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Shri Mool Chand Wahi v. National Paints Pvt. Ltd. .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 3, 1983
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act. The petitioner alleged that in 1970 he was the Managing Director and shareholder of respondent No. 1 (a private limited company) and that, according to the company's account books for 1971, an amount exceeding one lakh rupees stood to the credit of L.R. Wahi & Co. (a proprietorship of the petitioner), which the petitioner claimed had since increased to over four lakh rupees. The petitioner sent a registered notice to respondent No. 2 (the Director in-charge) asking for payment and, through counsel, served a notice dated 9 January 1980 under section 434 of the Act requesting payment (the opinion records both figures Rs. 4,20,000 and Rs. 4,40,000 in different paragraphs). The company did not pay, and the petitioner prayed that the company be wound up.

The respondents contested the petition. They denied that the petitioner had ever been the Managing Director and explained that a company resolution of 15 August 1960 provided for the petitioner to supervise the company under the Board's control and for a monthly salary of Rs. 1,000 subject to shareholders' confirmation; the shareholders did not confirm that resolution. The company had credited Rs. 1,000 per month to the petitioner's personal account and later transferred those credits to L.R. Wahi & Co.'s account. The 1970–71 balance-sheet showed an unsecured loan of Rs. 1,03,455.23 from L.R. Wahi & Co. The company later recovered amounts paid after 31 August 1960 when it was pointed out that there was no provision for payment beyond that date.

The company also received income-tax related notices indicating liabilities in the petitioner's name (including notices under section 226(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961), and the company paid the tax demands stated to be due from the petitioner. After debit of these amounts, the account of L.R. Wahi & Co. showed a debit balance of Rs. 57,980.28; respondents therefore asserted that nothing was due to the petitioner and that the petition should be dismissed.

Two preliminary objections were advanced by the respondents: (1) that no proper notice under section 434 had been served on the company, and (2) that the affidavit accompanying the petition (dated in the opinion variously as 20th February, 1980 and 20th February, 1986) was not in proper form.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a notice under section 434 of the Companies Act was served upon the Company (i.e., whether the notice served on the Director in-charge was a valid service on the company).
  2. Whether the affidavit accompanying the winding-up petition was in proper form (specifically whether the verification clause complied with the requirements to distinguish statements true to the deponent's knowledge from those stated on information and belief) and, if not, what the effect of that defect should be.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted he had a substantial sum outstanding from the company (originally stated as more than one lakh in 1971 and later as having swelled to over four lakhs) and that he had given the company proper notices demanding payment, including a notice dated 9 January 1980 under section 434 sent through his counsel.
  • The petitioner's counsel argued that the alleged defect in the verification of the affidavit was a matter of form and that the petition should not be dismissed on that ground; counsel relied on Manohar Narayan Joshi v. Ramu Mhatang Patel (AIR 1973 Bombay 105) to support the proposition that the affidavit's particular mode of verification should not be fatal in the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents denied that the petitioner was ever the Managing Director and explained that any salary arrangement was subject to shareholders' confirmation which was not obtained.
  • They asserted that the company had accounted and adjusted amounts (including tax liabilities) so that, after debits, the L.R. Wahi & Co. account showed a debit balance and that no sum was due to the petitioner.
  • On preliminary points they argued (a) that no valid notice under section 434 was served upon the company, and (b) that the affidavit accompanying the petition did not comply with required verification formalities (it used the phrase "true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief" without indicating which paragraphs were true to knowledge and which were on information and belief), rendering it invalid and justifying dismissal of the petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhupinder Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1968 P&H 406 Affidavit verification must comply with Order 19, Rule 3 CPC: the deponent must state which paragraphs are true to knowledge and which are on information and belief; a generic "knowledge and belief" verification is unacceptable. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that an affidavit lacking the required distinction between knowledge and belief is valueless and cannot be accepted as proper verification in a winding-up petition.
Gaya Textiles Private Ltd. v. Star Textile Engineering Works Ltd., AIR 1968 Cal 388 Where a winding-up petition is not properly verified at presentation, leave to re-verify later should not be granted because a winding-up order relates back to the date of presentation and re-verification would create uncertainty and prejudice third parties. The court cited and applied this reasoning to hold that permitting curing of the defect by re-verification would cause confusion and could permit the company to avoid consequences of dealings occurring after the original (defective) presentation date; this supported dismissal rather than allowing re-verification.
Manohar Narayan Joshi v. Ramu Mhatang Patel, AIR 1973 Bombay 105 In the context of election petitions, an affidavit's verification requirements are less stringent because such affidavits are not treated as substantive evidence and the source of information need not be disclosed in the same way. The court distinguished this authority: it held that the election-law context and purposes differ from winding-up petitions, and therefore the leniency in that case did not apply to a company winding-up petition.
Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, (1910) ILR 37 Cal. 259 Order 19, Rule 3 CPC must be strictly observed: every affidavit should clearly express what is from the deponent's knowledge and what is from belief, with grounds of belief stated sufficiently. The court relied on this decision to emphasise that the verification must state grounds of belief with particularity; absence of such compliance renders affidavit unreliable and unacceptable.
State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317 Supreme Court endorsement of the principle that affidavits must distinguish knowledge from belief and that verification requirements under Order 19, Rule 3 must be observed. The court cited this Supreme Court endorsement as part of the established authority requiring strict compliance with affidavit verification rules.
Durga Das v. Nalin Chandra Nandan, AIR 1934 Cal 694 Supports the principle that affidavit verification must comply with requirements distinguishing knowledge and belief. Included among the line of cases reinforcing the court's view that non-compliant affidavits are valueless.
Bisakha Rani Ghose v. Satish Chandra Roy, AIR 1956 Cal 496 Reinforces requirement of proper affidavit verification under Order 19, Rule 3 CPC. Used as part of the chain of authorities to support dismissal for improper verification.
Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 Pat 101 Another authority in the line supporting strict observance of affidavit verification requirements. Cited to demonstrate consistent judicial treatment that verification must be proper and that generic "knowledge and belief" verifications are inadequate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the preliminary objections in sequence.

