Guru Nanak Education Trust v. Balbir Singh .

G.S Singhvi, J. — This revision is directed against the order dated 19.9.1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1994 (Balbir Singh and others v. Guru Nanak Education Trust and others). The petitioners are aggrieved against the order dated 19.9.1994 because the learned Additional District Judge has accepted the appeal filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and has dismissed the injunction application filed by the petitioners.

2. In order to determine the various points raised in this petition, it is necessary to make reference to the facts of the case. Guru Nanak Education Trust was registered vide Trust Deed, dated 1.6.1969 Originally there were seven trustees and the trust deed contemplated appointment of more trustees. Initially Shri Avtar Singh was the President of the Board of Trustees. He resigned in the year 1970 and was succeede by Shri Gurnam Singh. Avtar Singh was unanimously elected as President when the said office became vacant due to the death of Sh. Gurnam Singh Avtar Singh, relinquished the office of the President on account of medical reasons and in the meeting of the Members held on 7.3.1981 Gurbir Singh was elected as President. On 21.7.1985 Gurbir Singh was removed and was replaced by Ujagar Singh. On 15.10.1986 Ujagar Singh was removed from the office of the President and in his place Avtar Singh was elected. On 30.12.1992 the office of President again became vacant due to the death of Avtar Singh. In the meeting held on 15.2.1992 Gurbir Singh was authorised to appoint any person as President. He, however, did not exercise his power and, therefore, election was held. In this election Gurbir Singh was elected as President. In this meeting Shri Balbir Singh was elected as Vice-President and Jagdev Singh Grewal was elected as Secretary. It was also resolved in the meeting on 9.4.1993 that the President, the Vice-President and the Secretary will operate the bank account by any two of them jointly signing the papers.

3. It appears that dispute arose between the parties sometime in July/August, 1993. On 26.8.1993 Secretary of the Trust wrote a letter to the trustees calling upon them to submit agenda items for the next meeting. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 suggested certain items one of which was that the venue of the Trust meeting should not be outside the premises of the Girls College. They also gave out that in case the items mentioned by them were not included in the agenda their letter dated 30.8.1993 should be taken as a requisition for the Trust meeting. On 3.9.1993, the Secretary of the Trust issued telegrams for meeting on 7.9.1993 which was to be held at Chandigarh. On their part, respondents Nos. 1 to 3 sent telegrams dated 4.9.1993 that a requisition meeting of the Trust will be held in the College premises at Ludhiana. They also questioned the legality of the meeting to be held at Chandigarh. On 5.9.1993 Vice-President of the Trust issued telegrams to the members calling upon them to attend the meeting at Chandigarh and asserted that the meeting being held at Chandigarh was a legal one. On 7.9.1993 two meeting were held - one at Chandigarh and the other at Ludhiana. The Chandigarh meeting was attended by the President, Secretary and one trustee Baldev Singh. Avtar Singh was represented by proxy. In this meeting it was decided to adopt the rules for donor trustees. At the same time, respondents Nos. 7 and 8 were inducted as donor trustees. Minutes of the meeting held on 8.9.1993 were also confirmed. The Ludhiana meeting was attended by three persons respondents Nos. 1 to 3 - who appointed themselves as President, Vice-President and Secretary of the Trust respectively. They also decided to operate the bank account of the Trust. At the same time, one Parminder Singh was appointed as a trustee. A letter dated 7.9.1993 was sent by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to the Bank stating therein that they were authorised to operate the bank account.

4. On 8.9.1993 a notice was sent to all the members of the Trust for a meeting to be held on 12.9.1993 The meeting was in fact held on that date and it was resolved that the meeting held by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 at Ludhiana was illegal.

5. On 18.9.1993 the plaintiff-petitioners instituted a suit for declaration that the meeting held at Ludhiana was illegal. They also sought injunction for restraining the defendant-respondents from giving effect to the resolutions passed in the meeting held at Ludhiana. Under an order passed by this Court on 1.2.1994 the suit was transferred from the Court at Phillaur to the Court of Senior Sub-Judge at Jalandhar.

