- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Daman Anand And Another v. Hira Lal And Others
Case Summary — Extracted from the Provided Opinion (R.N. Mittal, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs instituted a suit for rendition of accounts of a partnership said to arise under a partnership deed dated January 4, 1963. The defendants (through defendant No. 1) filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking a stay of the court proceedings on the ground that the partnership deed contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes between partners to be referred to arbitration, and that the defendants were ready and willing to take steps necessary for arbitration.
The plaintiffs contested that application, alleging (inter alia) that there was no such arbitration agreement, that the defendants had taken steps in the court proceedings (thus waiving arbitration), that the defendants had not disclosed the dispute sought to be referred to arbitration in their application, and that the defendants were not ready and willing to refer the matter to arbitration.
The trial Court (Senior Subordinate Judge, Kapurthala) framed the issue whether the suit was liable to be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and decided that issue in favour of the defendants, staying the suit and directing referral to arbitration. The plaintiffs appealed to the present Court. The appellate judgment is delivered by R.N. Mittal, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit is liable to be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (this was the issue framed by the trial Court).
- Whether the defendants had taken steps in the court proceedings (such as actions amounting to participation in or contribution to the progress of the suit) that would preclude them from invoking the arbitration clause under section 34.
- Whether the application under section 34 was defective or liable to be dismissed because it did not specify the dispute to be referred to arbitration (i.e., whether it was necessary to state the nature of the dispute in the s.34 application and, if so, whether failure to do so is fatal).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments
- The defendants had taken steps in the court proceedings (relying on the record of adjournments and appearances), and such steps amounted to participation in and progress of the suit; therefore they could not seek a stay under section 34.
- The defendants did not disclose in their s.34 application the dispute sought to be referred to arbitration; under the law it was necessary to state such dispute in the application, and the omission made the application liable to dismissal.
- The defendants were not ready and willing to refer the matter to arbitration (this contention was pleaded in the plaint and in reply to the s.34 application).
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The partnership deed (dated January 4, 1963) contained an arbitration clause; defendants were willing and ready to take all steps necessary for proper conduct of arbitration.
- The institution of the suit itself evidenced that a dispute existed between the parties, so specifying the dispute in the s.34 application was not essential; there was no sufficient ground to interfere with the trial Court's discretionary stay under s.34.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Daulat Ram Rala Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 Punj. 19 | The true test for determining whether an act is "a step in the proceedings" is whether the act displays an unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit and to give up the right to have the matter disposed of by arbitration. | The Court adopted this test to conclude that requesting an adjournment for compromise does not, by itself, show that the defendants gave up the right to arbitration. |
| The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra, 1973 2 SCC 96 | Taking steps in suit proceedings connotes doing something in aid of the progress of the suit or submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court for adjudication of the merits of the controversy. | The Court relied on this ratio to hold that the adjournment/compromise requests did not constitute steps in the progress of the suit which would bar arbitration. |
| Amarjit Singh v. Shrimati Saroj Malik, 1971 CLJ 637 | In that case a request by defendants' counsel for adjournment to file a written statement was treated as a step in aid of the proceedings; the judgment observed there is no exact definition of "a step" and that it depends on circumstances. | The present Court distinguished this case and held that the appellants could not derive benefit from it on the facts before this Court. |
| Ladha Singh Bedi v. Raja Sree Sree Jyoti Prasad Singha Deo Bahadur, AIR 1949 Cal 105 | An arbitration presupposes a dispute; if there is no dispute or difference there is no occasion for arbitration and a pending suit should not be stayed. | The Court invoked this principle to emphasise that a s.34 application must show the existence of a dispute; absence of such a showing is a reason to refuse a stay. |
| Chiranjiv Lal v. The Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1952 Punj 63 | Where there was no point of difference before the filing of the suit, there is nothing to refer to arbitration. | The Court followed this approach in concluding that if no dispute existed prior to suit (or was not shown), a stay is inappropriate. |
| Bharat Construction Company Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1954 Cal 606 | An application under section 34 should make out that (a) a dispute, as understood in arbitration law, had arisen before the institution of the suit or before filing the application, (b) such dispute is the subject-matter of the suit, and (c) the dispute falls within the arbitration clause. | The Court applied this formulation to hold that the defendant's s.34 application failed because it did not state the disputes between the parties. |
| Dwarka Nath Kapur v. Rameshwar Nath, 1966 PLR 91 DS | Where the dispute between parties was not mentioned in the s.34 application and there was no point of difference before the filing of the suit, the court proceedings could not be stayed. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that failure to state the dispute in the s.34 application precluded a stay of the suit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two analytical strands corresponding to the two principal contentions raised by the appellants:
-
Whether defendants had taken steps in the proceedings so as to forfeit the right to arbitration
The Court examined the chronology and the orders recorded on the cause list: the suit was registered on April 29, 1970; service issues persisted; on several dates (July 25, August 29, October 21, November 16, December 24 and January 1) the matter was adjourned. The October 21 and December 24 orders showed the case adjourned for filing written statement, but those orders did not record any request by the defendants' counsel for such an adjournment. The Court reasoned that where an adjournment is granted by the Court without a request by the defendant's counsel, that fact cannot be treated as a "step" taken by the defendants in the proceedings. It adopted the test from Daulat Ram Rala Ram (whether the act displays an unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit and give up the right to arbitration) and the ratio in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran (that steps mean doing something to aid the progress of the suit or submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court). Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the adjournments (including a request for adjournment to effect compromise on November 16) did not show that defendants had abandoned their right to arbitration. The Court rejected the appellants' submission that the defendants' conduct amounted to steps in the proceedings.
