Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

William Jacks & Company (India) Limited v. Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Limited

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 20, 1983
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Messrs William Jacks & Company (India) Limited (the Company) filed a petition under section 439 read with sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 against Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Limited (the Syndicate), claiming about Rs. 5 lakhs due and acknowledged by the Syndicate. Notice of the petition was ordered on 13 January 1983 for hearing on 3 March 1983; the notice was dispatched on 18 January 1983 and, according to the opinion, would have been received by the Syndicate within a week thereafter.

On 3 March 1983 Mr. A.K. Jaiswal, Advocate, appeared for the Syndicate and requested time to file a written statement; the matter was adjourned to 7 April 1983. On 5 April 1983 the Syndicate (C.A. No. 54 of 1983) filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking a stay of the court proceedings on the ground that the parties' agreement contained an arbitration clause. The Company contested that application. The Court ultimately adjourned the main matter for written statement and dismissed the section 34 application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the oral request made by counsel for the Syndicate (to obtain time to file a written statement) amounted to "taking any other steps in the proceedings" within the meaning of section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, thereby precluding a stay of proceedings.
  2. Whether the Syndicate's application under section 34 properly disclosed the particular dispute or material particulars required so that the Court could determine whether the subject-matter fell within the arbitration clause.
  3. Whether an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is maintainable in the context of a winding up petition brought under sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Arguments of the Parties

Syndicate's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bhagirath Dass)

  • The agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be referred to an arbitrator (appointed by mutual agreement, or otherwise to a nominee of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delhi), and therefore the court proceedings must be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
  • Attempted to distinguish cases holding that an adjournment request can amount to taking a step by highlighting that in this instance no memorandum of appearance was filed and no written application for adjournment was moved.
  • Relied on authority (Harbans Lal and Punjab State v. Moti Ram) to show that in some factual circumstances a request for adjournment does not amount to taking a step in the proceedings.

Company's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Khaitan)

  • The Syndicate, by requesting time on 3 March 1983 to file a written statement, took a step in the proceedings; once a party has taken a step, section 34 relief (stay) is not available.
  • The section 34 application lacked material particulars of the dispute (no particulars of alleged non-compliance or of the losses complained of), and so was liable to be dismissed for failure to disclose the dispute required by section 34 jurisprudence.
  • An application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not maintainable in the context of a winding up petition under sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956; winding up proceedings constitute a special jurisdiction not intended to be ousted to arbitration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra, 1973 2 SCC 96 Holding that a Government Pleader's request for time to file a written statement amounted to taking a step in the proceedings, thus precluding an application under section 34 to stay the suit. The court treated that decision as directly analogous and persuasive: it applied the reasoning to conclude that the Syndicate's counsel's request for adjournment was a step in the proceedings and therefore section 34 relief was not available.
Union of India v. Hira Lal Sud, 1978 80 PLR 239 Held that an oral request for adjournment to file a written statement is as effective as a written request; an oral adjournment request can amount to taking a step in the proceedings. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the oral request made on 3 March 1983 constituted taking a step in the proceedings.
Segat Brothers v. Food Corporation of India, 1983 85 PLR 235 Followed the view that an oral request for adjournment is equivalent to a written request and can amount to taking a step. The court cited this case as a subsequent authority that followed the same principle relied upon here.
Harbans Lal v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 (P&H) ??? (as cited) Example where an oral request for adjournment did not amount to taking a step because the defendant needed to obtain instructions from head office; the facts distinguished the later authorities. The court considered and distinguished this authority on its particular facts, finding it inapplicable to the present case.
Punjab State v. Moti Ram, 1957 59 PLR 567 Held that a voluntary appearance without authority and an adjournment requested on an assumption of later authority did not amount to a step; facts limited that holding. The court distinguished this decision on its facts and did not treat it as controlling here.
Daman Anand v. Hira Lal, AIR 1974 P&H 232 Stated that an application under section 34 must disclose the existence of a dispute between the parties so the Court can determine if the matter falls within the arbitration clause; absent such allegation the application is not maintainable. The court relied on this principle to hold that the Syndicate's section 34 application failed because it did not set out particulars of the dispute or of the alleged breaches or losses.
Pearl Hostery Mills Ludhiana v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Delhi 64 Held that on an application under section 34 the Court must see what the dispute is and whether it falls within the arbitration clause; the Court must examine both the clause and the asserted dispute. The court cited this decision to support the requirement that the section 34 application must specify the dispute and explain why it falls within the arbitration clause; applied to find the present application deficient.
Salig Ram etc. v. New Suraj Financiers & Chit Fund Company etc., C.A. No. 8 of 1979 (decided 12 July 1979) Observed that winding up proceedings under sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act are a special jurisdiction distinct from proceedings for recovery that would be referable to arbitration; an application under section 34 is misconceived in that context. The court relied on these observations (including those of B.S. Dhillon, J.) to hold that section 34 is not maintainable in a winding up petition and that the application in the present winding up context was misconceived.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in three main strands corresponding to the core issues identified.

