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Kumari Renuka Batra v. M/S. Grindlays Bank Ltd., Amritsar, Punjab And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Feb 11, 1980
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Factual and Procedural Background

Grindleys Bank Limited obtained an ex parte decree for Rs. 99,904.82 on 5th April 1978 and initiated execution proceedings. A warrant of attachment was issued by the executing Court at Amritsar to the Executive Engineer of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi, prohibiting payment to the judgment debtor firm. Smt Renuka Batra, sole proprietor of Batra Associates, filed an objection petition under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), contending that the Amritsar Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the attachment warrant affecting payments outside its territorial jurisdiction, specifically at Delhi. A preliminary issue on jurisdiction was framed on 31st March 1979. The executing Court held that it had jurisdiction and dismissed the objection. Aggrieved, the objector filed this revision petition challenging the executing Court's order dated 5th May 1979.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the executing Court at Amritsar had jurisdiction to issue the order of attachment for money in the custody of the Executive Engineer, AIIMS, New Delhi, which is outside its territorial jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the Executive Engineer of AIIMS qualifies as a public officer under Order 21 Rule 52 of the CPC for purposes of attachment.
  3. The scope and applicability of the exceptions under Order 21 Rules 46, 48, and 52 of the CPC regarding attachment of debts and property not in possession of the judgment debtor.
  4. Whether the revisional jurisdiction of this Court extends to interference with the executing Court's order even if alleged to be wrong or illegal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The executing Court at Amritsar lacked jurisdiction to issue the attachment order against money in the custody at Delhi, as the CPC provisions (Order 21 Rules 46, 48, and 52) restrict attachment beyond territorial jurisdiction except in the limited case of salary or allowances under Rule 48.
  • The Executive Engineer of AIIMS is not a public officer as defined under Section 2(17) of the CPC, since AIIMS is a statutory body corporate, and thus Rule 52 does not apply.
  • Reliance was placed on several precedents including Begg, Dunlop and Co. v. Jagannath Marwari, Bilas Mal-Damodar Das v. Hari Das, Bissesserdas Daga v. Gabdumal Brahmin, Hanuman Dutt v. Hazarimal, Padmanabha Pillai v. Bank of Kerala Ltd., and S.N Sunderson and Co. v. Harbans Singh Sobti and Co. (P) Ltd., which support the territorial limitation on attachment orders.

Respondent's Arguments

  • No evidence was presented that the amount was payable at Delhi; hence, jurisdiction cannot be presumed in favor of the objector.
  • The executing Court at Amritsar was competent to issue attachment orders anywhere in India.
  • The Executive Engineer of AIIMS qualifies as a public officer under Order 21 Rule 52, despite being an officer of a statutory body corporate.
  • Precedents cited include Chimandas Methuram v. Manager Mahadevappa Firm, Tarachand v. Misrimal, British Transport Co. Ltd. v. Suraj Bhan, Gayoor Ahmad Khan v. Hazarimal, Anna Laticia De Silva v. Govind Balwant Parashare, and Abdul Ghani v. Anjuman Dehi Imdad Bahmi Ghuinke Sharqi.
  • The revisional jurisdiction should not be exercised to interfere with the executing Court's order even if it is allegedly wrong or illegal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
British Transport Co. Ltd. v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1963 All 313 Jurisdiction depends on situs of the debt, not the debtor Distinguished on facts; debt in that case was payable at Agra (executing Court’s location), unlike present case
Gayoor Ahmad Khan v. Hazarimal, AIR 1965 Raj 41 Attachment by Court in custody of property Distinguished as custody was by the Court, not a public officer as in present case
Begg, Dunlop and Co. v. Jagannath Marwari, (1912) ILR 39 Cal 104 Territorial jurisdiction limits attachment orders Relied upon to support territorial limitation on attachment
Bilas Mal-Damodar Das v. Hari Das, AIR 1929 Lah 645 Territorial limits on executing Court’s jurisdiction Relied upon to support appellant’s contention
Bissesserdas Daga v. Gabdumal Brahmin, AIR 1934 Nag 167 Attachment jurisdiction and territorial limits Relied upon to support appellant’s argument
Hanuman Dutt v. Hazarimal, AIR 1956 Raj 235 Attachment jurisdiction and territorial limits Relied upon in support of appellant’s position
Padmanabha Pillai v. Bank of Kerala Ltd., AIR 1966 Trav Co. 100 Territorial jurisdiction of executing Court Relied upon by appellant
S.N Sunderson and Co. v. Harbans Singh Sobti and Co. (P) Ltd., ILR (1972) 1 Delhi 263 Attachment jurisdiction and exceptions under Order 21 Rules Found persuasive; held Rule 48 is the sole exception to territorial jurisdiction
Kamta Prasad Singh v. Regional Manager, Food Corpn of India, AIR 1974 Pat 376 Definition of public officer under CPC Section 2(17) Relied on to argue Executive Engineer is not a public officer
Chimandas Methuram v. Manager Mahadevappa Firm, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 417 Executing Court’s jurisdiction Relied on by respondent to support wide jurisdiction
Tarachand v. Misrimal, AIR 1970 Raj 53 Executing Court’s jurisdiction Relied on by respondent
Anna Laticia De Silva v. Govind Balwant Parashare, AIR 1920 Bom 50 Public officer definition Held not relevant to statutory corporation officers
Abdul Ghani v. Anjuman Dehi Imdad Bahmi Ghuinke Sharqi, AIR 1942 Lah 287 Public officer definition Held not relevant for officers of statutory corporations

