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Kedar Nath And Others v. Kanwal Bhatia .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-respondent entered into an agreement to purchase a residential plot from the defendants-appellants on April 8, 1995. Initial payments of Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 30,000 were made by the plaintiff; the balance of Rs. 5,33,750 was to be paid on or before June 16, 1995 when the sale deed was to be executed and registered. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance on July 19, 1995, alleging that the defendants failed to execute the sale deed on June 16, 1995.
Defendants filed an application on March 7, 1996, admitting receipt of the initial payments and stating their willingness to execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance consideration, while asserting that payment of the balance was a condition precedent. No written statement was filed; the trial Court decreed specific performance on August 8, 1996 subject to the plaintiff paying the balance on or before September 10, 1996, with a warning that failure to pay would result in dismissal of the suit.
The plaintiff appealed the trial Court's decree on September 25, 1996 (seeking costs), and also applied to stay the operation of the trial Court's decree. The defendants contended the appeal was undervalued (incorrect court-fee) and that the plaintiff had not deposited the balance. The lower appellate Court (Additional District Judge) on January 16, 1997 affirmed the trial Court's decree but extended the time for payment of the balance sale consideration from September 10, 1996 to January 31, 1997. The plaintiff deposited the balance in the lower appellate Court on January 17, 1997.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lower appellate Court had jurisdiction and was justified in extending the time for payment of the balance sale consideration (i.e., whether it could extend time under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and/or Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code).
- Whether time was the essence of the contract in this case, thereby preventing any extension of time for payment and justifying dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for specific performance.
- Whether the respondent-plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract (including timely payment of the balance), or whether he was employing delaying tactics.
- Whether the plaintiff's appeal was incompetent because of alleged deficiency in Court-fee affixed on the Memo of Appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants-Defendants' Arguments
- The respondent-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and had engaged in delaying tactics by filing suit without prior notice and by not paying the balance consideration as directed by the trial Court.
- The balance payment was a condition precedent (time being of the essence for payment by June 16, 1995) and the plaintiff's failure to pay by the extended date of September 10, 1996 should have led to dismissal of the suit under the trial Court's direction.
- The appeal was said to be incompetent because the Memo of Appeal carried only Rs. 25 as Court-fee whereas the defendants asserted a court-fee of Rs. 27,370/- was required, rendering the appeal undervalued and not maintainable.
- The lower appellate Court erred in extending time to January 31, 1997 without the plaintiff specifically praying for such extension.
Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments
- The lower appellate Court possessed jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the balance under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and under Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code; respondent relied on authorities (Smt. Mangla Ghosh v. Rabindra Nath Hazra; Tapan Kumar Chatterjee v. Kalyani Debi; Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani) to support this jurisdictional proposition.
- Time was not the essence of the contract in this case; the trial Court's condition directing dismissal if the balance was not paid by September 10, 1996 was, in substance, an order in terrorem and was not intended to prevent the appellate Court from exercising its power to extend time.
- The respondent asserted that he had thereafter deposited the balance in the lower appellate Court (on January 17, 1997) for payment to the defendants.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Mangla Ghosh v. Rabindra Nath Hazra, AIR 1987 Calcutta 307 | Cited by respondent's counsel to support the proposition that the appellate Court has jurisdiction to extend time (in context invoking Section 28 Specific Relief Act and Section 148 CPC). | Noted as one of the authorities relied upon by respondent's counsel in support of the appellate Court's jurisdiction to extend time; the Court accepted that the appellate Court had such jurisdiction. |
| Tapan Kumar Chatterjee v. Kalyani Debi, AIR 1985 Calcutta 243 | Cited by respondent's counsel in support of the appellate Court's power to extend time under the Specific Relief Act and CPC provisions. | Recognised as part of the body of authorities invoked to justify the appellate Court's extension of time; the Court treated appellate power to extend time as available. |
| Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, (1983) 2 SCC 127 : AIR 1983 SC 428 | Cited by respondent's counsel to support the appellate Court's jurisdiction to extend time under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and Section 148 CPC. | Included among authorities relied on by respondent's counsel; the Court upheld that extension was within appellate jurisdiction. |
| Ruldu Singh (Deed.) v. Inder Singh, 1974 R.L.R 542 | Relied on by the Court for the general proposition that time is not ordinarily the essence of contracts for sale of immovable property unless circumstances show otherwise. | The Court invoked this authority to support its finding that time was not the essence of the contract in the present case. |
| Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868 | Relied on by the Court as authority for the proposition that, generally, time is not the essence of a contract for sale of immovable property. | Relied upon by the Court to reinforce the conclusion that the contract did not make time of the essence here. |
| Amba Lal Umrao Singh Ji v. L. Harish Chander, AIR 1955 Punjab 189 | Relied upon for the settled position that time is not ordinarily essence in sale contracts for immovable property. | Used by the Court to support the conclusion that the plaintiff's delay did not automatically oust relief, given parties' conduct. |
| Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by L.R.s v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by L.Rs, (1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742 | Relied on for the general rule that time is not normally of the essence in contracts for sale of immovable property unless shown otherwise by circumstances. | Relied upon by the Court in holding that the circumstances of the present case did not make time the essence of the contract and that extension was permissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis based strictly on the record and submissions:
- Preliminary legal principle: The Court noted the settled law that, generally, in contracts for sale of immovable property time is not the essence of the contract unless the circumstances indicate otherwise. The Court expressly relied on several authorities (listed above) for this proposition.
