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Gurbachan Singh v. Bachan Singh And Others
Structured Summary of Opinion — R.L. Anand, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
(Narrative constructed strictly from the provided opinion.)
The case arises from a decree for specific performance dated 3.12.1970 in favour of Jai Singh (referred to as defendant No. 2 in the trial proceedings), by which the plaintiff-decree-holder was directed to deposit Rs. 1,100/- on or before 7.1.1971 and to pay stamp and registration charges; the decree provided that if the defendant failed to get the sale deed executed, the plaintiff would be entitled to have it executed through the court.
Jai Singh did not deposit the sum by 7.1.1971 and filed an application dated 9.3.1971 under section 148 C.P.C. (Ex. D-3). By an order dated 13.9.1971 (Ex. D-2), the Sub Judge II Class, Kaithal allowed an extension permitting deposit on or before 19.11.1973. The amount was deposited on 19.10.1973 and a sale deed was executed in favour of Jai Singh through a local commissioner on 15.7.1976.
Meanwhile, defendant No. 1 (Bachan Singh, son of Ghasita Singh) purportedly sold the subject property to the appellant (Gur Bachan Singh son of Mehar Singh) by a registered sale deed dated 13.2.1971 for Rs. 2,000/-. The purchaser (Gur Bachan Singh) obtained a decree for permanent injunction on 7.8.1975 protecting his possession, with a direction that defendant No. 2 (Jai Singh) could obtain possession with the help of an order of a competent court or officer.
The appellant (Gur Bachan Singh) then filed a suit for declaration on 18.4.1978 claiming to be the sole owner in possession and alleging that the decree for specific performance was null and void because Jai Singh had failed to deposit the balance by 7.1.1971. The trial Court dismissed the appellant's suit. The Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, by judgment dated 5.9.1981, affirmed the trial Court's dismissal. The present Regular Second Appeal was heard by R.L. Anand, J., who also dismissed the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff-appellant had purchased the suit land for Rs. 2,000/- as alleged (trial Court Issue No. 1).
- Whether defendant No. 2 (Jai Singh) in collusion with defendant No. 1 filed the suit for specific performance as alleged and, if so, its effect (trial Court Issue No. 2).
- Whether the plaintiff (appellant) is the owner in possession of the agricultural land (trial Court Issue No. 3).
- Whether the suit of the plaintiff (appellant) is time barred (trial Court Issue No. 4).
- Whether the plaintiff's suit was maintainable in its present form (trial Court Issue No. 5).
- Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs (trial Court Issue No. 6).
- Whether a decree for specific performance becomes ineffective or non-executable automatically on the decree-holder's failure to deposit the balance consideration by the time fixed, and whether a court can enlarge the time under section 148 C.P.C. where the decree is silent as to consequences of non-payment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Shri Hemant Kumar)
- On 13.12.1971 there were no lis pending between defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (the appellant's submission regarding the status of litigation at that date).
- The decree-holder (Jai Singh) failed to deposit the balance consideration by 7.1.1971 and therefore the appellant's title/suit should prevail.
- The order dated 13.9.1971 (extending time) could not have been validly passed because the trial Court had made time the essence of the contract by fixing 7.1.1971 as the last date for payment.
- In the proceedings under section 148 C.P.C., the appellant (as purchaser by registered sale deed) was not heard; the registered sale deed is a sufficient public notice under the Registration Act and should have been treated as such.
Respondent's Arguments (as presented through counsel and adopted from lower courts)
- The decree for specific performance did not become ineffective automatically on non-deposit of the balance consideration; the decree being silent on consequences, the decree-holder retained rights subject to rescission being sought by the vendor under section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act.
- The order of extension under section 148 C.P.C. was validly passed; proceedings were contested and notice was given to the judgment debtor.
