospective implementation of benefits or force the State to accept Pay Commission recommendations.
Applying this line of authority to the facts before it, the court concluded that the petitioners do not have an enforceable right to the specific grade pay claimed and that the issue of pay parity is one for the executive/competent authority to consider. The court therefore declined to grant the writ remedy sought.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court held that the petitioners are not entitled to claim the same grade pay assigned to Inspectors in other departments in the circumstances before the Court and that they do not possess an enforceable right to the relief sought.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the petitioners' request for a mandamus directing parity of grade pay is refused and the petition is dismissed as without merit.
- The court underscored that fixation of pay and determination of parity lies primarily within the executive and expert bodies; courts should exercise restraint and may interfere only in exceptional circumstances (e.g., where the government's decision is patently irrational or ignores material factors).
- The petitioners retain administrative recourse: if they have sufficient material, the appropriate remedy is to approach the Competent Authority of the Government rather than the judicial forum.
- The judgment does not prevent the Government from independently considering the issue of grade pay parity; the order expressly states it will not act as a restraint on the Government in that regard.
- No novel legal precedent was created by this judgment; the court applied and followed the established Supreme Court authorities limiting judicial intervention in pay fixation matters.
RAJIV NARAIN RAINA, J.
The petitioners, who are Inspectors in Haryana Roadways, State Transport, Haryana have approached this Court under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer for issuance of a mandamus to the respondent-State to grant them the pay grade equivalent to the Inspectors working in other departments of the State. Their claim is founded on the assertion that the status and qualifications of the petitioners and the Inspectors working in various departments are identical and they perform similar nature of duties.
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the pay scale of Inspectors of the departments of State including Transport department was almost equal up to 01.01.2006 However, an anomaly arose during the revision of pay scales w.e.f 01.01.2006 They complain that when at one point of time the petitioners and the Inspectors working in other departments were equated in the matter of qualification and pay scale, then they cannot be discriminated against by giving grade pay of Rs. 3200/- in place of Rs. 3600/- as granted to the Inspectors of other departments i.e Excise, Forest and Labour.
The argument of learned counsel is that since the petitioners possess the same qualifications and their nature of duties is the same, therefore, they are entitled to the same grade pay as that of various departments on the principle of equal pay for equal work. In support of their claim, reliance has been placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in cases Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 879 and Inder Singh v. Vyas Muni Mishra1987 (4) S.L.R 550.
In Randhir Singh's case (supra), it was observed that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the executive/Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission to enter upon and not for Courts to dabble in but where things are manifestly clear, that is, where all possible relevant considerations are the same in almost every manner, persons holding identical posts are entitled to the same pay on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
Similarly, in Inder Singh's case (supra), it was held that the two posts, one being the promotional post and the other being the feeder post, will be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work inasmuch as such implementation will practically result in the amalgamation of the two posts leading to great administrative difficulties. But, when two groups of persons are in the same, or similar posts performing the same kind of work, either in the same or in the different Government departments, the Court may in suitable cases direct equal pay by way of removing unreasonable discrimination and treating the two groups, similarly situated, equally.
There is hardly any quarrel with regard to the aforesaid observations, but, to the mind of this Court, the same would not come to the rescue of the petitioners in the present controversy. The aforesaid decisions are not applicable in this case in view of the later case-law in State of U.P v. J.P Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 and State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72, wherein their Lordships have ruled that equation of posts or equation of pay falls within the domain of the executive and it should be left to be determined by expert bodies. Suffice it to say that if the petitioners have sufficient material to claim parity in pay scales, the appropriate recourse for them would be to approach the Competent Authority and not the judicial forum.
In State of Haryana v. Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association (supra), it was ruled as under:-
“The claim of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. While taking a decision in the matter, several relevant factors, some of which have been noted in Secy. Finance Deptt. case, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 153, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financial position and capacity of the State Government to bear the additional liability of a revised scale of pay. The priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the State Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the State Government. In the context of the complex nature of issues involved, the far-reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on the administration of the State Government, courts have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. The courts should approach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that the decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while taking the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter. Even in a case where the court holds the order passed by the Government to be unsustainable, ordinarily a direction should be given to the State Government or the authority taking the decision to reconsider the matter and pass a proper order. The court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compelling the Government to implement the same. In the present case, the High Court has also ignored the basic principle that there are certain rules, regulations and executive instructions issued by the employers which govern the administration of the cadre.”
