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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Des Raj And Another.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (N.K. Sodhi, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts and procedural steps are taken from the opinion:
- Shop-cum-flat No. 26 in the Vegetable Market at Chandigarh was sold by Des Raj Gupta (respondent No. 1) to Smt. Ram Piari (respondent No. 2) by sale deed dated 23 February 1973 for an apparent consideration of Rs. 91,000.
- The competent authority believed the apparent consideration was less than the fair market value and referred the matter to the Valuation Officer, who reported a fair market value of Rs. 1,28,750.
- On the basis of that report, the competent authority initiated acquisition proceedings and a notice under section 269D(1) of the Income-tax Act was sent for publication in the Official Gazette on 26 July 1973; it was published on 11 August 1973.
- Copies of the notice were served on the transferor and transferee on 30 July 1973 and a copy was affixed to the property on 20 August 1973. The transferor and transferee filed objections on 10 September 1973 and 5 October 1973 respectively. The competent authority passed an order of acquisition dated 30 March 1978 under section 269F(6).
- The property was in occupation by Kesar Singh Lamba and Sons at a monthly rent of Rs. 400; a rent note dated 1 March 1973 existed. The competent authority did not serve any notice to the tenant.
- Both transferor and transferee appealed; the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh, by a common order dated 21 October 1978 allowed those appeals and set aside the acquisition order on two grounds: (a) no notice to the person in possession (tenant) meant initiation under section 269D was incomplete and void ab initio; and (b) mandatory provisions of section 269D(2) had not been complied with and service on the person in possession was a "must".
- The Commissioner of Income-tax (the Department/Revenue) filed the present appeal under section 269H of the Income-tax Act challenging the Tribunal's decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the failure to serve the tenant (person in occupation) with the notice required by section 269D(2) vitiates acquisition proceedings when the transferor and transferee (who were served) challenge the acquisition.
- Whether service of a notice on the transferor and transferee prior to publication of the notice in the Official Gazette (i.e., before the initiation of proceedings under section 269D(1)) invalidates subsequent acquisition proceedings and the order of acquisition.
- Whether, if acquisition proceedings are found vitiated by procedural defects, the appropriate remedy is to set aside the acquisition order permanently or to remit the matter back to the competent authority to proceed afresh.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Commissioner of Income-tax / Revenue)
- Argued that the Tribunal was incorrect to set aside the order of acquisition solely because the tenant had not been served; contended that the transferor and transferee, who had been personally served, could not assail the proceedings on the ground of non-service to the tenant because the tenant itself did not challenge the order.
- Argued that service of notice on the transferor and transferee before its publication in the Official Gazette was at most a procedural irregularity and did not vitiate the jurisdiction of the competent authority to initiate proceedings; accordingly, any defect could be corrected and did not require setting aside the acquisition order.
- Sought, alternatively, that if the order were vitiated, the matter should be remitted to the competent authority to proceed afresh because proceedings had been validly initiated on 11 August 1973.
Respondents (Transferor and Transferee)
- Contended before the Tribunal that the mandatory provisions of section 269D(2) had not been complied with—specifically, that notice had not been served on the person in occupation (tenant)—so the acquisition proceedings were invalid.
- Also contended that the notice under section 269D(2) had been served on them before its publication in the Official Gazette (i.e., prior to initiation under section 269D(1)), and that serving the notice before Gazette publication invalidated all subsequent proceedings, including the acquisition order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| CIT v. Amrit Sports Industries, [1983] 144 ITR 113 (Full Bench, P&H) | Held that publication in the Official Gazette under section 269D(1) is the primary step initiating proceedings; service/publication under section 269D(2) is supplemental; and only the person aggrieved by non-service of individual notice can complain. | The court relied on this decision for the propositions that (a) initiation is completed by Gazette publication and the other modes of service/publication are subservient, and (b) only the person on whom service was required and who is aggrieved can challenge non-service. The opinion also clarifies limits of Amrit's holding when distinguishing other authorities. |
| A. Premchand v. LAC of I.T., [1985] 153 ITR 774 (Karnataka High Court) | Held (as described in the opinion) that issuance of notice to transferors and transferees before Gazette publication did not affect the jurisdiction of the competent authority and was merely procedural. | The court considered this authority but expressly disagreed with its conclusion that pre-Gazette service is only a procedural defect that does not affect jurisdiction. The opinion distinguishes and rejects Premchand on that point. |
| B.M. Marappa v. LAC of I.T., [1986] 160 ITR 642 (Karnataka High Court) | Reiterated the Karnataka High Court's earlier view that defects in service under section 269D(2), including pre-Gazette service, were procedural and not jurisdictional. | The court noted this authority but declined to follow its view, treating the pre-publication service as a jurisdictional defect that vitiates the proceedings. |
| Satyn Narain Prakash Punj v. Union of India, [1986] 160 ITR 693 (Delhi High Court) | Held that a notice served on the transferor and transferee before its publication under section 269D(1) did not comply with the mandatory provisions of section 269D and was liable to be quashed. | The court expressly agreed with this view and relied on it in concluding that pre-Gazette service invalidated the authority's subsequent proceedings and order of acquisition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis follows two distinct strands corresponding to the principal grounds considered:
1. Non-service to the tenant (person in occupation)
The Tribunal had set aside the acquisition order because the competent authority did not serve the tenant and therefore, in the Tribunal's view, initiation under section 269D was incomplete. The Revenue argued that the transferor and transferee (who had been served) could not assail proceedings on the ground of non-service to the tenant because the tenant itself had not challenged the acquisition.
