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Balwant Singh v. District Food & Supplies Controller
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a Criminal Miscellaneous application seeking quashing of First Information Report No. 225/74 dated 27 April 1974, lodged by the Food and Supplies Controller, Amritsar. The ground asserted was that the facts stated in the F.I.R. do not disclose any offence, and therefore the F.I.R. should be quashed under the High Court's inherent powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The F.I.R. alleged that a permit (No. 374/386 dated 15 March 1974) was issued in favour of an Executive Engineer for supply of bricks. The Executive Engineer informed the Controller that the brick-kiln owner (petitioner) had refused to supply bricks. Inspectors and an overseer went to the kiln but found nobody; a person described as a partner refused to supply bricks at his house. The refusal was said to violate clauses 9, 10 and 11 of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supply Order, 1972, and the F.I.R. requested registration of a case and necessary action.
The petitioner's counsel relied on a Division Bench decision in Chhaju Ram Babu Ram v. State of Punjab (Civil Writ No. 1474 of 1972) to argue that issuance of permits to Government departments under clause (9) was beyond the Director's or District Magistrate's jurisdiction and therefore refusal to supply against such permit did not constitute an offence. Counsel for the State relied on a Division Bench decision in Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri v. The State of Haryana to argue that the High Court should not exercise its inherent power to quash an F.I.R. where investigation is permissible.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the facts alleged in F.I.R. No. 225/74 (dated 27 April 1974) disclose any offence under the Punjab Control of Bricks Supplies Order, 1972 (specifically clauses 9, 10 and 11).
- Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash an F.I.R. that, on its face, does not disclose any offence.
- Whether the Division Bench decision in Chhaju Ram Babu Ram v. State of Punjab precludes treating refusal to supply bricks to a Government Department pursuant to the permits complained of as an offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Relying on the Division Bench decision in Chhaju Ram Babu Ram v. State of Punjab (CW 1474 of 1972, decided 14 December 1973), counsel for the petitioner argued that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Director, Food and Supplies, or the District Magistrate to issue permits to Government Departments and Semi-Government Organisations for bricks under clause (9) of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supplies Order, 1972.
- Therefore, the petitioner (brick-kiln owner) was entitled to refuse supply against the permit referred to in the F.I.R., and that refusal did not constitute an offence under the cited Order.
State's Arguments
- Counsel for the State conceded the petitioner’s reliance on the Division Bench decision but argued that even if the F.I.R. did not disclose an offence, the High Court would not be competent to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. in the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner.
- For this submission, the State relied on the Division Bench decision in Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri v. The State of Haryana (I.L.R. 1971 2 Pb & Hary 533), which dealt with limits on the High Court's interference in police investigations.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chhaju Ram Babu Ram v. State of Punjab (Civil Writ No. 1474 of 1972; decided 14 December 1973) | The Government order directing brick-kiln owners to sell bricks to Government/Semi-Government Departments at a fixed price was held illegal because no authority for such monopsony procurement exists under the Punjab Control Order, 1972 or the East Punjab Act, No. 1 of 1949. | The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to conclude that the brick-kiln owner was within his rights to refuse to supply bricks to a Government Department against the permit; therefore the facts in the F.I.R., even if accepted as true, did not disclose any offence. |
| Ramrichpal Agarwalla v. The State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 257) | It was held that the Government has no power to order a stock-holder under section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 to sell to Government or its officers acting as agents of Government; the section permits directing sale to 'such person or class of persons' but does not treat the State/Government as such a 'person'. | Quoted in the Division Bench reasoning (Chhaju Ram) to support the proposition that Government lacks power to compel sale to itself; used indirectly by the Court to underpin the conclusion that the permit-based supply obligation was not legally enforceable against the petitioner. |
| Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri v. The State of Haryana (I.L.R. 1971 2 Pb & Hary 533) | Explored the scope of High Court interference in police investigations; affirmed that courts should not interfere with investigations which are in accordance with law and that the power to investigate vests exclusively in police/investigating agency subject to legal compliance. | The State relied on this decision to argue against quashing the F.I.R. The Court in the present case limited its ratio, holding it applicable to preventing interference with lawful investigations but not to cases where an F.I.R. discloses no offence at all. |
| Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (Emperor) v. Nazir Ahmad (AIR 1945 PC 18) | The Privy Council observed that if no cognizable offence is disclosed (and especially if no offence of any kind is disclosed), the police would have no authority to undertake investigation. | The Court quoted this authority to support the proposition that where an F.I.R. discloses no offence, continued investigation is not authorized and the High Court may intervene to prevent harassment. |
| M.M.S.T. Chidambaram Chettiar v. Shanmugham Pillai (referenced) | Referenced as an instance in which Newsam, J. may have correctly decided that no investigation should proceed if no cognizable offence is disclosed. | Quoted in the course of citing Privy Council observations; used illustratively to support the view that police have no authority to investigate where no cognizable offence is disclosed. |
| State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak (AIR 1963 SC 447) | The Supreme Court approved Privy Council observations and explained that recording an F.I.R. is not a condition precedent to criminal investigation; police may investigate on their own knowledge or credible intelligence under section 157 Cr.P.C. | The Court relied on S.N. Basak to distinguish between (a) the High Court's limited role in restraining lawful investigations and (b) the High Court's power under section 482 to quash an F.I.R. that discloses no offence, emphasizing that S.N. Basak does not preclude quashing where no offence is disclosed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two principal stages: (1) assess whether the facts in the F.I.R. disclose an offence; and (2) consider whether the High Court can quash the F.I.R. under section 482 Cr.P.C.
