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Om Parkash v. Inderawati And Ors.
Judgment Summary: M.M. Kumar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
A civil suit (No. 530-C of 2000) was filed by the plaintiff-petitioner challenging two sale deeds: Sale Deed No. 420 dated 28.4.2000 and Sale Deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000. The plaintiff sought a declaration that these sale deeds were liable to be set aside on grounds of misrepresentation, fraud and concealment of facts, and sought consequential relief including permanent injunctions restraining the purchasers (defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3) from alienating or obtaining mutation of the suit land.
The plaintiff assessed the suit value at Rs. 200 and affixed a court fee of Rs. 25. The defendant-respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of inadequate court fee, contending that Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 applied and that ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration was payable. The Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa allowed the defendant application by an order dated 24.11.2001 directing the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds. The plaintiff filed the present revision petition challenging that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 applies to a suit seeking a declaratory decree to set aside sale deeds together with consequential reliefs (such as injunction), thereby requiring the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court fee based on the sale consideration stated in the sale deeds.
- Whether the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff are substantive (requiring valuation for court-fee as substantive relief) or primarily declaratory with only ancillary consequential reliefs (permitting valuation under Section 7(iv)(c) at the plaintiff's discretion).
- Whether the Civil Judge's order directing payment of ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds should be interfered with in revision.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Petitioner (as represented in the opinion)
- The plaintiff relied upon the Full Bench decision in Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur (1982) 84 P.L.R. 127 (F.B.), arguing that the Civil Judge's order was not sustainable in view of that authority.
- The learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the consequential reliefs claimed were ancillary to the challenge of the sale deed and therefore the suit could not be treated as one seeking substantive relief that would attract ad valorem court-fee based on the sale consideration.
Defendant-Respondents (as recorded in the opinion)
- The defendant-respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 (CPC) seeking rejection of the plaint for affixing inadequate court fee, asserting that Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act applied and that the plaintiff was liable to pay ad valorem court-fee on the value of the sale deeds (i.e., the sale consideration).
- The Civil Judge, in entertaining the application, noted earlier authorities (including Gurjeewan Singh's case) and more recent views of the Punjab & Haryana High Court (Bagrawat's case; Ranjit Singh and others) concerning when ad valorem fees are payable in suits challenging alienations.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gurjeewan Singh's case | Used to support the proposition that in a suit by a son (member of joint Hindu family) challenging alienations by the father as without legal necessity and without consideration, the question of paying ad valorem court-fee on the sale price did not arise; the suit is effectively for declaration and possession as consequential reliefs. | The Civil Judge relied on this case to describe a line of authority favoring the plaintiff's position that ad valorem fee may not be required; the High Court recorded that the Civil Judge placed reliance on this authority but considered other authorities as well. |
| Bagrawat's case (Punjab & Haryana High Court) | Cited as taking a recent view that a challenge to validity of a sale deed as null and void for being without legal necessity and consideration requires payment of ad valorem court-fee based on the sale-deed consideration. | The Civil Judge referred to this recent view as a counter to Gurjeewan Singh's case; the High Court noted this authority as part of the authorities supporting the view that ad valorem fee is payable in such suits. |
| Ranjit Singh and other's case (Punjab & Haryana High Court) | Cited as adopting the same view as Bagrawat's case regarding payment of ad valorem court-fee when validity of sale deed is challenged as void for want of legal necessity/consideration. | The Civil Judge and the High Court treated this authority as part of the recent Punjab & Haryana High Court position applicable to the facts. |
| Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, (1982) 84 P.L.R. 127 (Full Bench) | Full Bench decision on interpretation and application of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act; relied upon by the plaintiff-petitioner. | The plaintiff relied on this Full Bench authority; the High Court examined it but concluded that applying the Full Bench principles to the present facts did not help the plaintiff because the suit here involved a declaratory decree with consequential reliefs requiring ad valorem fee—hence the Full Bench did not support the revision petitioner. |