First, on the timing and the effect of the Syndicate's conduct: the Court noted the undisputed chronology—notice issued 18 January 1983 and, on 3 March 1983 (more than a month later) counsel for the Syndicate appeared and orally requested time to file a written statement. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act permits a party to apply for a stay of legal proceedings "at any time before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings." The central question the Court framed was whether the oral request made by Mr. Jaiswal amounted to "taking a step."

The Court treated the Supreme Court's decision in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra as directly analogous, where a Government Pleader's application for time was held to be a step and thus incompatible with a later section 34 application. The Court emphasised that a lawyer appearing and asking for adjournment is presumed to act on client instructions and that such an oral request is as efficacious as a written one (relying on Union of India v. Hira Lal Sud and Segat Brothers v. FCI). It rejected the distinction urged by Mr. Bhagirath Dass (that no memorandum of appearance was filed and no written application was moved), observing that neither a formal memorandum nor a written application is necessary and that an oral request suffices.

Second, on the sufficiency of the section 34 application: the Court explained that section 34 requires the applicant to furnish material showing the existence of a dispute that is properly referable to arbitration. Relying on Daman Anand v. Hira Lal and Pearl Hostery Mills, the Court held that the Syndicate's application failed to specify the obligations allegedly breached by the Company or the losses claimed; the particulars of the dispute were therefore inadequate. On that basis the application was also vulnerable to dismissal for lack of essential material.

Third, on maintainability in a winding up petition: the Court considered and adopted the view expressed in Salig Ram's case that winding up proceedings under sections 433, 434 and 439 involve a specialised jurisdiction aimed at expeditious realisation of assets and payment of debts, and are not to be treated as ordinary recovery proceedings that can be referred to an arbitrator. The Court concluded that it is not the legislative intent to confer such winding up power on an arbitrator and that a section 34 application to stay winding up proceedings is not maintainable.

Having reached these conclusions, and after considering the authorities that were relied upon and those distinguished on factual grounds, the Court found that (a) the oral adjournment request constituted a step in the proceedings so as to preclude relief under section 34, (b) the section 34 application lacked necessary particulars of the dispute and therefore was liable to be dismissed, and (c) in any event section 34 relief is not maintainable in a winding up petition. For these reasons the Court dismissed the application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court DISMISSED the Syndicate's application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Court adjourned the matter for written statement to 17 November 1983. The formal order reads: "Application dismissed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Syndicate is not permitted to obtain a stay of the winding up proceedings under section 34 and must proceed with the court process (the matter was adjourned for the filing of a written statement).
  • Scope of the decision: The Court based its conclusion on (i) the procedural act of requesting an adjournment as amounting to taking a step in the proceedings, (ii) the insufficiency of the section 34 application in failing to specify the dispute, and (iii) the view that section 34 is not maintainable in a winding up petition. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel general rule beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; it resolves the application before the Court on the stated factual and legal grounds.

R.M.S
Application dismissed.
Show all summary ...

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.:— Briefly, the facts are that Messrs William Jacks & Company (India) Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Company), filed a petition under section 439 read with section 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, against Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Syndicate), stating that an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs and odd was due from it which it failed to pay in spite of acknowledging that the above said amount was due from it Notice in the petition was ordered to be issued by this Court on 13th January, 1983, for 3rd March, 1983. The notice was despatched on behalf of the Company by Mr. R.N Narula, Advocate, to the Syndicate on 18th January, 1983, which must have been received within one week thereafter. On 3rd March, 1983, Mr. A.K Jaiswal, Advocate, appeared on behalf of the respondent and made a request for time to enable him to file a written statement. At this request, the case was adjourned to 7th April, 1983. Two days before the date of hearing, that is, on 5th April, 1983, an application (C.A No. 54 of 1983) was filed on behalf of the Syndicate under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called the Act), for staying the proceedings on the ground that the agreement between the parties contained an arbitration clause. The application has been contested on behalf of the Company.

