- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Smt. Darshna Devi And Others v. Sher Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners are claimants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Hissar. They challenged an order dated 21 April 1976 made by the Tribunal which held that, although the petitioners were paupers, they could not be absolved of the responsibility of paying court-fee on the claim petition because Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal. The petition sought setting aside that Tribunal order and a declaration that the petitioners were entitled to the benefits of Order XXXIII, Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal such that paupers may be absolved from payment of court-fee.
- Whether rule 20 of the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964, by omitting certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, necessarily excludes those omitted provisions from applying to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Groz Beckert Saboo Ltd. v. Jupittr General Insurance Co. . 1966 68 P.L.R 161. | Interpreting rule 20 of the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules to determine which provisions of the First Schedule to the CPC apply to Tribunal proceedings. | The Tribunal relied on this Single Bench decision to conclude that omission of Order XXXIII from rule 20 excluded its applicability. The High Court treated the reasoning as not sound in view of later Full Bench authority. |
| Smt. Shanti Devi v. General Manager Haryana Roadways, Ambala . 1971 73 P.L.R 543. | Full Bench dictum analysing Motor Vehicles Act and Rules; holding that proceedings before Claims Tribunal closely resemble civil court proceedings and the Tribunal acts as a Court. | The High Court treated this Full Bench decision as overruling the contrary view; it was central to the conclusion that CPC provisions compatible with fair play apply to the Tribunal. |
| Major Triloki Nath Bharguva, etc. v. Smt. Jaswant Kaur . 1975 77 P.L.R 422. | Division Bench consideration of whether provisions of the CPC not specifically mentioned in rule 20 are excluded; discussion of applicability of CPC provisions (including rule 22 of Order XLI). | The Division Bench followed the Full Bench in Shanti Devi and held that omitted CPC provisions could still apply; Narula, C.J. rejected the view that omission in rule 20 implied exclusion. |
| A.I.R 1967 S.C 1494 (referred to as Jugal Kishor's case) | Used for the proposition that the Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the same functions and duties as a court of law. | The High Court quoted this Supreme Court language (via Shanti Devi) to support the conclusion that Tribunal proceedings resemble civil court proceedings. |
| Smt. Chawli Devi v. Union of India . 1973 75 P.L.R 848. | Reiteration of the view that Tribunal proceedings are like those in civil courts. | The decision was cited as following the Full Bench view that the Claims Tribunal acts as a court and hence CPC provisions can apply. |
| The Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shrimati Renuka Roy . A.I.R 1973 Gauhati 142. | Held that CPC provisions not mentioned in rule 20 should be held excluded (the Gauhati High Court's view). | The High Court declined to follow this view; Narula, C.J. and others treated the Gauhati decision as not laying down the correct law. |
| K. Chandrashekara Naik v. Narayana . A.I.R 1955 Karnatka 18. | Authority relied on to reject the Gauhati view and to support applicability of omitted CPC provisions in certain contexts. | The Full Bench dictum in Shanti Devi (and subsequent reasoning) relied on this and other authorities to hold that omitted CPC provisions may nevertheless apply. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Tribunal had concluded that rule 20 did not list Order XXXIII among the CPC provisions applicable to the Claims Tribunal and, by implication, therefore excluded Order XXXIII. It relied on rule 20 and the Single Bench decision in Groz Beckert Saboo Ltd. to support that interpretation. Dua, J.'s view in that decision was that section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act did not confer all characteristics of a civil court on the Tribunal and that the Rules deliberately excluded certain CPC provisions (e.g., parts of Order XVI).
The High Court examined Full Bench and Division Bench authorities that analysed the Motor Vehicles Act and the Tribunal Rules at length. The Full Bench in Smt. Shanti Devi concluded that proceedings before the Claims Tribunal closely resemble civil court proceedings and that the Tribunal acts as a Court. This Full Bench dictum was followed in subsequent decisions (including Smt. Chawli Devi and Major Triloki Nath Bhargava). In Major Triloki Nath Bhargava the court rejected reliance on the Gauhati decision which had held that omitted CPC provisions were excluded.
The High Court reasoned that rule 20 does not, expressly or by necessary implication, exclude the applicability of those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which it does not specifically mention. Instead, CPC provisions that are consonant with principles of fair play and propriety apply to Tribunal proceedings. Applying this principle, Order XXXIII (which deals with paupers and exemption from court fees) should be available to petitioners found to be paupers. The court emphasized that denying the benefit would create an impermissible distinction between poor and wealthy litigants and would close the gates of justice to those unable to pay.
Holding and Implications
PETITION ALLOWED. The impugned order is set aside and the petitioners are held entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Consequences and directions given by the Court (as stated in the opinion):
- The Claims Tribunal shall henceforward proceed on the basis that the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of Order XXXIII, CPC.
