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Sham Lal Gupta v. M/S. Hemco Industries (P) Limited, Jalandhar City
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an order dated 17.5.1994 of the learned Company Judge dismissing the appellant's petition under Sections 433(c), 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking winding up of M/s. Hemco Industries Private Limited ("the Company") on the ground of inability to pay debts.
Relevant facts as set out in the opinion:
- On 10.5.1982 the appellant applied for 110 shares by sending a filled share application and a cheque for Rs. 1.10 lacs. The cheque was encashed and the amount appears in the company's balance sheet as share application money, but no shares were allotted.
- The appellant repeatedly sought refund. He sent letters in 1990; a registered letter dated 6.12.1990 (which the company admits receipt of the envelope but claims was empty) and another registered letter dated 20.12.1990 (the company admits receipt). The appellant alleges he also sent registered notices through counsel under Section 434 in January 1991, giving three weeks to refund; refund did not occur and the appellant filed the winding-up petition (the petition was filed in 1993 as indicated in the judgment).
- The company denied non-payment and asserted that in 1988 (via a compromise in a civil suit dated 15.9.1988) it paid a consolidated sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs to the appellant and his family, which the company said included the Rs. 1.10 lacs share application money. The company also said it had sent replies to statutory notices by letters dated 11.2.1991 and 1.10.1993.
- The learned Company Judge formulated two questions for decision: (1) whether the Rs. 1.10 lacs was in fact paid back to the petitioner by the company; and (2) whether the petitioner's claim was barred by limitation.
- The learned Company Judge found the amount had not been refunded but held the petitioner's claim was barred by limitation under Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Company Judge therefore dismissed the petition. This appeal challenges that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the amount of Rs. 1.10 lacs which was admittedly lying in deposit with the Company was paid back to the petitioner as alleged by the Company?
- Whether the claim of the petitioner has become barred by time?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant's counsel contended that the money advanced was movable property and that Article 70 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (which relates to recovery of movable property deposited or pawned) applied; limitation should be computed from the date of refusal after demand.
- He argued that the date of refusal would be when the company failed to respond to legal notices sent in January 1991 and September 1992 (as referenced in the opinion), and therefore the claim was within limitation under Article 70.
- He also submitted that, if the company's letters dated 11.2.1991 and 1.10.1993 were to be treated as refusals, limitation under Article 70 would start from those dates.
- The appellant relied on three authorities: (i) Zila Parishad, Ambala v. Banarsi Dass Kapur; (ii) The Central Warehousing Corporation v. Central Bank of India Ltd.; and (iii) Union of India v. Gangadhar Mimraj.
Respondent Company's Arguments
- The company contended that the disputed Rs. 1.10 lacs had already been refunded in 1988 as part of a consolidated compromise payment of Rs. 1.50 lacs made on 15.9.1988 in a suit brought by the appellant, his wife and children; that payment settled all claims and included the Rs. 1.10 lacs.
- The company denied inability to pay its debts and asserted that it had replied to statutory notices by letters dated 11.2.1991 and 1.10.1993.
- The company also pleaded that the appellant's claim was barred by limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Zila Parishad, Ambala v. Banarsi Dass Kapur | Relied on by the appellant in support of treating the money as subject to the rule governing recovery (the opinion notes this case involved return of security deposited for performance of a works contract). | The court held this precedent did not support the appellant. It was distinguished on the ground that in Banarsi Dass Kapur the suit was for return of a security deposit, whereas in the present case the money was paid for allotment of shares for the appellant's use; therefore Article 62 of the Old Act (equivalent to Article 24) was not the point in that case and the decision was of no assistance to the appellant. |
| The Central Warehousing Corporation v. Central Bank of India Ltd. | Cited by the appellant in support of the proposition that money advanced could be regarded as movable property within the meaning of Article 70. | The court treated the decision as cited in support of the Article 70 argument but held the issue academic because, on the facts, Article 70 deals with recovery of movable property deposited or pawned while Article 24 governs refund of money advanced for the plaintiff's use; thus Article 70 was not applicable. |
| Union of India v. Gangadhar Mimraj | Cited by the appellant in support of the proposition that money advanced was movable property within Article 70. | The court noted the decision but observed that even if the money were assumed to be movable property, Article 70 would not apply because the money here was advanced for the appellant's own use (allotment of shares) and therefore governed by Article 24; in that sense the precedent did not alter the conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded incrementally, following the approach of the learned Company Judge and the pleadings:
- The Court first examined the factual matrix and accepted that the sum of Rs. 1.10 lacs had been advanced by the appellant for the specific purpose of allotment of shares in his name; it was not advanced as a deposit to be kept by the Company.
- The Court then quoted and compared the relevant entries of the Limitation Act, 1963:
- Article 24: "For money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff's use".
