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Ravinder Kaur And Others v. Jagmohan Singh And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aug 4, 2004
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Regular Second Appeal arises from a dispute between descendants of two real brothers, Piara Singh and Kaur Singh, concerning properties situated in two villages: Ghudani Kalan and Ghudani Khurd (Tehsil Payal, District Ludhiana). Both Piara Singh and Kaur Singh died prior to the suit. The plaintiffs (referred to as plaintiff-appellants) are the legal representatives and descendants of Piara Singh: Ravinder Kaur (widow of Savinder Singh) and his two sons Harjinder Singh and Sukhjiwan Singh, together with Piara Singh's other sons Jaswinder Singh, Jasbir Singh and Sukhbir Singh. The defendants (referred to as defendant-respondents) are descendants of Kaur Singh: Jagmohan Singh, Manmohan Singh, Harmohan Singh and Avtar Singh (son of Jagmohan Singh).

Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming they are owners in possession in equal shares of the disputed land in village Ghudani Kalan and sought to restrain defendants from interfering. They relied on an alleged oral family settlement reached in 1960 that was reduced to writing on 8.9.1961 (Exhibit P-1), under which Piara Singh received properties in Ghudani Kalan and Kaur Singh received properties in Ghudani Khurd; Piara Singh purportedly paid Rs. 3,800 to Kaur Singh as compensation.

Defendants denied the family settlement and contended Exhibit P-1 was illegal, not a memorandum of partition, and that they remained co-sharers in respect of their inherited shares. The trial Court dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 12.1.2000 on the ground that the family settlement (Exhibit P-1) being unregistered could not be looked into and therefore plaintiffs were not proved to be in exclusive possession. The District Judge (first appellate court) affirmed the trial Court. The plaintiffs then brought the present second appeal, which is the subject of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land (issue framed at trial).
  2. Whether the suit land was partitioned and whether the settlement was reduced into writing on 8.9.1961 (i.e., the character and effect of Exhibit P-1).
  3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for.
  4. Whether the suit is maintainable (procedural objection raised by defendants).
  5. Whether Exhibit P-1 (the memorandum/settlement) required registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 — the substantial question of law formulated by counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Exhibit P-1 is a memorandum of family settlement and did not require registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908; therefore it is binding on the successors-in-interest of Kaur Singh.
  • The finding that Exhibit P-1 is not a memorandum of partition is legally unsustainable and based on misreading of Exhibit P-1.
  • Reliance was placed on decisions of higher and coordinate courts including Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1976) 3 SCC 119 (AIR 1976 SC 807), Ram Lal v. Harbhagwan Dass (1995 (2) RLR 557 P&H), and Mool Chand v. Udho Ram (1994 (3) RRR 127 P&H) in support of the proposition that a family settlement memorandum prepared after an oral arrangement does not require registration.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The appeal does not involve any substantial question of law: both Courts below concurrently found Exhibit P-1 is not a memorandum of partition but a document that creates rights in praesenti and thus required registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act.
  • Since Exhibit P-1 is unregistered, it cannot be acted upon and confers no rights.
  • Exhibit P-1 did not associate Manmohan Singh, who had been given a 1/4 share in 1953 and was therefore a co-sharer; hence Exhibit P-1 is invalid without his association. Various authorities were relied upon to support these submissions (several coordinate/civil bench decisions listed in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807 Sets out the legal position on family settlements: distinction between (a) oral family arrangements, (b) written documents that merely record an already effected oral settlement (memorandum) which do not create or extinguish rights and therefore need not be registered, and (c) documents containing terms and recitals which create or extinguish rights and which require registration. The Court quoted and relied on the propositions set out in paragraph 10 of that judgment. Applied as the governing principle: the Court used the Kale framework to analyze whether Exhibit P-1 was a mere memorandum (not requiring registration) or a document creating rights (requiring registration). The Court concluded Exhibit P-1 created rights in praesenti and therefore required registration.
Ram Lal v. Harbhagwan Dass, 1995 (2) RLR 557 (P&H) Cited by the appellants in support of the proposition that a family settlement memorandum may not require registration. Cited by appellants; the Court observed the rulings relied upon by plaintiffs were not helpful to them in the factual circumstances of this case.
Mool Chand v. Udho Ram, 1994 (3) RRR 127 (P&H) : 1994 (2) CCC 395 (P&H) Cited by the appellants in support of their position on family settlement/memorandum. Cited by appellants; the Court regarded the cited rulings as not assisting the plaintiffs on the facts here once Exhibit P-1 was found to create rights and be unregistered.
K.G. Mal v. Sham Behari Mal, 1994 (2) CCC 675 Relied upon by respondents and referred to by the trial Court concerning the registerability of documents evidencing partition or creation/extinguishment of rights. The trial Court referred to this decision in support of the view that the document was written in present tense and, being unregistered, could not be acted upon.
Harpal Singh v. Mohinder Singh, 2003 (2) RCR (Civil) 756 (P&H) : 2002 (2) PLJ 281 Cited by respondents to buttress the submission that Exhibit P-1 required registration and could not be acted upon if unregistered. Cited by respondents; used to support the concurrent view of the Courts below that Exhibit P-1 created rights requiring registration.
Bankev Bihari v. Surya Narain alias Munnoo, 1999 (3) RCR (Civil) 469 (Allahabad) Cited by respondents as part of their supporting authorities on registerability and effect of unregistered documents. Cited by respondents; considered among authorities supporting the lower Courts' conclusions.
Chander Shekhar v. Des Raj, 1990 (1) RRR 135 Cited by respondents in support of their submissions on the effect of unregistered documents. Cited by respondents; treated as part of the supporting case law for the respondents' position.
1997 (Supp.) CCC 633 Relied upon by respondents counsel (as stated) in support of the proposition that Exhibit P-1 without associating Manmohan Singh is a nullity. Cited by respondents counsel; the Court accepted the point that Manmohan Singh not being associated was a legal defect affecting Exhibit P-1's validity on the facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court heard learned counsel for the parties and reviewed the record and judgments of the Courts below. The analysis proceeded in the following steps, based on what is stated in the opinion:

  1. The Court identified the decisive legal principle from the Apex Court's decision in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation. That decision delineates when a family settlement requires registration: an oral family arrangement need not be registered; a mere memorandum recording an already effected family settlement that does not create or extinguish any rights is not compulsorily registerable; but a written document that contains terms and recitals which create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish rights in immovable property falls within Section 17 and must be registered.
  2. The central factual-legal question was whether Exhibit P-1 was (a) a memorandum prepared after an oral settlement (not requiring registration), or (b) a document that itself created or extinguished rights (requiring registration).
  3. The Court examined Exhibit P-1 itself. The Court noted features of the document emphasized in the judgments below: the heading "Agreement"; the tenor in the present tense; recitals indicating the parties were partitioning properties by virtue of the document; and an endorsement recording payment by Piara Singh to Kaur Singh of Rs. 1,500 and Rs. 2,300 (total Rs. 3,800) as price/compensation.
  4. The Court reasoned that the present-tense wording and the endorsement of payment demonstrated that Exhibit P-1 effected rights in praesenti (i.e., it operated to create or extinguish rights at the time), and therefore it fell within the mischief of Section 17 (the registration provision) and was compulsorily registerable.
  5. The Court also considered the identity of relevant parties: revenue/jamabandi records showed that Manmohan Singh had a 1/4 share by virtue of a 1953 sale deed and was reflected in subsequent jamabandies as a joint owner. Exhibit P-1 did not give any land to Manmohan Singh nor did it associate him. The trial Court and the appellate Court found that failing to include a co-sharer rendered the document legally ineffective as to him.
  6. The trial Court's factual findings (reproduced in the opinion) noted the jamabandi entries, the present-tense character of Exhibit P-1, and reliance on precedent to conclude the document required registration; the trial Court found the plaintiffs failed to prove exclusive possession and hence dismissed the suit. The Appellate Court agreed and amplified that the endorsement of payment brought Exhibit P-1 within Section 17(c) of the Registration Act, making it compulsorily registerable.
  7. The present Court reviewed the arguments of counsel and the evidence. It found no error in the concurrent findings of the Courts below: Exhibit P-1 created present rights and so required registration; being unregistered it could not be acted upon; and it was legally ineffective insofar as Manmohan Singh, a co-sharer, was not a party to it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the Courts below that Exhibit P-1 is an unregistered document which created rights in praesenti and therefore was required to be registered; being unregistered, it could not be acted upon and conferred no benefit on the plaintiffs-appellants. It was also held that Exhibit P-1 is invalid insofar as it failed to associate Manmohan Singh, a co-sharer. The judgments of both the Courts below are upheld. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiffs-appellants cannot derive any benefit from Exhibit P-1 and their suit for declaration and permanent injunction fails. The opinion does not purport to set any new legal precedent beyond applying the settled principles (as articulated in Kale and other cited authorities) to the facts of this case.

Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.:— The dispute involved in this Regular Second Appeal is between the offsprings of two real brothers, namely, Piara Singh and Kaur Singh pertaining to their properties situated in two villages, Ghudani Kalan and Ghudani Khurd, Tehsil Payal, District Ludhiana. In order to appreciate the controversy raised herein, it is deemed appropriate to notice as to who are the legal representatives left behind by Piara Singh and Kaur Singh. The two brothers are said to have expired long ago even prior to the filing of the suit. Savinder Singh, Jasbir Singh, Jaswinder Singh and Sukhbir Singh are the sons of Piara Singh. Savinder Singh has also died, leaving behind his widow Ravinder Kaur and two sons - Harjinder Singh and Sukhjiwan Singh. On the other side, Jagmohan Singh, Manmohan Singh and Harmohan Singh are the sons of Kaur Singh whereas Avtar Singh is the son of aforesaid Jagmohan Singh.

2. A suit for declaration and permanent injunction was filed by Savinder Singh through his legal representatives, i.e widow Ravinder Kaur and two sons Harjinder Singh and Sukhjiwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘plaintiff-appellants’) and the remaining three sons of Piara Singh, namely, Jaswinder Singh, Jasbir Singh and Sukhbir Singh against three sons of Kaur Singh, namely, Jagmohan Singh, Manmohan Singh, Harmohan Singh and Avtar Singh son of Jagmohan Singh (hereinafter referred as ‘defendant-respondents’).

3. The plaintiff-appellants sought a decree for declaration to the effect that they are owners in possession in equal shares in the land in dispute. They also prayed for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from interfering in their peaceful possession over the suit land. It was averred in the plaint that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs i.e Piara Singh and of defendant No. 1 to 3, i.e Kaur Singh were real brothers who owned property in two villages i.e in Ghudani Kalan and Ghudani Khuard as co-sharers. In the year 1960, aforesaid Piara Singh and Kaur Singh arrived at an oral family settlement in respect of the property situated in the two villages and this family settlement (Exhibit P-1) was reduced into writing on 8.9.1961 which was signed by both the parties and the witnesses. As per this family settlement, Piara Singh got the agricultural and residential properties owned by both the brothers in village Ghudani Kalan whereas Kaur Singh got such property which was owned by the two brothers in village Ghudani Khurd. Piara Singh paid a sum of Rs. 3,800/- to Kaur Singh towards cost of house and some land which he had got in excess of his share and an endorsement to this effect was made in the family settlement. Both brothers agreed to get the mutations entered and sanctioned on the basis of the above family settlement, which somehow could not be done during their life time. It was further averred that after the death of Piara Singh, his widow Hardial Kaur and four sons became owners of the property and after the death of Hardial Kaur, her share also fell in the share of the plaintiffs by way of natural succession. The plaintiff-appellants claimed that ever since the day of arriving at the oral family settlement, they are in peaceful, uninterrupted and exclusive possession of the property situated in village Ghudani Kalan.

4. It was further averred that the defendants moved an application for partition of the land before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade with a view to rake up the matter of difference of land between the parties though the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants i.e Kaur Singh had already been compensated by paying a sum of Rs. 3,800/-. It was claimed that the defendants had no right and title to the land which fell in-the share of the father of the plaintiffs and after his death, to the share of the plaintiffs. The defendants had been threatening the plaintiffs by causing interference in their peaceful and exclusive possession over the property.

5. The defendants resisted the claim of the plaintiffs by filing written statement, stating that no oral family settlement was ever arrived at between Kaur Singh and Piara Singh and the alleged writing dated 8.9.1961 is illegal, null and void and has no effect on the rights of the defendants. It was incorrect that the land situated in village Ghudani Kalan was given to Piara Singh. It was alleged that Kaur Singh was not the exclusive owner of the property situated in village Ghudani Kalan and he remained owner in possession as co-sharer to the extent of his share and after the death of Kaur Singh, defendants 1 to 3 became the owners in possession of his share. The defendants admitted that share of Piara Singh in the property was inherited by the plaintiffs and that of Kaur Singh was inherited by them. It was alleged that the defendants never leased out their share in the suit land and were still owners in possession of the same. The factum of transfer of the property of the share of defendant No. 4 in his favour was admitted.

6. The plaintiffs filed replication controverting the averments contained in the written statement and reiterating those taken in the plaint.

7. The respective pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues:—

(i) Whether plaintiffs are owners in possession of suit land? OPP

(ii) Whether the suit land was partitioned and settlement was reduced into writing on 8.9.1961? OPP

(iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction as prayed for? OPP

(iv) Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD

(v) Relief.

8. The trial Court after appreciating evidence on record held that the family settlement dated 8.9.1961, Exhibit P-1, being not registered one as required in law, the same could not be looked into and the plaintiffs could not be held to be in exclusive possession as owners of the suit land. It was further held that since the plaintiffs were not proved to be in exclusive possession of the suit land, they were not entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for. In view of these findings, the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed by the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 12.1.2000

9. The appeal carried by the plaintiffs before the District Judge also met with failure and this is how, they have filed the present second appeal. It deserves to be mentioned that the lower appellate Court also concurred with the findings of the trial Court and held that the alleged partition Exhibit P-1 did not carry any value in the eyes of law and nor was there any partition legally made between Kaur Singh and Piara Singh and therefore, the plaintiffs could not claim themselves to be in exclusive possession of the suit land.

10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the entire record including that of the trial Court.

11. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants Shri B.S Guliani submitted that the following substantial question of law arises in this appeal:—

“Whether the document Exhibit P-1 which is a memorandum of settlement, required registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908?”

12. The learned counsel submitted that Exhibit P-1 did not require registration being a memorandum of family settlement and, therefore, the same is binding on the successors-in-interest of Kaur Singh. He further submitted that the finding to the effect that Exhibit P-1 is not a memorandum of partition is legally unsustainable and is based on misreading of document Exhibit P-1. In support of the legal proposition as raised by him in this appeal, the learned counsel placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807, Ram Lal v. Harbhagwan Dass, 1995 (2) RLR 557 (P&H) and Mool Chand v. Udho Ram, 1994 (3) RRR 127 (P&H) : 1994 (2) CCC 395 (P&H).

13. Controverting the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Satinder Khanna, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law and both the Courts below have concurrently recorded a finding that Exhibit P-1 is not a memorandum of partition and in fact it creates a right in praesenti and, therefore, under the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (for short, ‘the Act’), it required registration. Since the document Exhibit P-1 is unregistered, it cannot be acted upon by the parties. the learned counsel has relied upon the following case law to buttress his arguments:

(i) K.G Mal v. Sham Behari Mal, 1994 (2) CCC 675;

(ii) Harpal Singh v. Mohinder Singh, 2003 (2) RCR (Civil) 756 (P&H) : 2002 (2) PLJ 281;

(iii) Bankev Bihari v. Surya Narain alias Munnoo, 1999 (3) RCR (Civil) 469 (Allahabad) and

(iv) Chander Shekhar v. Des Raj, 1990 (1) RRR 135.

14. The learned counsel further submitted that Manmohan Singh had been given ¼th share in 1953 and thus, he had become a co-sharer to that extent along with Piara Singh and Kaur Singh, and, therefore, Exhibit P-1 could not have been legally and validly executed without associating him. He conversely submitted that Exhibit P-1 without associating Manmohan Singh is a nullity. In this regard, he placed reliance on 1997 (Supp.) CCC 633.

15. The legal position relating to registration of family settlement has been conclusively settled by the Apex Court in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807. The legal position governing registration of family settlement as laid down by the Apex Court is in para 10 thus:—

“10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concertised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangements may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2)(sic) [Section 17(1)(b)(?)] of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registerable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.”

16. The legal principle thus enunciated by the Apex Court is that where the document is containing terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document, it requires registration whereas a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been effected, then in that situation it does not require registration as in such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore, does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(1)(b).

17. The only controversy between the parties is that whether Exhibit P-1 is a memorandum of settlement, as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant and thus did not require registration in view of Section 17 of the Act or this is a document creating rights of the parties by partition and compulsorily required registration. I have closely examined the document Exhibit P-1. A careful reading of the documents shows that it has been mentioned in the heading “Agreement”. The tenor of the agreement is in present tense and the recitals show that the parties to the agreement are partitioning the properties by virtue of the said document. Further, the condition regarding payment of Rs. 3,800/- i.e Rs. 1,500/- and Rs. 2,300/- by Piara Singh to Kaur Singh also shows that the receipt of consideration on account of creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinguishment cf any right, title or interest was in praesenti and, therefore, it required compulsory registration under the Act. Further, Exhibit P-1 does not associate Manmohan Singh who had become co-sharer in 1953 by virtue of sale deed executed by Kaur Singh to the extent of ¼th Share and, therefore, without associating him, document Exhibit P-1 could not have been validly executed.

18. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to oral statements of witnesses and also to the revenue record in the form of documentary evidence and has tried to persuade this Court to take a different view from the one taken by both the Courts below. The trial Court in paras 11, 12 and 13 of its judgment, after considering the evidence on record, had recorded the following findings:—

“11. I have carefully applied to the respective submissions. Plaintiffs have sought declaration to the effect that they are the owners in possession in equal shares of the suit land. They also pleaded that land was partitioned between predecessors-in-interest of the parties vide agreement Ex. P-1. Defendants have denied any partition and pleaded that parties are not in exclusive possession of the properties. Agreement Ex. P-1 is on the file. Perusal of which shows that heading “agreement” is written on the top of this document. This agreement is written in present tense, so that it could be used in future. When partition of immoveable properties is reduced into writing so that it could be used in future at the time of need, the document requires to be registered compulsorily. It was so held in 1994 (2) CCC 675 (supra). In the Jamabandies Ex. P-2 for the year 1963-1964, Ex. P-3 for the year 1969-1970 and Ex. P-4 for the year 1974-1975, Manmohan Singh is shown to be joint owner in the property situated at village Ghudani Kalan. There is note in Jamabandi P-5 for the year 1979-1980 that Manmohan Singh had sold his entire share and mutation No. 6368 was effected/sanctioned in this regard. In the Jamabandi for the years 1984-1985 Ex. P-6 names of Avtar Singh and Jagmohan Singh figure in the column of ownership on the basis of which mutation No. 6368 was sanctioned. Similarly, Jamabandi for the years 1989-1990 Ex. P-7 is also depicting the said persons to be the owners to the extent of ¼th share. Therefore, it is evident that Manmohan Singh was co-owner in the property in dispute, but no land was given to him vide Ex. P-1. It is well settled principle that when a co-sharer is not given land, the document in question cannot be looked into.

12. In the copies of Jamabandies Ex. P-14 and P-15 for the years 1960-1961 and 1966-1967, respectively, Kaur Singh and Piara Singh are shown to be joint owners to the extent of ½th share each. Perusal of copy of Jamabandi Ex. P-18 for the year 1981-1982 depicts the sons of Kaur Singh and LRs of Piara Singh to be joint owners of the suit property. In this Jamabandi, Jagmohan Singh is shown to be in joint possession of the suit property. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot be held to be in exclusive possession as owners of the suit land.

13. As already discussed above, Ex. P-1 is written in present tense and it being not registered as required, cannot be looked into. Even if this agreement is taken into consideration, then also same is illegal as Manmohan Singh was not given any land through the document Ex. P-1. Hence, the rulings cited by plaintiffs are not helpful to them. Plaintiffs failed to prove both these issues and hence, both these issues are held against the plaintiffs.”

19. The lower Appellate Court dealing with the matter has held as under:—

“…..Admittedly in the case in hand Piara Singh and Kaur Singh were having share in the lands etc. situated in both villages Ghudani Kalan and Ghudani Khurd at the time, when the alleged family settlement Ex. P.1 was arrived at in the year 1960 and the same was reduced into writing on 8.9.1961 But from the perusal of this family settlement Ex. P-1, it is found that said Piara Singh and Kaur Singh had partitioned not only their lands situated in above said both the villages. Besides this, there is an endorsement on this document at page 2 that a sum of Rs. 1,500/- and Rs. 2,300/- was paid to Kaur Singh by Piara Singh as the price of the house and as well as regarding the deficiency of the land respectively. Then as per the provisions of Section 17(c) of Registration Act, 1980, non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration or account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any right; title or interest are legally required to be registered. As above said, in the case in hand, a sum of Rs. 1,500/- and Rs. 2,300/- was paid to Kaur Singh by Piara Singh as price of some house and as well as deficiency of land, meaning thereby that right of Kaur Singh qua the said house and land situated in village Ghudani Kalan was extinguished on receipt of this payment from Piara Singh. So as per the provisions of the above said Section 17(c) of the Registration Act, alleged family settlement Ex. P-1 becomes compulsorily registerable. The matter would have been different, had there been no endorsement as above discussed made on family arrangement Ex. P-1……”

20. However, the learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to point out any error or misreading of evidence and has only tried to assail the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. Both the Courts below after considering the oral as well as documentary evidence, rightly concluded that document Exhibit P-1 created rights in the present and, therefore, was required to be compulsorily registered. The same without registration would not confer any right on the plaintiffs-appellants. It has further been rightly held that Manmohan Singh not being party to the same, the document Exhibit P-1 has no legal force.

21. The findings recorded by both the Courts below are unassailable. Accordingly, it is held that Exhibit P-1 being an unregistered document could not have been acted upon and plaintiffs-appellants cannot derive any benefit from Exhibit P-1. In the light of what has been observed above, the question as formulated by counsel for the plaintiff-appellants is decided against the plaintiff-appellants. Thus, there is no merit in this appeal. The same is hereby dismissed. The judgments of both the Courts below are upheld. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.