- The parties shall appear before the Tribunal on 20th March, 1978.
- No costs were awarded.
The court also stated that, as far as this High Court is concerned, the law is well settled that a Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act performs functions similar to a court and that rule 20 does not exclude, either expressly or by necessary implication, the applicability of CPC provisions not specifically mentioned; such provisions will apply if they are in consonance with fair play and propriety. The opinion did not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying and reaffirming existing Full Bench and Division Bench authority.
A.D Koshal, C.J:— In this petition the relief sought by the petitioners who are claimants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Hissar, is for setting aside an order dated the 21st of April, 1976, made by the Tribunal and holding that although the petitioners are paupers, they cannot be absolved of the responsibility of paying court-fee on the claim petition for the reason that order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedures not applicable to proceedings adjudicated upon by the Tribunal.
2. In coming to the conclusion that the proceedings before the Tribunal were not governed by Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Tribunal relied on rule 20 of the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 and a Single Bench decision of this Court reported as Groz Beckert Saboo Ltd. v. Jupittr General Insurance Co. . 1966 68 P.L.R 161., reads thus:
“The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall go far as may be apply to proceedings before this Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30, Order IX, Order XIII, Rule 3 to 10, Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21, Order XVII and Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3”.
3. The Tribunal was of the opinion that as this rule does not mention Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure among the provisions of later made applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal, by implication it excludes their applicability to such proceedings. Support for this interpretation of the rule was sought from Groz Beckert Saboo's case (supra) in which Dua, J. expressed the opinion that section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act by no means clothes the Tribunal with all the characteristics of a Civil Court so as to attract the provisions of Order XVI, Code of Civil Procedure, and even the New Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules exclude the applicability of rule of Order XVI, Civil Procedure Code, which authorises the parties to obtain summons to persons whose attendance is required”.
4. According to Dua, J., this exclusion of rule 1 of order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure appeared to be deliberate. This interpretation of rule 20, however does not appear to be sound and must be deemed to have been over-ruled by the dictum of a full Bench of this Court in Smt. Shanti Devi v. General Manager Haryana Roadways, Ambala . 1971 73 P.L.R 543. read with that of a Division Bench in Major Triloki Nath Bharguva, etc. v. Smt. Jaswant Kaur . 1975 77 P.L.R 422., P.C Jain, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench in Shanti Devi case, analysed the relevant provisions the Motor Vehicles Act and the said Rules at length and came to the conclusion:
“The proceedings before the Claims Tribunal closely resemble the proceedings in civil court and to use the language of their lordships of the supreme court in Jugal Kishor's case (A.I.R 1967 S.C 1494) the Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. In this view of the matter hold that the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are not in the nature of arbitration proceedings and that the Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims acts as a Court”.
5. This dictum was followed and reiterated by Tuli and S.C Mittal, JJ. in Smt. Chawli Devi v. Union of India . 1973 75 P.L.R 848. and again by Narula, C.J, and Bains, J. in Major Triloki Nath Bhargava's (supra). In the case last mentioned it was argued that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure not specifically mentioned in rule 120 must be held to have been excluded and in support of the argument reliance was placed on The Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shrimati Renuka Roy . A.I.R 1973 Gauhati 142.. The view expressed in the Gauhati case, however, did not find favour with Narula, C.J who came to the conclusion on the basis of the Full Bench dictum in K. Chandrashekara Naik v. Narayana . A.I.R 1955 Karnatka 18., and three cases decided respectively by the Delhi. Orissa and Madhya Pradesh High Courts that the same did not lay down the correct law. He held, repelling the argument advanced before him, that the provision of rule 22 of order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to proceedings under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act in spite of the fact that rule did not find a place in rule 20 above mentioned.
6. In so far as this High Court is concerned, therefore the law appears to be well settled that a Claims Tribunal performing functions under the Motor Vehicles Act has more or less the same statute as that of a Court and performs functions similar to it and also that rule 20 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, exclude the applicability to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal of those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which it does not specifically mention and that, on the other hand, such provisions would be applicable if they are in consonance with the principles of fair-play and propriety. Viewed in this light rule 20 would not stand, in my opinion, in the way of the petitioners being absolved of the responsibility to pay court fee if they are found paupers as they have actually been found by the Tribunal. To hold otherwise would be to create an invidious distinction between subject and subject and to close the gates of justice to persons who are unable by virtue of their poverty to pay court-fee while such gates are left wide open for the millionaires a distinction which cannot have the sanction of any law worth the name.
7. In the result the petition succeeds and is accepted and the impugned order is set aside. The petitioners are held entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Claims Tribunal shall hence forward proceed on that basis. The parties shall appear before it on 20th of March, 1978. No costs.
8. Petition allowed.
Alert