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Labh Singh And Others v. Piara Singh (Deceased By L. Rs.) And Another
Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal Concerning Execution of a Will
Factual and Procedural Background
Bakhtawar Singh was the owner of the disputed land and died on April 27, 1970, issueless and without leaving a widow. His siblings were Udhe Singh, Inder Singh and Piara Singh (the latter was the defendant-respondent and propounder of the Will), and their sister was Inder Kaur. Plaintiffs (Udhe Singh, Inder Singh and Inder Kaur) sued claiming 3/4 share of the land by inheritance and denied the execution and validity of a Will propounded by Piara Singh by which Bakhtawar Singh allegedly bequeathed the entire land to Piara Singh. Piara Singh contended that the Will was genuine and that he was the rightful beneficiary.
The trial Court found that the execution and genuineness of the Will were not established and decreed the plaintiffs' suit. On first appeal, the lower appellate Court allowed Piara Singh's appeal, held that the Will's execution and validity had been proved, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The present matter is a second appeal against that first appellate judgment, with the sole point for determination described as whether due execution of the Will propounded by Piara Singh stands proved.
During the litigation, Udhe Singh (a plaintiff) died and his son Labh Singh was substituted; subsequently Inder Singh, Inder Kaur (plaintiffs) and defendant Piara Singh also died and their legal representatives were brought on record.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the due execution of the Will propounded by Piara Singh is proved (the sole point stated for determination).
- Whether the Sub-Registrar (the registering officer) can be treated as an attesting witness for the purposes of Clause (c) of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and whether his testimony alone can satisfy the statutory attestation requirement.
- Whether the facts and testimony before the Court satisfy the strict requirements of Clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act (i.e., attestation by two or more witnesses, each having seen the testator sign or having received the testator's personal acknowledgment, with each witness signing in the presence of the testator).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moonga Devi v. Radha Ballab, 1972 Cur LJ 717 : AIR 1972 SC 1471 | Establishes that proof of execution under Section 63 of the Succession Act is not satisfied merely by genuineness of signatures or marks; compliance with Clause (c) (attestation by two or more witnesses as specified) is required. | The Court relied on this principle to emphasize that strict compliance with Clause (c) of Section 63 is necessary and that the matter must be examined within the four-corners of that clause. |
| M.L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. H. Venkata Sastri and Sons, AIR 1969 SC 1147 | Sets out essential conditions of valid attestation: (1) two or more witnesses who have seen the executant sign or received personal acknowledgment; and (2) each witness signs in presence of the executant; explains animo attestandi and addresses the role of the registering officer (who generally signs in discharge of statutory duty under Section 59 of the Registration Act and not as an attesting witness). | The Court used this authority to articulate the requirements of attestation (including animo attestandi) and to explain why a registering officer's signature is prima facie attributable to statutory duty unless facts show he had the animo attestandi. |
| Naranjan Singh v. Parsa Singh, 1971 Cur LJ 195 | Holds that a Sub-Registrar can be considered an attesting witness if the endorsement indicates that the Sub-Registrar read the document to the testator, the testator accepted and admitted execution, put his thumb impression in the Sub-Registrar's presence, and the Sub-Registrar signed the endorsement — i.e., the registering officer appended attestation with animo attestandi. | The Court treated this precedent as analogous on the question whether a registering officer may serve as an attesting witness but distinguished it on facts: in Naranjan Singh there was both the Sub-Registrar's attestation and evidence of another attesting witness; in the present case, only attestation by one witness (the Sub-Registrar) could be established, so the statutory requirement of two witnesses remained unsatisfied. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court confined the appeal to the question of due execution of the Will because parties' counsel addressed only that issue and appellants did not contest the Will's testamentary genuineness if execution were proved. The Court set out the statutory attestation requirement in Clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act and reiterated the settled principles from higher authority: attestation must be by two or more witnesses, each having either seen the testator sign or received a personal acknowledgment of the testator's signature or mark, and each witness must sign in the presence of the testator.
The factual record showed:
- The Will named two attesting witnesses: Nachhattar Singh and Hamir Singh.
- Hamir Singh, though alive, was not produced as a witness.
- Nachhattar Singh (DW 3) did testify but failed to support the Will and stated he had no knowledge about its execution.
- The Sub-Registrar Hardip Singh (DW 1) testified that he read over the Will to the testator, that the testator admitted executing it, that the testator acknowledged his thumb-mark on the endorsement, and that the Sub-Registrar signed the endorsement.
Applying legal principles, the Court reasoned:
- While the Sub-Registrar's testimony established that he had the animo attestandi in respect of the testator's personal acknowledgement (making him an attesting witness under the facts), that testimony could at best establish attestation by one witness.
- Clause (c) of Section 63 requires attestation by two or more witnesses meeting the specified conditions. There was no evidence that either Nachhattar Singh or Hamir Singh had seen the testator affix his mark or had received his personal acknowledgment and then signed in the testator's presence.
- The Sub-Registrar was not present at the moment of execution and therefore could not attest to the precise compliance by any other named attesting witness with the requirements of Section 63.
