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M. Holkar And Another v. A.P Srihan .
Factual and Procedural Background
The revision petition challenges two prior judgments: the trial Court's order dated 7-4-1983 granting an ex parte injunction, and the appellate Court's order dated 2-8-1983 dismissing the petitioners' appeal against that injunction. The suit was filed by Mr. A.P. Shrihan seeking a permanent injunction against Mr. and Mrs. Holkar to restrain them from misusing premises No. 374, Sector 30-A, Chandigarh, leased to them for residential purposes, by running a school therein. The petitioners contended that the premises had been used as a school from the beginning of the tenancy with the plaintiff's knowledge, invoking Section 41(g) of the Specific Relief Act to argue that no injunction could be granted. The plaintiff denied this claim. The trial and appellate Courts considered whether the defendants could rely on acquiescence to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial Court under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendants could invoke the plea of acquiescence to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain a suit for injunction under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act.
- Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction despite the plea of acquiescence.
- Whether the use of residential premises for running a school violated statutory provisions and justified the grant of injunction.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The premises had been used as a school from the inception of the tenancy with the plaintiff's knowledge.
- Under Section 41(g) of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff could not be granted an injunction due to this acquiescence.
- If acquiescence was established, the trial Court was precluded from granting injunction.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- Denied the claim that the premises were used as a school from the beginning with knowledge or consent.
- Asserted that the premises were leased strictly for residential purposes and that running a school was a prohibited use under the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 and related rules.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mrs. Amarjit Kaur Sandhu v. Malabar Cane Furniture, (1979) 1 Rent LR 732 | Principle that estoppel cannot operate against statutory rules and regulations. | The trial Court relied on this precedent to hold that acquiescence cannot bar enforcement of statutory provisions. |
| Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh, (1982) 1 Rent CJ 149 | Support for the principle that estoppel does not override statutory prohibitions. | The trial Court cited this decision to reinforce that statutory rules cannot be bypassed by acquiescence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the applicability of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, focusing on whether acquiescence by the plaintiff could bar the grant of injunction or the trial Court's jurisdiction. It held that the bar on jurisdiction under Section 41 applies only when facts are undisputed and clearly attract the statutory provision. In cases where factual disputes exist—as here, with the plaintiff denying acquiescence—the trial Court must first make a factual determination before applying Section 41. The Court emphasized that estoppel or acquiescence cannot override statutory rules, particularly those under the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952, which prohibit the use of residential premises for running a school. The trial Court's finding that the use violated statutory provisions and that the Chandigarh Administration's policy decision could not override these provisions was upheld. Consequently, the plea of acquiescence did not oust the trial Court's jurisdiction, and the discretion exercised by the Courts below in granting the injunction was not interfered with.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the revision petition, affirming the trial and appellate Courts' orders granting the injunction and dismissing the appeal. The petitioners were granted one month's time to comply with the injunction order, extended to 26-4-1984. The decision directly enforces the injunction against misuse of residential premises and clarifies that statutory prohibitions cannot be circumvented by acquiescence or estoppel. No broader precedent beyond the facts was established.
D.S Tewatia, J.:— This revision petition is directed against the judgment of the trial Court dt. 7-4-1983 granting ex parte injunction and that of the appellate Court dt. 2-8-1983, who dismissed the appeal of the present petitioners against the said order.
2. Facts relevant to the controversy can be stated thus:—
Mr. A.P Shrihan filed a suit for permanent injunction against Mr. & Mrs. Holkar restraining them from misusing the premises No. 374. Sector 30-A. Chandigarh which were leased out to them for residential purposes by running a school therein.
3-4. The petitioners had taken the plea that the said premises were used by running a school therein from the very inception of the tenancy to the knowledge of the plaintiff and that by virtue of S. 41(g) of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the plaintiff cannot be granted any injunction. The plaintiff denied the said averments.
5. The question that was posed before the trial Court and the appellate Court and reiterated in this Court is as to whether the defendant-petitioners herein (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) could take up the plea of acquiescence and thus challenge the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the suit for injunction in view of the provisions of S. 41 of the Act. The trial Court had prima facie come to the conclusion that the premises were given for purposes of residence, that it had been put to a use which was prohibited by the rules and regulations of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 and the rules made thereunder and the violation was such as a result of the prohibited use of the premises that the building could be resumed by Clhandigarh Administration. The trial Court also observed that even though Chandigarh Administration had taken a policy decision that use of the residential premises for running school shall be overlooked but the Court was of the opinion that such policy decision could not override the statutory provisions.
6. Regarding the raising of plea of acquiescence, the trial Court observed that there can be no estoppel against (he statutory rules and regulations and sought support from two single Bench decisions of this Court reported as Mrs. Amarjit Kaur Sandhu v. Malabar Cane Furniture, (1979) 1 Rent LR 732 and Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh, (1982) 1 Rent CJ 149.
7. Mr. Bhandari learned counsel for the petitioners, has canvassed that if it is established that there had been acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, then the trial Court is precluded from granting injunction in view of the provisions of S. 41 of the Act.
8. There is no dispute with the proposition that the trial Court in the matter of granting of injunction and the entertaining of the injunction suit has to keep in forefront the provisions of S. 41 of the Act. So far as the bar of jurisdiction at the threshold in view of the relevant provisions of S. 41 is concerned, that would arise only where on admitted facts the matter being such that it would attract the relevant provisions of S. 41 prohibiting the grant of injunction. Where such is not the case and one party has raised the plea and the other has denied then the trial Court shall have to give a finding first and then would consider as to whether the relevant provision of S. 41 prohibiting the grant of injunction is attracted or not But then with the given finding the necessity of grant of interim injunction would not arise as the case would stand finally decided. Hence, we are of the view that provisions of S. 41 of the Act can be attracted at the threshold to cases where there is no dispute in regard to the facts which would attract the application of relevant provision of S. 41 barring the jurisdiction of the Court in regard to the granting of injunction and by implication prohibiting the entertaining of injunction suit in question.
9. In view of the above the question that the trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to try the suit as the defendant had raised the plea of acquiescence does not arise. As regards the other material facts and circumstances which the Court normally takes into consideration while granting or not granting interim injunction, we are of the view that no case is made out for interfering with the discretion exercised by the Courts below. Hence the revision petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
10. The petitioners pray for one month's time to obey the injunction order. We accede to their request and direct that they shall comply with the injunction order by 26-4-1984.
Surinder Singh, J.:— I agree.
Petition dismissed.
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