Not only that, again the Supreme Court considered an identical matter in case Union of India v. Arun Jyoti Kundu, (2007) 7 SCC 472 and observed as under:-
“It was open to the Government to extend a benefit to a set of its employees with effect from a particular day on the basis of some anomaly found in the report of the Fifth Pay Commission. In such a case there would arise no discrimination because the very implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission. Report would not entitle the respondents to any benefit. The fact that notwithstanding the Fifth Pay Commission not recommending, particularly, the payment of higher scale to two sets of typists, typists in English language and typists in Hindi language, the Government chose to give them relief with effect from 31-1-2000 would not justify an inference of discrimination or a finding that the authority has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Once the recommendations of the Pay Commission are accepted, in full, it could also give effect to it from the date recommended in that behalf. But when admittedly no provision was made in respect of the English and Hindi typists and they pointed to the anomalies and the Government on the basis of the recommendation of the Anomalies Committees decided to give them the scale with effect from 31-1-2000, it could not be held to be discriminatory or to be beyond the power of the Government. When a concession was being extended as distinct from implementing a specific recommendation of the Pay Commission with reference to a particular point of time, it is open to the Government to provide that the benefit it proposes to give, would be available only from a notified date. The very right to their benefit arose because of the decision of the Government to extend to them a particular benefit not specified in the Fifth Pay Commission Report. It is, therefore, not possible to postulate that the decision of the Government must be given retrospective effect. The recommendations of Pay Commissions are subject to acceptance or rejection. Unless the Government has accepted the recommendation to merge the cadres, the court cannot proceed on the basis of the recommendation alone or to direct the Government to accept the recommendation. Pay Commissions are constituted for evaluating duties and functions of the employees and the nature thereof vis-a-vis the educational qualifications therefor. Although the Pay Commission is an expert body, the State in its wisdom and in furtherance of its valid policy may or may not accept its recommendations.”
The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in cases State of West Bengal v. Subhas Kumar Chatterjee(2010) 11 SCC 694 and Rameshwar Dayal v. Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 11 SCC 733, wherein it was held that the Court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compel the Government to implement the same. Equation of posts and equation of salaries is a matter, which is best left to an expert body. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter, which is for the executive to discharge. Even the recommendations of the Pay Commissions, are subject to acceptance or rejection by the appropriate Government. The Courts cannot compel the State to accept the recommendations of the Pay Commission. It was also ruled that the State Government is under obligation to follow the statutory rules and give only such pay scales as are applicable under the statutory provisions. Neither the Government can act contrary to the rules nor can the Court direct the Government to act contrary to the rules. No mandamus lies for issuing direction to the Government to refrain from enforcing the law. No Court can issue direction to act in contravention of the rules as it would amount to compelling the authorities to violate the law. Such direction may result in destruction of the rule of law itself and lead to chaos.
In State of West Bengal's case (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under:
“17. It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed merely on the basis that earlier the subject post and the reference category posts were carrying the same scale of pay. In fact, one of the functions of the Pay Commission is to identify the posts which deserve a higher scale of pay than what was earlier being enjoyed with reference to their duties and responsibilities, and extend such higher scale to those categories of posts. The Pay Commission has two functions; to revise the existing pay scale, by recommending revised pay scales corresponding to the pre-revised pay scales and, secondly, make recommendations for upgrading or downgrading posts resulting in higher pay scales or lower pay scales, depending upon the nature of duties and functions attached to those posts. Therefore, the mere fact that at an earlier point of time, two posts were carrying the same pay scale does not mean that after the implementation of revision in pay scales, they should necessarily have the same revised pay scale.”
The ratio of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments mutatis-mutandis is fully attracted to the present case and is in complete answer to the problem in hand. In this manner, it is held that the petitioners are not entitled to claim the same grade pay assigned to the posts of Inspectors working in various other departments of the State Government, in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
Having regard to the aforesaid, the petitioners do not have any enforceable right. Consequently, the petition is dismissed being without any merit.
However, before parting with the judgment I would like to make it clear that this order will not act as a restraint on the Government in considering on its own the issue of grade pay parity.
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