- The Court distinguished Naranjan Singh v. Parsa Singh because, in that earlier case, the Sub-Registrar's endorsement showed both his animo attestandi and there was evidence of another attesting witness who satisfied the statutory requirements; those combined facts met Section 63. In the present case, that second requisite attestation was missing.
- Consequently, the lower appellate Court committed an error of law by treating the testimony of the registering officer alone as sufficient proof of execution under Section 63.
The Court therefore concluded that the execution of the impugned Will was not proved in compliance with the statutory requirements.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED
The Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, and restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In practical effect, the trial Court's finding that the execution and genuineness of the Will were not established is reinstated; the plaintiffs' decree stands restored. The Court ordered no costs.
The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications beyond the case-specific application of Section 63 and the principles governing attestation; the decision's direct effect is to reverse the lower appellate Court's finding that the Will's execution was proved and to restore the trial Court's decree. This opinion does not announce or purport to establish any new precedent beyond the application and clarification of existing authorities on attestation requirements and the circumstances in which a registering officer may be regarded as an attesting witness.
Appeal allowed. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court set aside; trial Court's decree restored; no order as to costs.
In this second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Senior Sub-Judge, Ludhiana, exercising enhanced appellate powers, the sole point for determination is whether due execution of the Will propounded by Piara Singh defendant-respondent stands proved.
2. The relevant facts of this case are that Bakhtawar Singh was owner of the land in dispute. He died issueless and without leaving a widow on April 27, 1970. Udhe Singh and Inder Singh plaintiffs and Piara Singh defendant are his brothers. Inder Kaur plaintiff is their sister. Plaintiffs brought a suit claiming possession of 3/4th share in the land by succession as heirs of Bakhtawar Singh. They denied the execution and validity of a Will propounded by Piara Singh defendant alleged to have been executed by Bakhtawar Singh bequeathing the whole land to him. It is said that Piara Singh is entitled to only 1/4th share in the land by inheritance. The suit was resisted by Piara Singh reiterating the genuineness of the Will executed in his favour by Bakhtawar Singh. The trial Court held that execution and genuineness of the Will have not been established and consequently decreed the plaintiffs' suit. The first appeal filed against, this decision of the trial Court by Piara Singh was allowed by the lower appellate Court holding that the execution of the Will as well as its validity have been proved. On this finding the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
3. It may be mentioned here that before filing of the instant appeal Udhe Singh plaintiff died and his son Labh Singh filed this appeal along with the other two plaintiffs Inder Singh and Inder Kaur. During the pendency of the appeal the plaintiffs Inder Singh and Inder Kaur as well as defendant Piara Singh died and their legal representatives were brought on record.
4. The disputed Will bears the name of Nachhattar Singh and Hamir Singh as attesting witnesses. Hamir Singh, though alive, was not produced in the wtiness-box to support the execution of the Will. Nachhattar Singh stepped into the witness-box as DW 3 but he failed to support the will. He stated that he has no knowledge about the execution of such a Will. As none of the attesting witnesses had come forward to prove execution of the Will, the trial Court held that its execution has hot been proved. The trial Court also doubted the genuineness of the Will because although it was recited therein that Piara Singh had been rendering service to the testator, but no evidence has been produced to prove this fact. The trial Court was, therefore, of the view that there appeared to be no good reason for Bakhtawar Singh to have excluded his other brothers from inheritance. The lower appellate Court took the view that the Sub-Registrar Hardip Singh (D.W 1) who had registered the Will, can be considered to be an attesting witness of the Will and from his testimony the execution of the Will stands proved. It was also observed that no circumstance existed from which the genuineness of the Will may be doubted. The vital point for consideration is whether the view taken by the lower appellate Court is sustainable.
5. Before me the learned counsel for the parties addressed arguments in respect of the execution of the Will only. It was not contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that even if the Will is found to be duly executed it should not be considered genuine testamentary disposition of the property. I will, therefore, confine myself to the question of due execution of the Will.
6. It appears proved from the testimony of the Sub-Registrar that the testator had acknowledged his thumb mark on the Will at the time of registration. However, as held by the Supreme Court in Moonga Devi v. Radha Ballab, 1972 Cur LJ 717 : (AIR 1972 SC 1471), it is not merely the genuineness of signatures or mark of the testator on which the proof of the execution of the Will under Section 63 of the Succession Act depends. It has to be proved that the will was attested in accordance with CI. (c) of that section. This clause reads as follows:—
“63 (c). The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person: and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.”
The execution of the Will is to be proved within the four-corners of the aforesaid clause and the law requires strict compliance of this provision of law. Thus, before execution of a Will is considered to be proved the Court has to satisfy itself that the Will was attested by two or more witnesses each of whom had either seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or had received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark. Each of the witnesses must also sign or affix his mark on the will in the presence of the testator. As to what are essential conditions of a valid attestation on a document was considered by the Supreme Court in M.L Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. H. Venkata Sastri and Sons, AIR 1969 SC 1147. It was held that to attest is to bear a witness to the fact. Briefly put, the essential conditions of a valid attestation are:—
(1) Two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign the instrument or have received from him a personal acknowledgement of his signature;
(2) With a view to attest or to bear witness to this fact each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant.