| Shamsher Singh's case (Supreme Court) | Discussed as holding that where plaintiffs seek declaration that a decree obtained by a mortgagee against their father was not binding on them, they were effectively asking for setting aside the decree or for consequential injunctions, and ad valorem fee might be necessary in such contexts. | The High Court considered Shamsher Singh as distinguishable in certain factual scenarios but relied on its reasoning (as discussed in the Full Bench and other authorities) to explain when declaratory reliefs attract ad valorem fee. |
| Vinayakrao v. Mankunwaribai, AIR 1943 Nagpur 70 | Held that in a suit by a son for declaration that a decree against his father did not affect his interests, consequential relief was involved and ad valorem court-fee was necessary. | The High Court cited this authority (as discussed in Shamsher Singh's case) to illustrate contexts where declaratory relief carries attendant consequential reliefs attracting ad valorem fee. |
| Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa's case | Observed that the "consequential relief" in Section 7(iv)(c) cannot mean a substantive relief for which separate valuation is provided; warned against evasion by prefacing substantive reliefs with a prayer for declaration. | The High Court relied on this principle to explain that if the main relief is substantive (e.g., cancellation of a deed) and declaration is merely a preface, Section 7(iv)(c) will not apply; however, applying the Full Bench principles to the present case, the Court concluded the suit here fell within Section 7(iv)(c). |
| Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, 54 Allahabad 812 (Full Bench) | Interpreted "consequential relief" in Section 7(iv)(c) to mean a relief that follows directly from a declaration, not independently claimable or capable of definite valuation; such consequential reliefs are ancillary and left to plaintiff's valuation under the section. | The High Court relied on this explanation (as cited in the Full Bench reasoning) to determine whether the reliefs claimed in the present suit were consequential (ancillary) or substantive; it concluded they were consequential within the meaning of the section. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court began by identifying Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act as the statutory provision central to the dispute: the clause applies "for a declaratory decree and consequential relief" and contemplates that where a suit is for a declaratory decree and consequential relief is prayed, ad valorem court-fee is required.
The court explained the controlling approach: in determining court-fee liability the court must look to the substance of the relief claimed in the plaint rather than its form or artful drafting. The High Court emphasized established principles from the Full Bench decision in Niranjan Kaur and other authorities that the essence of the suit must be ascertained — whether the main relief is declaratory (with ancillary consequential relief) or whether the so-called declaration is a preface to a substantive relief that requires separate valuation.
The opinion recited and applied prior authorities (Supreme Court and High Courts) which clarify that:
- If the declaration is the principal relief and the consequential reliefs are truly ancillary (unable to be independently valued and following directly from the declaration), Section 7(iv)(c) applies and ad valorem fee is payable as left to the plaintiff's valuation under that clause.
- If, however, the relief claimed is in substance a substantive relief (for which the Act provides a separate valuation), a mere prefatory declaration cannot convert that substantive claim into a declaratory suit to evade proper court-fee.
Applying these principles to the present case, the High Court concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not merely a substantive challenge framed as cancellation of deed or a suit for possession; rather the suit sought a declaratory decree that the sale deeds were void (on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, collusion) together with consequential reliefs including permanent injunctions restraining alienation and mutation based on those sale deeds. The Court found that the reliefs claimed fall within the ambit of Section 7(iv)(c) — the declaratory part was the essence and the other reliefs were consequential.
Consequently, the High Court held that the Civil Judge's direction to require payment of ad valorem court-fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds was justified. The Court therefore found no merit in the revision petition and dismissed it.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The revision petition is DISMISSED.
Implications and direct effects:
- The order of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa dated 24.11.2001 directing the plaintiff-petitioner to pay ad valorem court-fee on the sale consideration of Sale Deeds No. 420 (28.4.2000) and No. 395 (27.4.2000) is upheld.
- The High Court found that Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act applies because the suit is for a declaratory decree with consequential reliefs; therefore the plaintiff must pay ad valorem court-fee as directed.