First, on service of the section 434 notice: the petitioner (through counsel) served a notice dated 9 January 1980 on Shri L.R. Wahi, Director in-charge. The petition itself alleged that the notice dated 9 January 1980 under section 434 was sent under registered cover requesting payment (the petition uses the figure Rs. 4,40,000 in one paragraph and Rs. 4,20,000 in another). In the respondents' reply there was no objection to the receipt of the notice; indeed the respondents admitted receipt of the 9 January 1980 notice. Given that the notice was served on the Director in-charge and the respondents admitted receipt, the court held that the notice must be deemed to have been served on the company.

Second, on the form and effect of the affidavit accompanying the petition: the court examined the relevant rules. Rule 11(a) and Rule 21 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 require petitions (including under section 439 for winding up) to be accompanied by an affidavit in Form No. 3, which requires the petitioner to indicate which paragraphs are true to his knowledge and which are based on information and belief. Rule 18 requires affidavits to be signed and sworn in the manner prescribed by the Code. Order 19, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure confines affidavits to matters of the deponent's knowledge except in interlocutory applications. The court observed that it is well-settled that affidavits not in due form are valueless.

The court relied on prior authorities (including Bhupinder Singh, Padmabati Dasi, and State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik) emphasizing that the generic phrase "true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief" is insufficient: an affidavit must state what is from the deponent's knowledge, what is from information, and must disclose the source or grounds of belief so the court can judge whether to act on that belief.

The court further explained the special significance of correct verification in the context of winding-up petitions: a winding-up order relates back to the date of presentation of the petition. If a petition is not properly verified on presentation, there is in law no valid petition on that date; allowing re-verification later would create uncertainty and could prejudice third parties by retroactively altering the legal status of dealings with the company's assets. The reasoning in Gaya Textiles was applied to show that permitting re-verification would produce confusion concerning the application of rules on fraudulent preference and other consequences tied to the date of presentation.