It was observed that it was essential that the witness should have put his animo attestandi, that is, for the purpose of attesting that he has seen the executant sign or has received from him a personal, acknowledgment of his signature. If a person puts his signature on the document for some other purpose, e.g to certify that he is a scribe or an identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness. So far as the role of registering Officer is concerned it was held in this judgment that the Registration Act, 1908 lays down a detailed procedure for registration of documents. The registering Officer is under a duty to enquire whether the document is executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed and to satisfy himself as to the identity of the executant. He can register the document if he is satisfied about the identity of the person executing the same and if that person admits execution. The signatures of the executant and of every person examined with reference to the document are endorsed on the document. The registering Officer is required to affix the date and his signature to the endorsements. The Supreme Court held that prima facie, the registering Officer puts his signature on the document in discharge of his statutory duty under Section 59 of the Registration Act and not for the purpose of attesting it or certifying that he has received from the executant a personal acknowledgment of his signature.
7. In the present case it is important to ascertain if the disputed Will was attested in accordance with Clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act. For this purpose only the statement of one attesting witness can be taken into consideration. As mentioned earlier only Nachhattar Singh one of the attesting witnesses was examined by the pro-pounder of the Will and he failed to support the execution of the Will. The other person named in the Will as the second attesting witness i.e Hamir Singh was not produced. I am then left with the statement of the registering Officer Hardip Singh D.W 1 and it is to be considered whether he can be deemed to be an attesting witness of the Will and if so whether his testimony satisfies the requirement of Clause (c) of Sec. 63 of the Succession Act.
8. It has been noticed above that the registering Officer cannot be regarded as an attesting witness if he had not appended his animo attestandi, i.e, for the Purpose of attesting the fact that he had seen the executant sign or had received from him a personal acknowledgment of his signature. He should also sign the endorsement of registration in presence of the testator. This point arose for determination before a single Bench of this Court in Naranjan Singh v. Parsa Singh, 1971 Cur LJ 195. In that case the endorsement by the Sub-Registrar on the Will indicated that contents of the documents were read over to the testator Who had accepted the same and admitted fhat he had executed the Will. The Sub-Registrar also signed the endorsement. It was held that in view of the language of the endorsement and the fact that the testator put his thumb impression thereon in the presence of the Sub-Registrar who also signed the endorsement, the Sub-Registrar also became an attesting witness of the Will in question. In other words the registering Officer had appended his attestation animo attestandi. The present case is of a similar nature. The Sub-Registrar Hardip Singh D.W 1 testified that he had read over the Will to the testator who admitted having executed the same. The endorsement was then thumb-marked by the testator and signed by the Sub-Registrar. It will be reasonable to gather from these circumstances that the Sub-Registrar had not merely registered the Will formally but had appended his attestation for the purpose of attesting the fact that the testator had personally acknowledged his thumb impression op the document. Since the testator affirmed the contents of the Will and put his thumb impression on the endorsement in the presence of the Sub-Rgistrar, therefore, the Sub-Registrar can also be considered to be an attesting witness of the Will. However, this fact alone does not prove the compliance of Clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act. In order to satisfy this provision of law the Propounder of the Will has to prove attestation of at least two witnesses each of whom had seen the testator sign or mark the Will or had received his personal acknowledgment of his signatures or mark and each of them should have signed or marked in presence of the testator. The testimony of the Sub-Registrar may be sufficient to prove attestation, of the. Will by one witness but it does not establish the attestation of the second witness. There is no evidence on the record that either Nachhattar Singh or. Hamir Singh named as attesting witnesses on the Will had actually seen the testator thumb-marking the Will or had himself put his thumb impression in presence of the testator. The Sub-Registrar evidently was not present when the Will was executed and he, therefore, could not say if any other person had attested the Will meeting with the requirements of S. 63 of the Succession Act. The judgment in the case of Niranjan Singh. (Supra) relied upon by the learned lower appellate Court to arrive at a finding, in respect of the due execution of the Will is inapplicable to the facts of this case. In that case the Sub-Registrar was taken, to be an attesting witness of the Will and there was also evidence of another attesting, witness who had averred that the testator had signed the Will in hrs presence and that he also put his signatures on the Will in testator's presence. It is in such, circumstances that in view of the Will having been attested by two witnesses it was Considered that there/had been sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act. In the present case the attestation of the Will be only one witness has been proved which certainly cannot be taken to satisfy the mandatory provisions of Section 63. An error of law has, therefore, been plainly committed by the lower appellate/Court by considering the execution of the Wilt proved merely on the testimony of the registering Officer. In this view of the matter the execution of the impugned. Will is not considered to be proved and as such the decision of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained.
9. For the aforesaid reasons this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower, appellate Court are set, aside and those of the trial Court are restored. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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