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Matu Ram v. Union Territory Of Chandigarh

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 12, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chandigarh — Land Acquisition matters)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Union Territory of Chandigarh acquired 8.58 acres in village Dadu Majra by notification dated May 30, 1980, for rehabilitation purposes. The Land Acquisition Collector's award dated June 23, 1980 fixed compensation at Rs. 33,000 per acre. On reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act the District Judge enhanced compensation to Rs. 76,000 per acre by order dated June 2, 1983.

The tenure-holders appealed to this Court. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated August 27, 1984, allowed the appeal and fixed market value at Rs. 80,000 per acre, and directed solatium at 15% and interest at 6% per annum from date of taking possession till payment. A letters patent appeal by the tenure-holders seeking further enhancement to Rs. 1,00,000 per acre was dismissed by a Division Bench by order dated January 17, 1985 (one-line dismissal).

After the letters patent appeal decision, one tenure-holder, Matu Ram, died; his heirs together with other appellants filed the present application asking this Court to modify the Division Bench order to grant benefits under sections introduced/amended by Act 68 of 1984 — specifically section 23(1A), section 23(2) (as amended) and section 28 (as amended).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicants are entitled to the enhanced solatium under amended section 23(2) and enhanced interest under amended section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as provided by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984.
  2. Whether the applicants can claim the benefit of section 23(1A) (the newly inserted sub-section providing 12% per annum from date of notification) as introduced by Act 68 of 1984, given the dates of award and subsequent proceedings.
  3. Whether the present application is, in substance, a time‑barred review of the Division Bench's order dated January 17, 1985, and therefore barred by limitation, or whether it is a permissible application to bring earlier decisions into conformity with statutory changes (including the Court's power to amend its earlier decree/judgment under transitional provisions).
  4. Whether the Court may, by means other than review (for example under the statutory duty implied by section 30(2) of the Amending Act or by analogy to powers recognized in precedent), amend an earlier judgment to give effect to statutory amendments without being constrained by the 30‑day review period or by rules restricting correction to clerical errors.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The applicants asked that the Division Bench's order dated January 17, 1985 be modified so as to grant benefits introduced by Act 68 of 1984 — namely amended section 23(1A) (12% per annum from notification to award/taking possession), amended section 23(2) (increase of solatium from 15% to 30%) and amended section 28 (increased rates of interest on excess awards).
  • The applicants contended that the Court has an obligation under section 30(2) of the Amending Act to give effect to the amended provisions in appeals decided by the High Court between April 30, 1982 and the enforcement date of the Amending Act (September 24, 1984), and thus their application is not a barred review but a request to have statutory entitlements implemented.
  • It was also urged that because the letters patent appeal was dismissed on January 17, 1985, the appellate proceedings should be regarded as pending until that date and that section 23(1A) should apply to those appellate proceedings by its own force (an argument the Court considered and rejected).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the present application was, in substance, a review of the Division Bench's order dated January 17, 1985 and therefore had to be filed within 30 days; since it was filed about two years later with no application for condoning delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was barred by limitation and not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1985 3 SCC 737) Interpreted section 30(2) of the Amending Act to apply amended provisions of section 23(2) and section 28 to proceedings pending on 30‑4‑1982 or filed thereafter — i.e., retrospective application to appeals pending or filed after that date even if awards were made earlier. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that amended section 23(2) and section 28 must be applied to appeals decided by the High Court between 30‑4‑1982 and the enforcement date of the Amending Act; it informed the conclusion that the Court has a duty to amend decisions to bring them into conformity with the amended Act.
Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1985 1 SCC 582) One of the decisions cited as illustrating conflict of judicial opinion regarding the retrospective effect of section 30(2) and applicability of amended provisions. Noted by the Court as part of the body of conflicting authorities which the Supreme Court considered before resolving the scope of section 30(2); used as contextual background for adopting the Supreme Court's clearer interpretation.
State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh (C.A. No. 3267 of 1979; decided May 1, 1985) The Supreme Court concluded that section 30(2) makes amended section 23(2) and section 28 applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30‑4‑1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector, the Court, High Court or Supreme Court. The Court adopted this conclusion to find that amended section 23(2) and section 28 applied to the High Court appeal decided on August 27, 1984 and therefore must be given effect even though the Amending Act was enforced later.
Raja Shatruniat v. Mohammad Azmat Azam Khan (1971 2 SCC 200) Held that where a statute confers power on a court to amend decrees/judgments to apply law notwithstanding the Code of Civil Procedure, such amendment is not a review; substance controls form and the court may exercise the statutory power independently of review procedure. The Court relied on this authority to characterize the applicants' application (seeking statutory amendments to earlier judgment) as not being a prohibited review application but as an exercise of the Court's duty/power to apply the law as it always stood or as made applicable by transitional provisions.
State of Punjab v. Krishan Lal (Full Bench — C.M. No. 1001 of 1986 in L.P.A. No. 773 of 1982; decided May 4, 1987) Held that the retrospective operation of section 23(1A) (as inserted by Act 68 of 1984) is limited to cases where the Collector's award had been made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. The Court applied this holding to conclude that applicants could not claim the benefit of section 23(1A) because the award in the present case was made prior to the relevant cut‑off period and thus section 23(1A) did not apply to them by virtue of section 30.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main analytical strands: (A) entitlement to benefits under amended section 23(2) and section 28, and (B) entitlement to section 23(1A).

