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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. S. Hoshnak Singh (Huf)
Summary of Opinion — Reference from Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar
Factual and Procedural Background
The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar, referred a question of law to this court arising from its order dated 8 July 1992 in I.T.A. No. 428 (ASR/1987), for assessment year 1972-73. The reference asked whether the Tribunal erred in upholding the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)'s decision that capital gains of Rs. 6,27,614 and related interest of Rs. 27,649 arising out of the acquisition of certain agricultural lands within the municipal limits of Pathankot did not give rise to any capital gain taxable under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Material facts recorded in the opinion: the assessee was allotted land in lieu of land left behind in Pakistan. That land was acquired by the Government, and the revenue sought to tax the assessee on capital gains arising from that transfer. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the assessee's claim on the ground that the assessee had not incurred any cost of acquisition; the Tribunal upheld that view, relying on the Supreme Court decision in B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in error in upholding the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)'s decision that the capital gains of Rs. 6,27,614 and related interest of Rs. 27,649 arising out of the acquisition of the agricultural lands situated within the municipal limits of Pathankot did not give rise to any capital gain taxable under the Income-tax Act, 1961?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The assessee's pleaded position was that the cost of acquisition of the allotted land was nil.
- On that basis the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the claim (i.e., treated the receipt as not giving rise to taxable capital gain because, as accepted by CIT(A), there was no cost of acquisition).
Tribunal / Appellate Authority Position
- The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)'s decision and relied on the Supreme Court decision in B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294 to support the conclusion that the receipt did not give rise to taxable capital gain.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B.C. Srinivasa Setty, [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC) | Held that for charging tax under the head "Capital gains" the transaction must fall within the computation provisions of section 48; in that case, sale of firm's goodwill did not give rise to taxable capital gain because the cost of acquisition of goodwill was incapable of being determined. | The Tribunal relied on this decision to conclude the capital gains were not taxable. The court examined its applicability and distinguished it on the ground that in the present case the cost of acquisition of land is not incapable of being ascertained. |
| A.R. Krishnamurthy v. CIT, [1989] 176 ITR 417 (SC) | Distinguished B.C. Srinivasa Setty: where the value/cost of leasehold rights or similar interests in land is determinable, computation provisions apply and section 45 is applicable. | The court relied on this decision to show that Setty's ratio is not attracted where the cost of acquisition can be determined; used to support the position that land/leasehold rights can give rise to taxable capital gains because cost is ascertainable. |
| CIT v. D.P. Sandu Bros. Chembur P. Ltd., [2005] 273 ITR 1 (SC) | Reaffirmed that where cost of acquisition of tenancy/leasehold rights can be determined, the receipt on surrender is a capital receipt and section 45 applies; but if cost cannot be computed under section 48, section 45 cannot be applied. | The court cited this case to show the Supreme Court's consistent approach: inability to compute cost under s.48 prevents invocation of s.45; in the present case the Department's position (in other contexts) that cost was computable supported taxing the receipt as capital gain. |
| Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Gurcharan Singh, [2007] 292 ITR 387 (P&H) | Addressed valuation of capital assets owned prior to 1 March 1970 and related issues concerning the date from which cost must be taken for computation. | The court applied the reasoning in this case to hold that, although the capital gain in the present case is exigible to tax, for the purpose of computing capital gains the cost should be determined as on 1 March 1970 because the land was allotted before that date. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the narrow legal question referred by the Tribunal: whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that the capital gains and interest were not taxable. It then summarized the factual foundation: allotment of land in lieu of land left in Pakistan and subsequent acquisition by Government, the CIT(A)'s acceptance of the assessee's claim of no cost of acquisition, and the Tribunal's reliance on B.C. Srinivasa Setty.
The court analyzed the applicability of B.C. Srinivasa Setty. It observed that Setty dealt with goodwill—a self-generated asset for which cost of acquisition could not be conceived or determined, and hence the transaction fell outside the computation provisions required to attract the charge under section 45. The court emphasized that the rationale in Setty rests on the impossibility of determining cost and the date of acquisition for the asset in question.
Applying that principle, the court found a key distinction between the Setty facts and the present case: land (including leasehold or related rights) does not share the same indeterminacy as goodwill; the cost of acquisition of land or leasehold rights is conceptually and practically determinable. The court relied on A.R. Krishnamurthy and CIT v. D.P. Sandu Bros., decisions which distinguished Setty and held that where the cost can be determined the computation provisions apply and section 45 will be attracted.
The court also noted that the assessee's plea was that the cost of acquisition was nil, not that the cost was incapable of being computed. The court explained that a claim of nil cost is different from an inability to compute cost; the latter was the basis of Setty's exception. Therefore, merely asserting a nil cost does not place the transaction outside the charging and computation framework of the Income-tax Act.
Finally, the court examined a temporal fact in the assessment record: the land had been allotted to the assessee before 1 March 1970, the date on which agricultural land situated within municipal limits was declared a capital asset for tax purposes. Relying on the earlier P&H decision in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Gurcharan Singh, the court concluded that while the capital gain is exigible to tax, the appropriate date for determining the cost for calculation is 1 March 1970 (i.e., determine cost as on that date for computation of capital gains).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference is disposed of. The court held that the capital gain arising out of the acquisition of the land in the present case is exigible to capital gains tax, and for the purpose of computing the capital gain the cost of acquisition must be determined as on 1 March 1970.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The assessee cannot rely on the ratio in B.C. Srinivasa Setty to escape tax solely by saying the cost of acquisition was nil; the land transfer is subject to capital gains tax and computation should use the cost as on 1 March 1970 because the land was allotted before that date.
