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Maman Chand v. Smt. Kamla
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition challenges the District Judge, Bhiwani's injunction order dated 12.6.1995 which reversed the Sub Judge 1st Class, Charkhi Dadri's order dated 9.12.1994. The respondent, Kamla Devi, filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with her possession and from raising construction on a plot measuring 1 Kanal 1 Maria in Khasra No. 488 Khatoni No. 627. The respondent sought temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. The Sub Judge dismissed the application; on appeal the District Judge granted the injunction. The present revision petition challenges that appellate order. The record also shows prior litigation: a suit and application for temporary injunction by Smt Laxmi Devi (predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondent) was dismissed on 14.8.1992; thereafter a sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellate Court (District Judge) had jurisdiction to reverse the trial Court's order refusing temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 CPC.
- Whether the appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction by acting as a court of first instance rather than interfering only where the trial Court's order was illegal, perverse or erroneously reasoned.
- Whether the trial Court correctly refused injunctive relief in view of prior proceedings and the possession of the petitioner, and whether granting injunction would cause abuse of process or prejudice to the petitioner.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Shri Goel)
- The appellate Court acted without jurisdiction in reversing the trial Court's order; it should have recorded a specific finding that the trial Court's order was erroneous in law or perverse before setting it aside.
- The trial Court gave cogent reasons for refusing injunction; the appellate Court upset that order on conjecture, causing potential substantial injustice to the petitioner.
Respondent's Arguments (Shri Mani Ram)
- Even if the appellate order is imperfect or erroneous, the High Court should not interfere under Section 115 CPC because the petitioner will not suffer prejudice from the grant of injunction.
- The appellate Court was justified because, absent injunction, the petitioner might raise construction which later could not be undone by the Courts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Guru Nanak Education Trust v. Balbir Singh and Ors., (C. R. No. 4007 of 1994) decided on 18.4.1995 (1995-2)110 P.L.R. 625 | The principle that orders refusing temporary injunction are discretionary and appellate courts ordinarily should not substitute their discretion for that of the trial Court; interference is justified only if the lower Court acted arbitrarily, perversely, capriciously, in disregard of sound legal principles, or without considering the records; mere possibility of a different conclusion is not enough for interference. | The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the District Judge erred by acting as a Court of first instance and by failing to show that the trial Court's order was patently illegal or perverse; this supported setting aside the appellate order and dismissing the injunction application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed the settled scope of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 CPC, noting that appellate interference is permissible only where the trial Court's order involves clear legal error, perversity, or failure to apply established principles on prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Citing Guru Nanak Education Trust (paras. 5–8), the Court reiterated that a mere possibility of a different conclusion by the appellate Court does not justify interference.
On examining the impugned order, the Court found the District Judge failed to apply this standard: he did not hold the trial Court's rejection of injunction to be erroneous in law or perverse, and acted as a Court of first instance rather than as an appellate Court (para. 7). The Court further found that the District Judge ignored material facts and prior litigation: the earlier injunction application by predecessor-in-interest Smt Laxmi Devi had been dismissed and the petitioner Maman Chand was found in possession (para. 8). Granting injunction to the plaintiff-respondent would have amounted to abuse of process. The Court also observed that preventing the petitioner from enjoying property would cause irreparable loss, and any alteration of possession during the suit could be addressed by the competent Court when deciding the suit (para. 9).
Holding and Implications
Revision petition allowed; the order dated 12.6.1995 passed by the District Judge, Bhiwani, is set aside and the injunction application by the plaintiff-respondent stands dismissed.
Direct effect: The appellate injunction is vacated and the trial Court's dismissal of the temporary injunction application is restored. The opinion does not announce any broader new precedent beyond applying established principles governing appellate interference with interlocutory orders.
1. This petition is directed against the order of injunction dated 12.6.1995 passed by the District Judge, Bhiwani, which he passed while reversing the order dated 9.12.1994 passed by the Sub Judge 1st Class, Charkhi Dadri.