The court agreed with the Revenue on this point. Relying on the Full Bench decision in CIT v. Amrit Sports Industries, it held that only the person aggrieved by non-service of the individual notice under section 269D(2) can make a grievance of that non-service. Consequently, insofar as the Tribunal set aside the acquisition solely on the ground that the tenant had not been served, that conclusion could not stand against the transferor and transferee who had been validly served; that particular finding by the Tribunal was set aside.
2. Service of notice prior to Gazette publication (sequence of steps under section 269D)
The court then addressed a separate ground that had been raised before the Tribunal but left undecided there: whether serving the notice on the transferor and transferee before the notice was published in the Official Gazette (i.e., before initiation under section 269D(1)) invalidated the subsequent acquisition proceedings.
The court undertook a textual analysis of section 269D. It observed that subsection (1) requires initiation of acquisition proceedings by publication of a notice in the Official Gazette and that the publication in the Gazette is the event by which proceedings are validly initiated. Subsection (2) then prescribes that the competent authority shall cause a copy of that notice to be served on the transferor, transferee, person in occupation, and other known interested persons, and to cause publication in the office and locality.
From this statutory structure the court concluded that the Gazette publication must precede the service and local publications contemplated by subsection (2). Therefore, any service under subsection (2) that occurs before the Gazette publication is contrary to the scheme of the section and renders the proceedings initiated without jurisdiction.
The court reviewed competing authorities: it accepted the parts of the Amrit Sports Industries Full Bench decision that the Gazette publication is primary and that subsection (2) is supplemental; it agreed with the Delhi High Court in Satyn Narain Prakash Punj that pre-Gazette service did not comply with mandatory provisions and was liable to be quashed; but it disagreed with the Karnataka High Court decisions (A. Premchand and B.M. Marappa) which characterized pre-Gazette service as merely procedural rather than jurisdictional. The court concluded that pre-Gazette service is a jurisdictional defect and vitiates the acquisition proceedings.
Remand / Fresh Proceedings
The Revenue urged that, if the acquisition order were vitiated, the matter should be remitted to the competent authority to proceed afresh (because the Gazette publication occurred on 11 August 1973). The court refused to remand, giving two reasons stated in the opinion: (a) the sale occurred many years earlier (nearly 23 years earlier at the time of judgment), and third-party interests may have intervened making a fresh initiation inequitable; and (b) the difference between the apparent consideration and the fair market value was not substantial though it fell within the limits in section 269C.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed and the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal dated 21 October 1978 setting aside the competent authority's order of acquisition is upheld. The court held that the notice served on the transferor and transferee on 30 July 1973 (prior to publication in the Official Gazette on 11 August 1973) was unlawful and vitiated all subsequent proceedings including the order acquiring the property under section 269F(6).
Direct implications for the parties:
- The acquisition order passed by the competent authority is set aside and the Tribunal's decision allowing the appeals of the transferor and transferee is sustained.
- The appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax is dismissed with no order as to costs.
- The court declined to remit the matter to the competent authority for fresh proceedings because of the long passage of time and potential third-party interests.
The opinion contains statutory analysis of section 269D of the Income-tax Act and distinguishes earlier High Court authorities on whether pre-Gazette service is merely procedural or jurisdictional; the court treats pre-Gazette service as a jurisdictional defect. No broader binding precedent beyond the decision's holdings is asserted by the court other than its conclusions on the proper interpretation and application of section 269D as applied to the facts of the case.
