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Gurbachan Kaur v. Union Of India

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 31, 2000
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Judgment Summary — R.L. Anand, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion disposes of two appeals arising from a common award dated 18.5.1985. One claim petition was filed on behalf of Gurbachan Kaur (widow of Santokh Singh, deceased) and the other by Chint Kaur (mother) and Mohinder Kaur (widow) of Balbir Singh, deceased.

The factual narrative (taken from FAO No. 1016 of 1985 as recorded in the opinion) states that on 27.8.1992 at about 10.14 a.m., Balbir Singh (driver of motorcycle No. UIS 2966) with Santokh Singh riding on the pillion, were proceeding on the left side of the road on a bridge on the Circular Road, Nabha, when a military lorry (3 Tonnes 4×4 TMV 74-D-14531 × 6006 — Indian Workshop EME) driven by respondent No. 2 (with respondent No. 3 sitting by his side) came from the opposite direction allegedly at high speed and without following traffic rules. The lorry is alleged to have been driven rashly and negligently, coming onto the wrong side and ramming the motorcycle. Both Balbir Singh and Santokh Singh sustained multiple injuries; the lorry driver and the companion are said to have fled the scene. Witnesses included Bhajan Singh and Lachhman Dass.

Balbir Singh (aged about 28 at death) gave rise to a claim petition by his mother Chint Kaur and widow Mohinder Kaur for Rs. 2 lakhs in compensation, on the ground of rash and negligent driving of the military lorry. Notice was served; respondents denied the allegations and contended the motorcycle was driven rashly and negligently by Balbir Singh who attempted to overtake a civilian truck and rammed the lorry.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal) framed several issues, heard evidence and initially found in favour of the claimants on issues of liability and quantum, but additionally framed and decided an issue (No. 2A) whether respondent No. 2 was acting in exercise of sovereign function such that the Union of India would not be liable. The Tribunal ultimately held issue No. 2A in favour of respondents (finding sovereign duty), and therefore denied relief to the claimants despite earlier findings in their favour on causation and quantum. The appellants (claimants) appealed the Tribunal's award; these appeals are the subject of the present order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Balbir Singh deceased was killed in a motor vehicle accident on 27.8.82 (as framed by the Tribunal) due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry by respondent No. 2.
  2. If the answer to issue No. 1 is affirmative, what amount of compensation, if any, are the applicants entitled to and from whom?
  3. Whether respondent No. 2, the driver of the military lorry, was acting in the exercise of the sovereign function of the Union Government at the time of the accident and, if so, whether the Government of India is not liable for his negligence (Issue No. 2A).
  4. Relief (procedural/legal relief to be granted consequent to the above findings).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants relied on the Tribunal's findings that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the military lorry and that they were entitled to compensation in specified amounts.
  • Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Tribunal wrongly absolved the Union of India on the basis of sovereign immunity by relying on Baxi Amrik Singh v. Union of India, 1973 PLR 1 (KB), because that earlier decision had been set aside by the Supreme Court in Pushpa Thakur v. Union of India, 1984 ACJ 559, which held that the plea of sovereign immunity is not open to the Union of India in this context.
  • Counsel also relied on this Court's earlier observation in Usha Aggarwal v. Union of India, 1985 ACJ 834, paragraph 5, to the effect that the principle of sovereign immunity of the State for the acts of its servants has no application on the facts of that case. Appellants urged that these authorities entitled them to the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and interest at 12% per annum.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents denied negligence by their driver and contended that Balbir Singh was driving the motorcycle rashly and negligently and caused the collision while attempting to overtake a civilian truck.
  • The respondents also asserted that the military lorry was engaged in discharge of official duty (collecting army mail from the railway station and returning), and that the driver was performing sovereign functions; therefore the Union of India would not be liable for any tortious act of the driver while discharging sovereign functions (plea of sovereign immunity or non-liability for acts done in exercise of sovereign powers).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Nandram Heeralal v. Union of India, AIR 1978 Madhya Pradesh 209 (DB) Observed that driving a vehicle to bring back officers was not an act which can be lawfully exercised only by a sovereign or by delegation of sovereign rights (i.e., driving such vehicles is not necessarily a sovereign function). The Tribunal noted the proposition but concluded that it did not assist the claimants; the opinion records the authority but proceeds to other authorities in reaching its ultimate conclusion on sovereignty.
Union of India v. Miss Sahita Sharma, AIR 1979 J & K 6 (DB) Held that driving a military vehicle to bring jawans to unit headquarters was not necessarily the exercise of delegated sovereign powers since such transport could be effected by private transport. The Tribunal cited this decision as an example but considered it not decisive in light of the factual distinction that army mail could not be collected by private persons; the opinion records the authority but does not treat it as determinative.
Baxi Amrik Singh v. The Union of India, 1973 PLR 1 (KB) (five-judge Bench) Was relied upon by the Tribunal as supporting the proposition that certain acts (as characterized in that case) may amount to sovereign functions. The Tribunal relied on Baxi to support its conclusion that the lorry was being driven in discharge of sovereign function. The appellant's counsel before the High Court, however, submitted that Baxi had been set aside by the Supreme Court in Pushpa Thakur; the High Court accepted that position in reversing the Tribunal's finding on Issue No. 2A.
Shakuntla Devi v. Union of India, 1976 ACJ 97 Decision of the same High Court cited in support of the proposition concerning sovereign function. The Tribunal relied upon this decision as one of the authorities fortifying the conclusion that the military lorry was being driven in discharge of sovereign function; the High Court considered the surrounding authorities in its appellate decision.
Unspecified Rajasthan High Court decision (famine relief truck case) Held that a truck driver engaged in famine relief work was not absolved the State's liability because famine relief was not a sovereign function in the traditional sense (it could be undertaken by private individuals). The Tribunal observed this authority but held it did not help the claimants because army mail could not be collected by private persons; thus the Tribunal found the circumstances distinguishable.
Pushpa Thakur v. Union of India, 1984 ACJ 559 (Supreme Court) Observed that the plea of sovereign immunity is not open to the Union of India; the Court held that the plea that the driver was on sovereign duty is not available to the Government vis-à-vis its citizens in a welfare State (i.e., sovereign immunity does not bar liability in that context). Counsel for the appellants relied on Pushpa Thakur to contend that Baxi had been set aside. The High Court accepted this submission and, on that basis, reversed the Tribunal's finding on Issue No. 2A.
Usha Aggarwal v. Union of India, 1985 ACJ 834 (this Court) The Court observed (para 5) that on the facts of that case the principle of sovereign immunity of the State for the acts of its servants had no application, and rejecting the defence of sovereign immunity. The opinion cites this Court's observation in Usha Aggarwal as supportive of the appellants' position; the High Court relied on this line of authority in reversing the Tribunal's finding of sovereign non-liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court (R.L. Anand, J.) reviewed the Tribunal's findings and the authorities cited by the parties. The Tribunal had (a) found that Balbir Singh's death resulted from the negligent driving of the military lorry and (b) assessed compensation in favour of the claimants (Rs. 43,200 awarded in one claim petition — Rs. 7,200 to Chint Kaur and the remainder to Mohinder Kaur — and Rs. 67,200 to Gurbachan Kaur in the other). However, the Tribunal recorded that the finding on liability (Issue No.1) would be subject to Issue No. 2A, and it ultimately decided Issue No. 2A in favour of the respondents, concluding that the lorry was being driven in discharge of a sovereign function of the Union of India and therefore the claimants were not entitled to relief.