- The Court recorded that it made no order as to costs.
- No broader or novel precedent was created by this order; the decision follows and applies existing Full Bench and appellate authorities to the facts before the Court.
This summary is confined strictly to the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond the text of the judgment.
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is a revision petition directed against the order dated 24.11.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa allowing the application of the defendant-respondents filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) wherein a direction has been issued to the plaintiff-petitioner to pay the ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds namely No.420 dated 28.4.2000 and sale deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000. Aggrieved by the order dated 24.11.2001, the plaintiff-petitioner has filed present revision petition.
2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the issues raised in this revision petition are that a civil suit No. 530-C of 2000 was filed by he plaintiff-petitioner challenging the sale deeds on various grounds. A declaration was sought to the effect that the sale deed No. 420 dated 28.4.2000 made by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 2 regarding the part of the suit land is liable to be set aside as the same is result of mis-representation and concealment of facts. It was also prayed that the other sale deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000 executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 3 in respect of other part of the suit land is also liable to be set aside as the same is the result of fraud, mis-representation and concealment of facts, Therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. The consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from further alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any part thereof to anyone on the basis of aforesaid sale deeds and from creating any type of bar, encumbrance or charge etc. in respect of the above said suit land in any manner or also restraining them from getting the mutation entered or sanctioned in their favour has also been sought. However, the plaintiff-petitioner has assessed the value of the suit at Rs. 200/- and affixed the court fee of Rs. 25/-. An application under Order VII Rule 11, of the Code was filed by the defendant-respondents seeking rejection of the plaint for affixing inadequate court fee and it was claimed that the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for brevity, the Act) would be attracted and the plaintiff-petitioner is liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of the sale deed. The Civil Judge accepting the application directed that the plaintiff-petitioner to pay court fee ad valorem on the sale consideration of the sale deeds. The order passed by the Civil Judge reads as under:
"After hearing the rival contention of the both the Ld. counsel for the parties and perusal of record, it has been observed that in the present case plaintiff has challenged two sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2000 as both the sale deeds were executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of the defendants No. 2 & 3. The plea of the plaintiff is that defendant No. 1 had executed the above said sale deeds in favour of the defendants No. 1 & 3 because there was no legal necessity to alienate the suit property. In support of his arguments he has placed reliance on Gurjeewan Singh's case (Supra). It was a case where suit was filed by son for declaration challenging alienations made by the father on the ground of being without legal necessity and without consideration. The plaintiff being the member of the joint Hindu Family has a right to have transactions declared null and void, if they are not justified. It was, therefore, held that being so question of paying ad-valorem court fee on the sale price did not arise. For all intends and purposes the suit is for declaration and possession by way of consequential relief. But the recent view of our Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court is that challenge to validity of sale deed which is null and void being without legal necessity and consideration required to pay ad valorem court fee as per sale deed consideration in sale deed in Bagrawat's case (Supra). In this case Hon'ble High Court has also discussed Gurjeewan Singh's case. The same view has been taken by our Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ranjit Singh and other's case (supra). The above said authorities are squarely applicable on the facts of the present case."
3. I have heard Shri Kulwinder Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner, who has argued that in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, (1982)84 P.L.R. 127 (F.B.), the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) is not sustainable. He has also argued that the consequential relief claimed by the plaintiff-petitioner is ancillary relief of challenging the sale deed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff-petitioner is seeking substantive relief of declaration.
4. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the record with his assistance. I am of the considered opinion that this revision petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act may be referred in order to ascertain the statutory intention in cases where a declaration for setting aside the sale deed has been sought. Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act reads as under:
for a declaratory decree and consequential relief. - to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.
