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Phuman Ram And Ors. v. Munshi Ram And Ors

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Dec 3, 2003
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff-respondent Munshi Ram filed Civil Suit No. 434/ASSJ/82 on 7.9.1981 seeking a declaration that he is owner in possession of a house marked ABCD and that the portion AEFD (shown red in the site plan) formed part of his courtyard. He alleged ancestral possession and that the Gram Panchayat/Panchayat authorities were threatening dispossession after constructing drains nearby. Prior to the civil suit, the plaintiff had applied before the District Development and Panchayat Officer (DD&PO) to restrain interference, but that application was dismissed on 10.9.1979 (recorded as Ex.D4).

The Additional Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur (trial court) framed seven issues and dismissed the suit by holding, inter alia, that the disputed area was shamilat deh (village common land) vesting in the Gram Panchayat, that necessary parties had not been impleaded, and that the suit was barred by res judicata due to the earlier DD&PO decision (Ex.D4). On 18.9.1984 the learned District Judge reversed the trial court: he held the disputed area to be abadi deh (part of inhabited plot) and not shamilat deh, found the plaintiff to be owner in possession, held Gram Panchayat not to be a necessary party, and held the earlier DD&PO decision not to operate as res judicata under Section 11 of the Code. Defendants filed the present appeal under Section 100 of the Code challenging the District Judge's reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the present suit?
  2. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties?
  3. Whether the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata?
  4. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the property in dispute?
  5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and injunction as prayed for?
  6. Whether the property in dispute forms part of Kh. No. 17?
  7. Relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments

  • In written statement: asserted that the disputed taur (AEFD) was a public place used by all Adharmis and vested in the Gram Panchayat; pleaded that the suit was barred by res judicata; raised objection of mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties; contended that the plaintiff was estopped by his earlier application dismissed by the DD&PO on 10.9.1979; denied plaintiff's ownership and possession and asserted Gram Panchayat's ownership; challenged Civil Court's jurisdiction.
  • Before the present court, learned counsel K.S. Dadwal argued that any land used for village common purposes, including land described as abadi deh, should be treated as shamilat deh and vest in the Gram Panchayat; if accepted, all other issues would go against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments

  • Plaintiff's replication pleaded that the DD&PO lacked jurisdiction to determine the controversy and that dismissal of the earlier application did not bar filing a civil suit; denied that the suit land had ever vested in the Gram Panchayat.
  • Before the present court, learned counsel J.B.S. Gill referred to the definition of shamilat deh in Section 2(1)(g) of the Act and argued that the land is described in the revenue record as abadi deh and was specifically excluded from the definition of shamilat deh; thus, if the land is abadi deh, the Civil Court has jurisdiction and the DD&PO has none.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Syed Mohd. Salie Labhai and Ors. v. Modh. Hanifa and Ors., A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1569 Cited in support of the District Judge's view that Section 11 of the Code would not be applicable to the DD&PO decision (i.e., that the earlier administrative decision did not have the characteristics required for res judicata under Section 11). The District Judge relied on this authority to support reversal of the trial court's finding that res judicata (Section 11) barred the suit; the present opinion records that reliance was placed on this judgment in support of that view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by reviewing the District Judge's factual and legal findings and by applying statutory definitions in the Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 ("the Act") and provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  1. Nature of the land: The District Judge found, on the basis of the Local Commissioner's reports (including Ex.LC/1 and the report dated 30.12.1978), and on a historical revenue entry (Ex.P3 — a copy of the entry in Misal Khasra Khana Shamari, Village Dadiana Khurd, year 1850), that the disputed plot fell within plot No. 17 and was part of the abadi deh (within the lal lakir), not shamilat deh. The Local Commissioner confirmed possession by the plaintiff and described the disputed plot as adjoining the plaintiff's house and used as courtyard (khaddi, manger for cattle).
  2. Statutory definition and effect: The court referred to Section 2(g)(1) of the Act which describes shamilat deh in the revenue records "excluding abadi deh." The court treated this as an express exclusion of abadi deh from the definition of shamilat deh, and reasoned that the Act and its jurisdictional bar (Section 13) apply only to land that is shamilat deh (i.e., as described in revenue records) and not to abadi deh.
  3. Jurisdiction and necessary parties: Because the disputed land was found to be abadi deh, the Gram Panchayat was held not to be the owner and thus not a necessary party. The plaintiff had a possessory right as co-sharer and could legally protect his possession until any partition of plot No. 17. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal for non-joinder under Order I Rule 9 (proviso) was reversed.
  4. Res judicata/earlier decision: The District Judge and the present court held that the DD&PO's decision dated 10.9.1979 (Ex.D4) was not a decision by a "Court" for the purposes of Section 11 of the Code. The present opinion notes that the basic ingredients of Section 11 were not satisfied because pleadings of the parties in the previous suit were not produced to show identity of issues; hence the DD&PO/Collector's decision did not operate as res judicata to bar the civil suit. The court explicitly records that reliance was placed on the cited Supreme Court authority in support of this view.
  5. Ownership and possession: On the evidence (Local Commissioner's reports and documents such as Ex.P4), the District Judge's finding that the plaintiff was owner in possession and that the disputed plot formed part of Kh. No. 17 (abadi deh) was accepted.
  6. Rejection of late factual contention: The court rejected the defendants' contention, raised at the second-appeal stage, that the suit land was used for village common purposes; the court stated there was no material or evidence on record to substantiate that claim and that it could not be first advanced at the stage of a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code.
  7. Conclusion on appeal: For these reasons — factual findings supporting abadi deh, statutory exclusion of abadi deh from shamilat deh, absence of res judicata effect of Ex.D4, and plaintiff's established possession — the court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED — the District Judge's judgment reversing the trial court and decreeing the plaintiff-respondent's suit is upheld.