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the provisions of Order 21 Rules 46, 48, and 52 of the CPC, focusing on the territorial jurisdiction of the executing Court to attach debts or property not in possession of the judgment debtor. It recognized that Rule 48 expressly provides an exception permitting attachment of salary or allowances of government servants or similar officers beyond territorial jurisdiction, but no such exception exists under Rule 52 for property in custody of a public officer. The Court agreed with the view taken in S.N Sunderson and Co.'s case that the executing Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 52 is confined to its territorial limits and that the Executive Engineer of AIIMS, being an officer of a statutory corporation, does not qualify as a public officer under Rule 52 and Section 2(17) of the CPC. The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the respondent and the executing Court, noting that in British Transport Co. Ltd.'s case, the debt was payable within the executing Court’s jurisdiction, unlike the present case. The Court also emphasized the absence of evidence that the debt was payable at Amritsar, thus presuming it payable at Delhi. The respondent’s argument that revisional jurisdiction should not be exercised was rejected. Consequently, the Court concluded that the executing Court at Amritsar lacked jurisdiction to issue the attachment order against money in the custody of the Executive Engineer at Delhi.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed, the order of the executing Court is set aside, and the objection petition is accepted on preliminary objection.

The direct effect is that the attachment order issued by the executing Court at Amritsar against money in the custody of the Executive Engineer, AIIMS, New Delhi, is declared without jurisdiction and therefore invalid. The petitioner is entitled to costs. No broader precedent beyond the facts and legal interpretation in this case is declared.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition filed on behalf of the objector (third party) against the order of the executing Court dated 5th May, 1979, whereby her preliminary objection has been decided against her.

2. Grindleys Bank Limited obtained a decree for Rs. 99,904.82 ex parte on 5th April, 1978, and lodged execution in which warrant of attachment was issued to the Executive Engineer All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, prohibiting the payment to the judgement debtor firm. Smt Renuka Batra, a sole proprietor of Batra Associates, filed an objection petition under Order 21 Rule 58 of the CPC in which a preliminary objection was taken that the Court at Amritsar had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant of attachment prohibiting the payments outside its jurisdiction at Delhi. On the pleadings of the parties, the following preliminary issue was framed on 31st March, 1979, and the par-this did not produce any evidence on this issue, though full opportunity was given:—

“Whether this Court has jurisdiction to pass the impugned order of injunction? OPDH”.

3. The executing Court came to the conclusion that the warrant of attachment has been properly issued by the executing Court at Amritsar as it had the jurisdiction and there is no illegality about it. Reliance has been placed on British Transport Co. Ltd. v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1963 All 313 and Gayoor Ahmad Khan v. Hazarimal, AIR 1965 Raj 41. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the Objector has come up in revision to this Court. The sole question to be decided in this petition is whether the executing Court at Amritsar had the jurisdiction to issue the order of attachment for money in the custody of Executive Engineer, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, which is admittedly a body corporate under the Central Act No. 25 of 1956.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Order 21 Rule 52 and R. 46 and Order 21 Rule 48 of the CPC as these are the relevant provisions under which the executing Court can issue order of attachment. Order 21 Rule 46 of the CPC, deals with the mode of attachment of debt, share and other property not in possession of judgement-debtor, whereas Order 21 Rule 52 of the CPC, provides attachment of property in custody of Court or public officer. Rule 48 of Order 21 contemplates attachment of salary or allowances of servant of the Government or railway company or local authority. However, it has been specifically provided therein that the executing Court may, order that the amount shall, subject to the provisions of Section 60, be withheld from such salary or allowances, whether the judgement-debtor or the disbursing officer is or is not within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction. This has been specifically so provided in this Rule regarding the salary etc., which are liable to attachment though the judgement-debtor or the disbursing officer may not otherwise be amenable to territorial jurisdiction of the executing Court. By making this provision in Order 21 Rule 48 of the CPC, it has been contended, he legislature has made only this exception to the general Rule. On these facts, the executing Court at Amritsar it was argued, could not issue the order of attachment of money in the custody at Delhi and payable at Delhi. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Begg, Dunlop and Co. v. Jagannath Marwari, (1912) ILR 39 Cal 104; Bilas Mal-Damodar Das v. Hari Das, AIR 1929 Lah 645; Bissesserdas Daga v. Gabdumal Brahmin, AIR 1934 Nag 167; Hanuman Dutt v. Hazarimal, AIR 1956 Raj 235; Padmanabha Pillai v. Bank of Kerala Ltd., AIR 1966 Trav Co. 100 and S.N Sunderson and Co. v. Harbans Singh Sobti and Co. (P) Ltd., ILR (1972) 1 Delhi 263, All the above said authorities and the relevant case taw has been discussed and relied upon in the judgement of the Delhi High Court in S.N Sunderson's case (supra).