N.K Sodhi, J.:— This appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 269H of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, “the Act”), is directed against the order dated October 21, 1978, of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh, whereby the order of acquisition passed by the competent authority acquiring the property in dispute under section 269F(6) of the Act was set aside and the two appeals filed by the transferor and the transferee allowed.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal which are not in dispute may first be noticed. Shop-cum-flat No. 26 in the Vegetable Market at Chandigarh was sold by Des Raj Gupta, respondent No. 1, to Smt. Ram Piari, wife of Kesar Singh Lamba, respondent No. 2, as per sale deed dated February 23, 1973, for an apparent consideration of Rs. 91,000. The competent authority had reason to believe that the apparent consideration was less than the fair market value of the property and a reference was, therefore, made to the Valuation Officer, Chandigarh, to determine the said value of the property so transferred. As per his report, the fair market value was Rs. 1,28,750. On receipt of this report, the competent authority initiated proceedings for acquiring the aforesaid property and accordingly notice under section 269D(1) of the Act was sent on July 26, 1973, for publication in the Official Gazette. It was published on August 11, 1973. A copy of that notice was served on the transferor and the transferee on July 30, 1973, and a copy thereof was also pasted on a conspicuous part of the property on August 20, 1973. The transferor and the transferee filed their objections on September 10, 1973, and October 5, 1973, respectively, and after hearing the parties, the competent authority made an order dated March 30, 1978, for acquisition of the property. It is common ground between the parties that the aforesaid shop-cum-flat had been rented out to Kesar Singh Lamba and Sons on a monthly rent of Rs. 400 and that a rent note dated March 1, 1973, was executed between the landlord and the tenant. It is also not in dispute that the competent authority while acquiring the property did not issue any notice to the tenant, namely, Kesar Singh Lamba and Sons. Being aggrieved by the order of acquisition, the transferor and the transferee both filed separate appeals which were disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal by a common order dated October 21, 1978. The Tribunal did not hear the parties on the merits as it was of the opinion that the mandatory provisions of section 269D(2) of the Act had not been complied with. The appeals were allowed and the order of acquisition was set aside on the two grounds reproduced hereunder:
“(a) That there being no issue of notice to the person in possession of the property, the initiation of the proceedings as provided under section 269D of the Act was not complete and, therefore, acquisition proceedings were void ab initio.
(b) That no order could be passed without complying with the mandatory provisions of section 269D(2) of the Act and service on the person in possession of the property being a ‘must’, the order passed is bad.”
3. Mr. R.P Sawhney, learned counsel for the Department, has strenuously urged that the Tribunal was not right in setting aside the order of acquisition merely because notice under section 269D(2) of the Act had not been served on the tenant. He contended that even though it was necessary to serve the tenant yet the order could not be set aside because the tenant did not challenge the order of acquisition before the Tribunal and the transferor and the transferee both of whom had been personally served could not assail the acquisition proceedings on the ground of nonservice of notice on the tenant. There is merit in this contention.
4. It is true that under sub-section (2) of section 269D of the Act, a notice had to be served on the person in occupation of the property sought to be acquired under Chapter XX-A of the Act. This not having been done the competent authority obviously committed a procedural irregularity which by itself may not vitiate the proceedings at the instance of the transferor and the transferee. It would have been a different matter if the tenant had impugned the proceedings on the ground of non-service of notice on it but that is not the case here. As held by a Full Bench of this court in CIT v. Amrit Sports Industries, [1983] 144 ITR 113, it is only the person aggrieved by the non-service of the individual notice under section 269D(2) of the Act upon him who can make a grievance thereof. Consequently, the transferor and the transferee who had been validly served in the present case could not assail the acquisition proceedings on the ground of non-service of notice on the tenant of the property and the finding recorded by the Tribunal to that effect will have to be set aside.