The court distinguished Manohar Narayan Joshi (election-law context) as inapplicable because affidavits in election petitions are not intended to be treated as substantive evidence in the same way and thus the stricter requirements for verification in civil/winding-up practice do not apply there.

In view of the defective verification, and because a properly verified affidavit is mandatory for a winding-up petition (so that the affidavit and petition together can be treated as substantive evidence), the court concluded that the petition must be dismissed on that ground and it was unnecessary to consider the merits of the parties' substantive claims.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the petition on the preliminary ground that it was not accompanied by a properly verified affidavit; the court also held that the notice under section 434 was deemed to have been served on the company. The opinion concludes: Petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner’s winding-up petition was dismissed for procedural non-compliance (improper verification of the affidavit); the court did not reach or decide the substantive merits of the underlying claim for payment.
  • Practical consequence emphasized by the court: in winding-up proceedings, strict compliance with affidavit verification requirements is mandatory because a winding-up order relates back to the date of presentation of the petition; permitting re-verification would create legal uncertainty affecting third parties and dealings with the company's assets.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was announced by the court; the decision applies and reinforces existing authorities that require proper verification of affidavits in civil and companies court practice.

Other procedural notes: The court made no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.:— This is a petition under sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act (hereinafter called the Act).

2. Briefly, the facts are that respondent No. 1 is a private limited company and respondent No. 2 is its Director incharge. The petitioner, it is alleged, was the Managing Director and shareholder of respondent No. 1 in the year 1970. It is further alleged that as per the account books for the year 1971, an amount of more than one lakh rupees stood to the credit of L.R Wahi and Co., a proprietorship concern of the petitioner, which amount has now swelled to more than four lakh rupees. A registered notice was sent by him to respondent No. 2 asking him to make payment of four lakh rupees Later, another notice dated 9th January, 1980, under section 434 of the Act was sent through his counsel requesting the respondents to make payment of Rs. 4,20,000/-. However, the Company has not paid the amount. Consequently, it is prayed that the Company be ordered to be wound up.

3. The respondents have contested the petition and inter alia pleaded that the petitioner at no point of time was the Managing Director of the Company. It was resolved by the Company on 15th August, 1960, that the petitioner would supervise the Company under the control of the Board of Directors and he would be paid a monthly salary of Rs. 1,000/-, with effect from 16th August, 1960, subject to the confirmation by the shareholders of the Company. Respondent No. 2, however, would carry on as a Manager and Technical Director on the remuneration already drawn by him. It is alleged that the shareholders of the Company did not confirm the resolution regarding payment of a monthly salary of Rs. 1,000/- to him. The company had been crediting the personal account of the petitioner with Rs. 1,000/- P.M The credit towards salary was transferred from his personal account to the account of L.R Wahi & Co., in which account some money of the petitioner lay already deposited. Thus, in the balance-sheet for the year 1970-1971, the Company showed an unsecured loan of Rs. 1,03,455 23 from L.R Wahi & Co. Later, when it was pointed out in the meeting of the Board of Directors that there was no provision about the payment of the salary to Mr. M.C Wahi after 31st August, 1960, the amount already paid to him from Ist September, 1960, onwards was recovered from him.

4. The Company also received a notice under section 226(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, saying that a sum of Rs. 40,741/- was due from the petitioner on account of income-tax etc. and it was directed to pay the said amount to the Income-Tax Officer forthwith. Again, a notice dated 2nd August, 1968, was received by the Company from the Income Tax Officer to the effect that if any salary or other sum was paid to the petitioner without specific permission from him the Company and its principal officers will be personally liable to the extent of payment made or Rs. 40,741/- whichever was less. Later, a notice dated 29th May, 1971, was received from the Tax Recovery Officer, Income Tax Department, directing the Company to pay to him a sum of Rs. 26,414/- forthwith. Accordingly, the Company paid to the Income Tax Department all the dues demanded from petitioner towards arrears of income tax/wealth tax. After debiting the above-said amounts, the account of L.R Wahi & Co. now shows a debit balance of Rs. 57,980.28. It is stated that thus no amount is due to the petitioner and the application is liable to be dismissed.

