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Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Kailash Devi .
Judgment Summary — N.K. Kapoor, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from an appeal against an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 4.8.1992. The appellant (Oriental Insurance Company Limited, via its Deputy Manager, Sh. Amarjeet Pal Chopra) filed the appeal belatedly and sought condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
An application for condonation of delay was registered as C.M. No. 1586-C-II of 1993 and notice was issued to the respondents, who appeared and contested the application. On 26.5.1993 the Court examined the initial application and affidavit and found the averments to be general and vague; the applicant was directed to file further affidavit(s) to make out sufficient cause. The applicant filed additional affidavits on 1.6.1993 and 12.8.1993 (and an initial affidavit dated 30.1.1993 is also part of the record). The asserted delay in filing the appeal amounted to 47 days.
The Court heard arguments and considered the three affidavits sworn by Sh. Amarjeet Pal Chopra and the correspondence between the Divisional and Regional offices of the company and their counsel which were relied upon to explain the delay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant has shown "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to justify condonation of a 47-day delay in filing the appeal.
- Whether the applicant's conduct demonstrated diligence and bona fide prosecution of the appeal such that the court should exercise its discretion to condone the delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the 47 days' delay was fully explained and constituted "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The counsel read almost in extenso the affidavit dated 12.8.1993.
- Reliance was placed on the decision of the apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353, to urge that the delay be condoned and the appeal be heard on merits.
Respondents' Arguments
- Counsel for the respondents submitted that the three affidavits filed by the applicant contain different versions explaining the delay, with the later affidavits improving upon or contradicting the earlier versions, indicating afterthoughts.
- The respondents argued that the applicant was callous and failed to take suitable steps for filing the appeal; consequently, no sufficient cause exists to condone the delay.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353 | Cited by the appellant's counsel in support of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. | The Court expressly found that the ratio of that judgment was not attracted on the facts of the present case and therefore did not apply it to condone the delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a factual and evidentiary analysis of the three affidavits (dated 30.1.1993, 1.6.1993 and 12.8.1993) sworn by Sh. Amarjeet Pal Chopra and of the inter-office correspondence relied upon to explain the 47-day delay.
The Court noted that "sufficient cause" is not defined in the Limitation Act but, according to judicial pronouncements cited in the opinion, it denotes a cause beyond the control of the party invoking the section. Thereafter diligence and bona fides are to be considered. The Court emphasized that if the delay could have been avoided by exercise of due care and attention, it would not qualify as sufficient cause.
On examination, the Court found inconsistencies and evolving versions across the three affidavits:
- The affidavit dated 30.1.1993 stated the Divisional Office had lost papers sent by the Regional Office and could locate them on 22.1.1993; the file was then sent to counsel for preparation and the appeal was filed on 30.1.1993 due to intervening holidays.
- The affidavit of 1.6.1993 presented a different explanation that the appeal could not be filed because counsel desired additional documents before giving an opinion; this affidavit did not mention the loss of original papers.
- The affidavit dated 12.8.1993 introduced yet another version and, in the Court's view, almost contradicted the earlier affidavits; the earlier story of loss of the original file was undermined by a Divisional Office letter dated 9.10.1992 which indicated that a certified copy of the award was sent and received by the Regional Office on 5.11.1992.
Given these discrepancies, the Court concluded that a new version had been introduced at a later stage, amounting to an afterthought rather than a credible and consistent explanation. The Court further observed that the delay was attributable to casualness and correspondence between the Regional and Divisional offices—matters that could have been avoided had the company been vigilant.
The Court reiterated that the discretion to condone delay must be exercised judicially, and though the expression "sufficient cause" is to be construed liberally in order to advance substantial justice, that liberal construction does not apply where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide are imputable to the applicant. On the present facts the Court found negligence and lack of diligence and therefore declined to apply the Anantnag ratio.
Holding and Implications
The application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed; consequently the appeal, being filed after the period of limitation, is also dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's application to condone the 47-day delay was refused, and the belated appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered that there be no costs.
- Broader implications: The Court held that the ratio in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) did not apply on these facts; no new legal precedent was announced beyond the application of established principles concerning "sufficient cause," diligence and the judicial exercise of discretion under Section 5. The decision turned on the factual findings (inconsistent affidavits and lack of vigilance) rather than on a novel legal principle.
No additional facts, arguments, or precedents beyond those contained in the provided opinion have been included in this summary.