5. The learned counsel also contended that the Executive Engineer of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences New Delhi, is also not a public Officer as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 52 of the CPC because of its definition as contained in Section 2(17) of the CPC. In view of the said definition the Executive Engineer, being an officer of the Institute of Medical Sciences, which has been created under a statute it is submitted is not covered under the Rule. Reliance in this respect is placed on Kamta Prasad Singh v. Regional Manager, Food Corpn of India, AIR 1974 Pat 376.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that here is no evidence on the record that the said amount was payable at Delhi and therefore, it cannot be presumed in favour of the objector. Moreover, according to the learned counsel, executing Court at Amritsar was competent to issue order of attachment anywhere throughout the territory of India. He cited Chimandas Methuram v. Manager Mahadevappa Firm, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 417; Tarachand v. Misrimal, AIR 1970 Raj 53; British Transport Co. Ltd. v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1963 All 313 and Gayoor Ahmad Khan's case (supra). The learned counsel also disputed the proposition that the officers of body corporate constituted under a statute are not public of officers. In this respect, he placed reliance on Anna Laticia De Silva v. Govind Balwant Parashare, AIR 1920 Bom 50 and Abdul Ghani v. Anjuman Dehi Imdad Bahmi Ghuinke Sharqi, AIR 1942 Lah 287.

7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at great length, I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am in respectable agreement with the view taken in Sunderson and Co.'s case (supra) wherein it has been observed that:—

“It appears to me that order XXI Rule 48 is the only exception and that relates to the salary or allowances of a servant of the Government or of a servant of Railway Company or local authority, no matter whether the judgement debtor or the disbursing officer is or is not within the local limits of the court's jurisdiction. There are no such provisions in the case of property to be attached under Order XXI Rule 52. The absence at the words “Whether the judgement-debtor or the disbursing or is not within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction” from Rule 52 of order XXI is a clear indication fact that the power exercisable under rule 48 of Order XXI is the only exception and that it cannot be enlarged to bring the case within the purview Rule 52 of order XXI. The court or public officer under rule 52 appears to me to be a court or public officer within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court”.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent was unable to distinguish the said authority. The authorities relied upon by him have absolutely no relevancy for the proposition in hand. As regards the authorities which were relied upon by the executing Court, the same are distinguishable on facts. In British Transport Co, Ltd.'s case (supra), debt attached was payable at Agra where the executing Court was situated and therefore, order of his attachment at Delhi could be issued; However, it has been observed therein that “it has appeared to us that on an examination of the Code of Civil Procedure we must hold that it is the situs of the debt that will decide the jurisdiction of the execution Court and not the situs of the debtor from whom the debt is payable to the judgement-debtor”. In Gayoor Ahmad Khan's case (supra) the custody was that of the Court which is not the position in the present case. In the absence of any evidence that the debt was payable at Amritsar, it will be presumed that it was payable at Delhi, particularly when it was specifically so stated in the objection petition and was not denied in the reply filed on behalf of the decree-holder.

9. As regards the question whether the officers of a corporate body are public officers or not, we are to see the definition as given in the Code of Civil Procedure in Section 2(17). The authorities of Anna Laticia De Silva's case (supra) and Abdul Ghani's case (supra) are not relevant as the same do not deal with any corporation etc. and therefore, are of no help in deciding the, present, controversy.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent also tried to argue that even if the order is wrong and illegal, this Court will not interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. I do not find any merit in this contention.

11. The executing Court had no jurisdiction to issue order of attachment in the present case and the order being without jurisdiction is liable to be set aside in this petition.

12. For the reasons recorded above, this petition succeeds and the order of the executing Court is set aside and the objection petition is accepted on preliminary objection. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this petition.

13. Petition allowed.