On the first issue, the Court examined the Division Bench decision in Chhaju Ram Babu Ram (cited by petitioner's counsel). That decision held that an order requiring brick-kiln owners to sell bricks to Government and Semi-Government Departments at a fixed price amounted to monopoly procurement without legal authority under the Punjab Control Order, 1972 or the East Punjab Act, 1949, and was therefore illegal. The Court accepted the legal conclusion in Chhaju Ram that a brick-kiln owner could lawfully refuse to supply bricks to a Government Department pursuant to the permits complained of. Applying that precedent to the facts of the F.I.R., the Court concluded that the petitioner's refusal to supply, even if the factual allegations were accepted, did not amount to breach of clauses (9), (10) or (11) of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supplies Order, 1972, and therefore the F.I.R. did not disclose any cognizable or non-cognizable offence.
On the second issue—whether the Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 to quash—the Court first set out the text of section 482 (that the High Court's inherent powers are exercisable to give effect to orders under the Code, prevent abuse of process, or secure the ends of justice). The Court then engaged with the State's reliance on Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri, where a Division Bench had emphasized that the police's power of investigation should not be interfered with by the courts so long as the investigation is in accordance with law.
The present Court distinguished Saral Beopar as authority limited to the proposition that courts should not stop police investigations that are lawful and properly conducted. It noted that Saral Beopar did not decide that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to quash an F.I.R. where the F.I.R. discloses no offence at all. The Court referred to Privy Council observations in Khawaja Nazir Ahmad and to the Supreme Court decision in State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak to show that there is judicial precedent for the proposition that if no cognizable offence is disclosed (and particularly if no offence of any kind is disclosed), the police have no authority to investigate and court intervention is appropriate.
The Court emphasized the phrase "in the interest of justice" in section 482 and concluded that where an F.I.R. does not disclose any offence, allowing investigation to continue would amount to harassment of a citizen and would not be in the interest of justice. Therefore, the inherent power of the High Court under section 482 is available to quash such an F.I.R.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition was allowed and the F.I.R. in question was quashed. The core ruling is stated as:
F.I.R. No. 225/74 dated 27th April, 1974 is quashed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The criminal proceedings initiated by the lodging of the F.I.R. were terminated by quashing the F.I.R.; the petitioner (brick-kiln owner) will not be subject to investigation or prosecution on the basis of that F.I.R.
- Broader implications: The Court applied existing authorities (including Chhaju Ram Babu Ram, Khawaja Nazir Ahmad and S.N. Basak) to hold that the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 to quash an F.I.R. which, on its face, discloses no offence, because permitting investigation to proceed in such circumstances would be contrary to the interest of justice. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new principle beyond the application of these precedents in the facts of this case.
Order: "Petition allowed." (Final line of the opinion.)
