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The State Of Haryana v. Man Singh And Another
Judgment Summary: O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. — Regular First Appeals Nos. 451–453, 455–460 and 468–473 of 1968
Factual and Procedural Background
These fifteen Regular First Appeals concern land belonging to various respondents that was acquired by the Government of Punjab (now Haryana) pursuant to a notification dated 5 September 1961 under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
By an award dated 29 June 1962 the Land Acquisition Collector fixed compensation at:
- Rs. 700 per acre for Chali land;
- Rs. 490 per acre for Narmot, Chaknote and Magda land;
- Rs. 245 per acre for Banjar Qadim;
- Rs. 122 per acre for Gair Mumkin.
The claimants received the compensation on 23 September 1967 allegedly without protest. On 10 October 1967 they filed written applications under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act seeking that the matter be referred by the Collector to the Court. The Collector made the references to the Court.
Before the learned Additional District Judge the Government raised a preliminary objection that the references were incompetent because: (a) they were filed after the prescribed period of limitation; and (b) the claimants had accepted the award without protest and thus could not seek a reference. The learned Additional District Judge overruled the preliminary objection and, on the references, enhanced compensation to Rs. 1,200 per acre for Chahi, Narmot, Chaknot and Magda lands and to Rs. 900 per acre for Banjar Qadim and Gair Mumkin lands.
The State of Haryana (the appellant) appealed, raising only the question whether the references were incompetent for the same reasons urged before the Additional District Judge. No question was raised about the adequacy or excess of the enhanced compensation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Court to which a reference is made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act may "go behind" the reference and adjudicate upon the question whether the reference was validly or properly made (for example, by examining compliance with limitation or whether the claimant had accepted the award without protest); and
- Whether, in the context of Punjab and Haryana (where section 18(3) provides a statutory right of revision to the High Court against a Collector's order on an application under section 18), the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the reference or whether the remedy is confined to revision under section 18(3).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Government's Arguments
- The references were incompetent because the claimants filed them after the period of limitation prescribed by section 18.
- The references were incompetent because the claimants had accepted the compensation awarded by the Collector without protest, and therefore were not entitled to seek references to the Court.
- More generally, the Government submitted that a Court to which a reference is made must satisfy itself that the matter brought to it is in the proper form and in accordance with statutory requirements — i.e., the Court has the power to determine whether the reference complies with the statute before entertaining it.
Respondents / Claimants' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the claimants' legal arguments beyond the procedural history that they applied under section 18 for references and that compensation was enhanced by the Court below.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mahadev Krishna (Mahadeo Krishna Parkar) v. Mamlatdar of Alibag, A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 200 | Holds that the Court is bound to satisfy itself that the reference made by the Collector complies with the specified statutory conditions before entertaining it; Court may examine validity of the reference. | The judgment is quoted and its reasoning described, but the present Court does not accept that broad proposition. The present Court distinguishes the position and declines to follow this approach in the context of references under section 18 where the subject matter of the reference is one the Court is competent to hear. |
| Narayanappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 23 | Supported the proposition that the Court should verify the validity of the reference before hearing it (same line of reasoning as Mahadev Krishna). | The present Court notes that Narayanappa proceeded on the same reasoning as Mahadev Krishna and indicates it does not adopt that line of authority for the present matter. |
| Special Deputy Collector v. Kodandaramacharlu, A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 25 | Also proceeded on the view that the Court must be satisfied of the validity of the reference. | The present Court records that this decision proceeded on the same reasoning as Mahadev Krishna and treats it as not persuasive for allowing a Court to go behind a reference in the present statutory context. |
| Gangawa v. Udashappa, A.I.R. 1964 Mysore 107 | Another decision in the line that the Court can satisfy itself as to the validity of the reference. | Not followed — the present Court groups it with other decisions adopting the Mahadev Krishna approach and does not accept that the Court should generally go behind the reference. |
| Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu, A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 490 | Held the contrary view: the Court should not go behind a Collector's reference under the statute; the remedy is by revision (in Punjab/Punjab-amended provisions) rather than by the Court embarking on an enquiry into validity of the reference. | The present Court expressly concurs with this view and states that, sitting singly, it is bound by Hari Krishan Khosla. The decision is followed. |
| Sri Vankateswara Swami v. Sub-Collector, A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 327 | Adopted the view that the Court should not go behind the Collector's reference (contrary view to Mahadev Krishna). | The present Court records concurrence with this approach as part of the line of authority it endorses. |
| Kalyanchand Devi Lal v. Kanchan Bai, A.I.R. 1963 M.P. 221 | Another authority adopting the contrary view that the Court should not adjudicate on validity of reference where the subject matter is one the Court can hear. | The present Court includes this decision among those with which it concurs. |
| State of U.P. v. Abdul Karim, A.I.R. 1963 All. 556 | Also adopts the contrary view refusing to allow the Court to go behind the reference in the general case. | The present Court cites this decision as part of the line of authority it follows. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds from a textual and purposive reading of sections 18 and 20–26 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended for Punjab and Haryana. The key analytical steps set out in the opinion are:
- Examination of sections 20 to 26 shows these provisions prescribe the powers and duties of the Court on a reference and are directed exclusively to determining the proper amount of compensation. Nothing in those provisions suggests the Court is empowered to investigate the procedural validity of the Collector's decision to make the reference.