- Article 70: "To recover movable property deposited or pawned for a depository or pawnee."
- Applying those definitions to the facts, the Court agreed with the Company Judge that Article 24 governs a claim for refund where money was received for the plaintiff's use — here the money was payable for allotment of shares to the appellant and thus was money received for his use.
- The Court distinguished Banarsi Dass Kapur on the facts: that case involved a security deposit for performance of a works contract (a true deposit) and did not engage Article 24; therefore it did not assist the appellant.
- The Court addressed the authorities cited in support of Article 70 (Central Warehousing and Gangadhar Mimraj) and noted they were relied upon to treat the advanced money as movable property under Article 70. However, the Court explained that Article 70 applies to recovery of movable property deposited or pawned, whereas Article 24 specifically governs refunds of money received for the plaintiff's use. Given the factual finding that the money was for allotment of shares (the appellant's use), Article 24 was the applicable provision; therefore the discussion of Article 70 became academic.
- Because the Court applied Article 24, which prescribes a three-year limitation period from when the money was received, it held the appellant's claim to be time-barred. Consequently, it did not need to decide the contested factual question regarding the precise date on which the company refused refund (i.e., when limitation might have started under Article 70 if that Article applied).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed the learned Company Judge's conclusions that (a) the Rs. 1.10 lacs had not been shown to have been refunded to the appellant in the manner alleged by the company, and (b) the appellant's claim was barred by limitation under Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The appellant's winding-up petition (and the claim for refund of Rs. 1.10 lacs) fails; the petition remains dismissed and the appellant's remedy on this claim is time-barred as per the Court's application of Article 24.
- No broader change in law: The opinion applies established provisions of the Limitation Act to the facts and distinguishes prior authority on factual grounds; it does not purport to set a new legal precedent beyond that application.
Decision delivered by Virender Singh, J.; appeal dismissed.
N.K Sud, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Company Judge dated 17.5.1994 whereby the petition of the appellant under Sections 433(e), 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) for winding up of the respondent-company, M/s. Hemco Industries Private Limited, Jalandhar (hereinafter called ‘the Company) has been dismissed.
2. Before adverting to the controversy raised in the appeal, the relevant facts may first be noticed.
3. The Company wanted to float some shares with a view to increase its capital. The appellant applied for allotment of 110 shares in his name and sent a duly filled share application to the Company alongwith a sum of Rs. 1.10 lacs vide cheque No. 219479 dated 10.5.1982 The cheque was encashed and receipt admitted by the Company. This amount is also reflected in its balance sheet as share application money. The company, however, did not float any fresh shares and, therefore, none was allotted to the appellant. According to the appellant, the share money paid by him continued to remain with the Company for a few years and it was in the year 1990 that he demanded the return of his money. For this purpose he is said to have written some letters to the Company. Not receiving any response, he sent a registered letter dated 6.12.1990 demanding the return of amount paid by him as share application money alongwith interest. The Company though admitted the receipt of the registered envelope, denied the receipt of this letter claiming that the envelope was empty. This fact was communicated to the appellant by a registered letter dated 13.12.1990 At any rate, the appellant sent another registered letter dated 20.12.1990 calling upon the company to return the amount with interest. The receipt of this letter is admitted by the company. However, in the written statement, it has taken the stand that a reply to this letter was sent on 2.1.1991 The receipt of this reply is, however, denied by the appellant in the replication. Since the share application money was not refunded to the appellant, he sent a registered notice though Counsel under Section 434 of the Act in January 1991 in which three weeks time was given to it for making the refund. Since the company failed to refund the application money even in the said period of three weeks, the appellant filed the present petition under Section 433(c) 434 and 439 of the Act for winding up of the company on the ground that it is unable to pay its debts.
4. The respondent company contested the petition and contended that it had refunded the share application money of Rs. 1.10 lacs to the appellant in the year 1988. It claimed that the appellant, his wife and children had filed a suit against the company in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Jalandhar claiming various amounts due to them. However, the suit was compromised on 15.9.1988 and company had paid a consolidated sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs to settle all claims whatsoever of the appellant and his family. The case of the company was that the sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs paid on 15.9.1988 while settling the disputes in the suit included the amount of Rs. 1.10 lacs claimed by the appellant in the present petition. It, therefore, denied that the company was unable to pay its debts. The company also maintained that it had duly sent replies to the statutory notices received from the appellant as per its letter dated 11.2.1992 and 1.10.1993 The petition was also contested on the ground that the claim of the appellant was barred by time and petition for winding up therefore, it was liable to be dismissed on that ground as well. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Company Judge formulated the following two questions;—
1. “Whether the amount of Rs. 1.10 lacs which was admittedly lying in deposit with the Company was paid back to the petitioner as alleged by the Company?
