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Resham Singh And Others v. Manmohan Singh Kent And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion disposes of Civil Revision No. 3271 of 1982 and Civil Revision No. 154 of 1983, both filed against the order dated 27th August 1982 of the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Hoshiarpur.
In a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, the trial Court passed a conditional decree on 29th October 1981 in favour of the plaintiffs (decree-holders). The decree required payment of Rs. 50,500/- within one month; it provided that if the sum was not paid within that period the plaintiffs' suit would stand dismissed. No appeal was filed by either party and the decree became final between them.
The plaintiffs did not deposit the decree sum within the stipulated time. They filed an execution application dated 15th March 1982, which was contested by the judgment-debtors on the ground that the plaintiffs' suit had already stood dismissed for non-payment and thus there was nothing to execute. The decree-holders then filed an application dated 7th April 1982 under sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking extension of time and condonation of delay to deposit the sale price. The Sub Judge heard and disposed of both applications by the impugned order dated 27th August 1982, holding that because the decree-holders had failed to deposit the amount within one month the suit stood dismissed and the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. Both the execution application and the application for extension were dismissed. The decree-holders filed these revision petitions challenging that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, where a conditional decree for specific performance provides that the suit shall stand dismissed if the purchaser fails to deposit the purchase money within the period specified, the executing Court has jurisdiction under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend the time for deposit after that period has expired.
- Whether a conditional decree of the kind described is compatible with the provisions of the Specific Relief Act (notably Section 28) and Order 20, Rule 12A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and what legal consequences follow if the sum is not deposited within the period stipulated in such a decree.
- Whether, once a decree containing such a default/dismissal condition has become final (no appeal filed), the Court (in execution proceedings) can vary the decree by extending the time for deposit, or whether doing so would amount to varying the decree after the Court has become functus officio.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (decree-holders') Arguments
- It was contended that the Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision allowing a conditional decree that causes the suit to stand dismissed on non-deposit of the sale price; the relevant provision is Order 20, Rule 12A which requires a decree to specify the period for payment but does not permit an additional condition of automatic dismissal.
- The decree in a suit for specific performance is of the nature of a preliminary decree; if the purchase money is not deposited within the time allowed, the appropriate remedy for the defendants is to apply under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract, rather than have the suit treated as automatically dismissed.
- Because the trial Court imposed the payment condition, the executing Court nevertheless retained power under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend the time for depositing the sale price and to condone delay; the executing Court erred by refusing to exercise that jurisdiction.
- Several authorities were cited (e.g., K. Saraiwathi/K. Kalpna Sarswathi and others) to support the view that a decree for specific performance should be treated as preliminary and that an automatic dismissal condition is inappropriate.
Respondents' (judgment-debtors') Arguments
- The decree in this case was a conditional decree, and there is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure against passing such a conditional decree; since the plaintiffs failed to deposit the sale price within the period specified, their suit stood dismissed automatically and the executing Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time.
- Extending time in execution proceedings would amount to varying the terms of the decree without an appeal; the trial Court would be functus officio after passing the decree and the executing Court cannot alter its terms.
- Authorities were cited (including Smt. Sarupi's case, Bokaro and Ramzur Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, Bhutnath Das v. Sohodeb Chandra Pania, Dhanna Singh v. Malkiat Singh) supporting the proposition that Section 148 applies to procedural orders but not to conditional decrees which, after the stipulated time lapses, result in loss of seisin and prevent extension of time.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Saraiwathi (alias) K. Kalpana v. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar, 1977 M.L.J. 68 | Cited by petitioners to show that a decree for specific performance is preliminary in nature and that a condition of automatic dismissal is inappropriate. | Court noted this authority but explained that the reported matter went to appeal and the appellate court deleted the default/dismissal condition; it did not deal with extension under Section 148 in execution where the decree has become final. |
| K. Kalpna Sarswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundram Chettiar, 1980 1 SCC 630 | Supreme Court decision arising from the K. Saraiwathi proceedings; discussed whether a decree could provide for automatic dismissal on non-deposit and characterized decrees for specific performance as preliminary. | Court relied on the fact that in that appeal the conditional/dismissal term was removed by the appellate court; used to distinguish present facts where no appeal was filed and the decree stood final. |
| Somethwar Dayal v. Widow of Lacman Shah, AIR 1958 All 488 | Cited as an authority that supports the view of the decree in specific performance being preliminary and related recourse under Section 28 (as relied on by petitioners). | Court grouped this among authorities showing the preliminary character of specific-performance decrees but observed these do not address extension of time under Section 148 in execution once a conditional decree is final. |