On appeal, counsel for the appellants argued that the Tribunal's reliance on Baxi Amrik Singh (1973 PLR 1) was misplaced because the Supreme Court had later set that decision aside in Pushpa Thakur v. Union of India, 1984 ACJ 559, and that the plea of sovereign immunity was therefore not available to the Union of India in the circumstances. Counsel also relied upon this Court's decision in Usha Aggarwal v. Union of India, 1985 ACJ 834, which rejected sovereign immunity on the facts there.

The Judge examined the authorities canvassed by the Tribunal (including Nandram Heeralal, Union of India v. Miss Sahita Sharma, Baxi, Baxi's supporting High Court decisions such as Baxi Amrik Singh and Shakuntla Devi, and a Rajasthan decision on famine relief) and the submissions of the appellants. The critical analytical pivot was that the Supreme Court in Pushpa Thakur had held that sovereign immunity was not available to the Union in this context. Accepting the appellants' submission that Pushpa Thakur had set aside the authority relied upon by the Tribunal (Baxi), the High Court concluded that Issue No. 2A had been wrongly decided by the Tribunal.

Therefore, the appellate court reversed Issue No. 2A (which the Tribunal had decided in favour of respondents), held that the claimants were entitled to the compensation amounts already assessed by the Tribunal, and directed payment subject to the terms set out (timing and interest).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court allowed the two appeals, reversed the Tribunal's finding on Issue No. 2A (sovereign duty/non-liability), and directed the respondents to pay the compensation amounts awarded by the Tribunal.

