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Sat Pal Petitioner v. Ram Kumar
Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.P. Chowdhri, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (plaintiff-pre-emptor) filed a suit for pre-emption against the respondents (defendant-vendees). After the parties concluded their evidence, final arguments were heard on May 17, 1991, and the matter was posted for final orders on May 22, 1991.
On May 22, 1991 the defendants filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserting that their written statement had earlier taken a specific objection that the pre-emptor (Satpal) was the "father's brother's son" of the vendors (Mohinder and Surjit) and relied on the Supreme Court decision in Jagdish v. Nathimal Kajriwal (A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 68) to contend that the plaintiff could not succeed as a co-sharer with the vendors. The application sought leave to argue that aspect; it was apparently uncontested and additional arguments were heard.
Subsequently, on May 29, 1991 an application under Order 18 Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed seeking permission to produce additional evidence — specifically, mutation No. 1490 attested June 24, 1979 (relating to inheritance/mutation of Bakhtawar, father of Rameshwar) and the statement of one defendant. The trial court (learned Subordinate Judge) allowed that application. The plaintiff-pre-emptor resisted and filed the present revision petition challenging the allowance of additional evidence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court had jurisdiction under Order 18 Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure to permit production of additional evidence after the conclusion of final arguments (i.e., whether the phrase "later stage" in that provision extends to the stage after final arguments but before judgment).
- Whether the alleged relationship between the pre-emptor and the vendors (as asserted by respondents) would bar the plaintiff's suit, in light of the then-authority in Jagdish v. Nathimal Kajriwal and its subsequent overruling by the Supreme Court in Bhikha Ram v. Ram Sarup.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' (Defendant-Vendees') Arguments
- The written statement had specifically pleaded that the pre-emptor Satpal was the "father's brother's son" of the vendors Mohinder and Surjit.
- Relying on Jagdish v. Nathimal Kajriwal (A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 68), the respondents contended that the pre-emptor, being a co-sharer, could not succeed in the pre-emption suit; accordingly they sought leave to argue this point.
- They sought to lead additional evidence (mutation No. 1490 dated June 24, 1979 and the statement of a defendant) to establish the alleged relationship.
Petitioner's (Plaintiff-Pre-emptor's) Position
- The petitioner's opposition to the production of additional evidence is shown by the fact that the application was contested and that the petitioner filed the present revision after the trial court allowed the application.
- No detailed narrative of the petitioner's substantive arguments in opposition is provided in the opinion; the remedy pursued was to seek revision of the trial court's order allowing additional evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jagdish v. Nathimal Kajriwal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 68 | Authority allegedly establishing that a pre-emptor who is a co-sharer (relationship to vendor) could not succeed in a pre-emption suit. | Relied upon by respondents to argue that the plaintiff could not succeed if the relationship were proved. The court observed this decision had been overruled and thus its holding could not be decisive. |
| Bhikha Ram v. Ram Sarup, (1992-1) 101 P.L.R. 49 (S.C.) | Supreme Court larger Bench decision overruling Jagdish; clarifies that proof of the alleged relationship will not, by itself, be sufficient to dismiss a pre-emption suit. | The Court held that this decision rendered the discussion in the revision "more or less academic" because Jagdish was overruled; consequently, even if respondents led additional evidence proving relationship, that alone would not defeat the suit. |
| Madan Mohan Aggarwal v. Smt. Mansa Devi, (1985-2) 88 P.L.R. 206 | Interpretation that the "last stage" of a trial extends up to the conclusion of arguments, and that "later stage" in Order 18 Rule 17-A could at most extend up to that point — implying no jurisdiction to admit additional evidence after final arguments. | Followed by the court as a basis to hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to admit additional evidence after final arguments; court found this interpretation persuasive in allowing the revision. |
| Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass v. Satish Kumar, (1990-2) 98 P.L.R. 277 | Similar interpretation to Madan Mohan — that Order 18 Rule 17-A does not permit adducing additional evidence after conclusion of final arguments. | Relied upon by the court as supportive authority for holding that the trial court's allowance of additional evidence after final arguments was not proper. |
| Smt. Karti v. Rattia, 1981-1983 PLR 29 | A Single Bench decision in which additional evidence was allowed after conclusion of final arguments (on its facts). | The present court examined this decision and found no reference to Order 18 Rule 17-A or the meaning of "later stage"; therefore it treated the decision as confined to its facts and not an authority for a general power to permit additional evidence post-arguments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds in a series of linked steps:
- Overruling of Jagdish by the Supreme Court: The court first noted that the Supreme Court in Bhikha Ram v. Ram Sarup (larger Bench) overruled Jagdish. Because Jagdish had been the principal authority invoked by respondents to assert that the pre-emptor could not succeed if he was a co-sharer, the overruling meant that even if respondents produced additional evidence establishing the alleged relationship, that alone would not suffice to dismiss the suit. This fact made much of the dispute academically less significant.
- Interpretation of Order 18 Rule 17-A: Independently of the Supreme Court's ruling, the court considered earlier Single Judge decisions (Madan Mohan Aggarwal and Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass) interpreting Order 18 Rule 17-A. Those decisions held that the "last stage" of trial is up to the conclusion of arguments and that the phrase "later stage" in Order 18 Rule 17-A could at most extend to the stage when final arguments are concluded. Under that interpretation, the court would have no jurisdiction to allow the production of additional evidence after the conclusion of final arguments and before pronouncement of judgment.
