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Banarsi Dass v. Labour Court, Ambala, And Others
By the Court:— The petitioner was appointed as condcutor by General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Yamuna Nagar, respondent 2, on 21 August 1987. His services were terminated on 11 March 1988 and an industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner-workman and the Labour Court gave its award on 27 October 1993, Annexure P1, holding the termination to be legal and valid. This award is being impugned by the petitioner-workman in this writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner read to us the appointment letter, though the same was not filed with the petition. It clearly indicates that the petitioner was appointed purely on ad hoc basis and his services could be terminated any time without any notice. The contention of counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court has ignored the provisions of S. 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly, the petitioner-workman has not put in 240 days of service that order of retrenchment could be held to be against the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. In order to attract the provisions of S. 25-G, it was first necessary to determine whether the order of removal of the petitioner is an order of retrenchment as defined in S. 2(oo) which reads as under:
“‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include —’
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman;
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.”
2. After going through the definition of “retrenchment,” as provided above, we find that the case of the petitioner will not be covered under the definition of “retrenchment” as his services had been terminated as no longer required under a Stipulation in that behalf contained in the order of appointment, in view of S. 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Suraj Prakash Bhandari v. Union of India [1986 - I L.L.N 706], to support his allegation that person junior to the petitioner was still retained and the order would be violative of the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment. On going through the case aforesaid, we find that the ratio cannot be applied to the case in hand. That was a case where on surplusage the services of the workman were terminated and the services of junior to be retained, gained importance. Present is not a case of that type that on account of surplusage the services of the petitioner were terminated. Present is a case where the order of termination has been passed simply in accordance with the terms of the appointment letter. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine.
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