| Gokul Prasad v. Fattelal, AIR 1946 Nagpur 29 | Cited by petitioners as an authority indicating the preliminary nature of specific-performance decrees. | Court treated it as part of the set of authorities that do not directly consider the executing Court's power to extend time under Section 148 once a conditional decree has become final. |
| Tribeni Tewary v. Ramarattan Noma, AIR 1959 Patna 460 | Cited in support of the proposition that decrees for specific performance are preliminary and that non-deposit may give defendants recourse under Section 28. | Court included it among cases that do not decide the question of extension of time in execution proceedings under Section 148 after a conditional decree has become final. |
| Smt. Sarupi v. Har Giar, AIR 1975 P&H 231 (referred to as Smt. Sarupi's case) | Cited by respondents and relied upon by the Court for the proposition that when a decree expressly directs that failure to deposit purchase money within prescribed time will cause the suit to stand dismissed, it is in substance an order of rescission under the concluding portion of sub-section (1) of Section 28 Specific Relief Act; in such a case the Court may not be competent to extend time. | Court relied on the observation in that case (quoted in the opinion) to support the conclusion that an executing Court lacks jurisdiction to extend time where the decree itself provides for dismissal on default and has become final. |
| Smt. Parmeshri's case (referred to in the opinion) | Cited for the view that Section 148 CPC confers power to extend time when it applies to procedural orders, but not to conditional decrees. | Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that Section 148 does not permit extension of time in relation to a conditional decree which operates to dismiss the suit on expiry of the time fixed by the decree. |
| Bokaro and Ramzur Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Cal 308 | Cited for the principle that where a decree conditions that a certain sum be paid within a specified time and in default the suit will stand dismissed, after expiry of that time the Court loses seisin and cannot extend the time. | Court quoted the passage from this case directly and adopted it as supportive of the view that the executing Court cannot extend time once the conditional decree's period has expired. |
| Bhutnath Das v. Sohodeb Chandra Pania, 1961-1962 66 C.W.N. 645 | Cited by respondents to support the position that conditional decrees cannot be treated as procedural orders subject to extension under Section 148. | Court treated it as one of the authorities which support the respondents' position; no contrary authority was found by the Court at the bar. |
| Dhanna Singh v. Malkiat Singh, 1983 85 PLR 275 | Cited by respondents as supporting authority for the contention that extension under Section 148 is not available where the decree is conditional and operates to dismiss the suit on default. | Court listed this among authorities relied upon by respondents supporting the non-availability of Section 148 relief in respect of conditional decrees. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court heard the parties and examined the authorities cited. The reasoning proceeds in the following steps, strictly based on the material set out in the opinion:
- The Court observed that certain authorities (referred to by the petitioners) establish that a decree for specific performance is often in the nature of a preliminary decree and that if purchase money is not deposited within the time allowed the defendants may seek rescission under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. However, the Court noted that these authorities do not address the precise question whether an executing Court may extend time under Section 148 CPC after a conditional decree has become final.
- The Court considered the authority in K. Saraiwathi (and its appellate outcome K. Kalpna Sarswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundram Chettiar). In that litigation the matter reached appeal and the appellate court deleted a default/dismissal condition imposed by the trial Court. The Court emphasised that in K. Saraiwathi the question of extension under Section 148 in execution after a decree became final was not the operative situation; rather the appellate court altered the decree in appeal.
- The Court placed particular reliance on Smt. Sarupi's case and on Bokaro and Ramzur Ltd., which support the proposition that when a decree expressly provides that the suit stands dismissed on non-deposit within the prescribed time, it is in substance tantamount to an order of rescission contemplated by Section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act; in such circumstances the Court may not be competent to extend the time once the period has expired because the Court loses seisin over the matter.
- The Court held that the present case differed from those where the conditional term was set aside in appeal: here the trial Court's conditional decree had become final because no appeal was filed by either party. The executing Court could not "go behind" a final decree to grant an extension of time; to do so would be to vary the decree after the Court had become functus officio.
- Separately, and on the merits, the Court considered the ground advanced for extension — that an interim injunction in another suit had prevented registration/execution of sale prior to the dismissal on 19th February 1982 — and concluded that this was not a sufficient ground for extension because that interim injunction had existed at the time the conditional decree was drawn (29th October 1981) and yet the Court imposed the condition notwithstanding the injunction.
- In the absence of any authority taking a contrary view on the specific point (extension in execution under Section 148 after expiry of a conditional decree period where the decree is final), and given the cited authorities that the Court relied on, the Court found no illegality or error of jurisdiction in the impugned order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions are dismissed. The Court's core ruling is that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the sale price under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the trial Court had passed a conditional decree providing that the suit shall stand dismissed on non-deposit and that decree had become final (no appeal was filed).
