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Ved Pal Alias Vedu v. Smt. Raj Rani
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a declaration of ownership and consequential possession of a house, alleging that the plaintiff was the owner in possession by virtue of a civil court decree dated 27.4.1992, which was obtained in favor of his father. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had forcibly entered the disputed house and illegally dispossessed the plaintiff. The defendant contested the suit, alleging that the plaintiff was not the son of the defendant's father, that the decree was obtained by impersonation and fraud, and that the plaintiff had no ownership or possession rights. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, holding that he was the owner entitled to possession. The defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. The defendant then filed the present regular second appeal challenging these judgments and decrees.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the civil court decree dated 27.4.1992 in favor of the plaintiff required registration to entitle the plaintiff to possession of the house.
- Whether the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the suit property based on the prior civil court decree despite the defendant's allegations of fraud and impersonation.
- Whether the judgments and decrees of the courts below suffer from any illegality or involve any substantial question of law warranting interference by this Court in the second appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Appellant's Arguments
- The civil court decree in favor of the plaintiff was not registered and, therefore, could not serve as a valid basis for decreeing the suit.
- The plaintiff was not the son of the defendant's father and had obtained the decree by impersonating the father, constituting fraud.
- The plaintiff had no ownership or possession rights over the house and was not dispossessed.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff was owner in possession of the house by virtue of a valid civil court decree dated 27.4.1992, which arose from a family arrangement admitted by the father.
- The decree was passed on the basis of pleadings and admissions and did not require registration as it recorded a pre-existing right under a family arrangement.
- The defendant's allegations of fraud and impersonation were unfounded and did not affect the validity of the decree or the plaintiff's entitlement to possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1976 SC 807 | Family arrangements may be oral and not require registration unless reduced to writing; memorandum after settlement does not create or extinguish rights and is not registerable. | The court held that the decree based on a family arrangement admitted by the father did not require registration, applying this principle to distinguish the present case from others. |
| Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major and others, AIR 1996 SC 196 | A decree creating a right for the first time requires registration. | The court distinguished this case, noting that unlike Bhoop Singh, the present decree acknowledged a pre-existing right and thus did not require registration. |
| S. Noordeen v. V.S Thiru Venkita Reddiar and others, AIR 1996 SC 1293 | A compromise decree acknowledging pre-existing rights does not require registration. | The court relied on this precedent to support the view that the civil court decree did not require registration. |
| Bachan Singh v. Kartar Singh, 2002 (3) RCR (Civil) 495 (SC) | A consent decree does not require registration. | The court cited this authority to reinforce that the decree in the present case was valid without registration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the defendant's contention that the civil court decree required registration and found it unpersuasive. The court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, which clarified that family arrangements may be oral and do not require registration unless reduced to writing. The court distinguished the present case from Bhoop Singh, where the decree created a new right requiring registration, noting instead that the present decree acknowledged a pre-existing right admitted by the father. Further, the court cited S. Noordeen and Bachan Singh to emphasize that compromise and consent decrees acknowledging pre-existing rights do not require registration. Applying these principles, the court concluded that the plaintiff had become the owner of the suit property by virtue of the civil court decree and was entitled to possession. The court found no illegality or substantial question of law warranting interference in the second appeal.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court upheld the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, affirming the plaintiff's ownership and right to possession of the suit property under the civil court decree dated 27.4.1992. The decision directly affects the parties by confirming the plaintiff's entitlement and dismissing the defendant's challenge. No new legal precedent was established by this ruling.
V.M Jain, J. — This regular second appeal has been filed by the defendant, challenging the judgments and decrees of the courts below whereby suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed by the trial Court and the appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge.
2. Plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of possession on the ground that the plaintiff was owner in possession of the house in question by virtue of civil court decree dated 27.4.1992, whereby his father had suffered the said decree in his favour. It was alleged that the defendants had forcibly entered into house in dispute and plaintiff has been dispossessed illegally. Suit was contested by the defendant. It was alleged that the plaintiff was not son of the father of the defendant and the alleged decree dated 27.4.1992 was obtained by the plaintiff by impersonating the father of the defendant and as a result of fraud. It was alleged that the plaintiff was neither owner, nor in possession of the house in question and was not dispossessed. It was alleged that the plaintiff had no concern with the suit property or with the family of the defendant or his father. After hearing both sides, learned trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff, holding that Darshan Lal, plaintiff was owner of the house in question and was entitled to seek its possession from the defendant. The appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed by the learned Addl. Distt. Judge. Now the defendant has filed the present regular second appeal in this Court.
3. It has been submitted before me by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the civil court decree in favour of Darshan Lal plaintiff could not be made the basis for decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. It was submitted that the said decree was not registered and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to seek possession of the house in question from the defendant. Reliance was placed on the authorities, Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1995 (3) RCR (Civil) 541 (SC) : AIR 1976 SC 807 and Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major and others, 1996 (1) RCR (Civil) 750 (SC) : AIR 1996 SC 196.
4. However, I find no force in this submission of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. In AIR 1976 SC 807 (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary. But registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also a distinction should be made between a document containing terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family settlement had already been made, either for the purpose of record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and is, therefore, not compulsorily registerable. In my opinion, the law laid down in this authority would be of no help to the defendant appellant. It is not disputed before me that in the present case, in the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff, it was alleged that in the family arrangement, suit property had been given to the plaintiff about one year prior to the filing of the earlier suit. This plea of the plaintiff was admitted by his father by filing admission written statement. Civil Court decree was passed on the basis of allegations made in plaint and admission written statement. In my opinion, under such circumstances, it could not be said that the civil court decree dated 27.4.1992 required registration. So far as authority AIR 1996 SC 196 (supra) is concerned, in my opinion, law laid down in the said authority would have application to the facts of the present case. In the reported case, civil court had passed the decree in presenti by declaring the plaintiff to be owner from the date when the said decree was passed. It was under those circumstances that it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that he said decree required registration. However, in the present case, position is entirely different. Here the pre-existing right of the plaintiff was acknowledged by the defendant and on the basis thereof decree was passed by the civil court.
5. Furthermore, in S. Noordeen v. V.S Thiru Venkita Reddiar and others, 1996 (1) RCR (Civil) 750 (SC) : AIR 1996 SC 1293, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the decree did not require registration. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Bhoop Singh's case (supra), was also considered and it was distinguished, holding that in that case there was no pre-existing right to the properties between the parties, but a right was said to be created for the first time under the compromise. After considering the entire matter, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the compromise decree did not require registration. Similarly in Bachan Singh v. Kartar Singh, 2002 (3) RCR (Civil) 495 (SC) : 2002 (1) PLJ 59, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a consent decree did not require registration.
6. In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, it would be clear that Darshan Lal, plaintiff had become owner of the suit property and was declared as such by virtue of civil court decree dated 27.4.1992, and as such he was entitled to seek possession over the suit property from the defendant. I find no illegality in the judgments of the courts below which may require interference by this Court in this second appeal. Even otherwise, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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