- Application of principle to facts: The Court examined the conduct of the parties and the sequence of events. The parties had agreed that the sale deed was to be executed on or before June 16, 1995. The plaintiff filed suit on July 19, 1995 and the trial Court decreed specific performance on August 8, 1996, directing payment by September 10, 1996.
- Conduct of defendants: The Court observed that defendants, both before the trial Court and the appellate Court, had not pressed that time was the essence; rather, they had admitted willingness to execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance at any date fixed by the Court. Hence, defendants' conduct did not support treating time as of the essence.
- Nature of trial Court's condition: The Court characterized the trial Court's condition that failure to pay by September 10, 1996 would result in dismissal as an order in terrorem — intended to compel compliance rather than to permanently divest the appellate Court of the power to pass consequential orders, including extension of time under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.
- Jurisdiction to extend time: The Court accepted the submission that the appellate Court has jurisdiction to extend time to comply with the terms of a decree, referring to Section 148 CPC and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court observed that the plaintiff had applied to stay the operation of the decree (thereby seeking relief that had the practical effect of seeking more time) and that the lower appellate Court was therefore entitled to extend time.
- Evaluation of defendants' specific contentions: The Court found that defendants' contention that no prayer for extension had been made was unsustainable because the plaintiff’s application to stay operation of the decree effectively sought preservation of rights and time; the appellate Court was empowered to act. The Court also noted that the defendants had not, before the appellate Court, specifically contended that time was the essence or that the plaintiff was not ready and willing.
- Equitable balancing: Although the Court upheld the appellate Court's jurisdiction and extension, it exercised equitable discretion to balance the parties' interests because the plaintiff had repeatedly failed to pay on the agreed date and by the first extended date. The Court therefore directed a modest monetary compensation (Rs. 10,000) to the defendants plus costs and counsel fee.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISPOSED OF
The Court found no merit in the second appeal. It held that:
- The lower appellate Court did not err in extending the time for payment of the balance sale consideration from September 10, 1996 to January 31, 1997; the appellate Court had jurisdiction to do so under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- On the facts, time was not the essence of the contract; the defendants had not insisted that time was of the essence and had been willing to execute the sale deed upon receipt of the balance at a date fixed by the Court.
- To balance equities, the plaintiff-respondent was ordered to pay Rs. 10,000 as compensation to the defendants-appellants in addition to costs of the appeal; counsel fee of Rs. 2,000 was allowed if certified.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The appellate Court's extension stands; the plaintiff must pay the balance consideration (which he had deposited in the appellate Court) and additionally pay Rs. 10,000 compensation and costs as directed.
- No broader novel precedent: The opinion applied established principles (that time is not ordinarily the essence of contracts for immovable property and that appellate Courts may extend time) to the facts; it did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond the cited authorities.
This summary is confined to and faithful to the information contained in the provided opinion; no facts or legal conclusions beyond the text have been inferred or added.
Dr. (Mrs.) Sarojnei Saksena, J.:— Defendants-appellants have filed this second appeal against lower appellate Court's judgment and decree dated January, 16, 1997, whereby time for payment of balance amount of sale consideration was extended from September 10, 1996 to January 31, 1997.
2. Adumbrated facts of the case are that the plaintiff-respondent filed suit for specific performance of contract in the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Faridabad, averring that the parties had entered into an agreement to sell a residential plot. This agreement was entered into between the parties on April 8, 1995. At the time of the agreement, Rs. 10,000/- were paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. He also paid Rs. 30,000/- to the defendants on April 11, 1995. The balance amount of sale consideration of Rs. 5,33,750/- was to be paid on or before June 16, 1995, the date fixed for execution and registration of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiff averred in the plaint that he was pursuing the defendants to execute the sale deed to transfer the suit plot in his name and to accept the balance sale consideration, but the defendants did not pay any heed. On June 16, 1995, plaintiff went to the Sub-Registrar's office for the due performance of the contract, but the defendants did not turn up. Hence, the suit.