(A) Entitlement under amended section 23(2) and section 28

  1. The Court first summarized the amendments effected by Act 68 of 1984: insertion of section 23(1A) (12% per annum from date of notification to date of award or taking possession), increase of solatium in subsection (2) from 15% to 30%, and enhanced rates of interest under section 28 (9% for the first year and 15% thereafter).
  2. It then examined section 30 (transitional provisions) of the Amending Act, which contains two relevant subsections:
    • sub‑section (1) dealing with application of section 23(1A) to proceedings pending on 30‑4‑1982 or commenced after that date (subject to conditions); and
    • sub‑section (2) deeming the amended subsection (2) of section 23 and amended section 28 to apply to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award after 30‑4‑1982 and before commencement of the Amending Act.
  3. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's interpretation in Bhag Singh and State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh to conclude that section 30(2) applies the amended section 23(2) and amended section 28 to appeals/decisions falling within the temporal scope described (i.e., proceedings pending on 30‑4‑1982 or filed after that date), and that the Court has a duty to amend earlier decisions to conform with these statutory changes.
  4. The Court addressed the respondent's limitation objection by distinguishing the present application from a conventional review. Relying on Raja Shatruniat, it held that where a statute (or transitional provision) confers power to apply an amended law to earlier proceedings, an application to give effect to that statutory obligation is not necessarily a review governed by the 30‑day review period; the substance (statutory duty to amend) controls form.
  5. On that basis the Court held the application seeking enforcement of the amended section 23(2) and amended section 28 was maintainable and not barred by limitation simply because it was not filed as a review within 30 days.

(B) Entitlement under section 23(1A)

  1. The Court observed that section 23(1A) came into force on September 24, 1984 and that section 30 conferred only a limited retrospective operation to subsection (1A).
  2. Relying on the Full Bench decision in State of Punjab v. Krishan Lal, the Court noted that the retrospectivity of section 23(1A) is confined to cases where the Collector's award was made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984.
  3. Because the Collector's award in the instant case was made prior to April 30, 1982, the applicants could not claim section 23(1A) without the specific aid of section 30; and section 30 did not bring this award within the limited retrospective ambit for subsection (1A). Thus, section 23(1A) was not available to the applicants.