2. Suit filed by respondent Kamla Devi for permanent injunction against the petitioner from interfering in her possession over the disputed land and also against the raising of construction in the plot measuring 1 Kanal 1 Maria falling in Khasra No. 488 Khatoni No. 627 is pending in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Charkhi Dadri. The respondent filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for grant of temporary injunction. The defendant-petitioner contested the application and challenged the locus standi of the plaintiff-respondent. After considering the rival cases, the learned Sub Judge dismissed the application. However, in appeal the learned District Judge, Bhiwani reversed the order of the trial Court and granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent restraining the petitioner from raising any construction on the disputed property.
3. First contention of Shri Goel is that the learned appellate Court has acted without jurisdiction in reversing the order passed by the trial Court. Elaborating this contention Shri Goel urged that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the trial Court without recording a specific finding that the order of the trial Court was erroneous in law or was perverse. Second contention of Shri Goel is that the trial Court had given cogent reasons for refusing the relief of injunction to the respondent, but the appellate Court has upset that order merely on conjectures and if the order of the appellate Court is not set aside the petitioner would suffer substantial injustice.
4. Shri Mani Ram argued that even though the order of the appellate Court may not be happily worded and even though it may be erroneous, this Court should not interfere with the same in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 115 of the C. P. C. because no prejudice will be suffered by the petitioner due to the grant of injunction in favour of the respondent. Shri Mani Ram further argued that the appellate Court was justified in passing the order of injunction because in the absence of injunction the petitioner may raise construction on the property and then it would not be possible for the Courts to undo the construction.
5. Scope of the jurisdiction of an appellate Court to interfere with an order passed by the trial Court on an application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with section 151, c.p.c., is well settled. The Supreme Court and the High Courts have consistently held that the appellate Court can interfere with an order of the trial Court only where such order suffers from clear violation of law or where the findings recorded by the trial Court on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are perverse or where the trial Court has not applied the settled principles of law for appreciation of the pleadings and evidence produced by the parties. The Courts have further held that a mere possibility of the appellate Court forming a different opinion on the basis of the facts and evidence produced by the parties cannot be a valid ground for interference by the appellate Court.
6. In Guru Nanak Education Trust v. Balbir Singh and Ors., (C. R. No. 4007 of 1994) decided on 18.4.1995 (1995-2)110 P.L.R. 625), this Court has dealt with the aforementioned issue on some length and held :
"The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the records.
The mere possibility of the appellate court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence will also not justify interference."
7. Perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned District Judge, Bhiwani, was totally unmindful of the settled legal position regarding the scope of Jurisdiction of the appellate Court while deciding the appeal against the order of the trial Court passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. Learned District Judge has failed to keep in mind the fundamental principle that the appellate Court can interfere with an interlocutory order of the trial Court only when it is shown to be patently illegal or perverse. The learned District Judge has not held that the order of the trial Court rejecting an application for injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondent, suffers from error of law or is based on misreading of the pleadings and evidence. In my opinion, the learned District Judge has acted as a Court in the first instance instead of acting as an appellate Court. This fundamental error in the approach of the learned District Judge has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The learned District Judge has acted in excess of his jurisdiction and, therefore, this Court is duty bound to interfere with the order of the learned -District Judge.
8. On the merits of the case also I find that the learned District Judge has seriously erred in observing that the trial Court should have ignored the previous litigation. There is no denying that Smt Laxmi Devi, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondent, had filed a suit for injunction and an application filed by her for grant of temporary injunction was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class on 14.8.1992. Learned Sub Judge found that the petitioner Maman Chand was in possession of the property alongwith one Dhan Singh and there was no justification to pass an order of injunction. Only thereafter Deep Chand, husband of Laxmi Devi and her alleged power of attorney holder executed sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and then she filed the suit out of which the present revision petition has arisen. The trial Court was fully justified in refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. In fact, grant of injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent would have resulted in abuse of the process of the Court. Unfortunately, the learned District Judge has gravely erred, in ignoring this material aspect of the case.
9. I am also of the opinion that if the petitioner is prevented from enjoying the property in his possession, he would suffer irreparable loss and if at all he alters the possession of the property during the pendency of the suit, the competent Court is entitled to take notice of it and pass appropriate order at the time of the decision of the same. Further, there is no reason, whatsoever, to prevent him from enjoying the property in the manner he likes.
10. For the reasons mentioned above, the revision petition is allowed. The order dated 12.6.1995 passed by the learned District Judge, Bhiwani, is set aside. Consequently, the injunction application by the plaintiff-respondent stands dismissed.
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