6. Along with the suit the plaintiff-petitioners filed an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for grant of temporary injunction. After hearing the parties the learned Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Jalandhar, passed order dated 28.7.1994 and accepted the prayer of the petitioners for grant of injunction. The appeal filed by the respondents against this order has been accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar.

7. The first argument of Mr. Sarin is that the learned Appellate Court has committed a patent jurisdictional error by holding that the suit filed by the petitioners is not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Sarin argued that no objection to the maintainability of the suit was raised by the respondents either in their written statement or in their reply to the injunction application filed by the petitioners, that no such point was raised before the trial Court, that such plea was not taken in the Memo of appeal, and, therefore the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the objection at the time of hearing of the appeal. Mr. Sarin argued unless an objection was specifically raised by the respondents in their pleadings, the Appellate Court should not have allowed them to build up an argument with reference to Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned counsel, provisions of Section 92 are not attracted in the instant case because none of the clauses of Section 92 is applicable to the suit filed by the petitioners. In the alternative, Mr. Sarin argued that if an objection had been raised in the written statement or in the reply to the injunction application, the petitioners could have made a prayer to the Court to grant permission for filing of the suit. Shri Kapoor, Sr. Advocate, appearing for some of the respondents, argued that although the plea involving bar to the maintainability of the suit in the context of Section 92 was not raised specifically in the written statement or in the reply to the injunction application, from the very plaint filed by the petitioners this objections could be raised by the respondents.

8. A look at the averments made in the plaint, the written statement, the injunction application and its reply shows that the suit filed by the petitioners simply seeks a declaration that the meeting held on 7.9.1993 at Ludhiana by defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and the decisions taken therein by them are illegal, null and void, without authority and jurisdiction. Relief in the form of permanent injunction restraining defendants Nos. 1 to 4 from operating the bank account of the plaintiff-Trust has been sought. It has also been prayed that they should be restrained from interfering or obstructing the working of plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 as President and Secretary respectively in the implementation and enforcement of the decisions made by the Trust in its meeting held on 7.9.1993 at Chandigarh. In the written statement defendant-respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have raised objections of misjoinder of parties, lack of locus standi in the plaintiff-petitioners and bad conduct of the plaintiff-petitioners. An objection has been raised that the suit is barred by Section 41 of the Specific Reliefs Act. It is, thus, clear that the defendants-respondents have not specifically raised a plea that the suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioners is not maintainable because it has neither been instituted by the Advocate-General nor by the plaintiff-petitioners after obtaining leave of the Court. Perusal of the order passed by the trial Court shows that no such objection was raised before it at the time of arguments. Even in the Memo, of appeal filed by the respondents such an objection has not been raised. Therefore the argument of Shri Sarin that such an objection should not have been allowed to be raised by the Lower Appellate Court for the first time during the course of hearing of the appeal deserves to be accepted. Learned counsel for the petitioners is right in contending that if such an objection has been raised in the written statement or in reply to the injunction application, the petitioners could have made an application and prayed before the trial Court that they be granted leave to institute the suit.

9. Argument of Shri Sarin that the provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted in the present case does merit a mention. A suit can be said to be covered by Section 92 if relief is sought for -

(a) removing any trustee;

(b) appointing a new trustee;

(c) vesting any property in a trustee;

(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed, or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any Trust property in his possession to the person entitled to possession of such property;

(d) directing accounts and inquiries;

(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;

(f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;

(g) settling a scheme; or

(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.

10. Prima facie, the suit filed by the plaintiff-petitioners does not fall within the ambit and scope of Section 92 and as has been held by the Supreme Court in Swami Permatmanand Sraswati and another v. Ramji Tripathi and another, A.I.R 1974 S.C 2141, every suit claiming the reliefs specified in Section 92 cannot be brought under Section 92 because section 92 envisages suit of a special nature which pre-supposes the existence of a public trust of religious or charitable character. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust. Furthermore, the plaintiff must pray for any one or more of the reliefs that are mentioned in the section. If the allegation of breach of trust is not substantiated or if the plaintiff has not made out a case for any direction by the Court for proper administration of the trust, the very foundation of a suit under Section 92 would fall. In that very case the Court held that only such suits can be brought under Section 92 which besides claiming any of the reliefs enumerated in Section 92 are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. Their Lordships further observed that in order to determine as to whether a suit falls within Section 92, the Court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the purpose for which the suit was brought. The Court went on to observe -

“When the right to the office of a trustee is asserted or denied and relief asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside Section 92.”