Additional procedural points addressed by the Court

  • The letters patent appeal was dismissed by a one‑line order "No ground for interference is made out. Dismissed." The Court held that such a summary dismissal did not constitute a clerical or arithmetical error under section 152 CPC and therefore could not be corrected under that provision.
  • The Court rejected the contention that the Single Judge's judgment of August 27, 1984 had merged into the letters patent order in a manner that precluded correction/amendment; it held that where an appeal is summarily dismissed, the Single Judge's judgment does not merge in the short order in such a way as to prevent amendment of the Single Judge's decision to conform with statutory obligations.
  • The Court therefore treated the present application as one seeking to correct or amend the Single Judge's judgment of August 27, 1984 so as to give effect to the amended subsection (2) of section 23 and amended section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application succeeds and is allowed. The Court amended the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated August 27, 1984 so that, on the enhanced compensation determined by him, the applicants are entitled to the benefits under the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as follows:

  • Solatium: Applicants are entitled to 30% solatium (instead of 15%) under the amended section 23(2).
  • Interest on excess: Applicants are entitled to interest calculated at the rate of 9% per annum for one year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum from the date on which possession was taken to the date of payment of such excess, in accordance with the amended section 28.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to increase the monetary compensation payable to the applicants by applying the amended solatium and interest provisions to the enhanced compensation previously determined by the Single Judge. The Court expressly declined to allow application of section 23(1A) to these applicants because the Collector's award predated the limited retrospective window for that sub‑section. The opinion treats the Court's power and duty under section 30(2) as permitting amendment of earlier judgments to give effect to the amended section 23(2) and section 28, and it clarifies that such an application is not necessarily a time‑barred review. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader precedent beyond these holdings and is confined to the statutory interpretation and remedy applied to the facts of this case.

R.M.S
Application allowed.

Note: This summary is strictly limited to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

H.N Seth, C.J and M.S Liberhan, J.:— The Union Territory of Chandigarh acquired 8.58 acres of land in village Dadu Majra, within the Union Territory of Chandigarh vide notification published on May 30, 1980, for rehabilitation of victims of Kumhar colony of sector 25, Chandigarh. The Land Acquisition Collector vide award dated June 23, 1980, awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 33,000/- per acre. On a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Judge vide his order dated June 2, 1983, enhanced the compensation to Rs. 76,000/- per acre. Aggrieved, the tenure-holders came up in appeal before this Court. Learned Single Judge by his judgment dated August 27, 1984, allowed the appeal and determined the market value of the acquired property at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre. He further directed that they shall be paid solatium at the rate of 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment thereof.

2. The tenure-holders then filed letters patent appeal claiming that the market value of the property be raised to Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre. This letter patent appeal, was, however, dismissed by a Division Bench by an order dated January 17, 1985.

3. After the decision of the said Letters patent appeal, one of the tenure-holders appellant Matu Ram died. This application has been presented by the heirs of Matu Ram as also by the remaining appellants. They pray that the order passed by the Division Bench on. January 17, 1985, be modified granting thereby the benefit of enhanced solatium and interest and additional compensation as envisaged by Act 68 of 1984. In substance, the prayer made by the applicants is that this Court may award to them the benefits envisaged by section 23 (IA) of the Land Acquisition Act as introduced by Act 68 of 1984, as also those of section 23 (2), and section 28 as amended by Act 68 of 1984.

4. On behalf of the respondent, a preliminary objection has been raised that in substance the prayer made in this application amounts to review of the judgment of the Division Bench dated January 17, 1985, which application wherein can be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the judgment. The present application has been filed after about two years and is barred by limitation. There is neither any request for condoning the delay nor has any explanation been offered for presenting the application beyond the period of limitation.

5. In our opinion, before dealing with the objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent, it will be apt to appreciate the impact of Act 68 of 1984 on the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 23 (2) prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984 provided that in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in each case award a sum of 15 percent of such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition Section 28 of the Act laid down that if the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum, which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from the date of taking possession till payment thereof. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984, inter-alia, added new sub-section (1A) to section 23, which laid down that in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 sub section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or to the date of taking possession, whichever was earlier Sub-section (2) of section 23 was amended so as to increase the amount in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition (solatium) from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Likewise, section 28 provided that the rate of interest provided for on the excess amount awarded by the Court shall be raised from 6 per cent 9 per cent for the first year and for the following years to 15 per cent per annum Section 30 of Act 63 of 1984 gave retrospective operation to the insertion of sub-section (1A) of section 23 and to amendments mad in Sub-section (2) of section 23 and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act thus:—

“30 Transitional provisions—(1) The provisions of sub-section (1A) of section 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,—

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People, in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before that date of commencement of this Act,

(2) The provisions of sub section (2) of section 23 and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of section 15 and section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bills, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act.