5. However, we propose to uphold the order of the Tribunal on another ground that was raised before it but left undecided in view of the fact that the Tribunal had agreed with the contention of the appellants before it that the mandatory provisions of section 269D(2) of the Act had not been complied with. It was contended before the Tribunal on behalf of the transferor and the transferee that the notice under section 269D(2) of the Act was served on them before its publication in the Official Gazette, that is, before the proceedings for acquisition were initiated and, therefore, all subsequent proceedings leading to the passing of the order of acquisition must be set aside. On a consideration of the provisions of section 269D of the Act, the Tribunal took the view that all the modes of publication and service contemplated by these provisions could be taken up by the competent authority simultaneously or in any order but it was necessary that those mentioned in sub-section (2) thereof including the person in occupation of the property must be served and the procedure must be completed within a period of nine months from the date of the transfer. It rejected the argument that the sequence of publication and service of notice should be the same as given in the section. We do not agree with this view of the Tribunal. Section 269D of the Act which falls in Chapter XX-A reads as under:
“269D. (1) The competent authority shall initiate proceedings for the acquisition, under this Chapter, of any immovable property referred to in section 269C by notice to that effect published in the Official Gazette:
Provided that no such proceedings shall be initiated in respect of any immovable property after the expiration of a period of six months from the end of the month in which the instrument of transfer in respect of such property is registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908):
Provided further that—
(a) in a case where it is determined under sub-section (4) of section 269B by the competent authority who has initiated proceedings for the acquisition of any immovable property under, this Chapter or by the Board that such competent authority has no jurisdiction to initiate such proceedings, the competent authority having jurisdiction may initiate such proceedings within—
(i) the period of six months specified in the foregoing proviso; or
(ii) a period of thirty days from the date of such determination, whichever period expires later;
(b) in a case where proceedings for the acquisition of any immovable property under this Chapter could not be initiated during any period of time by reason of any injunction or order of any court prohibiting the initiation of such proceedings or preventing the examination of documents or other materials required to be examined for the purpose of determining whether such proceedings should be initiated, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn shall be excluded in computing the period during which such proceedings may be initiated under this sub-section.
(2) The competent authority shall—
(a) cause a notice under sub-section (1) in respect of any immovable property to be served on the transferor, the transferee, the person in occupation of the property, if the transferee is not in occupation thereof, and on every person whom the competent authority knows to be interested in the property;
(b) cause such notice to be published—
(i) in his office by affixing a copy thereof in a conspicuous place;
(ii) in the locality in which the immovable property to which it relates is situate, by affixing a copy thereof in a conspicuous part of the property and also by making known in such manner as may be prescribed the substance of such notice at convenient places in the said locality.”
6. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that before the competent authority can proceed to acquire the property under Chapter XX-A of the Act, it is necessary to first initiate the proceedings for acquisition under section 269D(1) and this can be done by a notice to that effect published in the Official Gazette. It is only on the publication of this notice that the proceedings get validly initiated and it is thereafter that the competent authority is required to serve a copy of that notice on the transferor, the transferee, the person in occupation of the property and on other persons whom the competent authority knows to be interested in the property. A copy of that notice has also to be published in his office as also in the locality in which the property is situate by affixing a copy thereof on a conspicuous part of the property and by making it known in the prescribed manner the substance of the notice at convenient places in the locality. In the present case, the notice was served on the transferor and the transferee on July 30, 1973, whereas the notice was published in the Official Gazette on August 11, 1973. In other words, the proceedings were initiated after service of notice on the transferor and the transferee. This could not be done in view of the provisions of section 269D of the Act. As already observed, the first step to be taken is the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette and all other modes of service and publication have to follow thereafter. Thus, a notice in terms of section 269D(2) can be served on all those on whom it is required to be served only after it has been published in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1) thereof. The view that we are taking finds support from the Full Bench judgment of this court in Amrit Sports Industries' case, [1983] 144 ITR 113, wherein Sandhawalia C.J, speaking for the court, observed as under (page 121:
“The law provides primarily and first, the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette and then a replica thereof is to be served on individuals or published as laid down in sub-section (2)(b). An overall analysis thereof would disclose that apart from publication in the Gazette, the law also provides a publication in the locality where the property is situated as also affixing a copy thereof in the office of the competent authority. These are in the nature of public notices supplemental to the publication in the Official Gazette which plants presumptive knowledge of the same to everyone concerned. Apart from these, a further modus of service of notice is provided on the transferor, the transferee, the occupant and other persons interested in the property if known to the competent authority. I am clearly of the view that these are subservient and supplemental provisions and the initiation of proceedings is complete with the publication in the Official Gazette.”