5. Two preliminary objections were raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. Firstly, that no notice under section 434 of the Act was served upon the Company which was necessary to be served. Secondly, the affidavit, dated 20th February, 1980, accompanying the petition, was not in a proper form. According to him, in this situation, the petition is liable to be dismissed on these short grounds.

6. The first question that arises for determination it whether a notice under section 434 of the Act was served by the petitioner on the Company. The petitioner, through his counsel, Mr. M.S Ratta, served a notice dated 9th January, 1980 (copy Annexure ‘C’), on Shri L.R Wahi, Director Incharge, National Paints (Private) Ltd., Sonepat. In the petition, it was alleged that notice dated 9th January, 1980, under section 434 of the Act was sent under registered cover requesting the respondents to make the payment of Rs. 4,40,000 as outstanding to the petitioner. In reply to the para no objection was taken that a proper notice was not served upon the Company. On the other hand, it was stated by the respondents that the receipt of the notice dated 9th January, 1980, admitted. The notice, as already stated above, was served upon respondent No. 2 as Director Incharge of the Company. Taking into consideration the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the notice will be deemed to have been served upon the Company.

7. The second question that arises for determination is whether the affidavit dated 20th February, 1986, is in a proper form and, if not, with what effect. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that in the verification clause, paras 1 to 14 of the affidavit have been shown to have been true and correct to the best of the deponent's knowledge and belief whereas he was required to delineate which paras were correct to the best of his knowledge and which to the best of his belief. To support his contention, he made a reference to Bhupinder Singh v. State of Haryana . AIR 1968 P&H 406., and In the matter of Gaya Textiles Private Ltd. etc. v. Star Textile Engineering Works Ltd . AIR 1968 Cal 388.. It is not disputed by Mr. Ratta that in the verification clause, the deponent is required to say which of the paras are true to his knowledge and which true to his belief but he submits that the verification of an affidavit is a matter of form and the petition should not be dismissed on the ground that the affidavit does not bear a proper verification. To fortify his argument, he has referred to Manohar Narayan Joshi v. Ramu Mhatang Patel* . AIR 1973 Bombay 105..

8. I have duly considered the argument of the learned counsel. Rule 11(a) of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called the Rules), defines ‘petitions’. A petition under section 439 of the Act for winding up of a company is mentioned at serial No. (15) in the said rule. Rule 21 prescribes that every petition shall be verified by an affidavit made by the petitioner and such affidavit shall be filed along with the petition and shall be in Form No. 3 Form No. 3 prescribes that the petitioner shall mention the paragraphs of the petition which are true to his knowledge and the paragraphs which are based on information and he believes them to be true Paragraph 2 of the Form reads as follows:—

‘2. The statements made in paragraphs of the petition herein now shown to me and marked with the letter ‘A’ are true to my knowledge, and the statements made in paragraphs……are based on information, and I believe them to be true.”

9. Rule 18 says that every affidavit shall be signed by the deponent and sworn to in the manner prescribed by the Code or by the rules and practice of the Court. Order 19, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able to prove from his own knowledge except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted. From the aforesaid rules, it is evident that the petition for winding up is required to be accompanied by an affidavit in due form. It is well-settled that if an affidavit is not in due form, no value can be attached to it. In the above view, I am fortified by the observations in Bhupinder Singh's case (supra), wherein Tek Chand. J., after noticing Order 19, Rule 3(1), of the Code, observed as follows:—

“The words that the contents of the affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief carry no sanctity, and such a verification cannot be accepted. It has been held over and over again that affidavits must be either affirmed as true to knowledge or from information received provided the source of information is disclosed, or as to what the deponent believes to be true provided that the grounds for such belief were stated. Such affidavits where the verification lacks the essential requirements, are valueless.”