Implications and consequences:
- The effect on the parties is that the executing Court correctly dismissed both the execution application and the application for extension of time; the plaintiffs' suit stood dismissed by operation of the conditional decree upon expiry of the time fixed by the decree.
- The Court held that extending the time in such circumstances would amount to varying a final decree, which the executing Court cannot do because the trial Court is functus officio after passing the decree.
- No interference by the revisional Court was warranted as there was no illegality or jurisdictional error in the impugned order; accordingly the revision petitions were dismissed with no order as to costs.
- The Court allowed the civil miscellaneous petitions only to the extent that annexures P-1 and P-2 were permitted to be placed on the record.
No part of this summary adds facts or conclusions not contained in the provided opinion. Where the opinion contained limited or ambiguous drafting (e.g., variant spellings or multiple references to the same authority) the summary faithfully records the names and the uses to which the opinion itself put them.
J.V Gupta, J.:— This order will dispose of Civil Revision No. 3271 of 1982 and 154 of 1983, as both the petitions have been filed against the same order of the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Hoshiarpur, dated 27th August, 1982.
2. In a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell a conditional decree was passed on 29th October, 1981 in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners. According to the decree, a sum of Rs. 50,500/- was to be paid within one month, failing which the plaintiffs' suit was to stand dismissed. Admittedly, no appeal was filed by either party against the said decree of the trial Court which had become final between the parties. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did rot deposit the amount of the decree within the time allowed. They sought execution of the decree by filing an application dated 15th March 1982. This application was contested on behalf of the judgment-debtors on the ground that the amount had not been deposited within time and, therefore, the plaintiffs' suit stood dismissed, and the question of execution as such did not arise. Then the decree-holders filed an application dated 7th April, 1982 under sections 148 and 151, Civil Procedure Code, for extending time for depositing the sale price and condoing delay for depositing the same. This application was contested on behalf of the judgment-debtors. The learned Sub Judge disposed of both the applications by the impugned order, dated 27th August, 1982. It came to the conclusion that “since the decree-holders failed to deposit the amount within one month of the decree, their suit stood dismissed and this Court has no jurisdiction now to extend the time.” It was further held that the judgment-debtors were not obliged to move application for the rescission of the contract. Thus both the applications, that is, the execution application as well as the application for seeking the extention of time, were dismissed. Dissatisfied with the same, the decree-holders filed these petitions in this Court.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that under the Code of Civil Procedure, there it no provision by virtue of which conditional decree could be psssed in a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. The only provision in the Code is Order 20, Rule 12A which provides that where a decree for specific performance of the contract for sale or lease of immoveable property orders that the purchase money or other sum be paid by the purchaser or lessee it shall specify the period within which the payment shall be made. Thus, argued the learned counsel, no further condition could be put and in case the said amount was not deposited the suit shall not stand dismissed. According to the learned counsel, a decree in a suit for specific performance was in the nature of a preliminary decree, and in case the amount was not deposited within the time allowed, it was open to the judgment-debtors to move an application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract for the sale. It was further contended that simply because the court had imposed this condition in the decree, did not debar the Court for extending the time for depositing the amount of the sale price in view of the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, the executing Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not extending the time to deposit the amount of the gale price. In support of this contention, he referred to K. Saraiwathi (alias) K. Kalpana v. P.S.S Somasundaram Chettiar . 1977 M.L.J 68., Somethwar Dayal v. Widow of Lacman Shah . AIR 1958 All 488, Gokul Prasad v. Fattelal . AIR 1946 Nagpur 29, Tribeni Tewary v. Ramarattan Noma . AIR 1959 Patna 460., K. Katpna Serswathi v. Somasundram Chettiar . 1980 1 SCC 630. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since the decree was a conditional one which decree could be passed, as there was no bar under the Code of Civil Procedure to pass such a decree, the plaintiff's suit stood dismissed on the expiry of the period of one month when they failed to deposit the sale price. According to the learned counsel since the decree was conditional one, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time because that will be amounting to varying the decree without there being any appeal against the same. In support of his contention, reference was made to Smt. Parmesharl Naurata6 Smt. Sarupi v. Har Giar . AIR 1975 P&H 231., Bokaro and Ramzur Ltd. v. The State of Bihar . AIR 1965 Cal 308., Bhutnath Das v. Sohodeb Chandra Pania . 1961-1962 66 C.W.N 645. and Dhanna Singh v. Malkiat Singh . 1983 85 PLR 275.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the case law cited at the bar Such a matter was considered by this Court in Smt. Sarupi's case (supra). It has been observed in para 6 there that “the case may be different when the Court records a direction in the decree for specific performance that in the event of default of deposit of the purchase money within the prescribed time, the suit shall stand dismissed. In such a case, it would be deemed that the Court has also, in substance, passed the order of rescission of contract as contemplated by the concluding portion of sub section (1) of S 28 of the Specific Relief Act. It is in the case of such a decree that the Court may not, when the purchase money has not been deposited by the successful plaintiff within the prescribed time, be competent to extend the time for its deposit”. The matter has also been considered in Smt. Parmeshri's case (supra) where it was observed that under the provisions of Section 148, Civil Procedure Code, the Court has powers to extend the time when it applies to the procedural orders and not to conditional decrees. Similarly, in Bokaro's case (supra) it was held: that
“Where a decree is passed on condition that if a certain sum of money be put in within a specified time, the suit would stand decreed and in default thereof the suit would stand dismissed, after the expiry of the time limited by the decree, the Court loses seisin over the matter and cannot extend the time.”