- Treatment of Smt. Karti v. Rattia: The respondents relied on Smt. Karti v. Rattia where additional evidence was allowed after final arguments. The court examined that decision and observed it contained no reference to Order 18 Rule 17-A or a discussion of the meaning of "later stage". Consequently, the court regarded Smt. Karti as confined to its particular facts and not a binding precedent for permitting additional evidence post-final arguments generally.
- Judicial restraint on re-referral to a larger Bench: Although the judge expressed personal reservations about the correctness of the view restricting "later stage" to the point of conclusion of final arguments, he declined to refer the matter to a larger Bench because: (a) the Supreme Court had already reversed Jagdish, making the point academic in the present case, and (b) the present case was not considered fit for such a reference.
- Conclusion from combined analysis: Given the Supreme Court's ruling and the persuasive Single Judge authorities on Order 18 Rule 17-A, the court concluded that the trial court erred in allowing additional evidence after final arguments. The order admitting additional evidence was therefore liable to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petition is allowed and the order of the learned trial court permitting additional evidence is set aside.
Direct consequences ordered by the court:
- The parties were directed to appear in the trial court for further proceedings according to law on December 12, 1991.
- The trial court was directed to dispose of the suit according to law.
Implications as stated in the opinion:
- The court treated the Supreme Court's decision in Bhikha Ram v. Ram Sarup as dispositive of the respondents' reliance on Jagdish — i.e., proof of the alleged family relationship would not, by itself, be sufficient to defeat the pre-emption suit.
- The order does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying the discussed authorities; the court followed earlier Single Judge decisions limiting the ambit of Order 18 Rule 17-A and confined Smt. Karti to its facts. The opinion expressly notes reservations about the correctness of that line of authority but does not overrule or expand it.
Final note: The operative relief granted was narrow and procedural: setting aside the trial court's order allowing additional evidence and directing the trial court to proceed; the opinion expressly records that the Supreme Court decision changed the substantive effect of the relationship argument relied upon by the respondents.
A.P Chowdhri, J. — The facts giving rise to this revision petition are that the petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption against the respondents. After the parties had concluded their evidence, final arguments were heard on May 17, 1991, and the case was posted for final orders for May 22, 1991. On that day, an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made by the defendant-vendees stating that in the written statement a specific objection had been taken that the pre-emptor Satpal was father's brother's son of the vendors Mohinder and Surjit and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagdish v. Nathimal Kajriwal, A.I.R 1987 S.C 68, the plaintiff could not succeed on the ground of being a co-sharer with the vendor. It was prayed that even though the aforesaid objection had been duly taken in the written statement at the earliest stage, this aspect had not been argued and that further arguments on this aspect of the matter may be heard. The application was apparently not contested and the case was accordingly fixed for further arguments, which were heard. Another application was thereafter made on May 29, 1991 under Order 18 Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure for producing additional evidence. Learned counsel states at the Bar that only a mutation of inheritance being mutation No. 1490 attested on June 24, 1979, whereby the estate of Bakhtawar, father of Rameshwar, who was son of the pre-emptor as well as Balwant, father of the vendors, was to be proved besides the statement of one of the defendants. The aforesaid application for additional evidence was, however, resisted, but by the impugned order the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the application. Aggrieved by the order, the plaintiff-pre-emptor has filed this revision.
2. The discussion in this revision is rendered more or less academic in view of the recent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhikha Ram v. Ram Sarup, (1992-1) 101 P.L.R 49 (S.C) in which a larger Bench has overruled the law in Jagdish's case (supra). It follows that even if the defendant-respondents lead additional evidence and establish the alleged rationship of the pre-emptor with the vendor, it will not by itself be sufficient to dismiss the suit.
3. Even otherwise, the revision petition deserves acceptance in view of the interpretation placed on the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Madan Mohan Aggarwal v. Smt. Mansa Devi, (1985-2) 88 P.L.R 206, which was followed by another learned Judge of this Court in Ram Gopal Banarsi Dass v. Satish Kumar, (1990-2) 98 P.L.R 277. It was held in the aforesaid decisions that the last stage in the trial of a suit is the stage upto conclusion of arguments and the expression “later stage” occurring in Order 18 Rule. 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure could at the most extend upto the stage when final arguments are concluded. In other words, the view in the aforesaid decisions is that the Court has no jurisdiction to allow an application for additional evidence after conclusion of final arguments and before the delivery of the judgment. Though I have my own reservations about the correctness of the aforesaid view, but I do not find the present case to be a fit one to refer to a large Bench especially as the law in Jagdish's case (supra) has since been reversed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and, as stated earlier, the present exercise is rendered more or less academic.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents invited my attention to an earlier Single Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Karti v. Rattia, 1981-1983 PLR 29, in which after conclusion of final arguments, additional evidence was allowed to be produced. I have gone through the said decision. I find that there is no reference to the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure or the implication of the expression “later stage” occurring therein. The decision in Smt. Karti's case (supra) must, therefore, be held to be confined to the facts and circumstances of that case and the same cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that the Court has jurisdiction to permit additional evidence to be produced after conclusion of the final arguments.
5. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition is allowed and the order of the learned trial. Court is set aside. The parties are directed to appear in the trial Court for further proceedings according to law on December 12, 1991. The trial Court shall dispose of the suit according to law.
Petition allowed.
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