3. After being noticed, the defendants appeared before the lower Court and filed an application on March 7, 1996, showing their willingness to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on receipt of the balance sale consideration. They admitted receipt of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 30,000/- from the plaintiff. They pleaded that payment of the balance sale consideration was the essence of the contract, which was to be made on or before June 16, 1995, and thereafter the suit property was to be transferred in favour of the plaintiff. They were already ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, but the plaintiff essentially failed to perform his part of the contract as he could not arrange huge balance sum. They prayed that the plaintiff be directed to pay the balance sale consideration and on receipt of the said amount, they will get the plot in dispute transferred in his favour.
4. As no written statement was filed, no issue was framed and the plaintiff's suit was decreed and it was ordered by the trial Court that the plaintiff shall pay the balance sale consideration on or before September 10, 1996, and then the defendants shall execute the sale deed in plaintiff's favour, after getting the necessary permission from the Haryana Urban Development Authority, Faridabad if at all it is required. All the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell dated April 18, 1995, shall be binding on the parties. The lower Court also observed that in case the plaintiff fails to pay/deposit the balance sale consideration on or before the extended date, the plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed and in case, even after depositing the balance sale consideration, the defendants fail to get the sale deed in respect of the plot in question executed in plaintiff's favour, then the plaintiff shall get the same executed and registered through the Court. Parties were left to bear their own costs. The lower Court delivered this judgment on August 8, 1.996
5. Being aggrieved by the judgment/decree of the trial Court, plaintiff filed appeal on September 25, 1996, which was decided by Shri R.S Baswana, Additional District Judge (IV), Faridabad, on January 16, 1997. Plaintiff's only grouse was that costs were not awarded to him by the trial Court though his suit was decreed. On being noticed, defendant-appellants submitted an application that as the plaintiff had failed to deposit the balance sale consideration on or before September 10, 1996, in favour of the defendants and instead filed appeal, which is also not competent because Court-fee of Rs. 27,370/- was required to be affixed while the plaintiff had only affixed Court-fee of Rs. 25 on the Memo of Appeal. Hence, the appeal is undervalued. Therefore, the plaintiff-appellant should be directed to make up the deficiency of the Court-fee and then the appeal be heard.
6. In that appeal, plaintiff-respondent also filed an application to stay the operation of the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In reply to this application, the defendants appellants submitted that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to deposit the amount in question as per orders of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Faridabad, dated August 8, 1996. Hence, the plaintiff-respondent is not entitled to any relief of injunction order. He has failed to deposit the balance sale consideration. The defendants are suffering loss and damage for non-deposit of the amount of balance sale consideration by the plaintiff, he has not approached the Court with clean hands, because, on one hand, he intends not to deposit the amount in question and, on the other hand, he intends to challenge the sale to some other person.
7. After hearing both the counsel for the parties, the lower appellate Court decided the appeal, affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, but extended the time for payment of the balance sale consideration from September 10, 1996 to January 31, 1997.
8. Appellants-defendants' learned counsel valiantly argued that the respondent-plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, though the appellants-defendants were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The conduct of the respondent-plaintiff is borne out from the judgments of both the Courts below. Without giving any prior notice to the appellants-defendants to execute the sale deed and to accept the balance sale consideration, the respondent-plaintiff filed the suit before the lower Court. On the first date of hearing, the appellants-defendants filed an application on March 7, 1996, stating therein that they are ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, but the plaintiff had not paid the balance amount of sale consideration, which was the condition precedent. Therefore, the sale deed could not be executed by them (appellants-defendants). They also challenged that the appeal was incompetent as only Court fee of Rs. 25/- was affixed on the Memo of Appeal, though Court-fee of Rs. 27,370/- was required to be affixed. The plaintiff was directed by the lower Court to pay the balance sale consideration by September 10, 1996. Instead of paying/depositing the balance sale consideration to the appellants-defendants, the respondent-plaintiff wanted to while away the time and without complying with the terms given by the trial Court, he filed appeal against the said judgment before the lower appellate Court, only on the ground that the trial Court had not awarded costs of the suit to him. These facts only show that the respondent-plaintiff never wanted to perform his part of the contract as the trial Court had specifically directed that in case the plaintiff fails to pay the balance sale consideration by September 10, 1996, his suit shall stand dismissed. In view of this direction, the lower appellate court should have dismissed the plaintiff's suit as he failed to pay the balance sale consideration to the defendants on or before September 10, 1996. Instead, without any prayer being made by the respondent-plaintiff, the tower appellate Court has extended the time for payment of the balance sale consideration. Hence, the lower appellate Court's impugned judgment/decree should be set aside.