D.S Tewatia, J.:— The petitioner through the present Criminal miscellaneous application seeks to have the First Information Report No. 225/74, dated 27th April, 1974 lodged by the Food and Supplies Controller, Amritsar, quashed in exercise of inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the facts stated therein do not disclose any offence including the one alleged. The said F.I.R is in the following terms:
“A permit was issued in favour of the Executive Engineer vide permit No. 374/386, dated 15th March, 1974 in favour of Shri Balwant Singh. Brick-kiln owner, Hamidpura. The Executive Engineer vide his letter No. 172 dated 15th March, 1973 informed us that the brick-kiln Owner refused to supply him the bricks. After this, Inspector Food and Supplies, Shri R.K Goel, along with Shri Gurcharan Singh, Overseer went to the kiln. Nobody was present there. Shri Netter Pal, who is told to be a partner of kiln, refused to supply the bricks when they went to his house. The brick-kiln owner has violated clauses 9, 10 and 11 of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supply Order, 1972. A copy of the directions were sent to the Superintendent of Police vide Memo No. 72/30092, dated 15th May, 1972 issued under the Punjab Control of Bricks Supply Order, 1972, issued under section 3 of the East Punjab Control of Bricks Supply Order, 1949.
It is requested that a case be registered and necessary action taken.
Today 26th April, 1974 vide D.S.P Letter No. 74/1254, dated 22nd March, 1974 a case is being registered and papers be sent under section 3 of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supply Order, 1949.”
2. Mr. Bhal Singh Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in Civil Writ No. 1474 of 1972 (Chhaju Ram Babu Ram v. State of Punjab . CW 1474 of 1972., decided on 14th December, 1973, has argued that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Director, Food and Supplies, or the District Magistrate to issue permits to the Government Departments and Semi-Government Organisations for bricks under clause (9) of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supplies Order, 1972, and hence the petitioner by refusing to supply bricks against the permit referred to in the F.I.R did not commit any offence, as alleged. Mr. T.N Bhalla, learned counsel for the State, on the other hand argued that if for a moment it is conceded that the facts stated in the F.I.R did not disclose any offence, even then the High Court would not be competent to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R and for his submission abovesaid, he drew sustenance from a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri v. The State of Haryana . I.L.R 1971 2 Pb & Hary 533.
3. Before dealing with the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is in the first instance necessary to see as to whether the applicant has made out a case to the effect that the facts stated in the F.I.R do not disclose any offence.
4. In order to find out the truth of the said allegation, a reference to the Division Bench decision relied on by him becomes immediately necessary. That was a case in which the Brick-kiln Owners in a body challenged an executive order of the Director, Food and Supplies, issued under clause (11) of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supplies Order, 1972, whereby the brick-kiln owners had been directed to supply bricks to the Government against the permits assured by the Director, Food and Supplies, or the District Magistrate at a fixed price. That Order was struck down by this Court with the following observations:
“However, the order of the Government that the petitioners and other should sell bricks to the Government/Semi-Government Departments on payment of fixed price of Rs. 51-50 per thousand bricks tantamount to monoply procurement without any authority of law as no such right has been conferred on the Government by the Punjab Control Order, 1972, or East Punjab Act, No. 1 of 1949. Therefore, this order of the Government requiring the petitioners of all these writ petitions to sell bricks manufactured out of sponsored coal to Government Departments and Semi-Government Organisations against permits at fixed price is illegal. In Ramrichpal Agarwalla v. The State of West Bengal . A.I.R 1958 Cal. 257., it was held that Government has no power under the law as it stands to order a stock-holder under section 3(2)(f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to sell to Government or its officers acting as agents of Government. The section gives power to the Central Government or its delegate to require a stock-holder to sell its stock ‘to such person or class of persons’ specified by them in that Order and that the State or the Government carrying on its ordinary governmental functions cannot be a ‘person’ and, therefore, unless the section is amended so as to give power to order sale to person or persons including the Government itself a sale to the Government cannot be ordered. This order, which is beyond the powers conferred on the Government is illegal.
For the above reasons we hold that the Order issued by the Government that bricks manufactured by the petitioners out of the sponsored coal to Government Departments and Semi-Government Departments and Organisations against permits at fixed price is illegal and invalid and the same is struck down… … … … …”
5. A perusal of the contents of the F.I.R reveals that it is the refusal of the petitioner brick-kiln owner to supply bricks to the Executive Engineer against permit No. 374/386 dated the 15th March, 1974 that is said to have resulted in violation of clauses (9), (10) and (11) of the Punjab Control of Bricks Supplies Order, 1972. In the light of the Division Bench decision noticed above (Chhaju Ram Babu Ram case-Supra), the brick-kiln owner was well within his right to refuse to supply brick to a Government Department against the permit so issued. That being so and that being the law, his refusal to supply bricks in the case in question does not violate the three relevant clauses of the Punjab Control of Brinks Supplies Order, 1972, and thus even if all the facts stated in the said F.I.R are taken to be correct, these do not disclose any offence, cognizable or non-cognizable.