- The reasons and conclusions of the courts below (trial and first appellate) in dismissing/deeming the appellant's challenge as untenable were adopted and relied upon.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Sarupi v. Har Gian, (1974) 76 PLR 758 | Where a decree is silent about consequences of non-payment within fixed time, the decree does not lapse automatically; default entitles vendor to apply for rescission under section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act; until rescission is sought the decree subsists and remains executable; if a decree directs dismissal on default, the court cannot extend time. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that the decree dated 3.12.1970 did not become ineffective automatically for non-deposit by 7.1.1971 and that rescission under section 28(1) would be the remedy (which was not invoked). |
| Someshwar Dayal v. Widow of Lalman Shah, AIR 1958 Allahabad 488 | The opinion states that reliance was placed on this authority; the specific rule cited in the provided text is not set out. | The Court notes that reliance was placed upon this judgment by the respondent's counsel; the opinion refers to it as additional support but does not elaborate the specific principle from it. |
| Johri Singh v. Sukh Lal Singh, 1988 (3) Judgments Today 382 | The provided opinion records that this authority was cited by counsel; the opinion notes that in the cited case the decrees were conditional. | The Court distinguished this authority as not helpful to the appellant because in Johri Singh the decree was conditional, whereas the decree dated 3.12.1970 contained no consequential stipulation and was not conditional in the same way. |
| Parmeshwari v. Naurata, (1984) 86 PLR 591 | The opinion records that this authority was cited by counsel; the opinion notes that in the cited case the decrees were conditional. | The Court found the authority inapplicable for the same reason as Johri Singh — the decrees there were conditional while the decree in the present case was not. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps (as set out in the opinion):
- Characterization of the decree dated 3.12.1970: The Court observed that the decree was not a conditional decree. Although it required payment of Rs. 1,100/- by 7.1.1971, the decree did not state that failure to pay by that date would automatically dismiss the suit or render the decree ineffective.
- Application of section 148 C.P.C.: The Court noted that section 148 C.P.C. permits the Court, in its discretion, to enlarge a period fixed for doing an act under the Code even after the originally fixed period has expired. The order dated 13.9.1971 (or, as later referenced in the judgment, 13.9.1973 — the opinion records these dates) was passed under the Code of Civil Procedure and was not an order under the Specific Relief Act.
- Distinction between conditional decrees and silent decrees: The Court relied on Smt. Sarupi v. Har Gian to affirm the principle that where a decree is silent on consequences of non-payment within the time fixed, the decree does not lapse automatically; the vendor may apply for rescission under section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act, but unless such rescission is sought, the decree remains subsisting and executable.
- Onus and procedural posture of the appellant: The Court observed that the appellant had stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor (vendor) and that the proceedings under section 148 C.P.C. were contested with notice having been given to the judgment debtor. The Court rejected the submission that the appellant had not been heard in those proceedings and that the extension was therefore invalid.
- Rejection of appellant's contentions: The Court explicitly rejected the arguments that (a) the decree became non-executable automatically on failure to pay by the date fixed and (b) time had been made the essence of the contract such that the extension under section 148 could not have been granted. It also distinguished the authorities relied upon by the appellant (Johri Singh and Parmeshwari) on the ground that those involved conditional decrees, whereas the present decree contained no consequential stipulation.
- Consequence of the extension/order: The Court held that the order permitting the deposit of the balance consideration gave the decree-holder the right to execute the decree dated 3.12.1970; since no rescission under section 28(1) had been sought by the vendor (or by the appellant who purchased from the vendor), the decree remained effective and capable of execution.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
Direct effect on the parties: The Regular Second Appeal by Gur Bachan Singh (appellant) was dismissed; the lower courts' dismissal of the appellant's suit and the upholding of the decree for specific performance (subject to the consequences discussed) remain in place. The decree dated 3.12.1970 was held to subsist and to be executable because it was silent on any automatic dismissal for non-payment and no rescission under section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act had been sought.
Broader implications: The opinion reasons from established principles (as cited) concerning the legal effect of a decree that is silent about consequences of non-payment and the role of section 148 C.P.C. in enlarging time. The opinion does not assert that it is establishing a new legal precedent beyond applying those principles to the facts; the decision's practical consequence is limited to affirming the decree's continued subsistence and the validity of the extension order in the present circumstances.
R.L Anand, J.:— This Regular Second Appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 5.9.1981 passed by the Court of Shri O.P Gupta, Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, who affirmed the judgment and decree dated 22.9.1980 passed by the Court of Shri B.M Bajaj, Sub Judge Ist Class, Kaithal and dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff appellant Gurbachan Singh.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Jai Singh, defendant No. 2 in the trial Court filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance against defendant No. 1 Bachan Singh alias Gurbachan Singh son of Ghasita Singh and his suit was decreed on 3.12.1970 vide Ex. D-6 and it was ordered by the trial Court that plaintiff-decree, holder should deposit a sum of Rs. 1,100/- on or before 7.1.1971 The plaintiff should also pay stamp and bear the registration charges. In case the defendant still fails to get the sale deed executed, the plaintiff shall be entitled to get it executed through the Court of law.