N.K Kapoor, J. — Appellant feeling aggrieved by the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 4.8.1992 filed the appeal along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. This court issued notice in C.M No. 1586-C-II of 1993 to the respondents who put in appearance and contested the same. On May 26, 1993 this Court on perusal of the application and the accompanying affidavit came prima facie, to a conclusion that the averments made by the applicant in his application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are in very general and vague terms. All the same before taking final decision, the Court directed the applicant to place on record further affidavit or other material to make out a sufficient cause for the delay. The applicant consequently filed another affidavit in support of his application on 1.6.1993 The matter was once again examined by the Court. It was found that even additional affidavit filed by the applicant contains mistakes and so a direction was given to the applicant to file another affidavit giving correct dates. Instead of merely correcting dates; in the details of the various circumstances which led to delay in filing the appeal. The affidavit is dated 12.8.1993
2. The learned counsel for the applicant in support of his plea that the delay of 47 days stands fully explained and the same comes within the ambit of sufficient cause as envisaged by Section 5 of the Limitation Act almost read in extenso the affidavit dated 12.8.1993 In addition thereto, the counsel relief upon the decision of the apex Court in case reported as Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353 and thus urged that the delay be condoned and the appeal be heard on merit.
3. Counsel for the respondents, however, argued that each one of the three affidavits filed by the applicant give different versions as to how this delay occurred. In fact, the applicant has tried to improve upon the original version as given in the application. Examined in this light there is no escape from the conclusion that the latter version as per affidavit dated 1.6.1993 and 12.8.1993, is in the nature of an afterthought. The applicant, in fact, has been callous in taking suitable steps for filing this appeal and thus no case is made out for treating the delay in filing the appeal as a sufficient cause.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the application along with each one of three affidavits sworn by Sh. Amarjeet Pal Chopra, Deputy Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Regional Officer, Chandigarh - applicant. Existence of sufficient cause is the condition precedent in exercise of this discretion while deciding the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Question of diligence or bone fide is to be considered thereafter. Sufficient cause has not been defined in the Act. However, as held by various judicial pronouncements, it would mean a cause beyond the control of party invoking the aid of this section. The delay, if could be avoided by taking due care and attention, will into come within the ambit of sufficient cause. In the present case, in the first instance, all that has been stated in the affidavit dated 30.1.1993 is that the Regional Office of the company immediately decided to file the appeal and so directed its Divisional Office to send the necessary draft of Rs. 25,000/- as required. The Divisional Office, however, lost the papers sent by the Regional Office and could locate the same on 22.1.1993 and it is thereafter that the file was immediately sent to the Advocate for preparation of appeal by hand on 23.1.1993 itself. Since 24th, 25th, 26th or January, 1993 were holidays, the appeal was filed on 30.1.1993 In the subsequent affidaivt of 1.6.1993 the company came with a version that the appeal could not be filed as the counsel desired that certain other documents be sent before he can give an opinion as to the efficiency of filing the appeal or not. The affidavit incorporates snippets from the letters exchanged amongst the Regional Office, Divisional Office and the counsel. It is worth noticing that no mention has been made as to the loss of the original papers. In the latter affidavit of August 12, 1993, another version to explain this delay of 47 days in filing the appeal has been introduced. Again this affidaivt refers to the letters exchanged between the two offices of the company and states how the matter has been examined by one or the other. A bare perusal of this affidavit leaves no manner of doubt that a knew version has been introduced which did not find mention in the earlier tow affidavits sworn by the same person - Sh. Amarjit Pal Chopra. In fact, if one closely peruses the affidavit dated 12.8.1993, it almost contradicts the first two versions as given in the affidavit of 30.1.1993 and 1.6.1993 The story of loss of original file stands belied as the letter of Divisional Office dated 9.10.1992 makes mention the certified copy of the award was sent of the Regional Office which was received on 5.11.1992 Thereafter the delay is sought to be explained by referring to the various communications addressed by one office to the other or between counsel and the two offices i.e Divisional as well as Regional Office. The Regional Office having received the original file along with the certified copy of the impugned award could file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The delay occurred on account of correspondence between the two offices and the same cannot come within the ambit of sufficient cause as envisaged by the Act. Had the company been vigilant, such a delay would have not occurred.
5. There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be constructed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e one is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence. The ratio of the judgment of the apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag's case (supra) on the facts of the present case is not attracted. Both the offices of the company have taken the matter very casually resulting in delay in filing the appeal. As observed earlier, reasons assigned in the affidavit accompany the application does not satisfy the test of sufficient cause as envisaged by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Resultantly, the appeal having been filed after the expiry of period of limitation too stands dismissed. No costs.
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