Similarly, in Jamiat Dawat wa Tabligh Islam v. Mohammad Sharif, A.I.R 1928 Lahore 869, it has been held that where a suit is instituted by a person claiming to be a trustee of property dedicated for religious purposes for a declaration that he is a trustee and is entitled to manage the institution as such but the relief he claims is in his individual capacity and not in a representative capacity and the suit is against a rival trustee or one who claims to be a trustee such a suit does not fall under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure.

11. What the learned Additional Districts Judge has done is that without there being any basis for the plea that the suit was not instituted in accordance with the provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is therefore no maintainable, he has held that the suit has been brought on behalf of the trust and against the defendants who were the trustees and as the trust is of charitable character it is within the scope of Section 92. No doubt, the learned Additional District Judge has made reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati's case (supra) but has totally failed to appreciate the principles laid down by the Supreme Court about the applicability of Section 92. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court on the issue of applicability of Section 92 is held to be patently erroneous.

12. The second contention urged by Mr. Sarin is that the learned lower Appellate Court has committed various illegality in holding that the plaintiff-petitioners have failed to make out a prima facie case and that they will not suffer irreparable injury. Shri Sarin argued that the learned lower Appellate Court could not have interfered with the order of injunction passed by the trial Court without holding that the said order was perverse or wholly arbitrary or was passed by the trial Court ignoring the settled legal principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, and as no such conclusion has been recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court, it would not have interfered with the order of injunction passed by the trial Court. Shri Sarin relied on a decision of this Court in Krishan Kumar — Petitioner v. State Of Haryana —, 1992 (1) RRR 433(P&H) : 1992 (1) Revenue Law Reporter 207. Shri Kapoor, learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents, submitted that the Appellate Court has given cogent reasons for setting aside the order of the trial Court and, therefore, this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff-petitioners stood removed from the office of the President and the Secretary of the Trust and, therefore, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to pass order of injunction at their instance. Learned counsel vehemently submitted that the lower Court had no authority to pass a mandatory injunction in favour of the petitioners. He invited Court's attention to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ramchandra Tanwar v. Ram Rakhmal Amichand and another, A.I.R 1971 Rajasthan 292; and a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Durg Transport Co. Private Ltd., Durg v. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur and others, A.I.R 1965 Madhya Pradesh 142.

13. A look at the order passed by the trial Court on 28.7.1994 shows that the trial Court has made a detailed reference to the rival pleadings and then observed:—

