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Teja Singh v. Chhoto
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent wife sought maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging desertion due to insufficient dowry and that she had been living with her parents since the beginning of the marriage. The husband countered that the wife had deserted him when he refused to adopt the cult of ‘sacha sauda’. The trial Magistrate granted maintenance, but the husband's revision petition was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The husband then approached this Court seeking to quash both orders on the ground that the lower courts acted illegally by disregarding a prior Civil Court decision under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act between the parties.
The maintenance proceedings were initiated on March 28, 1977, after the matrimonial Court dismissed the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights on January 19, 1977. The wife had originally filed proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on March 31, 1975, based on the same grounds she later used in her maintenance petition. The Civil Court and the High Court found that the wife had left the matrimonial home of her own accord and thus was not entitled to restitution of conjugal rights.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the wife, having been found by the Civil Court to have deserted the husband, is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Whether the Magistrate is bound by the findings of the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act when deciding maintenance petitions under Section 125 CrPC.
- The applicability and effect of sub-section 2 of Section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on maintenance orders in light of Civil Court decisions.
Arguments of the Parties
Husband's Arguments
- The Courts below erred in granting maintenance by not being bound by the Civil Court decision under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
- The wife had deserted him, and therefore, under sub-section 4 of Section 125 CrPC, she was not entitled to maintenance.
Wife's Arguments
- The wife alleged desertion by the husband due to insufficient dowry and sought maintenance accordingly.
- The wife relied on her petition for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC after the dismissal of her petition for restitution of conjugal rights.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ravendra Kaur v. Achant Sarup, AIR 1966 All 133 | Binding effect of Civil Court decisions on maintenance proceedings under Section 125 CrPC. | Supported the view that Magistrates must give effect to Civil Court decisions under sub-section 2 of Section 127 CrPC. |
| Dahyalal Amathalal Bhagat v. Bai Madhukanta, AIR 1965 Guj 247 | Judicial support for the binding nature of Civil Court findings on maintenance orders. | Reinforced the principle that maintenance orders should be cancelled or varied in light of Civil Court decisions. |
| Baldev Raj v. Pushpa Rani, AIR 1976 P&H 515 | Precedent affirming the applicability of sub-section 2 of Section 127 CrPC. | Buttressed the Court's reasoning that Civil Court judgments bind Magistrates in maintenance cases. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the facts and found that the Civil Court had conclusively held that the wife had deserted the husband, thereby refusing to live with him. According to sub-section 4 of Section 125 CrPC, a wife who refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason is not entitled to maintenance. The Court further analyzed sub-section 2 of Section 127 CrPC, which mandates that if a Civil Court decision affects an order under Section 125 CrPC, the Magistrate must cancel or vary the maintenance order accordingly. Since the Civil Court had already ruled against the wife’s claim for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground of her desertion, this finding was binding on the Magistrate. The Magistrate erred in granting maintenance despite this binding finding. The Court also noted the absence of any allegation or evidence that the wife attempted to reconcile or join the husband after the Civil Court’s decision. Judicial precedents were cited to reinforce the binding nature of Civil Court decisions on Magistrates in maintenance proceedings.
Holding and Implications
The Court allowed the petition and set aside the judgments of both the trial Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge, thereby dismissing the wife’s petition for maintenance.
The direct consequence of this decision is that the wife is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC due to her desertion of the husband, as established by the prior Civil Court judgment. No new precedent was established; rather, the Court reaffirmed the binding effect of Civil Court findings under sub-section 2 of Section 127 CrPC on maintenance proceedings.
D.S Tewatia, J.:— Respondent wife sought maintenance from her husband, petitioner herein (hereafter they are referred to as the husband and wife) under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging that she had been deserted by him for reasons of bringing insufficient dowry and had been living with her parents almost from the inception of the marriage. The husband in his written statement claimed that she had deserted him on her own when he did not agree to her demand that he should adopt the cult of ‘sacha sauda’.
2. The trial Magistrate allowed maintenance and Revision Petition of the husband was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda. The husband has invokved the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing both these orders on the ground that Courts below have acted illegally and against the letter of law by not feeling bound by the Civil Court decision between the parties rendered in a petition under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by the wife.
3. The maintenance proceeding were launched by the wife on March, 28, 1977. This was after materimonial Court had dismissed wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights vide order dated January 19, 1977. The proceedings under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act were initiated by the wife on March 31, 1975. The very ground which was asserted in her petition under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, was the ground which she later on pleaded in her petition for maintenance. Her application for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the trial Court with the finding that the petitioner had left the matrimonial home of her own accord and it was she who had deserted her husband. This judgment was later on sustained by the High Court with the observation the she hereself left her husband and therefore, she could not obtain a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
4. sub section 4 of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is in the following terms:—
“No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this Section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refused to the with her husband, or if they are living separatly by matual consent”
5. Envisages that a wife shall not be entitled to receive any allowance from her husband under this section 125 of the Code Criminal Procedure inter-alia if she refuses to live with her husband.
6. The Civil Court had clearly found that it was she who had deserted her husband that means it was she who had been refussng to live with him. Such being the case by virtue of sub section 4 of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, she would not be entitled to any allowance.
7. The next question that calls for consideration is as to whether finding in a judgment of Civil Court between the parties would be binding upon the Magistrate trying the petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard sub-section 2 of Section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserves notice and it reads as under:—
“Where it appear to the Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under section 125 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be vary the same accordingly”.
8. A perusal of this sub-section would show that even if an order granting maintenance had been passed in favour of the wife and if thereafter a decision between the parties happens to be rendered by the Civil Court which has a bearing on the question which came up for consideration earlier before the Court dealing with the petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has to give effect to the Civil Court order by cancelling the order granting maintenance, if such is the import of the judgment of the Civil Court.
9. In the present case the Civil Court had already held against the wife by pronouncing that she was not entitled to a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, under sections 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act because it was not the husband who had deserted her, it was she who had withdrawn from his society and had deserted him. This finding of the Civil Court was binding upon the Magistrate and in the face of this finding the trial Magistrate could not come to a contrary finding and grant maintenance. In the petition for maintenance, it not being her case that after her petition under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act had been dismissed, she had made efforts to join her husband and her efforts had been thwarted by him.
10. For the view that the decision of the Civil Court between the parties is binding by virtue of the provisions of sub-section 2 of Sec. 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Judicial support is not lacking. Ravendra Kaur v. Achant Sarup . AIR 1966 All 133., Dahyalal Amathalal Bhagat v. Bai Madhukanta . AIR 1965 Guj 247. and Baldev Raj v. Pushpa Rani . AIR 1976 P&H 515. are the few of the decisions which buttress the above view.
11. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the trial Magistrate as also of the Additional Sessions Judge are set aside and wife's petition is dismissed.
R.M.S
Petition allowed.
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