Harbans Lal, J.:— This judgment will dispose of F.A.O No. 24 of 1973 (Municipal Committee, Jullundur v. Shrimati Jogdish Kaur), F.A.O No. 43 of 1973 (Municipal Committee, Jullundur v. Harnam Kaur), and F.A.O No. 70 of 1973 (Jagdish Kaur v. Bachan and Municipal Committee, Jullundur), as all three appeals arise out of the same judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jullundur, (hereinafter called the Tribunal), dated August 22, 1972.

2. The facts, in brief, are that on December 21, 1967, at about 1 P.M one Swaran Singh Ahuja, a youngman of 22 years, resident of village Kala Sanghian, was going on a scooter on Jullundur-Kapurthala Road in Jullundur near the Secretariat building when a Truck No. PNU: 7532 (hereinafter called the truck) owned by the respondent Municipal Committee, and driven by Bachan, respondent, who was in the employment of the Committee, collieded against the said scooter resulting in the instantaneous death of Swaran Singh. Two claim petitions under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) were filed, one by Jagdish Kaur, widow of the deceased, and the other by Harnam Kaur, widowed mother of the deceased, claiming Rs. 2 laks each as compensation on the plea that the fatal accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving by Bachan, respondent.

3. Compensation was claimed against both the driver and the Municipal Committee, the owner of the truck. Both the applications were consolidated by the Tribunal vide its order dated April 24, 1968. The claim petitions were contested by both the driver and the owner of the truck. It was alleged that they had no knowledge about the accident and, in the alternative, it was contended that the compensation claimed was highly exaggerated. Ownership of the truck was admitted. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:

1. Is the claim application barred by time, and if so, are there sufficient grounds to condone the delay?

2. Was the accident due to any negligent act on the part of the driver of the vehicle involved or that of the deceased himself or that of both and with what effect?

3. What should be the quantum of compensation due, if any, and from whom to whom?

4. Relief.

4. On issue No. 1, it was held that both the applications were filed within time. Regarding issue No. 2 it was held that fatal accident was due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver. On issue No. 3, the claimant, Jagdish Kaur, respondent, was awarded Rs. 25,000/- and the other claimant, Harnam Kaur, respondent Rs. 3,000/- as compensation. This award has been challenged in two appeals by the Municipal Committee vide F.A.O No. 24 of 1973, against Jagdish Kaur, and F.A.O No. 43 of 1973, against Harnam Kaur, F.A.O, No. 70 of 1973 has been filed by Jagdish Kaur widow of the deceased claiming enhanced compensation.

5. Finding on issue No. 1, regarding, limitation has not been challenged Admittedly, the accident took place on December 21, 1967, and the applications by both the claimants were filed within two months of the occurrence. Thus, clearly, the applications were filed within time.

6. Finding on issue No. 2, was challenged, but half-heartedly. The version regarding the tragic accident has been proved by the two eye-witnesses, Ram Singh, A.W 2 and Mehnga Ram, A.W 3. Ram Saran, A.W 2, runs a tea stall opposite the building of the Civil Secretariat near the place of occurrence. It was on the basis of his statement that the first information report. Exhibit A.W 5/1 was recorded against Bachan, driver, the respondent. His presence at the time of the occurrence was even supported by Saran Dass, R.W 4, Mehnga Ram, A.W 3, is a clerk of Shri Vasudev Mehta, Advocate, who was working in the Civil Secretariat. As the accident took place in the vicinity of the Civil Secretariat, the presence of this witness was quite natural. His statement was also recorded by the police during investigation of the case. Nor was his presence challenged in cross-examination. Both these witnesses categorically stated that the occurrence took place when the scooter driven by Swaran Singh Ahuja, deceased, was going on his proper side and the truck being driven by Bachan, respondent was, going on a fast speed on the wrong side and struck against the scooter. It was also pointed out that at the time, the driver of the truck did not sound the horn. The scooter was, according to the witnesses, being driven at a normal speed on the proper side of the road. Both the respondent Municipal Committee and Bachan, respondent, in their written statements vaguely denied the knowledge of the occurrence and did not take up any alternative plea. An attempt was made to make out a case in the evidence of their witnesses, Baru Ram, R.W 3 and Saran Dass, R.W 4, that the scooter was following the truck and the deceased driving the scooter attempted to overtake the truck and it was in that process that the occurrence took place due to the negligence of the deceased. This plea was clearly an after thought as the same was not adverted to in their written statements. Nor any of the two eyewitnesses produced on behalf of the claimants was confronted with the same. None of the witnesses produced on behalf of the respondent Municipal Committee and Bachan, driver, can be given any credence as they were only chance witnesses. Their statements were not even recorded by the Police during investigation which fact alone eloquent to throw doubt on the factum of their presence at the time and place of occurrence. Baru Ram, R.W 3, is admittedly, the driver under the employment of the Municipal Committee, the owner of the truck. Obviously, he was under the influence of the Committee. According to Saran Dass, R.W 4, he had gone at the relevant time to supply food to his father Mahesha Ram who is stated to be working as a cobbler near the place of occurrence. Strangely, this Mahesha Ram was not produced in evidence. The said Saran Dass in cross-examination admitted to be employed in Gopal Trading Pharmacy, at a distance of about one mile from the place of accident. In these circumstances, he cannot be expected to be off duty for such a considerable time that he could leave the factory, come to his house and take the food at such a long distance to his father. Madan Mohan R.W 6, who also claimed to be an eye-witness was a clerk of an Advocate was not expected to be at the place of occurrence at the relevant time because the said Advocate was not stated to be working in the Civil Secretariat. It was admitted that his statement had also not been recorded by the Sub-Inspector during investigation. All these witnesses went out of the way to support the version which was, as stated above, only an after thought indicating the deceased following the truck on a scooter. The learned Tribunal has discussed the entire evidence regarding the occurrence exhaustively in the judgment under appeal and came to a clear finding that at the time of the occurrence, the truck driven by Bachan, respondent, was going at a fast speed on Jullundur-Kapurthala road and was on the wrong side when the fatal accident took place and further that the deceased was coming at a normal speed on his proper side. It was also concluded that the occurrence was the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck by Bachan, respondent. These conclusions are based on correct assessment of the evidence and I entirely agree with the reasoning and the conclusions arrived at. The learned counsel for the appellant Municipal Committee also appeared to be conscious of the correctness of the conclusions of the Tribunal in respect of this issue and was not in a position to challenge the same with any force.

7. The learned counsel for the Committee, however, emphatically challenged the finding of the Tribunal on the amount of compensation awarded to the claimants. It was argued that there was absolutely no evidence to justify the conclusion that the deceased was earning Rs. 200/- per month. Undoubtedly, the claimants could not produce any satisfactory evidence to prove their contention in the claim applications that the deceased was earning about Rs. 3,000/- per month at the time of the tragic accident it was the case of the claimants in their evidence that the deceased was settled in Canada and was employed there, and further that he had come to India only a short while prior to the occurrence and that the marriage with Jagdish Kaur, claimant, had been solemnized only about a month before the occurrence and that the deceased alongwith his wife was intending to go back to Canada. The document, Exhibit A.W 6/1 along with a letter purporting to have been received by Jagdish Kaur from the British Columbia Forest Products Limited, Canada, renders no assistance to the contention of the claimants regarding the income of the deceased. Their perusal only shows that the deceased prior to his return to India was in Canada and was employed with the said Company, but before coming to India had left the service and had no claims left with his employer regarding the benefits relating to the insurance policy or salary etc. The Tribunal correctly opined that there was no evidence to prove that the deceased was gainfully, employed showing his exact monthly income. However, the conclusion was reached on the basis of unrebutted evidence on record that the deceased had passed matriculation examination, was an able bodied person, and was a tall young man five feet and ten inches, as opined by Dr. Miss Indira Khosla, R.W 4, who performed the autopsy on his dead body. His age was also approximately determined to be about 24 years by the doctor. Keeping in view these undisputed facts, the Tribunal concluded that the income of the deceased could be reasonably determined as Rs. 200/- per month. It is settled principle of law that even in those cases where the deceased is not proved to be actually earning any income prospective loss can and should be determined taking into consideration the possible earning capacity of the deceased. Reference may be made to Shiv Parsad Gupta v. S.M Zaidi . 1967 A.C.J 321., in India, a healthy youngman with matriculation as his qualification who had there source fullness to go to Canada and settle there for some time can be reasonably and justifiably expected to earn not less than Rs. 300/- a month and with experience and passage of time, he is expected to improve his earning. Thus, in my opinion, the determination of the monthly income Rs. 200/- by the deceased as held by the Tribunal was rather on the low side. If the deceased and his mother were not confident of the chances of his earning so much, the deceased was not likely to have gone in for marriage. Out of this income, he was expected to spend Rs. 50/- on the maintenance of his widowed mother though she had other three sons who were settled abroad and were expected to make their contribution towards her maintenance expenses. Out of the remaining Rs. 250/- per month, the deceased could be reasonably expected to spend 50 per cent amount on his wife. The average life expectancy in India being 70 years and Jagdish Kaur, claimant, being younger than the deceased, she would be getting Rs. 125/- per month for her maintenance from her husband for at least 40 years. On this basis, she would be entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 60,000/-. The Tribunal, after assessing the compensation due to Jagdish Kaur, claimant, at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month for about 47 or 48 years, and after making deduction at 33.3 per cent on account of lumpsum payment, assessed the total compensation at Rs. 25,000/-. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi . 1972 A.C.J 334., that no deduction on account of lumpsum payment should be allowed in cases where the prospects of the deceased improving his earning were not taken into account. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the Municipal Committee, that though it was not established that Jagdish Kaur, claimant, had contracted a second marriage after the death of Swaran Singh, it was very likely in view of the young age of the claimant and there being no child born out of the wedlock, that she will contract a second marriage and after her remarriage, she will cease to be dependent on the deceased and will not be entitled to any compensation. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the Municipal Committee and to deny proper compensation to the claimant on the speculative plea that she was likely to contract a second marriage. However, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that it will meet the ends of justice to award Rs. 40,000/- as compensation to Jagdish Kaur, claimant.

8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the claimant that so far not a single paise out of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal has been paid by the Committee or the driver of the truck though the same was awarded on August 22, 1972 and recovery had not been stayed by this Court. Keeping in view this non-Co-operative and defiant attitude of the Committee and the driver of the truck, it was emphasised that some reasonable interest as envisaged under section 110-CC should be awarded to the claimant so that her interests may be protected. This request appears to be quite reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances of this case. It is therefore, ordered that the claimant, Jagdish Kaur, will be entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount awarded by this order from the date of the award by the Tribunal till payment.

9. For the reasons mentioned above, the two appeals. F.A.Os Nos. 24 and 43 of 1973 filed by the Municipal Committee are dismissed with costs and F.A.O No. 70 of 1973 filed by Shrimati Jagdish Kaur is allowed with costs and the award of the Tribunal dated August 22, 1972, is modified to the extent that Jagdish Kaur, appellant, would be entitled to the compensation of Rs. 40,000/-. It is further ordered, as stated above, that the Municipal Committee and Bachan, respondent, driver of the truck, would be liable to pay interest to the claimaint at six per cent per annum from the date of the award of the Tribunal till the date of the payment.

10. Appeal dismissed.