“I find that it is admitted fact between the parties that the plaintiff Trust is a registered Trust created vide Trust Deed dated 1.8.1989 There is no dispute regarding founder trustees, etc. There is also no dispute that before 7.9.1993 plaintiff No. 2 was the President and plaintiff No. 3 was the Secretary of the Trust as stated in para 9 of the written statement. It is also an admitted fact between the parties that S. Jagdev Singh Grewal, Secretary, issued a letter to the trustees for inviting agenda points. It is also admitted between the parties that defendants Nos. 1 to 3 vide their letter dated 30.8.1993 in response to the letter dated 26.8.1993 gave some agenda points for the proposed meeting. It is also admitted that Secretary sent a telegram to the trustees for holding meeting on 7.9.1993 at 10.30 a.m at 286, Sector 10-A, Chandigarh. It is admitted fact also between the parties that Jaswinder Singh was appointed as Trustee vide resolution dated 2.12.1988 There is a dispute now between the parties regarding the resignation of Jaswinder Singh dated 11.4.1993 The plaintiff alleged that Jaswinder Singh resigned on 11.4.1993 and vide resolution dated 12.4.1993 Baldev Singh, defendant No. 6, was appointed trustee which is also signed by defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The defendants have stated that Jaswinder Singh wrote letter to all the trustees dated 29.7.1993 that he never resigned from the Trust and his resignation has been fabricated. Jaswinder Singh is now dead. It is admitted at the time of argument that before 7.9.1993 Baldev Singh was not removed being trustee. The dispute between the parties arose on 7.9.1993 when plaintiffs Nos. 2, 3 and defendant No. 6 Baldev Singh attended the meeting at Chandigarh, whereas defendants Nos. 1 to 3 held meeting at Ludhiana. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 alleged that the meeting held by them is a requisitioned meeting and it is a valid meeting and the decisions taken in this meeting are valid and resolution passed on 7.9.1993 is also valid resolution whereas plaintiffs alleged that the meeting held at Ludhiana by defendants Nos. 1 to 4 is illegal, null and void as first of all it cannot be treated as requisitioned meeting. Secondly notice of this meeting at Ludhiana was not given to Baldev Singh trustee. Thirdly, defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had no right to elect new President and Secretary for which there was no agenda. Similarly, they cannot pass resolution for operating bank account. It is also the case of the plaintiff that plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are not removed from Presidentship and Secretary, therefore, the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 are still President and Secretary. On the other hand, defendants' case is that meeting held at Chandigarh is void because meeting is to be held at the Trust office and without the consent of all the trustees it cannot be held at Chandigarh. Consequently, learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that Baldev Singh cannot be treated as trustee because resignation letter of Jaswinder Singh had been forged. Thirdly, he argued that Dr. Attar Singh cannot be treated as present through poxy because trust deed specifially barred proxy when the person is present in India. Learned counsel for the defendant next argued that suit is not maintainable in the present form and further there is no irreparable loss to the plaintiff as the beneficiaries are the students, etc. of the Trust. He also argued that the intention of the creator of the Trust is that the decision should be taken by the trustees in the meetings and majority decisions will be treated as decisions of all. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are trustees and they cannot be restrained being co-trustees i.e co-owners from taking part in the trust affairs. Learned counsel for the defendants also argued that the newly appointed trustees as donor trustees cannot be appointed legally became these are specifically barred by resolution.

From the documents on the record I find that vide letter dated 26.28.1993, Jagdev Singh, plaintiff No. 3, as Secretary of the Guru Nanak Education Trust called for the items to be included in the agenda of the meeting. Vide letter dated 30.8.1993 photostat copy of which is placed on the record Balibir Singh, M.S Grewal and Gurinder Singh Grewal have given nine points to be incoluded in the agenda meeting. It is written in this letter that the items given above may be included in the agenda in the proposed meeting. In case the items are not included in the agenda notice may be taken as a requisition for the trust meeting. The photostat copy of the items of agenda is also placed on the record which is dated 3.9.1993 I have perused the letter dated 30.8.1993 and agenda items. The item regarding condoling the death of Jaswinder Singh is included in the agenda item. Discussion regarding his resignation is also included in the agenda item. Similarly, the proposed agenda item regarding factum of governing council and the matter relating to the appointment of Punjabi lecturers and regarding seminar and use of complex by the outside guests in college etc. regarding meeting dated 8.5.1993 and regarding installation of photo of S. Lakhmi Singh all included in the agenda. Therefore, the requisitioned meeting was to be treated only if these items were not included. Therefore, the meeting held by the defendants at Ludhiana prima facie cannot be treated as requisitioned meeting. Secondly, no notice of this meeting was given to Baldev Singh, Trustee-President nor there is any document to prove the same as it was necessary to give notice to all the trustees. Further there was no agenda to remove earlier President and Secretary of the Trust and to appoint new one. Similarly, there as no agenda to change the operation of the bank account by other trustee etc. Similarly, I have perused the copy of the resolution passed on 7.9.1993 at Ludhiana. The earlier President and Secretary who are plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 are not removed before electing fresh President and Secretary. So from the above discussion it is prima facie clear that defendants Nos. 1 to 4 who held meeting at Ludhiana and passed resolution dated 7.9.1993 have not passed the same in a legal and validly called meeting. It cannot be treated as requisitioned meeting and no notice of this meeting was given to all the trustees. Further the earlier President and Secretary were not removed and there was no agenda to change the operation of bank accounts by other co- trustees.”