*******

6. We shall first deal with the applicants' claim for the benefits under the amended Sub-section (2) of section 23 and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.

7. In the case of Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh . 1985 3 SCC 737, notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on October 19, 1974. This notification was followed by notifications under sections 6 and 9. The Land Acquisition Collector made the award on October 9, 1975 which was eventually enhanced in appeal by the High Court. The High Court directed that the claimants were entitled to 15 per cent solatium on the enhanced amount of compensation. The matter was taken up in letters patent appeal, which was decided on December 8, 1982. wherein the compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge was enhanced from Rs. 25,000/- per acre to Rs. 38,720/- per acre for the second belt. The matter was then taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court, wherein controversy with regard to the extent of retrospective effect given by the provisions contained in section 30 (2) of the Amending Act was raised. The problem before the Court was as to whether amended provisions of section 23 (2) and section 28 were applicable only to cases where the award was made by the Collector or Court after April 30, 1982, or it applied also to cases where an award may have been made by the Collector or Court prior to April 30, 1982, but the proceedings by way of appeal were pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court on April 30, 1982 and were disposed of subsequent to that date. The Supreme Court, after noticing the conflict of judicial opinion prevailing in that Court in the cases of Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer . 1985 1 SCC 582., in Civil Appeal No. 3267 of 1979 State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh . C.A No. 3267 of 1979., decided on May 1, 1985 eventually concluded thus:—

“It is, therefore, clear that under section 30, sub-section (2), the provisions of the amended section 23, sub-section (2) and section 23 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April, 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. It would not be a correct interpretation of section 30, sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of the amended Section 23, sub-section (2) and section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April, 1982 and the commencement of the Amended Act. Even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April, 1982 and an appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April, 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of the amended Section 23, sub-section (2) and section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed in such appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court……….”

8. In the instant case, even if the award had been made prior to April 30, 1982, regular first appeal in respect of that award was filed before the High Court after the 30th day of April 1982 and was decided by the learned Single Judge on August 27, 1984, before the enforcement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 (the date of enforcement being September 24, 1984) The provision contained in sub-section (2) of section 30 to the effect that amended subsection (2) of section 23 and Sec. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to and in relation to appeals decided by the High Court as between the dates on which the bill for amending the provisions was introduced in the year 1982 and coming into force on September 24, 1984 clearly contains an implication that it is the duty of the Court to amend such decisions and to bring them in accord with the provisions of the amended Act. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether an application made for enforcing such an obligation placed on the Court for reviewing an earlier order, falls within the purview of Order 47, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or not.

9. Similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Shatruniat v. Mohammad Azmat Azam Khan . 1971 2 SCC 200, in which the Court, was concerned with the scope of section 4 of the U.P Zamindars Debt Reduction Act, 1952, which ran thus:—

“Power to reduce debts after passing of decree:

(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law, the Court, which passed a decree to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt, shall on the application either of the decree-holder or judgment-debtor, proceed as hereinafter stated.