3. Jai Singh decree-holder i.e defendant No. 2 could not pay the amount on or before 7.1.1971 Rather he submitted an application dated 9.3.1971 Ex. D-3 for extension of time for the deposit of Rs. 1,100/- and vide order dated 13.9.1971 Ex. D-2, the Sub Judge II Class, Kaithal allowed the application and allowed Jai Singh to deposit the amount on or before 19.11.1973 in terms of the decree dated 3.12.1970 This amount was to be deposited on or before 19.11.1973 but was actually deposited on 19.10.1973 and sale deed dated 15.7.1976 was executed in favour of defendant No. 2 through local commissioner on behalf of defendant No. 1. Meanwhile Bachan Singh son of Ghasita Singh, defendant No. 1 sold the property subject-matter of the suit for specific performance to the present appellant Gur Bachan Singh son of Mehar Singh vide registered sale deed dated 13.2.1971 for a sum of Rs. 2,000/-. Gur Bachan Singh then filed a suit for permanent injunction against Bachan Singh and Jai Singh which was decreed on 7.8.1975 vide Ex. D-4 and the operative part of the decree is as below:
“In view of my findings on the above issues, the Plaintiff who is in possession of the land has to be protected against forcible dispossession. The suit of the plaintiff succeeds against the defendants and it is hereby decreed with the condition that the defendant No. 2 shall be free to obtain the possession of the disputed land with the help of the order of any competent court or officer. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.”
4. Gurbachan Singh brought the present suit for declaration on 18.4.1978 that he was the sole owner in possession of the land in dispute and that the impugned decree for specific performance was null and void and therefore, not binding upon him alleging that he was owner and in possession of the agricultural land in suit as he had purchased the same for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- from defendant No. 1 vide registered sale deed dated 13.2.1971 and had taken possession of the same on 3.6.1973 as per report of roznamcha No. 383. It was further alleged that defendant No. 2 in collusion with defendant No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance on the basis of fictitious agreement and obtained by defendant No. 2 against defendant No. 1 had become infructuous because defendant No. 2 did not deposit or pay the amount to his alleged vendor up to 7.1.1971 and this omission had created a clog on the rights of the plaintiff.
5. The suit of plaintiff Gur Bachan Singh son of Mehar Singh was contested by defendant No. 2 Jai Singh who supported the decree for specific performance and also the order of the Court for extending time for the deposit of the amount.
6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:—
(1) Whether the plaintiff had purchased the suit land for Rs. 2,000/- as alleged in para No. 2 of the plaint? OPP.
(2) Whether defendant No. 2 in collusion with defendant No. 1 filed a suit for specific performance as alleged in para No. 3 of the plaint? If so, its effect? OPP.
(3) Whether the plaintiff is the owner in possession of agricultural land detailed in para No. 1 of the plaint? OPP.
(4) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is time barred? OPD.
(5) Whether the suit of the plaintiff does not he in the present form? OPD.
(6) Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs? If so, to what amount? OPD.
(7) Relief.
7. The parties led evidence in support of their case and ultimately the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff filed appeal before the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra who vide impugned judgment and decree dated 5.9.1981 dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that nothing was mentioned in the decree for specific performance as to what would happen to the decree if the amount was not deposited in time. The Court relied upon an authority reported as Smt. Sarupi v. Har Gian, (1974) 76 PLR 758 and stated that the decree of specific performance did not become ineffective automatically with the non-deposit of the balance consideration as contended by the present appellant and consequently the appeal was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the decision of the first Appellate Court, the present Regular Second Appeal by Gur Bachan Singh son of Mehar Singh and in my considered view the present appeal is also devoid of any merit for the reasons set forth in the subsequent portion of the judgment by which I would like to meet the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant Shri Hemant Kumar and these contentions were refuted by Shri Adarsh Jain, Advocate on behalf of the respondent.