14. The learned trial Court then examined the issue of irreparable injury and observed.

“There is good prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs as they were holding office of President and Secretary of the Trust and fresh were elected by some of the co-trustees which cannot be treated as legal and valid meeting. As regarding the fact of irreparable loss, the plaintiffs who are holding office though honorary of the Trust have not been removed by a valid resolution by the trustees and fresh President and Secretary have been elected. Therefore, it will amount to irreparable loss to the plaintiffs, if they also obstructed in their functions.”

15. Trial Court also held that if temporary injunction is not granted the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable loss.

16. The learned lower Appellate Court too referred to the pleadings and then held that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 92.

17. In para 10 of its order, the learned lower Appellate Court observed that various issues involving the legality of the meetings held at Chandigarh and Ludhiana, about the validity of appointment of Baldev Singh as trustee, about the validity of resignation of Jaswinder Singh and the issue relating to the notice given to Dr. Attar Singh are required to be decided and all such questions can be decided after the parties are given opportunity to adduce their respective evidence and the trial Court fell in error in holding that the meeting held at Ludhiana was not valid. The Appellate Court observed that the finding recorded by the trial Court amounts to deciding the suit finally and it was not proper for the trial Court to grant injunction and to restore back the position as it existed before 18.9.1993 The Appellate Court also held that by no means it can be said that the plaintiff had a prima facie case and that balance of convenience was also not in their favour. The Appellate Court also held that the meeting held at Chandigarh was also improper and that in any case there was no justification to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiffs.

18. A reading of the order passed by the Appellate Court shows that the said Court has nowhere recorded a finding that the trial Court has recorded a finding of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss without applying the settled principles of law or that it has ignored any material fact while recording a finding in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners. The lower Appellate Court has also not held that the conclusions recorded by the trial Court are perverse or are against the settled principles of law. Without recording any such finding, the Appellate Court has proceeded to contradict the conclusions recorded by the trial Court as if the lower Appellate Court was itself exercising the jurisdiction of the trial Court and in my opinion this course adopted by the Appellate Court has the effect of rendering its order as patently illegal and the one which has occasioned failure of justice. The extent and scope of jurisdiction of the lower Appellate Court to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Order 39, rules 1 and 3, has been discussed in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur, A.I.R 1977 Rajasthan 196. A learned Single Judge of that Court has summed up the legal position in the following words:—

“The order refusing temporary injunction of a discretionary character. - Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant records.

The mere possibility of the Appellate Court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence will also not justify interference.”

19. Same view has been expressed by this Court in Krishan Kumar's case (supra). In that case, this Court has observed-

“A perusal of the Appellate Court's order shows that it has not assigned any cogent reason to set aside the discretion exercised exercised by the trial Court. The lower Appellate Court has not demonstrated as to how on admitted facts principles of law have been wrongly applied. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the lower Appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the order and interfering in the discretion exercised by the trial Court.”

20. Since the lower Appellate Court has ignored the well established principles of law which govern the exercise of its jurisdiction qua an order passd by the trial Court, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115.