5. No judgment taking the contrary view has been cited at the bar. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are only to the effect that the nature of the decree passed in the suit for specific performance is that of preliminary decree and if the amount is not deposited within time allowed in the decree, the defendants will be entitled to take a recourse under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. None of the authorities deal with the extension of time as such under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The only authority which deals with the extension of time is K Sarswathi's case (supra) which has also gone to the Supreme Court in K. Kalpna Sarswathi v. P.S.S Somasudram Chettiar. In the former judgment it was an appeal against the decree itself where the time was allowed for depositing the sale price and at the same time it was also provided that if the amount was not deposited, the suit shall stand dismissed. The plaintiffs felt dissatisfied with that direction and filed the appeal against the judgment and decree of the Court. The Bench hearing the appeal discussed this matter in para 32 of the report which reads as under:—
‘32. The only other question is, whether “the learned Judge had jurisdiction to provide that the suit shall stand automatically dismissed, if the appellant committed default in making the payment within the time stipulated in decree. Having regard to the decisions, which we have referred to already, holding that the decree in a suit for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree, and also having regard to the express provisions contained in section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which constitute the statutory crystallization of the legal position in this behalf, we are clearly of the opinion that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to provide that if the appellant committed default in making the deposit within the time stipulated in the decree, the suit shall stand dismissed, since that will destroy the character of the decree as a preliminary decree and disable the Court from granting the reliefs provided for in section 28(3) as occasion may warrant”
6. Thus, this default condition was deleted by the D.B in appeal against the decree. As regards the present case, the decree of the trial Court had become final between the parties as no appeal was filed against the same by either of the parties. The Executing Court could not go behind the decree as such, and, therefore, the question of the extention of time under the cirumstances did not arise Before the Supreme Court also, the question of the extension of time was in the appeal against the decree. It is well settled that the Appellate Court could pass any order in appeal against the decree of the court below including the extension of time and therefore, the Supreme Court did observe that the condition that the suit will be dismissed on non-payment of the sale price within the prescribed time, could not be imposed in the light of the provisions of section 28 of the Specific Relief Act as the proper course in that situation was to pass a decree for specific performance which would, for all practical purposes, be a preliminary decree.
7. It may be observed that it was not the case of the petitioners that the Executing Court could go behind the decree when the same was a conditional one Such a condition, if imposed, was liable to be set aside in appeal, if any Since the amount was not deposited within the time allowed according to the terms of the decree, the suit stood dismissed automatically and, therefore, the Executing Court could not execute the decree. Now to extend the time for depositing the sale price will be varying the decree of the trial Court which could not be done as the Court has become functus officio after passing the said decree.
8. Apart from that even on merits no case has been made out for extension of time. The only ground pleaded in the application was that in another suit filed against the vendors-defendants they were restrained from executing any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners and when the said order was vacated OH the dismissal of the suit on 19th February, 1982, the necessary application for extension of time was moved. This by itself was no ground for seeking the extension of time because the said order of interim injunction was already there when the conditional decree was passed on 29th October, 1981. In spite of the said order, the said condition was imposed and, therefore, this by itself was not sufficient to claim extension of time.
9. In this view of the matter, I do not find any illegality or error of jurisdiction which justifies any interference in the revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petitions fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. The C. Ms. are allowed to the extent the annexures P-1 & P-2 are allowed to be placed on records.
H.L.S
Petition dismissed.
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