10. In Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, (1910) ILR 37 Cal. 259, Jenkins C.J and Woodroffee, J., observed:—

“We desire to impress on those who propose to rely on affidavits that, in future, the provisions of Order 19, Rule 3, must be strictly observed, and every affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement of the deponent's knowledge and how much is a statement of his belief, and the grounds of belief must be stated with sufficient particularity to enable the Court to Judge whether it would be safe to act on the deponent's belief.

11. This enunciation of the principle was endorsed by the Supreme Court in State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317. There is a catena of decided cases supporting this proposition and among others, reference may be made to Durga Das v. Nalin Chandra Nandan AIR 1934 Cal 694, Bisakha Rani Ghose v. Satish Chandra Roy, AIR 1956 Cal 496, and Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 Pat 101”

12. The learned Judge, in view of the fact that the verification of the affidavit was not proper, ignored the affidavit filed by the petitioner in that case. In a petition for winding up it is mandatory to file an affidavit along with the petition. The purpose of the affidavit is that the allegations in the affidavit read with the petition are treated as substantive evidence. In case the petition is not accompanied by an affidavit, in view of the Rules mentioned above, it is no petition in the eye of law and consequently it is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The main reason is that the petition for winding up, if accepted, relates back to the date of its presentation. In case a properly sworn affidavit is allowed to be filed subsequently, the question will arise as to whether the winding up petition would relate back to the date of presentation of the petition or the affidavit and in many cases a great deal of confusion regarding the rights of the third parties would crop up. In that regard, the following observations in the matter of Gaya Textiles Private Ltd. (supra) be read with advantage:—

“Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the defect in the verification of the petition was a mere irregularity which should be overlooked, and leave should be granted to the petitioner to re-verify the petition according to the rules……… Had this not been a petition for winding up a Company, I would have already accepted the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. But it cannot be overlooked that the present petition is a petition for winding up of a Company and a winding up order relates back to the date of the presentation of the winding up petition. If on the date when the petition was presented there was no proper verification according to law, then there was no petition at all on which the Court could issue directions for advertisement. Secondly, if leave is granted to cure the verification today, then a proper petition for winding up of the Company would come into existence as from today, and in that event the question of dealings by the Company with its assets between the date of presentation of the winding up petition and the date when the Court grants the Company leave to re-verify the petition would also create a good deal of confusion. Since a winding up order relates back to the date of presentation of the winding up petition, all dealings by the Company with its assets would be subject to the rules relating to fraudulent preference and transactions are liable to be set aside on the ground that the Company had unlawfully dealt with its assets in order to deprive its creditors. But if leave is granted to the petitioner to cure the defect in the verification by alllowing re-verification of the petition according to the rules today, it would be open to the Company to contend, if a winding up order is made, that the rules relating to fraudulent preference or unlawful dealing with the assets from the date of presentation of the winding up petition would not apply, as a petition properly verified according to law came into existence only on the date on which leave was granted to the petitioner to re-vcrify the petition.”

13. Manohar Narayan Joshi's case (supra), on which reliance was placed by Mr. Ratta, is distinguishable. That was a case under the Representation of the People Act. The learned Judge observed that the main purpose for requiring an affidavit to be filed in the case of an allegagation of a corrupt practice being made is to prevent wild allegations of corrupt practices being made against the successful candidate so that some restraint is exercised on the persons making those allegations. An affidavit filed in support of an election petition is not intended to be treated as evidence of facts stated in the affidavit itself because ultimately the election petition is to be decided on the evidence recorded by the High Court. After taking into consideration the aforesaid circumstances the learned Judge held that failure to disclose the source of information in the affidavit did not render the affidavit in any way defective. The case is distinguishable and Mr. Ratta cannot derive any benefit from the observations therein.

14. As the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is not accompanied by a proper affidavit, it is not necessary to deal with the case on merits. Consequently, I dismiss the petition on the preliminary objection. No order as to costs.

R.M.S
Petition dismissed.