21. In addition to the above-mentioned legal infirmities with which the impugned order of the learned lower Appellate Court suffers, I find that the lower Appellate Court has completely misdirected itself in appreciating the controversy raised before it. Apparently, the learned Additional District Judge has lost sight of the fact that the plaintiff-petitioners had challenged the legahty of the meeting held at Ludhiana. Instead of concentrating his attention to the defects in the meeting held at Ludhiana, the learned lower Appellate Court has directed its attention to the issue of the meeting held at Chandigarh. Thus, the learned Additional District Judge completely ignored the fact that the legality of the meeting held at Chandigarh was not at all in issue and the defects in the meeting held at Chandigarh were inconsequential for deciding the issue regarding the validity of the meeting held at Ludhiana. Indeed, it has not been disputed before this Court that the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 held the office of President and Secretary of the Trust on 26.8.1993 and on 7.9.1993 It is also not in dispute that Secretary of the Trust had written to the trustees to submit agenda items for the next meeting and vide their letter (at page 76 of the record of the trial Court) dated 30.8.1993 respondents Nos. 1 to 3 didsubmit the items to be included in the agenda. No doubt, they did give a veiled threat of requisitioned meeting by saying that if the items were not included in the agenda, their letter should be treated as requisition for a meeting. The learned Appellate Court has not at all applied its mind to the contents of the letter dated 30.8.1993 written by the respondents in the context of the agenda. A comparative reading of the letter written by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to the Secretary of the Trust and the agenda prepared by the Secretary for the meeting of 7.9.1993 shows that the items which the petitioners wanted to be included in the agenda figured in the agenda. Point No. 1 in the letter of the respondents appears at item No. 1 in the agenda. Point No. 2 appears at item No. 9. Point No. 3 appears at item No. 13. Point No. 4 appears partly at No. 12. Point No. 5 appears at No. 5. Points Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 appear at Sr. Nos. 7, 14, 10 and 5 of the agenda. It is, therefore, evident that the condition which the respondents had incorporated in their letter dated 30.8.1993 had been met by the plaintiff-respondent No. 3 while issuing the agenda for the meeting. This being the position, there was no justification legal or otherwise for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to send telegrams for holding the requisitioned meeting on 7.9.1993 at Ludhiana. While the learned trial Court examined this issue in detail, the learned lower Appellate Court has avoided a prima facie finding on this issue by simply observing that the dispute can be resolved after recording evidence. On the issue of prima facie illegality of the resolution passed in the meeting held at Ludhiana also the lower Appellate Court has tried to avoid a prima facie decision. It has altogether over-looked the fact that in the so-called requisitioned meeting held at Ludhiana there was no agenda for removal of the existing office-bearers of the Trust or for election of new office-bearers. Similarly, there was no agenda relating to the operation of the bank account and that the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 passed three resolutions even without agenda. Therefore, prima facie resolutions passed in the so called requisitioned meeting were without any authority. In this regard, it is significant to mention that there exists a specific provision regarding the meetings of the Trust and the manner in which the vacancies are required to be filled. The Trust Deed which appears at pages 52 to 59 of the file of the trial Court contains various provisions. Para III(3) says that the trustees shall exercise their powers and perform their duties as a Committee and except as otherwise provided in the instructions all resolutions are required to be passed by majority of the votes for the trustees in a meeting properly called and held as provided in the rules. Para IV deals with vacancies in the office of the trustees. Sub-paras (1) and (2) of para IV read as under:—

“IV) A Trustee shall hold office for the lifetime but this shall become vacant as provided under the Indian Trust Act and also by -

(1) His resignation from the office. In this case the office shall become vacant as soon as the remaining trustees by a majority of votes accept the resignation. In case of the refusal of the trustees to accept the resignation, the office shall become vacant three months after the date of resignation unless the resignation is withdrawn earlier.

(2) His dismissal or discharge by the remaining trustees by resolution unanimously passed by the trustees in their special meeting held for this purpose and called with a clear fifteen days written notice to all the trustees including the trustees proposed to be dismissed or discharged. The dismissal or discharge shall not take effect until a similar resolution is again passed unanimously in a meeting called and held after an interval of two months from the date of the passing of the previous resolution. Provided further that only one trustee can be dismissed at one time in this manner.”

22. Para V(10) says that the Managing Committee shall elect its office-bearers in a special meeting called for this purpose. In terms of para X(6) quorum for the meeting of the trustees shall be 1/3rd of the number of trustees with a minimum of 3.

