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Om Kumar Dhankar Petitioner v. State Of Haryana And Another S

Punjab & Haryana High Court
May 17, 2007
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ranjit Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a transporter operating as M/s Chaudhary Bus Service, had several buses impounded under the Motor Vehicles Act for alleged non-payment of passenger tax. The petitioner approached respondent No. 2 (R.C. Mittal), then Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Gurgaon (East). The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 2 asked him to deposit Rs. 200,000 for release of the buses; the petitioner paid Rs. 150,000 at respondent's residence on 1.5.2000 and Rs. 50,000 later that evening. Despite repeated requests, the petitioner did not receive receipts; correspondence indicated the amount had not been appropriated as passenger tax but misappropriated.

The petitioner filed a criminal complaint under Sections 420, 406, 427, 161 IPC and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On preliminary evidence, respondent No. 2 was summoned under Sections 420, 406 and 161 IPC. Respondent No. 2 filed a revision challenging the summoning order; the Addl. Sessions Judge, Gurgaon allowed that revision and dismissed the criminal complaint. The petitioner filed the present revision petition challenging the Sessions Judge's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether prior sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was required for prosecution of respondent No. 2.
  2. Whether the delay of more than six months in filing the criminal complaint invalidated the complaint or justified quashing of the summoning order.
  3. Whether Sections 406 and 420 IPC are mutually exclusive so as to vitiate the summoning order.
  4. Whether summoning under Section 161 IPC was unsustainable because that provision stood repealed (as contended by respondent).
  5. Ultimately, whether the impugned order of the Addl. Sessions Judge (which allowed respondent's revision and dismissed the criminal complaint) should be set aside.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The amount taken by respondent No. 2 did not fall within the ambit of his official duty; therefore Section 197 Cr.P.C. (requirement of sanction) would not apply.
  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. D.S. Nalwa) argued that sanction was not needed for prosecution under Sections 406 and 420 IPC.
  • The petitioner asserted that the delay in filing the complaint was sufficiently explained, so the summoning order should not have been quashed on the ground of delay.

Respondent No. 2's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Respondent pleaded that prior sanction of the Government was necessary for his prosecution because, on the petitioner’s own case, the amount of Rs. Two lacs was paid as tax and thus respondent acted in discharge of his official duties.
  • Respondent contended there was an inordinate delay of more than six months in filing the complaint, suggesting that the story was concocted to malign a public servant.
  • It was asserted that Sections 406 and 420 IPC are mutually exclusive and that the summoning order would be bad on that ground.
  • Respondent maintained that Section 161 IPC had been repealed and summoning under it could not be sustained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parkash Singh Badal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 1 Detailed examination of applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C.; observation that offences like cheating/breach of trust normally cannot be regarded as committed while acting in discharge of official duty (official status may provide opportunity). The court noted Parkash Singh Badal but distinguished it: because the petitioner here alleged payment was a tax (i.e., within official duty), Parkash Singh Badal's observation that cheating/breach of trust ordinarily fall outside official duty did not negate the requirement of sanction in this case.
Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur & Anr., 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 35; AIR 1988 SC 257 Emphasized the need to balance protection for public servants against vexatious proceedings and protection applies when the public servant is purporting to act as such. Used to support the proposition that protection under Section 197 applies when the public servant was acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty.
P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 Not every offence by a public servant requires sanction; the quality of the act is important—if the act is directly concerned with official duty, sanction is necessary. Quoted to explain the principle that the decisive question is whether the act falls within the scope/range of official duties so as to attract Section 197 protection.
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 An offence alleged must be related in some manner to the discharge of official duty; there must be a reasonable connection between act and duty. Relied upon to reinforce that a reasonable connection is required before Section 197's sanction requirement arises.
P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, 2001 (3) RCR (Crl.) 835 (SC) Holding that Section 197(1) bars court from taking cognizance where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of official duty without sanction; various tests to determine scope of Section 197. Adopted to state that cognizance is barred without sanction where there is a reasonable connection between the act and official duty.
Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar & others, 2006 (1) RCR (Criminal) 456; 2006 (1) Apex Criminal Judgements 175 Held that a court cannot entertain a complaint except with previous sanction when the offence by a public servant is in discharge of official duty; acts done in connection with official duty require sanction even if unlawful. Applied to the facts to demonstrate that, since petitioner alleged payment as tax (i.e., in connection with official duty), the complaint could not be entertained without sanction.
B. Saha & others v. M.S. Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC 177 Explained the proper scope of the words in Section 197(1); advocated a middle approach—an act constituting an offence directly and reasonably connected with official duty will require sanction. Used to justify interpreting Section 197 so as to require sanction where the alleged offence is directly and reasonably connected with official duty; the court held that this approach applied to the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded stepwise:

  1. It examined the factual stance taken by the petitioner and observed that the petitioner consistently pleaded that the sums (aggregating Rs. Two lacs) were paid as passenger tax to respondent No. 2 rather than as a bribe. Thus, on the petitioner's own case, respondent No. 2 had acted in discharge of official duties.
  2. The court surveyed settled law on Section 197 Cr.P.C., citing multiple Supreme Court authorities setting out the test: the decisive inquiry is whether the act complained of is directly and reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty or whether the public servant was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty.
  3. The court emphasized that Section 197's protection is not confined to fanciful or pretended claims; an act that is directly and reasonably connected with official duty attracts the sanction requirement. It cited B. Saha and others to advocate a middle approach between narrow and overly wide constructions of "any offence".
  4. Applying these principles to the present facts, because the petitioner alleged the sums were paid as tax (an act within the scope of a tax-collecting public servant's duties), the court concluded there was a sufficient nexus with official duty to invoke Section 197's requirement of prior sanction for prosecution.
  5. The court also considered procedural objections: it found that the petitioner had not advanced any justifiable explanation for the delay of over six months in filing the complaint. The court noted that the petitioner failed to make substantial submissions to meet the objection that Sections 406 and 420 IPC were mutually exclusive.
  6. On this combined basis — the requirement of sanction (given the petitioner’s own case) and the unexplained delay — the court held there was no infirmity in the impugned order of the Addl. Sessions Judge and declined to interfere.

The court's analysis adheres strictly to the legal tests and precedents cited; it did not make findings on merits beyond deciding the preliminary questions of sanction and delay.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The court refused to interfere with the order of the Addl. Sessions Judge which had allowed respondent No. 2's revision and resulted in dismissal of the criminal complaint; accordingly, the impugned order stands.
  • Legal consequence emphasized by the court: Because the petitioner alleged payments were made as passenger tax (i.e., in the course of respondent's official duties), prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was necessary before prosecution could proceed; absence of sanction barred cognizance.
  • The court also relied on the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the over-six-month delay as an additional ground supporting non-interference.
  • No broader or new precedent was announced by the court; the decision applies established principles (as cited) to the facts and does not purport to lay down novel law.

This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

Ranjit Singh, J. — R.C Mittal, respondent No. 2, who was then working as Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Gurgaon (East), was summoned to face trial under Sections 420, 406 and 161 IPC on a complaint made by the petitioner, a Transporter of Gurgaon. The revision filed by respondent No. 2, impugning the summoning order, was allowed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Gurgaon and the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The petitioner has filed the present revision petition against the said order.

2. The facts, in brief, are that the buses of the petitioner running under the name and style of M/s Chaudhary Bus Service and given on contract basis, were impounded under the Motor Vehicles Act. When the petitioner contacted respondent No. 2, who was working in the Taxation Department, he told him that the buses were impounded because of non-payment of passenger tax. Respondent No. 2 asked the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. Two lacs at his residence for release of the buses. The petitioner allegedly deposited Rs. 1,50,000/- at the residence of respondent No. 2 at 1.45 P.M On 1.5.2000 Petitioner states that respondent No. 2 promised to issue receipt from the office. When he visited the office at 4.00 P.M, the clerk told him that two of the impounded buses have been released. In the evening, the petitioner received a call on his Mobile phone from Mr. Kashyap requiring him to pay remaining amount of Rs. 50,000/-, so that the third bus could also be released. The petitioner accordingly paid Rs. 50,000/- at 9.30 P.M at the residence of respondent No. 2 and thus the third bus was also released. Despite repeated visits to the office of the respondent, the petitioner was not supplied the receipt. He also wrote a letter on 30.10.2000 requiring him to issue receipt. From the reply sent by the respondent, the petitioner learnt that the amount paid by him was not appropriated by him towards passengers tax and in fact stood misappropriated indicating it to be a case of an illegal gratification. He accordingly filed criminal complaint under Sections 420, 406, 427, 161 IPC and Section 13(1)(D) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On the basis of preliminary evidence, respondent No. 2 was summoned under Sections 420, 406 and 161 IPC. Respondent impugned the said order by filing a revision petition, which was allowed by Addl. Sessions Judge, as stated above, against which the petitioner has filed the present revision petition.

3. The grounds pleaded in the revision filed by respondent No. 2 were that prior sanction of the Government was needed for prosecution of the respondent and there was delay of more than six months in filing of the complaint, which would show that the story projected was concocted one to malign the reputation of a honest officer. It was further pleaded that Sections 406 and 420 IPC are mutually exclusive and the summoning order passed by the Magistrate would be bad on this ground, besides stating that Section 161 IPC stood repealed and as such summoning of respondent No. 2 under the said Section could not be sustained. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the act of taking this amount by the respondent would not fall within the ambit of his official duty, so as to attract the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C and hence, requirement of sanction would not arise in this case.