Direct implications:

  • The decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent (declaration of ownership/possession and injunction as sought) stands as recorded by the District Judge.
  • The disputed plot AEFD was held to be abadi deh (part of the plaintiff's occupied plot No. 17) and not shamilat deh; consequently, the Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (and the jurisdictional bar under Section 13 of that Act) was held not to apply to that plot.
  • The earlier decision of the District Development and Panchayat Officer dated 10.9.1979 (Ex.D4) was held not to bar the civil suit by operation of Section 11 of the Code, because it did not possess the required attributes of a decision by a "Court" and the pleadings/identity of issues were not established.

Broader implications:

  • The opinion confines its ruling to the facts and statutory construction in this case; it does not purport to set out any new broad precedent beyond applying the Act's definition excluding abadi deh from shamilat deh and confirming limits on res judicata where the earlier decision is not that of a "Court" for Section 11 purposes.

End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This is defendants appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity 'the Code') challenging the judgment of reversal passed by the learned District Judge, Hoshiarpur on 18.9.1984. The learned District Judge decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent and set aside the judgment dated 29.7.1983 passed by the Additional Sr. Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur who had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent.

2. Plaintiff-respondent Munshi Ram filed Civil Suit No. 434/ASSJ/82 on 7.9.1981 seeking a declaration that he is owner in possession of the house marked ABCD in the site plan attached to the plaint and the portion marked AEFD shown red in the site plan as part of the court-yard of his house. It was claimed that the house had remained in possession of the ancestral of the plaintiff-respondent since times immemorial which is in his possession as owner. It is further alleged that Panchayat of the village built a pucca drain on the north and west of the house and have started threatening him that he would be dispossessed from the portion marked AEFD shown red in the site plan which is claimed to be part of the courtyard of his house. Plaintiff-respondent filed an application before the District Development and Panchayat Officer with a prayer to restrain defendant-appellant from interfering in his possession which was dismissed resulting into filing of the instant suit. In the written statement defendant-appellant took a preliminary objection stating that the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. It was alleged that the disputed taur marked AEFD shown red in the site plan was a public place used by all the Adharmis for common purposes which vested in the Gram Panchayat. The objection of mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties was also raised. It was further submitted that the plaintiff-respondent was estopped from filing the suit as his earlier suit was dismissed by the District Development and Panchayat Officer on 10.9.1979. It was further asserted that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The averment with regard to ownership and possession of the plaintiff-respondent over the portion AEFD shown red in the site plan was denied by asserting that Gram Panchayat is owner of the property in dispute. A replication was also filed wherein it was pleaded that the District Development and Panchayat Officer did not have any jurisdiction to determine the controversy raised in the suit and there is no bar against filing of civil suit despite the fact that earlier application filed by the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed. It was denied that the suit land has ever vested in the Gram Panchayat. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:

"1. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit?

2. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties?

3. Whether the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata?

4. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the property in dispute?

5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and injunction as prayed for?

