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The Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Shri Pratap Chand .
Case Summary — Extracted from the Provided Opinion (S.S. Dewan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The judgment decides multiple Income-tax References (I.T. Reference Nos. 2, 10–17 of 1979 and 38, 39, 40 and 46 of 1978) raising similar legal questions. The factual narrative developed in the opinion arises from I.T. Reference No. 15 of 1979 (assessment year 1972–1973) and related references.
Briefly, the assessee concerned was a partner (Partap Chand Maheshwari) in M/s. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (a four‑partner firm). For assessment year 1972–1973 an advance tax notice under section 210 was issued on 19.8.1971 requiring deposit of Rs. 2,96,285/-. The firm filed an estimate on 15.9.1971 declaring income; the partner filed his estimate the same day, declaring income of Rs. 1,10,000/- and paid Rs. 53,037/-. On regular assessment the tax was determined at Rs. 1,32,774/-. Because the advance tax estimate filed by the assessee was incorrect, proceedings under section 273(a) (penalty) were taken and the Income‑tax Officer imposed a penalty of Rs. 4,654/- on the assessee. The assessee contended before the Income‑tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that he had relied on the firm's estimate and had reasons to believe it was true; that there was no proof of conscious under‑estimation; and therefore no penalty should be imposed. Those authorities rejected the contentions. On appeal, the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal relied on earlier case law and accepted the assessee's appeal, cancelling the penalty. The Tribunal expressly observed that the partner had relied on the firm's estimate and that the firm itself had already been penalised, so imposing a duplicate penalty on the partner would amount to double punishment. The matter was then before the High Court on multiple references framed by the Tribunal under section 256(1) of the Income‑tax Act, 1961.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee (partner) could not be said to have furnished an estimate under section 212 which he knew or had reason to believe to be untrue (i.e., whether the partner's reliance on the firm's estimate negated mens rea under s.273(a)).
- Whether, where a firm has been penalised under section 273(a) of the Income‑tax Act, 1961, no penalty can subsequently be imposed under the same section on its partners (i.e., whether imposing penalty on both firm and partners amounts to double punishment).
- Whether a wrong estimate of income filed by a firm under section 212 would constitute "reasonable cause" for a partner for the purpose of levy of penalty under section 273(a) (as raised in I.T. Ref. No. 2 of 1979, assessment year 1973–1974).
- Whether non‑filing of an estimate by the firm under section 212(3A) would constitute a sufficient/ reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273(c) for the partner's failure to file an estimate under section 212(2A)/(3A) (questions arising in assessment years 1970–71 and 1973–74 in various references).
- Whether the Tribunal was correct in cancelling penalties imposed under section 273(c) where it held that the firm's non‑filing constituted reasonable cause for the partners' non‑filing (issues emerging from multiple references specified in the opinion).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Revenue / Department) — Representative: Mr. D.N. Awasthy
- Argued that the accounting period of the firm ended on 31.7.1971, and therefore by 15.9.1971 the assessee (partner) should have known his share of the firm's profits; consequently the partner's incorrect estimate attracted section 273(a).
- Relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Mulji Laxmidas v. C.I.T. (1976 Taxation Vol. 43 p. 26) to support the proposition that penalty under the relevant provision could be justified.
Respondent (Assessee / Partner) — Representative: Mr. Desai and earlier submissions to tax authorities
- Contended that the partner's only source of income was his share of the firm's income and that he had reason to believe the firm's estimate to be true and correct; hence he relied on the firm's estimate when filing his own estimate on 15.9.1971.
- Argued there was no proof that the partner consciously under‑estimated his advance tax liability (no mens rea), and therefore penalty under section 273(a) should not be imposed.
- Contended that when a firm has been penalised, imposing penalty on partners for the same offence would amount to double punishment and is impermissible; relied on precedent (Additional Commissioner of Income‑tax, Lucknow v. Smt. Triveni Devi and related authorities).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkateswara Power Rolling Mills v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bangalore (1974 97 I.T.R 168) | Case relied upon by the Tribunal in support of allowing the assessee's appeal (used as supporting authority for the Tribunal's view). | The Tribunal relied on this case (among others) in accepting the assessee's appeal; the High Court noted that the Tribunal's reliance was appropriate in the circumstances. |
| Additional Commissioner of Income‑tax, Lucknow v. Smt. Triveni Devi (1974 97 I.T.R 390) | Principle that penalty imposed on a firm is, in effect, a tax on the partners and that a person cannot be punished more than once for the same offence; therefore penalty on firm precludes penalty on partners for same offence. | The Court held that the ratio of this decision applied to the present case and supported the Tribunal's conclusion that no penalty could be imposed on the partner where the firm had already been penalised. |
| Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (1970 76 I.T.R 696) | Addresses burden of proof in penalty proceedings: department must produce material beyond mere rejection of the assessee's explanation to show that unexplained receipts are of revenue nature and that the assessee concealed them; onus is on the department in penalty proceedings. | The Court considered Anwar Ali authoritative on the point that the burden rested on the department to show that the estimate was false to the knowledge of the assessee; applied that principle to hold in favour of the assessee. |
| Additional Commissioner of Income‑tax, Punjab v. Bipan Lal Kuthiala (1975 98 I.T.R 343) | Applied in similar circumstances to support Tribunal's approach (treated as authority in line with Triveni Devi). | The Court observed that this decision aptly applies and supports the Tribunal's view in the present matter. |
| C.A. B. Abraham v. Income Tax Officer (1961 4 I.T.R 425 S.C.) | Expresses that penalty is an additional tax and the principle preventing double taxation/punishment applies; a person cannot be punished more than once for the same offence. | The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that penalty cannot be levied both on the firm and again on the partners for the same offence. |
| Dulichand and Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1956 29 I.T.R 535 S.C.) | Observation that a firm, though assessable, is not a separate legal/juridical entity; tax or penalty on a firm operates in reality on the partners. | The Court relied on this proposition to reinforce the conclusion that penalty on a firm equates to a penalty on partners and to support the prohibition against double punishment. |
| Mulji Laxmidas v. C.I.T. (Gujarat High Court, 1976 Taxation Vol. 43 p. 26) | Authority relied upon by the Revenue in support of upholding penalty (section 271 context in that case). | The High Court in the present opinion found the Mulji Laxmidas decision distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case. |
| Amritlal Somabhat v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bhopal (1979 119 I.T.R 833) | Case relied on by the revenue (Madhya Pradesh High Court decision cited by Mr. Awasthy). | The Court observed this decision did not assist the Revenue because it did not consider the question of double penalty and did not refer to Dulichand & Laxminarayan. |
| Pearl Wollen Mills v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Patiala (1979 4 T.L.R 236) | Authority adopting a similar view that penalty on firm precludes penalty on partners for same offence. | The Court noted concurrence with this view and indicated that the present case fell within its ratio. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the facts and the relevant statutory provisions (notably section 273 and the linked section 212). Key aspects of the Court's step‑by‑step reasoning as set out in the opinion were:
- Statutory context: The Court quoted section 273 (penalty for furnishing untrue estimate or failure to furnish estimate without reasonable cause) and noted the parity of sections 271 and 273 (both penal in character).
- On the burden of proof and mens rea: The Court treated the question whether the partner knowingly filed a false estimate as governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anwar Ali. That decision requires the department to lead material beyond mere rejection of an explanation to show that the unexplained receipts (or an estimate) are of revenue nature and that the assessee deliberately concealed or gave false particulars. Applying that principle, the Court held that the department bore the onus of proving that the partner knew or had reason to believe the estimate was untrue.
- Application to facts: The firm's accounts had not been finalised by 15.9.1971 (the firm's return was filed only on 29.7.1972). Because the partner's principal source of income was his share in the firm and he filed his estimate on the same basis and the same day as the firm, the Court concluded there was no evidence of dishonest intention (no mens rea) on the part of the partner. The partner had reasonably relied on the firm's estimate.
- On the question of double punishment: The Court accepted the view (drawn from Triveni Devi and related authorities) that a firm is not a separate juridical entity for these purposes and a penalty imposed on a firm is effectively a penalty on the partners; therefore imposing penalty again on partners for the same offence would amount to double punishment and is impermissible. The Court applied authorities (including Dulichand & Laxminarayan, C.A. B. Abraham, and Pearl Wollen Mills) to support this legal principle.
- Distinguishing adverse authorities: The Court considered Mulji Laxmidas (relied on by the Revenue) but found it distinguishable on its facts; it also noted that Amritlal Somabhat did not consider the double penalty issue and therefore did not aid the Revenue.
- Conclusion of analysis: On the combined basis that the department had not discharged the onus of proving knowledge or deliberate falsity by the partner (per Anwar Ali) and that imposing penalty on both firm and partners would amount to double punishment, the Court concluded the Tribunal's determinations in favour of the assessees were correct.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Court answered the references in favour of the assessees and against the department and disposed of the references accordingly (the opinion states: "we answer the questions referred to for our opinion ... in favour of the assessees and against the department and dispose of the references accordingly").
Implications:
- Direct effect: The penalties previously imposed on the partners (in the references before the Court) were set aside as the Tribunal had correctly applied the law; the Tribunal's cancellation of penalties was upheld.
- Legal principle applied (as consequence for parties in similar circumstances): The Court applied existing precedent that (a) the department bears the burden to prove that an estimate was knowingly false (Anwar Ali), and (b) where a firm has been penalised for the same offence, imposing penalty again on partners would amount to double punishment (Triveni Devi, Dulichand & Laxminarayan, C.A. B. Abraham, Pearl Wollen Mills). The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying these authorities.
- Costs: The opinion records "The parties are left to pear their costs." (as stated in the provided text).
Final note: The summary above is prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion. No factual or legal matter has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.
S.S Dewan, J.:— This judgment will decide I.T Reference Nos. 2, 10 to 17 of 1979 and 38, 39, 40 and 46 of 978 which contain the similar question of law. The facts are being given in the judgment from I.T Ref. No. 15/1979. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar referred to us the following questions for he opinion of this Court under section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called ‘the 1961 Act’):—
(Arising out of I.T Ref Nos. 15, 14, 16 and 17 of 1979)
Assessment year 1972-1973
(i) Whether an the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee cannot be said to have filed an estimate on his income under section 212 of the Income tax Act, 1961 which he knew or had reason to believe to be untrue?
(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the ease, the Tribunal was correct in holding that when a firm has been penalised under section 273 (a) of the Income-tax Act 1961, no penalty can be Imposed under the said section on its partners?
2. (Arising out of I.T Ref. No. 2 of 1979)
Assessment year 1973-1974.
(i) Whether a wrong estimate of income filed by a firm under section 212 would constitute a reasonable cause in the case of the partner for the purpose of 1evy of penalty under section 273 (a) of the Income tax Act, 96???
(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunal is right in deleting the penalty imposed under section 273 (a) of the income tax Act?
3 (Arising out of of I.T Ref. Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13 of 1974)
Assessment year 1970-1971
(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding the non-filing of an estimate u/s 212 (3A) of the Income tax Act 1961 by the firm would constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of sec. 273 (c) of the Income tax Act 1961 for not filing an estimate under sec. 212 (2A) of the Act by the partners?
(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was correct in holding that when a firm has been penalised u/s 273 (c) of the Income-tax Act 1961, no penalty can be imposed under the said section on its partners?
4. (Arising out of 1. T. Ref. Nos. 38, 39 and 40 of 1973)
Assessment year 1973-74.
2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that non filing of an estimate under section 213 (3A) of the Income-tax Act 1961 by the firm would constitute a reasonable cause within the meaning of sec. 27) (c) of the Income-tax Act 1961 for not filing of an estimate u/s 212 (3A) of the Act by the assessee partner and in cancelling the penalty of Rs. 9550/- (Rs. 6780/. in I.T Ref. Nos. 39 and 40) imposed under sec. 273(c)?
5. (Arising out of I.T Ref. No. 46 of 1978)
Assessment year 1973-1974.
3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that non-filing of an estimate under section 212 (3A) of the Income-tax Act 1961 by the firm would constitute a reasonable cause within the menning of section 273 (c) of the Income-tax Act 196 for not filing of an estimate under sec. 212 (3A) of the Act by the assessee partner?
4. The facts in the context of which the aforesaid question are to be considered are not in dispute and can be stated this:
5. The assessee firm M/s. Partap Steel Rooling Mills, Amritsar consisted of four partners one of whom was Partap Chand Maheshwari. The assessment year involved was 1972-1973. The Income-tax Officer issusd a notice under sec 210 of the 19 of Act on 19.8.71 requiring the assessee to deposit advance tax of Rs. 2, 96, 285/. The assesses filed an estim ate on 15 9, 1971 declaring his income at Rs. 1,10,000/- and accordingly paid Rs. 53.037/-. The tax on regular assessment was determined at Rs. 1,32, 774/. As the estimate of the advance tax filed by the assessee on 15. 9. 1971 was found to be incorrect, proceedings were taken under section 27 (a) of the 1961 Act and the income tax officer imposed a penalty of Rs. 4, 654/- on the assessee. The contention of the assessee before the Income tax Officer as also before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax was that the only source of income of the assessee was the share out of the estimated income from the firm and, therefore, he had reasons to believe that the estimate filed by the firm was true and correct. It was also submitted that the Income-tax Officer did not prove that the assessee had consciously under estimated his advance tax liability and in these circumstances no penalty should be imposed. The Income tax Officer as also the Appella???e Assistant Commmissioner rejected the contention of the assessee and they held that the explanation offered by the assessee was not acceptable and that the failure to furnish the estimate of advance tax was without reasonable cause. Feeling agrrieved, the assessee went in the second appeal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal placed reliance on the decision in Venkateswara Power Raling Mills v. Commissioner of Income tax, Banglore . 1974 97 I.T.R 168. and Additional Commissioner of Income-tax. Lucknow v. Smt. Triveni Devi . 1974 97 I.T.R 390. and accepted the appeal. The Tribunal while accepting the assessee’ pleas observed as under:
“In our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee has considerable force. Since the assessee's main source of income was share from the firm M/s. Partap Steel Rolling Mills and the assessee filed his own estimate of advance tax on the basis of the estimate filed by the firm on 15.9.1971 it cannot be said that the assessee under section 212 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 furnished an estimate of advance tax which he knew or had reasons to believe to be untrue. On the other hand, on 15.9.1971 when the assessee filed his own estimate of advance tax he depended on the estimate fled by the firm and in these circumstances it cannot be said that the assessee was actuated by any dishonest intention to underestimate the advance-tax payable by him. This apar??? we find that in the case of the firm M/s. Partap Steel Rolling Mills, a penalty under section 2/3 (a) hat already been imposed by the Income-tax Officer for default of the previsions of section 212 of the Income tax Act. 1961 and in these circumstances we are of the opinion that no penalty can be imposed on the partner on the same offence as it would amount to double punishment.”
6. This is how the matter is before us.
7. Coming now to the first question in I.T Ref. No. 15 of 1979 Mr. D.N Awasthy learned counsel for the department has submitted that the accounting period of the firm had ended on 31st July, 1971 and as such on 15th September, 1971 the assessee should have known his share of profits in the firm and since he did not file his estimate correctly on 1???th September, 1971, the provisions of section 273(a) have been rightly attracted in this case. To fortify his argument, he has cited a decision of the Gujrat High Court in Mulji Laxmidas v. C.I.T (1976) Taxation Volume 43 page 26 wherein penalty imposed under section 271(a) of the 1961 Act was justified. We have gone through this decision and find that it has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
8. In order to determine the question it will be essentital to refer to the relvant part of section 273 of the 1961 Act which runs as under:—
“If the Income-tax Officer, In the course of any proceedings in connection with the regular assessment is satisfied that any assessee—
(a) has furnished under section 212 an estimate of the advance tax payable by him which he knew or had reason to believe to be untrue, or
(b)****
(c) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish an estimate of the advance tax payable by him in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 212.
he may direct that such person shall, in addition to the amount of tax, if any, payable by him pay by way of penalty……………”
9. Section 271 of the 1961 Act is a similar section authorising the imposition of penalty for filling a return in which particulars furnished of his income by the aseessee are in accurate or such particulars are concealed. The relevant part of this section is as follows:—
“(1) If the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person—
(c) has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished in accurate particulars of such income.
he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty………”
10. The provisions of section 271 and 273 are in pari materia. If imposition of penalty under section 271 is of penal nature, so is the penalty which is imposed under section 273 of the Act.
11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are of the considered view that the matters involved in ??? Ref No. 19 of 1979 are not res integra. The subject matter of question No. (i) stands covered by an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali . 1970 76 I.T.R 696. and we see no distinguishing features as to take the matter away from the cover of the ratio of the said decision as would be presently shown. Prior to the decision in Anwar Ali's case (supra) different views were taken as to on whom lies the burden of proving that the income has been concealed or that incorrect particulars have been given. In Anwar Ali 's case while making assessment for the year 1947–1948 the Income-tax Officer found certain undisclosed cash deposits aggregating to Rs. 87,000/- as having been mude by the assessee in the bank during the accounting year on 21st November, 1946. The explanation of the assessee that he had received certain amounts from his relations and he had deposited them in the joint names of himself and his minor sons was not accepted and the taxing authority came to the conclusion that this amount of Rs. 8???/- represented the income from undisclosed sources. The amount was consequently added to the income of the assessee and he was taxed accordingly. The assessee was unsuccessful up to the Tribunal ???enalty proceedings were started and a penalty of Rs. 66, 000/- was imposed. The Department did not lead any further evidence to show that the return was false except that a sum of Rs. 87, 000/- had been added to the income which was not disclosed. The Tribunal took the view that penalty proceedings were of a criminal nature and the onus lay on the Department to show by adequate evidence that the amount of the cash stated to have been concealed by the assessee was of revenue nature and was assessable as income and that the assessee had concealed it or deliberately furnished false particulars in regard thereto. Then it was observed as follows:—
“This onus in the opinion of the Tribunal was not discharged by the Income Tax Authorities by showing merely that the explanation given by the assessee in the assessment proceedings was found to be unacceptable. The Income-tax Officer, according to the Tribunal, must find some material apart from falsity of the assessee's explanation to support his finding that the receipt from undisclosed sources was income.”
12. The Mulji Laxmi Das's case (supra) relied on by Mr. Awasthy is clearly distinguishable and the facts therein are not applicable to this case. In that case, the explanation given by the assessee which was offered even at the stage of the second appeal before the Income tax Appellate Tribunal was that the default was on account of the failure on the part of the three partnership firms to make up their accounts in time and no material was produced even before the Tribunal to show that the assessee was vigilant and diligent. The Tribunal relied upon these and other grounds set out in support of its conclusion that the failure to furnish return within time was without reasonable cause. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while accepting the plea of the revenue observed that on an over all view of all the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal's finding that the default in the case was without reasonable cause, was unassailable. To the case in hand, the decision of this Court reported in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab v. Bipan Lal Kuthiala . 1975 98 I.T.R 343. and that of Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow v. Shmt. Triveni Devi aptly apply. The ratio of these decisions is clearly attracted and has been rightly followed by the Tribunal. The question whether or not the assessee failed without reasonable cause to furnish estimate of advance tax within time is primarily and essentially a question of fact to be decided in each case on consideration of all the relevant circumstances. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to show if the assessee had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars. The books of accounts of the firm had not been finalised by September 15, 1971 and in, fact, the return of income was filed by the firm only on July 29, 1972 Since the firm's accounts were not closed and the assessee was not in a position to know his share of income of the firm by September 15, 1971 he had to depend upon the estimate of advance tax filed in the case of the firm and it was on this basis that he filed his own estimate of advance tax on the same date on which the firm filed its estimate. There is no mens rea and as such the Tribunal was right in holding that the burden was on the department to show that the estimate was false to the knowledge of the assessee or was believed to be inaccurate by this assessee. The answer to this question would obviously be in the affirmative in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Anwar Ali's case (supra), that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department.
13. Now we advert to question No. (ii) in IT. Ref. No. 15 of 1979. The ratio of the decision in case Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow v. Shmt. Triveni Devi is clearly attracted and this has rightly been followed by the Tribunal. In fact, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in C.A B. Abraham v. Income tax officer . 1961 4 I.T.R 425 S.C. “a penalty is nothing but an additional tax and the principle contained in clause (iii) of section 86 would apply as such to penalty as to tax. Even if penalty is regarded as punishment, a person cannot be punished more than once in respect of the same offence,”
14. In Dulichand and Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Incometax . 1956 29 I.T.R 535 S.C. it was observed that a firm even though it is an assessable unit for the purposes of income-tax is not a legal person or a juridicial entity.
15. Mr. Awasthy relies on a case of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Amritlal Somabhat v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal . 1979 119 I.T.R 833.. The case referred to by Mr. Awasthy does not help in resolving the controversy because in that case the question of double penalty was not considered at all and, moreover, Dulichand Laxminarayan's case (supra) was not referred. On the ether hand Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the assessee has contended that when a firm has been penalised, no penalty can be imposed on its partners. He has placed reliance on the decision in c se Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow v. Shmt. Triveni Devi wherein it was observed as follows:—
“A firm even though it is an assessable unit for purposes of income-tax, is not a legal person or a juridicial entity. Thus, any tax imposed on a firm is, in fact, a tax upon the partners Penalty is nothing but an additional tax and the principle contained in section 86 (iii) of the income tax Act, 1951, would apply as much to penalty as to tax. Even if penalty is regarded as punishment, a person cannot be punished more than once in respect of the same offence. Hence, penalty for concealment of income cannot be levied once in the hands of the firm and again in the hands of its partners”.
16. Similar view was adopted in decision of this Court Pearl Wollen Mills v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Patiala . 1979 4 T.L.R 236. with respect, we entirely concur in the view aforesaid Once that is so, the case of the assessee is clearly within the ratio of the cases upon which reliance has been rightly placed by Mr. Desai.
17. In view of our answer to questions Nos. (i) and (ii) in I.T Ref. No. 15 of 1979, we answer the questions referred to for our opinin in I.T Refs. Nos. 2, 10 to 14, 16, 17 of 1973 and 38, 39, 40 and 46 of 1978 in favour of the assessees and against the department and dispose of the references accordingly. The parties are left to pear their costs.
B.S Dhillon, J.:— I agree.
R.M.S
Reference answered.
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