4. Mr. D.S Nalwa, the counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the manner in which respondent No. 2 took money from the petitioner would not call for requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C for his prosecution. The counsel would further contend that no sanction for prosecuting the respondent under Sections 406 and 420 IPC would be needed. As per the counsel, the delay in filing complaint was sufficiently explained by the petitioner and as such quashing of the summoning order on this ground was not justified.

5. Mr. Ashit Malik, the counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, would, however, controvert these submissions. He submits that even as per case set up by the petitioner, the amount of Rs. Two lacs was paid as a tax to respondent No. 2 and as such conceded position is that respondent No. 2 had acted in discharge of his official duties as a public servant. As per the counsel, sanction as such, would be needed for prosecuting respondent No. 2. He would seriously join issue with the counsel for the petitioner and would submit that no valid explanation is forthcoming justifying the delay of six months on the part of the petitioner to file this complaint.

I have heard the counsel for the parties.

6. Mr. Nalwa, by referring to the decision of Parkash Singh Badal and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 1, submits that the sanction for prosecution of the respondent is not needed. The issue regarding need of sanction for prosecuting a public servant, or in which cases it is needed is, by now, almost settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone in detail in regard to the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C in the case of Parkash Singh Badal (supra). Referring to Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur and Anr., 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 35 : AIR 1988 SC 257, the court emphasized the need of balance between protection to the officers and that of the citizens. As noticed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the protection given under this section is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as a public servant. It is, thus, noticed that when the public servant is purporting to act as such, he still would be under the statutory protection as provided under Section 197 Cr.P.C In P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 776, it was observed as under :—

“It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duty so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.”

7. In Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , AIR 1956 SC 44, the Court was to observe that the offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty…there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. In P.K Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, 2001 (3) RCR (Crl.) 835 (SC), it was, interalia, held :—

“The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government, touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is prohibition imposed by the Statute from taking cognizance. Different tests have been laid down in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code : “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.” The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point for determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official, duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What a court has to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly, in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.”

8. The case set up by the petitioner is that he had paid this amount to respondent No. 2 as a tax. It is not his case that this amount was paid as a bribe. Conceded position, as such, is that respondent had acted in discharge of his official duties. If the allegation is that respondent had accepted this money as a tax, obviously he had acted in discharge of his official duties as a public servant inviting the requirement of sanction. Reference can be made to the case of Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar and others, 2006 (1) RCR (Criminal) 456 : 2006 (1) Apex Criminal Judgements 175, where Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no court can entertain complaint or take notice of a complaint except with previous sanction of the competent authority when the offence committed by public servant is in discharge of his official duty. The court held that very cognizance is barred and that the complaint cannot be taken notice of. In this very judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to notice that a police officer using force in discharge of his official duty, which constituted an offence, the sanction is needed for prosecution, but such sanction would not be required if the same officer uses force in the course of service, but not in discharge of his official duty. It cannot be denied that the offence allegedly committed by respondent No. 2 was committed by him in the course of his service as part of his official duty. In the case of Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra), the search was made of the house without warrant, but still it was held that this sanction would be needed as the act/omission was done by officer concerned in connection with the official duty performed by him. Reference can also be made to the case of B. Saha and others v. M.S Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC 177 to understand difference between the expression, ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’. It was held as under :—

“The words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be’. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision.”

9. The above position of law appears to answer the objection of the counsel for the petitioner that sanction would not be a requirement when allegation of cheating or breach of trust is made. Basis of this objection is the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parkash Singh Badal's case (supra) that such offences by their very nature can not be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. It is further observed that in such cases, official status only provides opportunity for commission of offence. As per B. Saha's case (supra), the words ‘any offence’ is not to be construed narrowly as that can result in making the sanction totally sterile. A right approach in such cases is between two extreme as noted in B. Saha's case (supra). Here the act constituting an offence directly and reasonably is connected with the official duty, as is the case set up by the petitioner, making the requirement of sanction of prosecution essential having regard to the facts in this case. The act of cheating or breach of trust as alleged and even if made out in this case are inextricably mingled with the official duty of the petitioner to be considered severable to call for dispensing with the requirement of sanction. These are directly connected with the call of his official duties as can be seen from the allegations made.

10. In view of the law and the factual position, noticed above, I am inclined to hold that respondent No. 2 in this case has acted or purported to act in discharge of his official duties, while acting as a public servant and this is even the case set up by the petitioner. Accordingly, sanction would be essential for his prosecution for this offence. Even otherwise, the petitioner is not able to advance any justifiable reasons for filing this complaint after a lapse of six months. No substantial submissions were made by the counsel for the petitioner to contest the objection that Sections 406 and 420 IPC are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order and am of the view that no case for interference is made out in the present revision petition, which is accordingly dismissed.

Petition dismissed.