The precise directions in the order are:

  • The findings of the Tribunal on Issue No. 2A are reversed; Issue No. 2A is decided against the respondents and in favour of the appellants.
  • The respondents are directed to pay the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal to the claimants within three months from the date of the order.
  • The claimants are entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until payment.
  • No costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The claimants are to receive the compensation amounts previously awarded by the Tribunal (Rs. 43,200 in the claim of Chint Kaur and Mohinder Kaur — Rs. 7,200 to Chint Kaur and the balance to Mohinder Kaur — and Rs. 67,200 to Gurbachan Kaur), with interest as directed, payable within three months.
  • Broader implications: The opinion reverses the Tribunal's finding that sovereign immunity precluded liability in this factual matrix, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Pushpa Thakur and this Court's earlier observation in Usha Aggarwal. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying the cited higher authority to the facts of these appeals.

Appeals allowed.
Show all summary ...

R.L Anand, J.:— By this order, I dispose of two Gurbachan Kaur… v. Union Of India…), both of 1985 as both the appeals have arisen from the award dated 18.5.1985 and common questions of law and facts are involved. One claim petition has been filed on behalf of Gurbachan Kaur widow of Santokh Singh, deceased and the other has been filed by Chint Kaur, mother, and Mohinder Kaur, widow, of Balbir Singh, deceased.

2. The facts, as stated below, have been taken from FAO No. 1016 of 1985.

3. The brief facts of the case are that on 27.8.1992 at about 10.14 a.m, Balbir Singh, deceased, resident of Village Bakho Pir, Police Station Bhiwanigarh, was driving his motor cycle No. UIS 2966 with Santokh Singh, resident of Karnal riding on its pillion. They reached on the bridge of the sullage drain on the Circular Road, Nabha, and the motor cycle was proceeding on the left hand side of the road when a military lorry No. 3 Tonnes 4×4 TMV 74-D-14531 × 6006-Indian Workshop EME, driven by respondent No. 2 with respondent No. 3 sitting by his side, came from the opposite direction at a high speed without following any traffic rules. The military lorry was being driven rashly and negligently so as to endanger human life and respondent No. 2 brought the military lorry to the wrong side and rammed the same against the motor cycle as a result of which both Balbir Singh, driver of motor cycle and Santokh Singh, the pillion rider, received multiple injuries and the motor cycle was completely damaged. Respondents No. 2 and 3 ran away from the spot. The occurrence was witnessed by Bhajan Singh and Lachhman Dass. Balbir Singh was aged about 28 years at the time of his death, Chint Kaur, mother, and Mohinder Kaur, widow, of Balbir Singh, filed a claim petition for the award of Rs. 2 lacs by way of compensation on the plea that the accident was caused by due to rash and negligent driving of the military lorry by respondent No. 2.

4. Notice of the claim petition was given to the respondents who filed the reply and denied the allegations. They put the whole blame on Balbir Singh, driver of the motor cycle and as per the stand of the respondents, Balbir Singh was driving the motor cycle in a rash and negligent manner and he wanted to overtake a civilian truck and rammed into the right front of the military lorry.

5. The Tribunal framed the following issues in order to dispose of the claim petition:—

“1. Whether Balbir Singh deceased was killed in motor vehicle accident on 27.8.82 due to the rash and negligent driving of lorry three Tonnes 4×4 TMB 74-D1431×6006 INDEEP Workshop EME c/o 56 APO by respondent No. 2 Sepoy Sarwan Kumar? OPA

2. If issue No. 1 is proved to what amount of compensation, if any, are the applicants entitled and from whom? OPA

3. Relief.”

6. Subsequently, the following additional issue arising from the pleadings of the parties was also framed:—

“2A. Whether respondent No. 2 the driver of the military lorry was acting in the exercise of the sovereign function of the Union Government at the time of the accident and if so whether the Government of India is not liable for his negligence? OPR”

7. The parties led evidence in support of their case and on the conclusion of the proceedings, issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the claimants. However, it is remarked by the Tribunal that the finding on issue No. 1 shall be subject to the decision on issue No. 2A. Issue No. 2 was also decided in favour of the claimants. In the claim petition of Chint Kaur and Mohinder Kaur, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 43,200/-. Out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 7,200/- was awarded to Chint Kaur, mother of Balbir Singh, and the remaining amount was awarded to Mohinder Kaur, widow of Balbir Singh. A sum of Rs. 67,200/- was awarded to Gurbachan Kaur, widow of Santokh Singh. However, issue No. 2A was decided against the claimants by holding that the lorry was on sovereign duty of the Govt. of India and it was being driven by its driver-respondent No. 2 and therefore, the claimants are not entitled to any relief. Issue No. 2-A was decided in favour of the respondents and against the claimants, for the reasons given in para-13 of the award of the Tribunal, which reads as under:—

“13. The case that was set up by the respondents in the written replies separately filed in the two claim applications was that the army lorry was returning to Field Post Office after collecting the Mail from the Railway Station and the accident took place during the course of the discharge of the official duty of the Driver which was a sovereign function and as such the applicants were not entitled to claim any compensation. From the statement of Sepoy Ram Samp Sharma RW-1, it is made out that on that day he had gone with the lorry from his Unit to the Field Post Office and from there he took an official namely Sarwan Kumar with him to the Railway Station Nabha and they both were returning from the railway station in the lorry in question after having collected the Mail. According to Sepoy Ram Sarup Sharma the movements of the army vehicles are recorded in the Car Diary that is maintained in the discharge of the official duty and he produced the Photostat Copy Ex. R1 of the entry made in the Car Diary relating to the military lorry in question dated 27.8.1982 The perusal of Ex. R1 shows that respondent No. 3 was deputed to collect the Mail of the Army from the Railway Station. The question that crops up for consideration is as to whether Union of India would be liable for the tortuous act of the respondent-driver when he was driving the vehicle in the exercise of sovereign powers/delegated sovereign powers or not. The contention of Sh. K.S Nagra, the learned counsel for the claimants in the two claim applications was that the military lorry was not being driven in discharge of the sovereign functions of the State and as such both respondent No. 3 and the Unio'n of India would be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation. In this connection he has placed reliance on the observations made in Nandram Heeralal v. Union of India, AIR 1978 Madhya Pradesh 209 (DB), where it was observed that it cannot be disputed that the act of driving the vehicle in bringing back the officers from the place of exercise to the College of Combat is not an act which cannot be lawfully exercised except by a sovereign or a person by virtue of delegation of sovereign rights. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the D.B decision. Another authority cited was that of a decision of Rajasthan High Court, wherein a truck driver engaged in the famine relief work was involved in an accident and it was held that the same did not absolve the liability of the State for the negligence of its driver. The famine relief work is not a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. It is a work which can be and is being undertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legitimately undertake the work. This authority, therefore, does not help the claimants inasmuch as the Mail of the Army could not have been collected by any private vehicle or a person who was not serving in the Army like respondent No. 3. My attention was also drawn to the observations made in Union of India v. Miss Sahita Sharma, AIR 1979 J and K 6 (DB) which was a case where the Driver of the military truck was driving the motor vehicle in question to Railway Station to bring the Jawans to the Unit Headquarters. And it was held that it could not be said that the statutory duty the driver was performing was referable to the exercise of the delegated soverign powers. The Jawans could have been transported to the unit head-quarters in a private bus or a truck or in any other vehicle. I, therefore, need not carry further. The conclusion at which I have arrived at is that the military lorry was being driven in the discharge of the sovereign function of the Union of India. This conclusion is fortified by the observations made in Baxi Amrik Singh… v. The Union Of India…., 1973 PLR 1 (KB), a judgment of five Hon'ble Judges of our own High Court and the observations made in Shakuntla Devi… v. Union Of India…., 1976 ACJ 97, another decision of our own High Court. I, therefore, decide this issue in favour of the respondents and as against the two set of claimants. But for the findings on this issue, the claimants in the main application and the connected application would have been entitled re-cover the amount of compensation referred to above with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application till the date of the deposit.”

8. Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, the present two appeals.

9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the record of this case.

10. Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Tribunal has relied upon a judgment reported as Baxi Amrik Singh… v. The Union Of India…., 1973 PLR 1 (FB) but this judgment has already been set aside by the Supreme Court in Pushpa Thakur v. Union of India, 1984 ACJ 559, in which it was observed that the plea of sovereign immunity is not open to the Union of India. The plea that the driver was on sovereign duty is not open to the Govt. vis-a-vis its citizens especially in a welfare State. In Usha Aggarwal v. Union of India, 1985 ACJ 834, it was observed by this Court in para-5 of the judgment as under:—

“We are of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the case the principle of sovereign immunity of the State for the acts of its servants has no application and the High Court was in error in rejecting the claim of the appellant for compensation on that ground.”

11. In this view of the matter, the findings of the Tribunal on issue No. 2A are hereby reversed and issue No. 2A is decided against the respondents and in favour of the appellants. Accordingly, both the appeals are hereby allowed and it is directed to the respondents to pay the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal to the claimants within three months from today. Of course, the claimants will also be entitled to interest @ 12% from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment. No costs.

Appeals allowed.