- The Court observes that the absence of any statutory indication that a reference may be attacked on its validity implies the Legislature intended that the Court's role, upon a reference under section 18, is confined to the matters expressly allotted to it (principally the determination of compensation and related questions).
- The Court notes that in Punjab and Haryana the Legislature has expressly provided a remedy by way of revision to the High Court against an order made by the Collector under section 18(3). This express statutory revision remedy indicates that challenges to the Collector's order are to be addressed by the statutory revision route, not by the Court hearing the reference turning into a court of appeal/revision on the propriety of the reference.
- The Court distinguishes between two propositions: (a) the Court has jurisdiction to hear a reference once one is made (i.e., the mere fact of a reference engages the Court's jurisdiction); and (b) the Court may refuse to hear a reference only if the subject-matter of the reference is outside the Court's competence (for example, if the Collector purported to refer to the Court a question whether acquisition was for a public purpose — a matter for which the Court would be incompetent when the reference is not of a kind the statute contemplates). The Court accepts that in such exceptional circumstances it may say the reference is incompetent.
- The Court rejects the broad proposition (advanced in some authorities) that it may "go behind" the reference to determine whether the Collector validly made it on procedural grounds such as compliance with limitation or the claimant's supposed acceptance of the award. It reasons that allowing such an enquiry would transform the Court into an appellate or revisional body over the Collector's decision to make the reference — a power not conferred by the Act and inconsistent with the statutory scheme (especially in light of section 18(3) as amended).
- The Court reviews the conflicting authorities. It acknowledges the decisions supporting the proposition that the Court should satisfy itself of the validity of the reference (e.g., Mahadev Krishna and others), but declares its concurrence with the contrary line of authority (e.g., Hari Krishan Khosla and several others) that the Court should not generally go behind a valid-looking reference. Sitting singly, the judge states he is bound by Hari Krishan Khosla and adopts that approach.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED. All fifteen appeals are dismissed with costs.
Implications and direct consequences as stated in the opinion:
- The Court refused to entertain the Government's contention that it could inquire into the validity of the references on grounds of limitation or acceptance of the award.
- The references made by the Collector were therefore treated as properly before the Court and the determination on compensation made by the Court below (enhancing compensation) stands insofar as this appeal contested only the competency of the references.
- The Court adhered to an established line of authority (noted particularly in Hari Krishan Khosla) which confines the Court hearing a section 18 reference to the statutory scope of inquiry (primarily compensation-related questions) rather than permitting it to act as an appellate or revisional forum to examine the Collector's decision to refer. The opinion expresses concurrence with the contrary decisions and states the judge is bound by Hari Krishan Khosla.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond its conclusion that the Court will not, in the ordinary course, go behind a Collector's reference under section 18; it emphasizes that questions beyond the Court's competence may be excluded from reference (an example being a reference on a point the Court is not authorized to decide).
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.:— These fifteen Regular First Appeals (Nos. 451 to 453, 455 to 460 and 468 to 473 of 1968) may be disposed of by a single judgment as the questions at issue are common. Certain land belonging to the various respondents were acquired by the Government of Punjab (now Haryana) pursuant to a noitfication dated 5th September, 1961, issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. By his award dated 29th June, 1962, the Land Acquisition Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 700/- per acre for Chali land Rs. 490/- per acre for Narmot, Chaknote and Magda land, Rs. 245/- per acre for Banjar Qadim Rs. 122/- for Gair Mumkin. The claimants received the compensation awarded to them on 23rd September, 1967 and, according to the Government, it was received without any protest. Thereafter, on 10th October, 1967, they filed applications seeking references to the Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. After notice to the Government, references were duly made to the Court Before the learned Additional District Judge, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Government that the references were incompetent as the conditions prescribed by section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act were not fulfilled. It was said, firstly, that the references were sought after the prescribed period of limitation and, secondly that the claimants having accepted the compensation without protest, were not entitled to seek references to the Court. The preliminary objection was over-ruled by the learned Additional District Judge. Compensation was enhanced to Rs. 1200/- per acre for Chahi, Narmot, Chaknot and Magda lands and to Rs. 900/- per acre for Banjar Qadim and Gair Mumkin lands. The State of Haryana has preferred these appeals. No question is raised that the compensation awarded by the learned Additional District Judge is excessive. The only question raised is that the references were incompetent for the same reasons that were urged before the learned Additional District Judge.
2. The question for consideration is, whether it is open to a Court to whom a reference is made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to go behind the reference and investigate whether the reference was properly made. section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act may be usefully extracted here. It is as follows:—
“18(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:
(a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”
In Punjab and Haryana, the Land Acquisition Act was amended by Punjab Act No. 2 of 1954 by which a third sub-section was added to section 18 and it is as follows:—
(3) Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
Section 19 prescribes the particulars which the Collector is required to state for the information of the Court. It is as follows:—
“19(1) In making the reference, the Collector shall state, for the information of the Court, in writing under his hand,—
(a) the situation and extent of the land, with particulars of any trees, buildings or standing crops thereon;
(b) the names of the persons whom he has reason to think interested in such land;
(c) the amount awarded for damages and paid or tendered under sections 5 and 17, or either of them, and the amount of compensation awarded under section 11, and
(d) if the objection be to the amount of the compensation, the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined.
(2) To the said statement shall be attached a schedule giving the particulars of the notices served upon, and of the statements in writing made or delivered by, the parties interested respectively.”
Thereafter section 20 requires the Court to issue notice to the applicant, the Collector and all persons interested in the petition, except such of them as have consented without prejudice to receive payment of the compensation awarded. Section 21 restricts the scope of the enquiry in the proceeding pursuant to the reference under section 18 to “a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. Section 22 prescribes that the proceeding shall be in open Court. Section 23 prescribes the matters to be considered by the Court in determining the compensation. Section 24 prescribes the matters which the Court shall not take into consideration in determining the compensation. Section 25 prescribes the maximum and the minimum ??? to the amounts which may be awarded as compensation. Section 26 provides for the form of the award which may be made by the Court.
3. A scrutiny of sections 20 to 26 of the Land Acquisition Act which prescribe the powers and duties of the Court upon a reference made to it under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act shows that the powers and duties are to be exercised for the sole purpose of determining the proper amount of compensation to be awarded. There is nothing in any of these provisions giving even the slightest indication that the Court is entitled to go behind the reference and adjudicate upon the question whether the reference was properly made to the Court. The circumstances that the Government may be without any remedy if the Collector makes an improper reference to the Court cannot clothe the Court, once a reference is made to it to constitute itself into a court of appeal or Court of revision against the reference as well. It may be that, right or wrong, the Legislature wanted a reference to be final and did not want the Court to which the reference is made under section 18, to embark into an enquiry about the validity of the reference. Perhaps the Legislature thought that such needless and fruitless enquiry would not advance the cause of justice or the object of the various provisions enacted with a view to secure a just compensation to those who are deprived of their land. In Punjab, the Legislature has expressly provided a remedy by way of revision to the High Court against an order made by the collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Whatever may be said elsewhere, so far as the State of Punjab and Haryana are concerned, it is difficult, in view of the express remedy provided by section 18(3) to hold that the Court, to whom a reference is made under section 18 has the jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of the reference.
4. The submission on behalf of the Government appears to be that the Court to which a reference is made must necessarily be considered to be clothed with the power to determine whether the matter that has come before it, “is in the proper form and in accordance with the requirements of a particular statute”. The submission of the appellant is supported by the following decisions: Mahadev Krishna v. Mamlatdar of Alibag . A.I.R 1944 Bom. 200., Narayanappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer . A.I.R 1955 Mad. 23., Special Duty Collector v. Kodandaramacharlu . A.I.R 1965 A.P 25., and Gangawa v. Udashappa . A.I.R 1964 Mysore 107..
5. In Mahadeo Krishna Parkar v. Mamlatdar of Alibag, Beaumont, C.J and Rajadhyaksha, J. held:—
“It seems to me that the Court is bound to satisfy itself that the reference made by the Collector complies with the specified conditions so as to give the Court jursdiction to hear the reference. It is not a question of the Court sitting in appeal or revision on the decision of Collector; it is a question of the Court satisfying itself that the reference made under the Act is one which it is required to hear. If the reference does not comply with the terms of the Act, then the Court cannot entertain it. I have myself some difficulty in seeing on what principle the Court is to be debarred from satisfying itself that the reference, which it is called upon to hear, is a valid reference.”
With great respect to the Hon'ble Judges, it is one thing to say that the Court has jurisdiction only if a reference is made to it but it is quite a different thing to say that the Court has jurisdiction only if it finds that the reference was made legally. It may be that in a proper case; the Court can say that the reference is not one which it is competent to hear. For example, if instead of asking the Court to determine the question of compensation, the Collector purports to refer to the Court a question whether the acquisition was for a public purpose, the Court is bound to say that the reference is incompetent. But where the Collector refers a question, which the Court is competent to hear, I fail to see how the Court is competent to go behind the reference to find out whether the reference was validly made.
6. It is needless to refer to the decisions in Narayanappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Special Deputy Collector v. Kodiadaremacharlu, and Gangawa v. Udachappa, all of which proceeded on the same reasoning as that given by Beaumount, C.J and Rajadhyaksha, J.
7. The contrary view was taken by Bishan Narain and A.N Grover, JJ., in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu . A.I.R 1958 Punj. 490., Kuppuswamy Iyer J., in Sri Vankateswara Swami v. Sub-Collector . A.I.R 1943 Mad. 327., Krishnan and Sharma, JJ., in Kalyanchand Devi Lal v. Kanchan Bai . A.I.R 1963 M.P 221., and by M.C Desai C.J, B. Dayal and B.N Thakur, JJ., in State of U.P v. Abdul Karim . A.I.R 1963 All. 556.. I have already said enough to indicate my concurrence with the views expressed in these decisions. Indeed, sitting sinyly, I am bound by the decision in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu.
8. In the result, all the 15 appeals are dismissed with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
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