23. A bare reading of sub-paras (1) and (2) of Para IV of the Trust Deed clearly shows that before the trustee can be removed, a notice of 15 clear days is required to be given to all the members and the purpose of the meeting has to be indicated in such a notice. This provision has to be treated as mandatory because removal of a person from the office of trustee has grave consequences. What has happened in this case is that no notice, what to say of 15 days' clear notice, was given by the respondents indicating that there was a proposal to remove the existing office-bearers of the Trust. This matter was not included even in the agenda prepared by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 for the meeting held at Ludhiana. Therefore, the resolution passed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 is prima facie illegal. Similarly, in the absence of any agenda for election of the new office-bearers, the resolution passed in the meeting held at Ludhiana electing respondents Nos. 1 to 3 as new office-bearers is prima facie illegal. It must, therefore, be held that the trial Court was right in holding that the meeting held at Ludhiana was prima facie illegal and the various resolutions passed in the said meeting were also per se illegal. The Appellate Court has interfered with these findings without any justification. Rather it has misdirected itself in going into the issue of the legality of the meeting held at Chandigarh completely over-looking the fact that the meeting held at Chandigarh was not under challenge before the Court.

24. On the issue of irreparable injury and balance of convenience, the trial Court has adopted correct approach. It has rightly held that on the basis of the resolution passed in the meeting held at Ludhiana, petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 will l?e prevented from smoothly carrying on their duties as trustees and as the resolution of their removal from the various offices was prima facie contrary to the provisions contained in the Trust Deed, irreparable injury would be caused to them and that it was just and proper to maintain the position as it was obtaining prior to the passing of the impugned resolution.

25. Grant of injunction in such like matters is not only justified but necessary also so that the people are not deprived of their right to hold a particular office. In Suresh Kumar Sanghi v. Amrit Kumar Sanghi and others, A.I.R 1482 Delhi 131, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that an injunction restraining other partner from interfering with the management and partnership business deserves to be granted. The Court held-

“The Court will restrain a partner from violating the terms of his partnership contract of acting inconsistently with his duties as a partner during the subsistence of the partnership irrespective of the fact whether dissolution is also sought or not. It may be that where an agreement of partnership has not at all been acted upon the Court may, in a proper case, refuse to decree specific performance thereof because it may not be considered just or equitable to force partnership on an unwilling partner. However, the position in a case like the present where a partnership agreement was acted upon from several years and the partnership was subsisting would be altogether different. Certainly, after the commencement and during the continuation of the partnership it will be equitable for the Court in many a case to interpose to decree specific performance of articles/terms of the partnership. The necessity for such an action arises when the conduct of a partner virtually imperils the success of a partnership enterprise and jurisdiction to enjoin a partner from doing that which seriously interferes with the business or which is a breach of the express terms of the partnership agreement is now well established, even if the suit does not seek a dissolution of the partnership.”

26. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, A.I.R 1962 S.C 527, power of the Court to grant appropriate injunction in exercise of its powers under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151 has been recognised. Their Lordships have held that the Court has inherent power to grant an injunction by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it and when Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself recognises the existence of inherent power of the Court there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Court.

27. The two decisions of the Rajasthan High Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Kapoor are of no relevance to the controversy raised in the present case. These decisions do no contain any proposition of law that the Court is precluded from passing an order of injunction in a case like the present one. The Rajasthan case relates to specific performance of contract. The Court had held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was itself not maintainable and, therefore, there was no justification in passing a mandatory injunction in his favour. The Madhya Pradesh case related to a dispute between the parties regarding grant of permit under the Motor Vehicles Act. Cross appeals were filed by the parties. During the pendency of the appeals, stay order was granted by the Appellate Court. The High Court declared that the Regional Transport Authority should not have granted an injunction for issue of a permit when the appeal filed by the aggrieved party against the refusal of permit was pending.

28. Although a number of other points were raised by the learned counsel for the parties regarding the validity of the meeting held at Chandigarh, the entitlement of Baldev Singh to be inducted as a trust and the proxy presence of Dr. Attar Singh, in my opinion, all these issues do not merit any adjudication in this petition. Rather they should be left to be decided by the trial Court at the time of final adjudication of the suit.

29. In the result, the revision succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order dated 19.9.1994 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, is set aside and the one passed by the Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Jalandhar, is restored.

Petition Allowed.