2. Whether the claim of the petitioner has become barred by time.”
5. As regards the first question, the learned Company Judge has held that the amount of Rs. 1.10 lacs on account of share application money paid by the appellant to the company had not been refunded as claimed by the company. The learned Company Judge has observed that the dispute in the suit had nothing to do with the sum of Rs. 1.10 lacs that was lying in deposit as share allotment money as the compromise effected in the civil Court was only in respect of amount due against 62 equity shares held by the plaintiffs. The learned Company Judge further observed that the “…….net result is that the appellant kept on claiming the refund of his money and no replies were sent to him and it was the first time that the defence was taken that the amount had been repaid to the appellant in terms of the compromise.”
6. On the question of limitation, the learned Company Judge has accepted the stand of the company that the claim of the appellant is barred by limitation. It has been held that the claim for refund of share application money would be governed by Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short “the 1963 Act”) and not by Article 70 of the said Act as claimed by the appellant. According to the learned Company Judge Article 70 applies to the recovery of movable property deposited or pawned from a depository or pawnee. On the other hand, Article 24 is a provision which specifically deals with the refund of money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiffs use. The learned Company Judge, therefore, held that the share application money had been advanced for appellant petitioner's own use as it was meant for allotment of shares to him and thus the claim of the appellant would be governed by Article 24 of the 1963 Act. Since the period of limitation prescribed in this Article is 3 years from the date when the money is received, the claim made by the appellant by filing the present petition in 1993 was barred by time. Since the Company Judge did not accept the claim of the petitioner that his case was governed by Article 70 of the 1963 Act, he did not go into the question as to when the demand for refund had been refused.
7. Mr. Rajesh Garg, Counsel for the appellant, has contended that since the money advanced by the appellant was a movable property, the claim was to be considered under Article 70 of the 1963 Act and, therefore, the period of limitation had to be computed from the date of refusal after demand. He pointed out that in the present case the date of refusal by the Company would be the date when it failed to respond to the legal notices sent by the appellant in January 1991 and September 1992 demanding the refund. Thus, the learned Counsel contended that the claim of the appellant was within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 70 of the 1963 Act. He also contended that even if the stand of the Company that it had sent replies to the notices vide letters dated 11.2.1991 and 1.10.1993 were to be accepted, the dates of those letters would be the date of refusal after demand and limitation of 3 years under Article 70 of 1963 Act would start from the said dates. Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the following authorities as under:—
i) Zila Parishad, Ambala v. Banarsi Dass Kapur,1.
ii) The Central Warehousing Corporation, New Delhi v. Central Bank of India Ltd.,2.
iii) Union of India v. Gangadhar Mimraj,3.
8. We have heard the Counsel for the parties and have perused the relevant provisions of the 1963 Act and the authorities cited before us. Description of suits as per Articles 24 and 70 is as under:—
Article 24.— “For money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff's use”.
Article 70.— “To recover movable property deposited or pawned for a depository or pawnee.”
9. It is not in dispute that the sum of Rs. 1.10 lacs had been advanced by the appellant for allotment of shares in his name. Thus, the learned Company Judge has correctly held that the money was never meant to be kept by the Company as a deposit and was for the appellant's own use i.e for allotment of shares. The claim is, therefore, clearly governed by Article 24 of the 1963 Act. Article 70 applies to the recovery of movable property deposited or pawned. As already observed, the amount was never advanced to the Company as a deposit. The decision of this Court in Banarsi Dass Kapur's case (supra) does not support the claim of the appellant. It has been rightly distinguished by the learned Company Judge as under:—
“In Banarsi Dass Kapoor's case (supra), the plaintiff had filed a suit for the return of security which he had deposited for the due performance of a works contract whereas in the present case, there is no question of any deposit, but the money had been paid to the Company for the use of the petitioner for allotting the shares in his name. The question of the applicability of Article 62 of the Old Act which is equivalent to Article 24 of the Act 1963 Act did not arise for the consideration of the learned Judges. The judgment is therefore, of no help to the petitioner. I, therefore, hold that the claim in the instant case is governed by Article 24 of the 1963 Act and the same is barred by time.”
10. The decisions in Gangadhar Mimraj and Central Warehousing Corporation's cases (supra) have been cited in support of the contention that’ the money advanced was a movable property within the meaning of Article 70 of the 1963 Act. This issue is purely of academic interest in view of our finding that Article 70 applies to the recovery of movable property deposited or pawned whereas Article 24 governs a claim of refund of money advanced for plaintiff's own use. Thus, even if the money is assumed to be movable property, the Article 70 would still have no applicability.
11. In view of the above, it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to when the Company had refused to make the refund.
12. In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.
Sd/- Virender Singh, J.
R.M.S
Appeal dismissed.
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