6. Now the question arises as to whether the High Court would be competent to quash the F.I.R in the exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. Before proceeding with the consideration of the above question, provisions of section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, may be noticed. These are:
“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
8. In Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of the above provision when the petitioner before it sought an injunction against the police to investigate a criminal case against him on the ground that the contents of the F.I.R did not disclose any cognizable offence and hence the police authorities had no power to investigate the case. Gurdev Singh, J., speaking for the Court after an exhaustive review of decided cases of the High Courts, Privy Council and the Supreme Court concluded thus:
“There can, however, be no doubt that, as ruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and earlier by the Privy Council in Khawaja Nazir Ahmad's case (Emperor) v. Nazir Ahmad . AIR 1945 PC 18., the power of investigation so far as it vests exclusively in the police or investigating agency is not to be interfered with by the Courts, and investigating agency should be left to carry on investigation without any interference. This, however, clearly postulates that the investigation so long as it is in accordance with the provisions of law cannot be interfered with and it does not give immunity to investigation which is not in consonance with the relevant provisions of law governing the particular case or is in breach of them.”
9. The ratio of the abovesaid decision of this Court, I am afraid, cannot be stretched to cover cases where the contents of the F.I.R do not disclose any offence whatsoever. The inherent power of the Court no doubt has to be exercised very sparingly, but no decision has been cited in which it has been expressly held that even whore the F.I.R does not disclose any offence whatsoever, this Court would have no jurisdiction to quash it being patently in the interest of justice despite the said course. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Khawaja Nazir Ahmad's case (supra), in fact, had clearly observed to the following effect—
“No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and for this reason Newsam, J. may well have decided rightly in M.M.S.T Chidambaram Chettiar v. Shamngham Pillai,5.
10. These observations had been quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State Of West Bengal v. S.N Basak. . AIR 1963 SC 447.. The Division Bench decision relied on by the learned counsel for the State, in my opinion, is an authority only for the limited pro position as to whether it is open to the Court in exercise of its inherent powers to stop the police from investigating a case registered with it if the investigation had been carried on in accordance with law, although on the face of it the F.I.R did not seem to disclose a cognizable offence. It was mooted, and rightly so, that sometimes for the investigation it was not necessary that there even be a formal F.I.R In this regard the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.N Basak's case (supra) noticed by Gurdev Singh, J., in Saral Beopar Association Limited, Jagadhri's case (supra) are very apt and, if I may say so, bring out clearly the distinction between the proposition, i.e, one dealing with the powers of the High Court to the wart the investigation of a case simplicitor and the other with the power of the High Court to quash the F.I.R which discloses no offence whatsoever:
“But in any case the receipt and recording of an information report is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. No doubt in the great majority of cases criminal prosecution are undertaken as a result of information received and recorded in this way but their Lordships see no reason why the police, if in possession through their own knowledge or by means of credible through informal intelligence which genuinely leads them to the belief that a cognizable offence has been committed, should not of their own motion undertake an investigation into the truth of the matters alleged. Section 157, Criminal Procedure Code, when directing that a police officer, who has reason to suspect from information or otherwise that an offence which he is empowered to investigate under section 156 has been committed shall proceed to investigate the facts and circumstances, supports this view. In truth the provisions as to an information report (commonly called a first information report) are enacted for other reasons. Its object is to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, to record the circumstances before their is time for them to be forgotten or embellished, and it has to be remembered that the report can be put in evidence when the informant is examined if it is desired to do so.”
11. The expression “in the interest of justice” used in section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, would call for the interference of the High Court in the interest of justice even at the stage where only an F.I.R is lodged with the police, if the F.I.R does not disclose any offence whatsoever. For in a matter where the F.I.R does not disclose any offence, cognizable or non-cognizable, then allowing the investigating agency to continue with the investigation and harrass a citizen would certainly not be in the interest of justice. Against this kind of harassment of a citizen, the Court must exercise its inherent power whenever its assistance is sought by a citizen.
12. For the reasons stated, I accept this petition and quash the F.I.R in question.
13. Petition allowed.
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