5. A perusal of clause (c) makes it obvious that whenever a suit has been filed for grant of declaratory decree or order wherein consequential relief is prayed then the court fee ad valorem is required to be paid. This provision has been subject mater of the decision of the Full Bench in Niranjan Kaur's case (supra). The view taken by the Full Bench is based on various judgments of the Supreme Court and other High Courts which reads as under:-
"Thus, what the Supreme Court has held in Shamsher Singh's case (supra is that in the suit by the plaintiffs for the declaration that the decree obtained by the mortgagee against their father was not binding on them, they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-hold from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to do so. This case is hardly helpful to the case of the plaintiff-petitioner as it is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case for the simple reason that herein the plaintiff-petitioner is a party to the document, which she is required to get cancelled because of the alleged fraud etc. A suit for declaration by a son or a member of a coparcenary under the Hindu Law will thus be on a different footing. In such a suit, the main relief will be that of a declaration and the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree against the sons etc. will be just ancillary. This is further clear when reference has been made in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) to Vinayakrao v. Mankunwaribai, AIR 1943 Nagpur 70, wherein it was held that in a suit by the son for a declaration that the decree against his father does not effect his interests in the family property, consequential relief was involved and ad valorem Court-fee was necessary. On the other hand, there may be cases, where the declaration asked for is merely a suplusage and the so-called consequential relief is in reality an independent substantial relief. For instance, if a person sues for a declaration that the defendant is liable to pay him money due on a certain bond and also asks for recovery of the amount, or asks for a declaration that he is the owner of certain property and entitled to its possession and asks for possession of the property the reliefs for the recovery of the amount or for possession cannot properly be treated as consequential reliefs, which can be valued arbitrarily by the plaintiff under Section 7(iv)(c)."
6. It is well-settled that the Court in deciding the question of Court-fee should look into the allegations made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. Thus, in each case, the Court has to find out the real relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Where the main relief is that of the cancellation of the deed, and the declaration if any, is only a surplus age, the case would not be covered under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act, because in a suit under that clause, the main relief is that of a declaration and the consequential relief is just ancillary. In this respect, reference may again be made to Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa's case (supra), wherein it has been observed as follows:-
"It seems obvious that the consequential relief referred to in Section 7(iv)(c) could not mean a substantive relief, the valuation of which is separately provided for in the Court-fees Act. If it were so held, a plaintiff could easily evade payment of the necessary Court-fee on the substantive relief by prefacing it with a declaration as to his rights. Every suit involves the establishment of certain rights of the plaintiff as a necessary preliminary to the grant of the relief claimed by him. But the addition of a prayer for a declaration as to such rights cannot convert a suit for a substantive relief into one for a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act. It is significant that the valuation of the relief in cases falling within the scope of Section 7(iv)(c) is left to the plaintiff. This is presumably because the consequential relief contemplated by the section is some ancillary relief to which the plaintiff becomes entitled as a necessary result of the declaration, but for which no separate provision is made in the Act. The essence of the relief in such cases lies in the declaratory part and the consequential relief being merely an auxiliary equitable relief, its valuation seems to have been left to the plaintiff. The meaning of the expression consequential relief as used in Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fee Act, was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (consisting of five Judges) in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, 54 Allahabad 812, and it was held that the expression consequential relief means some relief, which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief. It follows, therefore, that if the relief claimed in any case is found in reality to be tantamount to a substantial relief and not a mere consequential relief in the above sense, the plaintiff must pay Court-fee on the substantial relief."
7. If the principles laid down by the Full Bench are applied to the facts of the case in hand, no doubt is left that the suit is not only for declaration but also for consequential relief. The prayer made in the suit is that the sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2000 may be set aside as the same have been the result of fraud, mis-representation and collusion. The consequential relief of permanent injunction has also been prayed restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any art thereof to anyone on the basis of the aforesaid wrong, illegal and void sale deeds and many other consequential reliefs. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner on the Full Bench does not in any manner advance his case. On the contrary, the Full Bench laid down the principle that the Court should find out the substantive relief claimed without going into the form. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.
8. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. How ever, I do not make any order as to costs.
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