6. Whether the property in dispute forms part of Kh. No. 17?

7. Relief."

3. Learned Additional Senior Subordinate Judge recorded a finding on issue No. 1 that the taur marked as AEFD shown in red colour in the site plan is a shamilat deh and Vest in the Gram Panchayat and therefore it is covered by the Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for brevity 'the Act') and the departmental authorities were fully entitled to adjudicate on the controversy raised.

4. On issue No. 2, also the objection raised by the plaintiff-respondent was sustained that plaintiff-respondent had failed to implead necessary parties. It was held that the suit was liable to be dismissed under Order 1 Rule 9 (proviso) of the Code.

5. On issue No. 3, the trial Court held that the principle of res judicata would apply as already an application has been decided by the District Development and Panchayat Officer on 10.9.1979 Ex.D4.

6. Issue Nos. 4 and 6 were considered redundant and issue No. 5 was decided against the plaintiff-respondent in view of the decision on issues already decided. On account of the findings on the aforesaid issues, the suit was dismissed.

7. On appeal, before the District Judge, the finding on issue No. 1 was reversed on the ground that the land in dispute marked AEFD and shown in red colour in the site plan is abadi deh which does not fall in the definition of expression 'shamilat deh'. Therefore, the bar created by Section 13 of the Act was not attracted. On the basis of the report of the Local Commissioner and document Ex.P3 which is a copy of entry in the misal Khasra Khana Shamari Village Dadiana Khurd year 1850, the District Judge held that the land in dispute is abadi deh which would not attract the application of the Act. The finding of the District Judge reads as under:

"Now, it is to be seen if the disputed site i.e. taur claimed by the plaintiff forms part of shamilat deh or if it forms part of the Abadi deh. In this respect, document Ex.P3 is most relevant. It is copy of entry in the Misal Khasra Khanna Shamari village Dadiana Khurd year 1850. It mentions plot No. 17 under occupation of various adharmis including one Jodha ancestor of plaintiff-appellant. It is common case of the parties that the plaintiff-appellant earlier had applied to the Collector for an injunction against the defendant-respondents and during the pendency of that application a commission was appointed to visit the site in dispute and to make a report. The Local Commissioner made the report on 30.12.1978, copy of which is on the file and the Local Commissioner confirmed that the disputed site falls within plot No. 7 which is Abadi deh. This fact is further mentioned in the judgment of the Collector copy of which is Ex.D4. Again during the pendency of the case before the trial Court another Local Commissioner was appointed who gave his report Ex.LC/1. It also mentioned that the disputed plot is part of abadi deh and not shamilat. It is not owned by Gram Panchayat or any other person but in possession of the plaintiff-appellant. Moreso, it is common case that the disputed plot is within the lal lakir i.e. within the Abadi deh. The report Ex.LC/1 further confirms that the disputed plot which has been mentioned by the plaintiff-appellant as Courtyard adjoins the house of the plaintiff-appellant just in the front, where the plaintiff has set up 'khaddi' and manger etc. It is well settled that house does not mean the construction of the building alone but also includes the site attached herewith. We have the definition of the house under the Act as provided in Section 2(c)."

8. On issue No. 2 also, the learned District Judge held that once the land is not part of shamilat deh as defined by Section 2(g)(1) of the Act then the Gram Panchayat was not a necessary party as plaintiff-respondent had no claim against the Gram Panchayat. The views of the District Judge on issue No. 2 reads as under:

"Firstly, when the dispute does not pertain to the shamilat land the Gram Panchayat is not a necessary party and the plaintiff-appellant was required to implead only those defendants who threaten his possession over the disputed plot. The plaintiff has no claim against the Panchayat nor the panchayat has any right to interfere in the possession over the plot which is part of the abadi deh. It is also in the evidence that the village Panchayat has constructed the drain beyond this disputed plot and the street is also beyond this plot. As such, the Gram Panchayat was not a necessary party. Moreover, we have the consecutive reports of two Local Commissioners appointed from time to time to determine the possession of the disputed plot vis-a-vis, the possession and ownership and it is established by the Local Commissioners that the Gram Panchayat has nothing to do with the plot and it forms part of the plot No. 17 of the Adharims. The possession of the plaintiff finds established by the report of the Local Commissioner besides he is using the disputed plot as his courtyard where he is running his 'khaddi' tethering his cattle. He is in exclusive possession of the plot and can legally protect his possession as against the other co-sharers, if any, till the whole plot No. 17 is partitioned between the co-share i.e. the Adharmis. The mere fact that the plaintiff-appellant impleaded Gram Panchayat in his application before the Collector in the civil suit which was dismissed vide judgment Ex.D3, does not by implication make Gram Panchayat a necessary party in the instant suit. A perusal of the judgment Ex.D3 would show that the learned Sub Judge dismissed the suit on the score that the dispute pertain to Shamilat deh and barred under Section 13 of the Act. Similarly, the Collector vide his decision, copy of which is Ex.D4, declined to issue injunction against the Panchayat holding that it had no such jurisdiction. The matter was left undecided. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded in para No. 4 of his plaint that the old revenue record was not available to the plaintiff at the time he filed application to the DD & PO and the earlier suit. The very fact that the disputed plot falls within the abadi deh any decision by the Collector was a nullity because it had no jurisdiction to pass any order on such a dispute. The judgment in the earlier suit as aforesaid was on the assumption that the dispute pertains to shamilat deh. Accordingly this Court finds that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties in any manner and the findings on the issue No. 2 are reversed and this issue is decided against the defendants."

On issue No. 3, the findings were also reversed because the decision of the District Development and Panchayat Officer elated 10.9.1979 Ex.D4 was held to be a decision not by a 'Court' and Section 11 of the Code would not be applicable. Copy of the judgment of the Civil Court Ex.D3 did not prevail with the district Judge because the basic ingredients of Section 11 of the Code were not satisfied as the pleadings of the parties in the previous suit were not produced in order to arrive at a conclusion that issue between the parties were the same on which the judgment Ex.D3 was delivered. In support of the afore-mentioned view reliance was placed on the judgment in the cases of Syed Mohd. Salie Labhai and Ors. v. Modh. Hanifa and Ors., A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1569.

9. Issue No. 4 was decided in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by holding that the plaintiff-respondent was owner in possession in his capacity as a co-sharer. Issue No. 6 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of the document Ex.P4 read with the report of the Local Commissioner dated 20.12.1978.

10. Accordingly, on the basis of the findings recorded by the learned District Judge, the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was decreed and the judgment of the learned Additional Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur was set aside.

11. Shri K.S. Dadwal, learned counsel for the appellant No. 3 has argued that any land which is being used for village common purpose including the land described as abadi deh is to be taken as shamlat deh. According to the learned counsel, the District Judge had made grave error by treating the land as abadi deh and holding that the land would not vest in the Gram Panchayat. According to the learned counsel once this basic issue is determined in favour of the defendant-appellant then all other issues would automatically be decided against the plaintiff-respondent.

12. Shri J.B.S. Gill, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the definition of Shamlat deh in Section 2(1)(g) of the Act and argued that the land is described in the revenue record as abadi deh and has been specifically excluded from the definition of shamlat deh. Accordingly, if the land in dispute is shown to be abadi deh only then the Civil Court would be entitled to adjudicate upon the right of the parties and the District Development and Panchayat Officer would have no jurisdiction over the land.

13. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned judgment, I am of the considered view that the conclusion recorded by the learned District Judge is liable to be affirmed because the land in dispute has been found to be abadi deh which is excluded from the definition of the land known as shamlat deh. It is only in respect of the land described in the revenue record as shamlat deh that authorities under the act would be entitled to adjudicate and no other. In respect of the other land, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would remain intact. For facility of reference, Section 2(g)(1) of the Act is reproduced hereunder:

"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

1) Land described in the revenue records as Shamilat deh excluding abadi deh." A perusal of the afore-mentioned Sections makes it evident that abadi deh land has been expressly excluded from the definition of shamlat deh. On other issues, it has been found that the plaintiff-respondent is owner in possession on the basis of the detailed evidence. Once it has been found that the land is abadi deh, the earlier order dated 10.9.1979 passed by the District Development and Panchayat Officer would not come in the way of the plaintiff-respondent for filing the suit nor there would be estoppel. It would further be clear that in respect of the land which is abadi deh, only the Civil Court would have jurisdiction. Therefore, I am of the view that this appeal is without any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.

14. The argument that the suit land is being used for village common purposes has not impressed me because there is no material document or evidence on record to substantive this claim. Such an argument cannot be advanced for the first time at the stage of second appeal under section 100 of the code. This argument is, therefore, rejected.

For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed