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Salim Ahmed v. Surjit Kumar Sahai .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
May 5, 1998
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Case Summary — Revision Petition by Salim Ahmed

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petition was filed by Salim Ahmed (the petitioner) challenging two earlier orders: the order of the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh dated 1.4.1992 and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 20.2.1997. Both lower forums had refused the petitioner's claim for eviction.

The petitioner filed an application for eviction against the respondent Surjit Kumar Sahai, who occupied a ground-floor two-room accommodation with kitchen, latrine and bathroom at House No. 1891, Sector 22-B, Chandigarh, at a monthly rent of Rs. 80 (excluding water and electricity). The petitioner had purchased the entire house and was residing on the barsati portion of the property at the time he filed the eviction petition. He sought eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for himself and members of his family.

Procedural and historical facts placed before the court include: the petitioner had earlier been a tenant at House No. 3185, Sector 21-D and vacated that premises on 24.4.1989 after an ejectment order on grounds of the landlord's personal necessity; he subsequently lived with a brother and then occupied one room on the barsati after purchasing the present house. The petitioner stated his family comprised his wife and two sons (though at one point the opinion records his family as himself, his wife and one son).

The respondent contested the eviction application, asserting mis-statements and concealment of facts, denying the petitioner's bona fide requirement, and alleging that the petitioner had obstructed common areas with the intention of forcing vacation and had undertaken additional construction.

Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority found that the petitioner's requirement was not bona fide and dismissed the eviction petition; this revision petition sought to challenge those findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's claimed requirement of the premises for himself and members of his family was bona fide so as to sustain an eviction on personal necessity.
  2. Whether the petitioner's eldest son was residing with the petitioner after his marriage (a factual question relevant to the extent of the petitioner's need).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted he required the property for himself and members of his family; his family included his wife and two sons when the petition was filed.
  • He relied on the general legal principle that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and that courts should ordinarily not reject the landlord's stated need.
  • Counsel argued that a person who purchases a house for his own residence would not normally invest a large sum only to allow tenants to continue to occupy it (reliance was placed on Jetha Nand v. Ram Chander).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent alleged mis-statements and concealment by the petitioner and denied that the petitioner genuinely required the premises.
  • The respondent asserted long-term tenancy (26 years) and argued that the petitioner had engaged in obstructive conduct (blocking front courtyard and passage) to force vacation.
  • It was pointed out that one son had applied for immigration to Australia and thus might not actually be resident with the petitioner; the respondent also relied on evidence suggesting the eldest son did not live with the petitioner.
  • The respondent drew attention to additional construction by the petitioner (another room on the top floor) after acquiring the property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies (Supreme Court) Principle that "it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live" and that the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of his residential requirement; courts should not dictate that a landlord continue to occupy alternative premises when inconvenient or insecure. The petitioner relied on this principle. The court acknowledged the principle but held it is not absolute: there must be an element of real need; mere assertion by the landlord is insufficient where facts do not support bona fides. The court therefore refused to apply the principle to override the factual findings that the requirement was not genuine.
Jetha Nand v. Ram Chander The observed expectation that a person who purchases a house would ordinarily intend to occupy it, and courts may believe the landlord's stated desire to occupy absent cogent reasons to doubt bona fides. The court noted the passage but explained that the observation was made with reference to that case's specific facts and is not a universal ratio automatically entitling a purchaser to eviction. The court treated the precedent as fact-sensitive and declined to treat purchase alone as conclusive proof of bona fide requirement in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a fact-based analysis, focusing on whether the petitioner's asserted need was genuine and whether the petitioner's family actually required additional accommodation.

On the disputed factual question of whether the petitioner's eldest son was residing with him after marriage, the court examined the evidence presented:

  • The petitioner relied on the testimony of Rev. Mohinder Peter (RW-10), who attended a reception and saw the marriage-related entries and met the daughter-in-law at the house on a particular date. The court held that such testimony, at best, proved presence on that date and did not establish continuous residence with the petitioner.
  • Contrary evidence included an affidavit (Exhibit PW10) dated 24.4.1996 in which Shamim Ahmad (a son) gave an address as House No. 409, Sector 10, Panchkula.
  • The eldest son (PW2) himself stated that he appeared on the ration card with his father and had married on 5.4.1996, but expressly said he only wanted to come and live with his parents and was not then residing with them. The court treated that statement as showing intention rather than present residence.

Weighing these materials, the court agreed with the lower forums that the eldest son was not residing with the petitioner; the son's expressed desire to live with his parents was characterized as aspirational and insufficient to establish bona fide present need.

The court then assessed the petitioner's available accommodation and social circumstances. The opinion records that the petitioner possessed two rooms with kitchen, latrine and bathroom on the first floor and two rooms with similar facilities on the second floor; the petitioner's immediate family was recorded (at one point) as himself, his wife and one son. The court concluded that the accommodation in the petitioner's possession was more than sufficient for his stated family needs. Even if the eldest son were to reside with the petitioner, the court held the space would still exceed the requirement.

The court considered the petitioner's occupation and previous living arrangements (a barber; previously living in modest accommodation and moving between relatives and a one-room barsati). On these combined factual indicators the court found no demonstration of a heightened family status or special need that would justify extending eviction on personal necessity grounds.

The court addressed the legal submissions invoked by the petitioner — namely, the landlord-as-best-judge principle and the expectation that purchasers intend to occupy purchased houses — but framed both principles as subject to factual scrutiny. The Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar principle was acknowledged but not applied to override the factual findings; Jetha Nand was treated as persuasive in context but not as a rule that purchase automatically establishes bona fide need. The court emphasized that an element of genuine need must exist and that this element was missing in the present case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition filed by Salim Ahmed is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The court affirmed the factual findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that the petitioner's claimed requirement was not bona fide and that his eldest son was not residing with him after marriage.
  • The direct effect is that the eviction claim (as advanced in the challenged proceedings) remains unsuccessful; the order dismissing the petition stands.
  • The opinion applied established principles (landlord-as-best-judge; expectations from purchase) but limited their application by emphasizing the need for objective, case-specific proof of genuine requirement. The court explicitly treated some authorities as fact-bound and did not lay down any new general ratio; no novel legal precedent was created by this decision beyond its application to the present facts.
R.M.S
Petition dismissed.
Show all summary ...

V.S Aggarwal, J.:— The present revision petition has been filed by Salim Ahmed, hereinafter described as “the petitioner”, directed against the order of the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh, dated 1.4.1992 and that of the Appellate Authority dated 20.2.1997 Both the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had not allowed the claim of the petitioner.

2. The relevant facts are that petitioner Salim Ahmed filed an application for eviction against Surjit Kumar Sahai respondent. The respondent-tenant is occupying two roomed accommodation with Kitchen, latrine and bath room on the ground floor of House No. 1891, Sector 22-B, Chandigarh, on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/- excluding water and electricity charges. Salim Ahmed petitioner had purchased the entire house. At the time When he filed the petitioner he was residing on barsati portion of the said house. The petitioner was seeking eviction of the respondent alleging that he bona fide require the property for himself and members of his family. Earlier the petitioner was residing in House No. 3185, Sector 21-D, Chandigarh, as a tenant He was in occupation of two rooms and kitchen on the first floor. The owner of the house filed an application for ejectment on personal necessity because he had retired. An order of eviction was passed against the petitioner. The petitioner vacated it on 24.4.1989 Thereafter, he lived with his younger brother in Sector 32-C, Chandigarh. The petitioner shifted to one room on barsati after he purchased the said house. His family comprises of his wife and two sons and the accommodation in possession of the petitioner is totally insufficient for himself and members of his family. The other grounds of eviction does not survive and, therefore, no mention of same is made here.

3. The respondent contested the petition and took up the plea that the petition is liable to be dismissed because there is mis-statement and concealment of facts. The respondent is tenant in the demised premises for the past 26 years. It was denied that the petitioner required the property for himself and members of his family. The petitioner started blocking the front court-yard and the passage with the sole objective of getting the property vacated. After taking the property in dispute, the petitioner had raised additional construction and had set up another room on the top floor with kitchen, latrine and bath-room.

4. Learned Rent Controller as well as Appellate Authority held that the requirement of petitioner was not bona fide. Accordingly, the petition as such was dismissed.

5. Some of the facts that were admitted during the course of arguments can conveniently be delineated. Earlier the petitioner was a tenant in a house in Sector 21. The landlord filed an eviction application. The result was that petitioner vacated that house. After sometime, he purchased the present building and shifted on the barsati portion. Presently, there are two rooms besides kitchen, latrine and bath-room on the barsati floor. At that time there were two tenants; one on the first floor and the respondent on the ground floor. The tenant on the first floor during the pendency of purchasing vacated his two rooms apartment and presently it is in the occupation of petitioner. When the petitioner filed eviction petition, he had alleged that his brother is also living with him but this has not been addressed. When petition was filed, his family comprised of his wife and two sons.

6. One son of the petitioner is named Vasim Ahmed. On behalf of the respondent, it has been pointed that said son of the petitioner had gone to Australia. When Shamim Ahmed, son of the petitioner, appeared as a witness he admitted that his brother had applied for immigration for going to Australia but it was not shown if he was immigrated to or left for Australia. It has not been established that said son of the petitioner, in any way, has left India or Chandigarh. He is, therefore, taken to be residing with the petitioner.

7. The controversy, however, was as to whether the eldest son of the petitioner is residing with him or not? The eldest son of the petitioner during the pendency of the proceedings had admittedly married a Christian girl. On behalf of the petitioner it was alleged that after marriage the said son with his wife is residing with the petitioner and, therefore, the requirement of the petitioner has increased.

8. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was being placed on the statement of Rev. Mohinder Peter, RW-10, to urge that the eldest son of petitioner after marriage is living with him in the same building. The witness has stated that he had baptised Salim Ahmed. He had gone to the community centre on 28.4.1996 There was a reception. The marriage had already been performed. He had seen the Nikah and entry regarding it. During cross-examination he had stated that he had gone to the house in question and met daughter-in-law of the petitioner on the first floor.

9. Can on the basis of such a statement it be held that the eldest son of the petitioner after marriage is residing with the petitioner or not? The answer would be in the negative. This is for the reason that at best it would be a evidence on that particular date. Daughter-in-law of the petitioner had come to her house at Sector 22 i.e the house in question.

10. In fact, there is other evidence on the record which shows that eldest son of the petitioner after marriage is not residing with him. Exhibit PW10 is the copy of affidavit of Shamim Ahmad s/o petitioner Salim Ahmad dated 24.4.1996 He has given his address as House No. 409, Sector 10, Panchkula. Not only this, eldest son of the petitioner appeared as PW2. He stated that his name appears in the ration card along with his father and that he married with Shehnaz on 5.4.1996 According to this witness, he firstly married her as per Muslim rites and thereafter Christian ceremony also. During further probing, he stated that, “I have marriage according to my wishes but I want to come and want to live with my parents. But there is a paucity of accommodation.”

11. A perusal of the above statement clearly shows that he is only being a dutiful son. But is not residing with his father. He only stated that he wants to reside with his parents. He was not residing with them at that moment. If he really wanted to live with his parents then there was no occasion why he had moved out. The claim is an after-thought. The finding of fact so arrived at by the, courts below, therefore, requires no disturbance that the eldest son of the petitioner after marriage is not residing with him.

12. As mentioned above, petitioner has two rooms, a kitchen, latrine and bathroom on the first floor and two rooms, kitchen, latrine etc on the second floor. His family comprises of himself, his wife and one son. The said accommodation is more than sufficient for the requirement of the petitioner. Even if for the sake of arguments, the eldest son is to live with the petitioner, still the accommodation is more than the requirement. This is for the added reason that it is not shown that the family status of the petitioner is so high that he requires much more accommodation. He is a barber. Earlier, he was living in two rooms in Sector 21. After his landlord got it vacated, he shifted to a house of his brother and then in one room barsati. The present accommodation is much more than required. The question of bona fide requirement does not arise.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner then pressed into service the well known principle that landlord is the best judge of his requirement and ordinarily, therefore, his claim should not be rejected or ignored. Indeed, no precedent for this principle is required. Supreme Court in the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies,1 while setting the said principle observed as under:—

“… As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the courts to dictate him to continue to occupy such premises. Though Eknath continues to be the tenant of the ‘Olympus’ flat, it is being occupied exclusively by Sridhar and his family since October, 1972. For this reason and also for the reason that because of the partial decree passed against him Eknath is now entitled to occupy the area of 550 sq. ft. only, it is difficult to appreciate how the Appellate Bench and the High Court could record a finding that the ‘Olympus’ flat is readily available to the appellant's husband and that the said accommodation will be quite sufficient and suitable for the appellant and her family.”

14. But as is apparent from the facts, it is not that the landlord at any time and every time can seek eviction. It is not his whimsical or fanciful desire. There has to be an element of need before it can be stated that the requirement is bona fide. The same is missing in the present case, therefore, the said contention necessarily must fail.

15. Another plea offered was that when the landlord has purchased the property in dispute for his own residence, he would not invest a huge sum only to allow the tenants to live therein. The attention of the Court was drawn to the decision of this Court in the case of Jetha Nand v. Ram Chander,2. It was held in paragraph No. 5 of the judgment as under:—

“…One would expect in the normal course that a displaced person who purchases a house for as much as Rs. 24,000.00 does so with the object of occupying it for the residence of himself and members of his family. He certainly does not pay such a considerable sum in order to realise the nominal rent which the tenants have been paying as allottees under the Custodian which ordinarily is a grossly inadequate return on the capital invested. Thus when a landlord says that he does want to occupy the house himself, there should be no difficulty in the Court's believing him unless cogent reasons exist for doubting his bona fide in this respect. The fact that landlord feels compelled, in order to meet the requirements of the Court to invent some unconvincing reasons to support his natural desire to occupy his own house, ought not in my opinion to be held against him.”

16. As one glances through the judgment it appears that it was so observed keeping in view the facts of that case and it was one of the reason why the order of eviction was sustained. It was not the ratio of the decision that whenever a landlord purchases a house he can automatically be taken to be requiring the property bona fide. The facts of each case have to be examined on its own.

17. In the present case, the facts clearly reveals that the requirement, in fact, is not genuine and bona fide. There is sufficient accommodation with the petitioner.

18. For these reasons, the revision petition begin without merit must fail and is dismissed.

R.M.S
Petition dismissed.