7. The question that now arises is as to whether a notice served on the transferor or the transferee before the initiation of proceedings would invalidate the acquisition proceedings including the order of acquisition. The argument of Mr. Sawhney, appearing for the Revenue, is that service of a notice on the transferor or the transferee before its publication in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1) was a mere irregularity and it would not vitiate the proceedings commenced by the competent authority. He submitted that the purpose of such a notice was only to put the transferor and the transferee on guard and to inform them that the competent authority had decided to initiate the proceedings for acquisition of the property in question. Reliance in this regard was placed on the observations of the Full Bench of this court in Amrit. Sports Industries' case, [1983] 144 ITR 113 and also on the judgments of the Karnataka High Court in A. Premchcmd v. LAC of I.T, [1985] 153 ITR 774 and B.M Marappa v. LAC of L.T, [1986] 160 ITR 642. As already observed earlier, the proceedings for acquisition have first to be validly initiated before any of the persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 269D of the Act are served. If before the initiation of proceedings by publication of a notice in the Official Gazette, a notice is served on any one of those mentioned in subsection (2), the proceedings before the competent authority would be without jurisdiction. The service of notice and its publication under section 269D(2) are subservient and supplemental to the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette and, therefore, in the very nature of things the service of notice under sub-section (2) cannot precede the publication in the Official Gazette. It will be open to the transferor or the transferee or any one of those mentioned in sub-section (2.) to ignore such a notice. A similar question arose before the Delhi High Court in Satyn Narain Prakash Punj v. Union of India, [1986] 160 ITR 693, wherein the learned judge after noticing the provisions of section 269D of the Act held that a notice served on the transferor and the transferee before its publication under sub-section (1) of section 269D did not comply with the mandatory provisions of this section and was liable to be quashed. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned judge. In Amrit Sports Industries' case, [1983] 144 ITR 113, the Full Bench of this court held that the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under subsection (1) of section 269D has to precede the service thereof under subsection (2). Once this is done, the learned judges were of the opinion that any procedural defect in the service of the notice under sub-section (2) of section 269D will not necessarily vitiate the acquisition proceedings. The learned judges of the Karnataka High Court in A. Premchand's case, [1985] 153 ITR 774, while relying upon the following observations of S.S Sandhawalia C.J in Amrit Sports Industries' case, [1983] 144 ITR 113 (P&H) [FB], have held that issue of notice to the transferors and the transferees before its publication in the Official Gazette did not affect the jurisdiction of the competent authority and the defect was only a procedural one (page 784 of 153 ITR):
“The proceedings under section 269D(2) of the Act being procedural and supplementary, are in no way jurisdictional. Any defect or irregularity therein consequently cannot affect the assumption of jurisdiction by the competent authority and, therefore, in no way vitiates the initiation of proceedings once validly done. Therefore, a default in service of the persons interested or even of publication under sub-section 2(b) does not affect the jurisdiction of the competent authority but at the very highest pertains to the exercise of the power thereunder. It is well-settled that an erroneous exercise of the power does not vitiate the proceedings, but merely calls for correction, be it in the appellate, revisional or any other jurisdiction.”
8. In our opinion, the Full Bench in Amrit Sports Industries' case, [1983] 144 ITR 113 (P&H) did not hold that even where the notice is served under sub-section (2) prior to its publication under sub-section (1), the error committed by the competent authority is only procedural and not jurisdictional. Such a defect is one of jurisdiction and the competent authority cannot proceed to make an order acquiring the property. We do not, therefore, in all respect agree with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in A. Premchand's case, [1983] 153 ITR 774 and B.M Marappa's case, [1986] 160 ITR 642 (Kar). In B.M Marappa's case, [1986] 160 ITR 642, the Karnataka High Court reiterated its earlier view while placing reliance on A. Premchand's case, [1985] 153 ITR 774.
9. In the result, it must be held that the notice served on the transferor and the transferee on July 30, 1973, before it was published in the Official Gazette was illegal and all subsequent proceedings including the order acquiring the property under section 269F(6) of the Act stood vitiated. We, therefore, uphold the impugned order of the Tribunal setting aside the order of the competent authority.
10. It was lastly contended on behalf of the Revenue that even if the order of the competent authority stood vitiated on the ground that notice was served on the transferor and the transferee before the proceedings were validly initiated, the case should be remanded to the competent authority for proceeding afresh because the proceedings had been validly initiated on August 11, 1973, and that thereafter the said authority can proceed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, we do not propose to adopt this course. The property in question was sold almost 23 years back and by now third party interests might have intervened and it would be most inequitable to permit the proceedings to start again after a lapse of such a long period. Moreover, the difference between the apparent consideration and the fair market value of the property is not much though it falls within the limits prescribed by section 269C of the Act.
11. The appeal thus stands dismissed with no order as to costs.
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