9. The respondent's learned counsel, relying on Smt. Mangla Ghosh v. Rabindra Nath Hazra, AIR 1987 Calcutta 307, Tapan Kumar Chatterjee v. Kalyani Debi, AIR 1985 Calcutta 243, and Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, (1983) 2 SCC 127 : AIR 1983 SC 428, submitted that the lower appellate Court had jurisdiction to extend the time for making payment of the balance sale consideration under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act as well as under Section 148, Civil Procedure Code. Thus, according to him, the lower appellate Court has rightly extended the time for payment of the balance sale consideration. He also submitted that the lower appellate Court had decided the appeal on January 16, 1997, and on January 17, 1997, the plaintiff-respondent has deposited the balance sale consideration in the lower appellate Court to be paid to the defendants-appellants.
10. The plaintiff-respondent's learned counsel also submitted that in this case time is not the essence of the contract. Therefore, the trial Court's order that if by September 10, 1996, the balance sale consideration is not paid to the defendants by the plaintiff, his suit for specific performance of contract shall stand dismissed was in essence an order in terrorem and not intended to divest the appellate Court of its power to pass other consequential orders including an order for extension of time expressly conferred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act.
11. After hearing the rival contentions, in my considered view, there is no merit in this appeal. It is settled law that primarily in all contracts for sale of immovable property time is not essence of the contract unless circumstances show otherwise. Reliance can be placed on Ruldu Singh (Deed.) v. Inder Singh, 1974 R.L.R 542, Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868, Amba Lal Umrao Singh Ji v. L. Harish Chander, AIR 1955 Punjab 189, and Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by L.R.s v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by L.Rs, (1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742. Even from the circumstances of this case, it is evident that time was not the essence of the contract. Parties agreed that the sale deed was to be executed on or before June 16, 1995. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit for specific performance of contract on July 19, 1995, which was decreed by the trial Court on August 8, 1996. Even before the trial Court, the defendants-appellants never agitated that time was the essence of the contract. Conversely, they expressed their willingness to execute the sale deed in plaintiff-respondent's favour provided he pays the balance sale consideration on any date fixed by the Court. The trial Court decreed the suit directing the plaintiff-respondent to make payment of the balance sale consideration on or before September 10, 1996. Putting it as a condition in ter-rorem, the trial Court directed that in case the balance sale consideration is not paid by September 10, 1996, the plaintiff's suit for specific performance shall stand dismissed. This condition is in essence an order in terrorem and was not intended to divest the Court of its power to pass other consequential orders including an order for extension of time expressly conferred by the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.
12. Even before the lower appellate Court, the defendants-appellants never contended that time was the essence of the contract or that the plaintiff-respondent was not at all ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and is adopting delaying tactics. During arguments, the learned counsel failed to point out that before the lower appellate Court, the plaintiff-respondent had filed an application for staying the operation of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The defendants-appellants filed reply to that application averring that on the one hand, the plaintiff does not intend to deposit the amount in question and, on the other hand, he intends to show that the defendants-respondents have no legal right to alienate the plot in dispute to some other person. In the application dated September 24, 1996, the plaintiff only prayed before the lower appellate Court that the operation of the judgment and decree under appeal be stayed. He never prayed that the defendants-appellants be restrained from alienating the suit property to anybody else. Thus, the contention of the defendants-appellants that the lower appellate Court has extended the time for depositing the balance sale consideration upto January 31, 1997, without any prayer being made by the plaintiff-respondent, is devoid of any merit. Under Section 148, Civil Procedure Code, Court has jurisdiction to extend time to comply with the terms of the decree. Thus, this argument has no bearing that the plaintiff-respondent never made such a prayer before the lower appellate Court that time be extended. Because time was running against the plaintiff, therefore, he specifically prayed that the operation of the trial Court's decree be stayed. Resultantly, his prayer was that time for making payment of the balance sale consideration be extended. In my considered view the lower appellate Court has not fallen into an error in extending the time for making payment of the balance sale consideration.
13. But, to balance the equity between the parties, it is hereby ordered that as plaintiff has not paid the balance sale consideration to the defendants-appellants firstly on or before June 16, 1995 as per the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell and again by September 10, 1996, as ordered by the trial Court, and has deprived the defendants-appellants of balance sale consideration in the sum of Rs. 5,33,750/-, it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff respondent shall pay Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand only) to the defendants-appellants as compensation, besides costs of this appeal. Counsel's fee Rs. 2000/- is allowed, if certified.
14. With this direction, the appeal is disposed of.
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