(2) Where the mortgaged property (charged under the decree consists exclusively of estate and such estate has been acquired under the provisions of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Court shall:—

*******

(3) Where the mortgaged property (charged under the decree) consists partly of estate and partly of property other than estate, the Court shall—

******”

10. The Court interpreted section 4 as confering power on the Court to amend certain decrees already made and held that such exercise of power could not be described as a review and could be exercised independently of it. This would be evident from the following observations made by it in paragraph 13 of the judgment:—

“Counsel for the appellants submitted that when the High Court decided the matter, the High Court applied the law as it stood and a subsequent change of law could not be ground for review. The appellant's contention is not acceptable in the present case for two principal reasons; first, it is not a subsequent law. It is the law which all along was there from 1962. The deeming provision is fully effective and operative as from 25th May, 1953 when the 1952 Act came into force. The result is that the Court is to apply the legal provision as it always stood. It would, therefore, be error on the face of the record. The error would be that law that was applied was not the law which is applicable. Secondly, section 4 of the 1952 Act confers power on the court to apply the law notwithstanding any provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the application though entitled an application was not so. The substance and not the form of the application will be decisive”

11. It is, thus, clear that when the applicants have moved the application requiring the Court to discharge its obligation by giving to them the benefit under section 23 (2) and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, their application cannot be termed as an application for review. As already stated, sub-section (2) of section 30 clearly implies that the benefit of Sub-section (2) of section 23 and amended section 28 has to be given by the Court even in those appeals which had been decided by it after April 30, 1982, and before coming into force of Act 68 of 1984 (date of enforcement being September 24, 1984) The section has not fixed any time-limit for this purpose. In the circumstances, the application moved requiring the Court to discharge is statutory obligation cannot be said to be barred by limitation merely because it has not been filed as an application for review within 30 days of the date of the judgment.

12. Coming now to the applicants claim for the benefit under section 23 (1A) is concerned, we find that this amended section 23 (1A) was introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984 with effect from September 24, 1984. The section, on its own, could not apply at the time when the learned Single Judge decided the appeal on August 27, 1984 Section 30 of the Amending Act gave a limited retrospective operation to sub-section (1A) of section 23 and, as held by Full Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Krishan Lal . C.M No. 1001 of 1986 in L.P.A No. 773 of 1982., decided on May 4, 1987, the retrospectivety is confined merely in cases where the award had been made between the two cut off dates, i. e., April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Since the award in this case was made earlier, the applicants cannot claim benefit under section 23 (1A) without the aid of section 30 of Act 68 of 1984

13. Learned counsel for the applicants next urged that inasmuch as the letters patent appeal was decided by this Court on January 17, 1985, the appeal will be deemed to be pending till that date and the provisions of section 23 (1 A) would be applicable to the appellate proceedings by its own force. We find that the letters patent appeal directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated August 27, 1984, was summarily dismissed by one line order which ran thus:—

“No ground for interference is made out. Dismissed”

14. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that while passing the said order, the Court omitted to do something which it wanted to do or it did something which it did not want to do and that the omission in this regard was as a result of some clerical or arithmatical mistake. The case would, therefore, fall outside the ambit of section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the Court committed a mistake in dismissing the letters patent appeal filed by the applicants the on error that respect can be corrected only by means of an application for review of the judgment and the present application, if treated as an application for review of the order dated January 17, 1985, would be barred by time. As no application under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed for condoning the delay, the application would not be maintainable. However, this does not preclude us for treating his application as an application for correcting the error in the judgment of the learned Single Jndge dated August 27, 1984, and we treat it accordingly.

15. It was suggested that in view of the order dated January 17, 1985, passed in the Letters patent appeal, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated August 27, 1984; has merged in the judgement of the letters patent appeal, and as such, no question of amending or correcting the judgement dated August 27, 1984, arises. In our opinion, where an appeal against a judgement is dismissed summarily, it cannot be said that the judgment merges in the order passed by the appellate Bench. In this view of the matter, we see no impediment in our way in correcting the judgement of the learned Single Judge dated August 27, 1984.

16. In the result, this application succeeds and is allowed. The judgement of the learned Single Judge dated August 27, 1984, is amended to the extent that on the enhanced amount of compensation as determined by him, the applicants would be entitled to 30 per cent instead of 15 per cent solatium under the amended section 23 (2) as also to the interest calculated at the rate of 9 per cent per annum for one year and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date on which possession of the land was taken to the date of payment of such excess in accordance with the amended section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act

R.M.S
Application allowed.