8. Assailing the findings of the Courts below it was argued at the first instance by Shri Hemant Kumar that on 13.12.1971 there were no lis pending between defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The decree holder of the suit for specific performance was supposed to deposit the balance consideration up to 7.1.1971 but he did not do so. Rather he moved the application under section 148 C.P.C on 9.3.1971 which was allowed on 13.9.1971 Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff-appellant should be decreed. The second argument of Shri Hemant Kumar, Advocate was that the orders dated 13.9.1971 could not be passed as time was made the essence by the trial Court when it allowed time to the decree holder to deposit or pay the balance consideration up to 7.1.1971 The third submission raised by the learned counsel was that in the proceedings under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, his client was not heard who purchased the property by virtue of registered sale deed and it is a sufficient notice to the entire public under the provisions of Registration Act. On the contrary, the judgments and decree of the Courts below have been supported by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent and he has adopted the reasons which were advanced by the Courts below in dismissing the suit and rejecting the appeal.
9. A glance to the decree at dated 3.12.1971 Ex. D-6 would show that it was not a conditional decree. The suit for specific performance was decreed subject to payment of Rs. 1,100/- to be paid by the plaintiff on or before 7.1.1971 The Court never mentioned in the decree that in case the plaintiff does not deposit the amount on or before the stipulated date i.e 7.1.1971 his suit shall stand automatically dismissed. I-do not agree with the submission of Mr. Hemant Kumar that with the non-deposit of the balance consideration up to 7.1.1971 the decree dated 3.12.1970 would become non-executable. I also do not subscribe to the view that the time was made the essence of the contract up to 7.1.1971 The present plaintiff-appellant has stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor who was supposed to give notice to the present appellant. It is an admitted fact that the proceedings under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure were contested. Notice was given to the judgment debtor who sold the property to the contesting respondent. The order dated 13.9.1973 has been passed under the Code of Civil Procedure and not under the provisions of Specific Relief Act because there is no such provision in that Act that consequent upon decreeing of a suit by way of specific performance the decree holder was required to deposit the amount by a particular date failing which his suit would be deemed to have been dismissed. A bare reading to the provisions of section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly shows that where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Court, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.
10. The order dated 13.9.1973 by which the contesting respondent was allowed to deposit the balance consideration would give him a right to execute his decree dated 3.12.1970 The decree for specific performance dated 3.12.1970 would not lapse automatically on failure to pay the balance Consideration in time; rather it gives a right to the vendor to apply for rescission of the contract under section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act which has not been done by defendant No. 1 or by the present appellant who stepped into the shoes of his vendor and in this regard the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to a citation of this Court reported as Smt. Sarupi v. Har Gian, (1974) 76 PLR 758. I was held therein that:
“When a decree is silent as to what is to happen if the purchase money is not paid within the time fixed, the decree will not lapse automatically on the plaintiff's failure to pay within the prescribed time. The default will, however, entitle the vendor to apply for rescission of the contract under section 28(1). But so long as the vendor does not apply for such relief the decree subsists and the decree holder can still execute it within the period of limitation by depositing the purchase money within the time allowed or extended. If, however, the decree directs that in the event of default of deposit within the time fixed the suit shall stand dismissed, the court would be incompetent to extend the time. In such a case it will be deemed that the court has also, in substance, passed an order of rescission of contract as contemplated by the concluding portion of section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act.”
11. Again the perusal of the decree dated 3.12.1970 would show that it was not mentioned by the trial Court Judge the consequence in case the decree holder fails to deposit the amount of Rs. 1,100/- on or before 7.1.1971 In other words, the decree would survive and remain executable and would not automatically become redundant till it is got rescinded under section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on Someshwar Dayal v. Widow of Lalman Shah, AIR 1958 Allahabad 488.
12. Learned counsel Shri Hemant Kumar has tried to distinguish these authorities by raising an argument that the interest of the intervener i.e the plaintiff had come with the sale deed dated 13.2.1971 but as I have stated above, the present plaintiff will be bound by the decree dated 3.12.1970 as he has stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor who gave a contest to the proceedings under section 148 CPC. The counsel Shri Hemant Kumar also relied upon Johri Singh v. Sukh Lal Singh, 1988 (3) Judgments Today 382, Parmeshwari v. Naurata, (1984) 86 PLR 591. But these authorities are not helpful because in the cited cases the decrees were conditional. In the decree dated 3.12.1970 no consequential stipulation was incorporated by the trial Court and the order dated 13.9.1973 was never given challenge by the judgment debtor.
13. Resultantly, this Court is of the considered view that this appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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