2. The first contention of Mr. Bhagirath Dass is that there is an arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties according to which all the disputes are to be referred to the Arbitrator to be appointed by the parties by mutual agreement and in the event of the parties failing to agree the reference would be to a nominee of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delhi, at the instance of the party first applying to him. He submits that therefore, the proceedings are liable to be stayed under section 34 of the Act.

3. On the other hand, Mr. Khaitan has argued that the Syndicate took step in the proceedings as a request was made on its behalf to file a written statement. In the circumstances, he submits, that the proceedings cannot be stayed.

4. I have duly considered the arguments of the learned counsel. It is not disputed that the service of the petition was ordered to be effected on the Syndicate in the second week of January, 1983. It is also not disputed that the notice must have been served upon the Syndicate within a week from 18th January, 1983, the date of its issuance. A request was made by Mr. A.K Jaiswal to adjourn the case for enabling him to file the written statement on 3rd March, 1983, that is, more than a month after having received notice by the Syndicate. In that situation, the inference is that the Syndicate knew the contents of the petition and it wanted to defend the same on merits. section 34 of the Arbitration Act inter alia provides that where any party to arbitration agreement commences any legal proceedings in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal proceedings may at any time before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending to stay the proceedings

5. The question that arises for determination is whether the statement of Mr. Jaiswal amounts to taking a step in the proceedings. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra . 1973 2 SCC 96. In that case, a suit was instituted for recovery of some amount by way of damages against the State of Uttar Pradesh. The summones of the case were served on the District Government Counsel who filed an appearance slip in the Court and an application praying for one month's time for the purposes of filing the written statement. The prayer was granted. Before the next date, he moved an application under section 34 of the Act stating that there was an arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties to the suit and, therefore, the suit should be stayed. The trial Court accepted the application and stayed the suit. On appeal, the High Court held that the action of the Government Pleader in applying for time to file the written statement amounted to taking step in the proceedings within the meaning of section 34 of the Act. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the application under section 34 was dismissed. The State went up in appeal before the Supreme Court. Dua, J., while speaking for the Court, after taking into consideration various cases, observed that there was no serious infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The District Government Counsel in that case was empowered to appear and act for and on behalf of the Government and also to make applications on its behalf. If the Counsel wanted time for the purpose of having fuller instructions, he could have asked for it specifically, for he was not a layman ignorant about the legal position but a professional lawyer retained by the Government for the purpose of acting and pleading on behalf of the Government as a recognized agent. He, however, chose instead to ask for time specifically for filing written statement and this act he purported to do on behalf of the State Government which he was fully empowered to do. The State took benefit of his appearance and his successful prayer for adjournment of the case by one month for the purpose of filing the written statement. In those circumstances, it was hardly open to the State Government to plead that the District Government Counsel was not authorised to seek adjournment on its behalf for that purpose. If he wanted time for further consultations, he could and should have specifically made a prayer to that effect. It was further observed that it would be somewhat irrational and perhaps incongruous to permit the State, after having taken the benefit of that adjournment, to plead that the application for adjournment was not made on instructions and was unauthorised. To accede to the State Government the right to do so would clearly be unjust to the opposite party which could have rightfully objected to the adjournment, had there been any indication that the prayer was not being made on instructions from the State Government. The above observations are fully applicable to the facts of the present case.

6. Mr. Bhagirath Dass sought to distinguish the case on the ground that Mr. Jaiswal did not file any memorandum of appearance on behalf of the Syndicate nor did he move any application as was done in the above referred to case. I am not impressed with the alleged distinction. It is presumed that when a lawyer puts in appearance, he does so on the instructions of his client. It is not necessary that he must put in a memorandum of appearance. It is also not necessary that a request should always be made in writing. An oral request is as good as a request in writing. In this view, I am not fortified by the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Hira Lal Sud . 1978 80 PLR 239., wherein it was held that the oral request for adjournment for filing the written statement is as good as a written request. It was further held that if a written request seeking adjournment to file written statement amounts to taking a step in the proceedings, there is no reason why an oral request to the same effect would not amount to taking such a step. That case was followed in Segat Brothers v. Food Corporation of India . 1983 85 PLR 235., wherein similar observations were made.

7. Mr. Bhagirath Dass made a reference to Harbans Lal v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. . AIR 1955 NUC P&H 4917. and Punjab State v. Moti Ram . 1957 59 PLR 567., to show that a request for adjournment in some circumstances does not amount to a step in the proceedings. In Harbans Lal's case (supra) the summons was served on the Branch office of the defendant and it was necessary to obtain instructions from the head office of the compony. Consequently, an adjournment was given on an oral request. In Moji Ram's case (supra), the Government pleader appeared voluntarily without any authority from the Government to represent it and asked for an adjournment for filing the written statement on the assumption that in due course he would receive instructions from the Government. Therefore, it was held that the request would not amount to a step in the proceedings. From the above facts, it is clear that both the cases are distinguishable.

8. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts and the case-law, I am of the view that the request for an adjournment for filing the written statement on behalf of the Syndicate amounts to a step in the proceedings. Consequently, it is not entitled to the benefit of Section 34 of the Act.

9. Mr. Khaitan raised some more points. Though in view of the above observations those are of academic interest only, yet I deem it proper to deal with them.

10. Mr. Khaitan argues that in the application material particulars of the dispute have not been given and, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed on this short ground. I find substance in this submission too. It is evident from the language of Section 34 of the Act that the existence of a dispute is a condition precedent for referring the matter to the Arbitrator. Therefore, the defendant, in an application under the said section, should bring all the material before the Court so that it may be able to record a finding that the subject-matter of dispute was agreed to be referred to the Arbitrator. If such material is not provided, the application is liable to be dismissed on this ground. Reference in this regard may be made to my decision in Daman Anand v. Hira Lal . AIR 1974 P&H 232., wherein it was held that an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit must disclose the existence of a dispute between the parties, which would oblige the parties under the Arbitration clause in an agreement to refer the matter to arbitration. In the absence of such allegation an application for stay of the proceedings is not maintainable. Similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Pearl Hostery Mills Ludhiana v. Union of India . AIR 1979 Delhi 64.. It was held therein that in an application under section 34 ibid, the Court has to see as to what is the dispute and what is the difference and then look at the arbitration clause to find out if it falls within its scope. Therefore, the Court has necessarily to look both at the arbitration clause as well as the particular dispute or difference which is specified in the application under section 34. In view of the above observations, the application under section 34 was dismissed holding that neither the dispute or difference nor the reason for the matter being referred to arbitration was set out in the application for stay.

11. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it will be seen that the allegation of the Syndicate-applicant is that on account of non-compliance of the obligations enjoined upon the Company it has suffered losses and hardship. No particulars as to what were the obligations of the Company which were not complied with have been given. It has also not been made clear as to what losses have been suffered by it. Therefore, I am of the view that the details of the dispute are lacking. In the circumstances, it can also be inferred that the application has been made mala fide to delay the proceedings.

12. The last submission of Mr. Khaitan is that an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not maintainable in a winding up petition. In support of his contention, he places reliance on a decision of this Court in C.A No. 8 of 1979 in C.P No. 147 of 1978 (Salig Ram etc. v. New Suraj Financiers & Chit Fund Company, etc.)8, decided on 12th July, 1979. I also find substance in this submission. The jurisdiction for ordering winding up of a Company is a special jurisdiction which has been conferred on the High Courts. The object of passing such an order is that the assets of the Company should be realised and debts paid expenditiously. The passing of such an order against the Company has as serious consequences and, therefore, the jurisdiction has been conferred on the High Courts. The order of winding up can be passed on the grounds mentioned in section 433 of the Companies Act. It does not appear to be the intention of the legislature that such a power can be conferred on an arbitrator. The petition for winding up cannot be treated as the one for recovery of an amount of debt from the Company. Therefore, I am of the opinion that an application under section 34 is not maintainable in a winding up petiton. In the above view, I am fortified by the following observations of B.S Dhillon, J. in Salig Ram's case (supra):—

“The application is wholly misconceived. The proceedings under the provisions of sections 433 and 434 read with section 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, are completely a different jurisdiction than the one regarding which remedy can be sought by way of arbitration under the clause in question. It is fallacious to conceive that the proceedings for winding up under the provisions of sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, are by way of recovery of amount touching the various provisions of the scheme. Under the provisions of section 433 of the Companies Act, the Legislature codified the circumstances/grounds on which a company may be odered to be wound up by the Court. Section 434 provides as to under what circumstances a Company may be deemed to be unable to pay its debts, whereas section 439 makes provision as to the application for winding up. It goes without saying that in case the petitioner is unable to satisfy the conditions precedent as laid down in sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, the petition for winding up is bound to be dismissed. The said petition cannot be taken to be the proceedings for the recovery of the disputed debts or proceedings regarding the settlement of the disputes arising out of the rights and liabilities of the conditions of the scheme. Therefore, the petition for staying the proceedings is misconceived.”

13. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the application and dismiss the same. The case is adjourned to 17th November, 1983, for written statement.

R.M.S
Application dismissed.