- No broader novel principle was announced: the court applied and distinguished existing Supreme Court authorities (B.C. Srinivasa Setty; A.R. Krishnamurthy; CIT v. D.P. Sandu Bros.) and followed the prior P&H decision (Commissioner v. Gurcharan Singh) for valuation dating. The opinion therefore resolves the reference on the facts and by application of established precedent rather than by creating a new rule of law.
Disposition: Reference disposed of accordingly.
1. The following question of law has been referred for the opinion of this court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Branch, Amritsar (for short, “the Tribunal”), arising out of its order dated July 8, 1992, in I.T.A No. 428(ASR/1987), in respect of the assessment year 1972-73:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has been in error in upholding the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)'s decision that the capital gains of Rs. 6,27,614 and related interest of Rs. 27,649 arising out of the acquisition of the agricultural lands situated within the municipal limits of Pathankot did not give rise to any capital gain taxable under the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?”
2. The assessee owned land which was allotted to him in lieu of land left in Pakistan. The said land was acquired by the Government, which was sought to be taxed for capital gains on transfer of land. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the claim of the assessee on the ground that the assessee had not incurred any cost of acquisition and this view was upheld by the Tribunal, relying upon the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Cit v. B.C Srinivasa Setty., [1981] 128 ITR 294. In B.C Srinivasa Setty's case, [1981] 128 ITR 294, the hon'ble Supreme Court held that for charging tax under the head “Capital gains”, the transaction must fall within the computation provisions of section 48 of the Act. Otherwise, the transaction must be regarded as never intended to be subject to charge. In that case, the question was whether a firm was liable to pay capital gains on sale of its goodwill. It was held that consideration received for such a sale could not be subjected to capital gains as the cost of acquisition of goodwill was incapable of being determined.
3. In the present case, the question is whether income from capital gains was not liable to be subjected to tax on the same principle. As far as goodwill is concerned, the same is built up over a period of time while the cost of land is not incapable of being ascertained. It cannot be held that there is no cost of acquisition.
4. Agricultural land is a capital asset under section 2(14) of the Act. Its acquisition is transfer of a capital asset and is liable to tax.
5. The judgment in B.C Srinivasa Setty's case, [1981] 128 ITR 294 was distinguished by the hon'ble Supreme Court in A.R Krishnamurthy v. CIT, [1989] 176 ITR 417, it was observed (page 421):
“The value of leasehold rights in the cost of acquisition of land being determinable, the computation provisions under the Act are applicable and section 45 would be attracted. In B.C Srinivasa Setty's case, [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC), the question was whether the transfer of the goodwill of a newly commenced business can give rise to a capital gain taxable under section 45 of the Act. This court answered the question in the negative. Referring to the charging section and the computation provisions under the Act, this court held that none of those provisions suggest the inclusion of an asset under the head ‘Capital gain’, in the acquisition of which no cost at all can be conceived. Goodwill generated in an individual's business was held to be an asset in which no cost element can be identified or envisaged. It was also held that the date of acquisition of the asset is a material factor in applying the computation provisions pertaining to capital gains and in the case of self-generated goodwill, it is not possible to determine the same. The third reason for holding that the goodwill generated in a newly commenced business cannot be described as an ‘asset’ within the terms of section 45 of the Act was that it is impossible to determine its cost of acquisition. None of the three reasons given by this court in B.C Srinivasa Setty's case, [1981] 128 ITR 294 are applicable in the present case. We have held that the cost of acquisition of leasehold rights can be determined. The date of acquisition of the right to grant lease has to be the same as the date of acquiring the freehold rights. The ratio of B.C Srinivasa Setty's case, [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC) is thus not attracted to the question involved in the present case……..”
6. The same view was taken by the hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT v. D.P Sandu Bros. Chembur P. Ltd., [2005] 273 ITR 1. It was observed (page 6):
“In A.R Krishnamurthy v. CIT, [1989] 176 ITR 417 this court held that it cannot be said conceptually that there is no cost of acquisition of grant of the lease. It held that the cost of acquisition of leasehold rights can be determined. In the present case however, the Department's stand before the High Court was that the cost of acquisition of the tenancy was incapable of being ascertained. In view of the stand taken by the Department before the High Court, we uphold the decision of the High Court on this issue.
Were it not for the inability to compute the cost of acquisition under section 48, there is, as we have said, no doubt that a monthly tenancy or leasehold right is a capital asset and that the amount of receipt on its surrender was a capital receipt. But because we have held that section 45 cannot be applied, it is not open to the Department to impose tax on such capital receipt by the assessee under any other section……”
7. In the present case, the plea of the assessee was that the cost of acquisition of land was nil and not that the cost of land could not computed. On this ground alone, it could not be held that capital gain was not liable to be taxed.
8. However, from a perusal of the order of assessment, we find that the assessee was allotted the land in question before March 1, 1970, i.e, the date on which agricultural land situated within the municipal limits was declared to be a capital asset. We have already considered a similar issue as far as the valuation of the capital assets in case the same is owned prior to March 1, 1970, in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Gurcharan Singh, [2007] 292 ITR 387 (P&H), I.T.R Nos. 34 and 35 of 1990, decided on July 4, 2006. Accordingly, for the reasons stated therein, though it is held that capital gain arising out of acquisition of land in the present case would be exigible to capital gain tax under the Act, however, for the purpose of calculation of capital gain tax, the cost has to be determined as on March 1, 1970.
9. Reference is disposed of accordingly.
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