-
Whether the s.34 application was defective for failing to state the dispute
The Court turned to the contents of the s.34 application filed by defendant No. 1. That application stated that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for accounts based on the partnership deed (dated January 4, 1963) and that the deed provided for arbitration of disputes between partners; it also stated that the applicant was willing to proceed with arbitration. However, the Court observed the application did not describe the actual differences or disputes sought to be referred to arbitration. The Court relied on the authorities (Ladha Singh Bedi; Chiranjiv Lal; Bharat Construction Co.; and Dwarka Nath Kapur) which require that an application under section 34 should show that a dispute existed before the suit or before the filing of the application, that the dispute is the subject of the suit, and that it falls within the arbitration clause. Applying those precedents, the Court concluded that defendant No. 1's failure to state the differences between the parties in the s.34 application was fatal: there was no adequate indication that a dispute (as legally understood) existed prior to the suit and was within the arbitration clause. Consequently, the Court held that the trial Court's finding that the dispute existed and should be referred to arbitration was erroneous.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis the Court accepted the appeal from the plaintiffs, set aside the judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge (which had stayed the suit and directed arbitration), and dismissed the application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Court also recorded that, in the circumstances, it made no order as to costs.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appellate Court accepted the appeal, set aside the trial Court's judgment that had stayed the suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and dismissed the application under section 34 of the Act.
Implications (direct effects recorded in the opinion):
- The trial Court's order staying the proceedings and directing reference to arbitration was set aside by the appellate Court.
- The defendants' application under section 34 (to stay proceedings in favour of arbitration) was dismissed for failure to show the requisite dispute in the application.
- The Court made no order as to costs.
Additional textual note: the opinion's last line reproduces the phrase "Appeal dismissed." in the published text. The operative paragraphs of the opinion state that the appeal is accepted, the trial Court's judgment is set aside and the s.34 application is dismissed; the summary above follows those operative statements as the dispositive outcome set out in the opinion.
R.N Mittal, J.:— This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Kapurthala, dated March 1, 1971, by the plaintiff.
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that a suit was instituted by the plaintiffs for rendition of accounts of the partnership between the parties. The defendants filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for staying the proceedings on the ground that according to the deed of partnership, dated January 4, 1963, it had been agreed between the parties that all disputes between the pincers were to be referred to the Arbitrator. It was further stated that the defendants were willing at the time of the institution of the suit and continued to be so to do all things necessary for proper conduct of the arbitration proceedings. The application was contested by the plaintiffs. inter alia they pleaded that there was no such agreement, that the defendants had taken steps in the proceedings and that the defendants had not disclosed in the application the dispute sought to be referred to the arbitration. It was further seated that the defendants were not ready and willing to refer the matter to the arbitration. The trial Court framed the following issue:—
(1) Whether the suit is liable to stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
3. The trial Court decided the issue in favour of the defendants and stayed the proceedings in the suit. It directed the parties to get the dispute between them referred to arbitration in accordance with the terms of partnership deed, dated January 4, 1963. The plaintiffs having felt aggrieved from the judgment of the trial Court have come up in appeal to this Court. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the defendants had taken steps in the proceedings and, therefore, the matter could not be referred to the arbitration under section 34 of the Act. In order to substantiate the contention the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the orders of the Court passed on various dates.
4. The suit was registered on April 29, 1970. The service could not be effected on the defendant except defendant No. 1 till July 25, 1970. On that date, counsel for defendant No. 1 appeared and the Court ordered that the service on the other defendants be effected for August 29, 1970. On August 29, 1970, it was ordered that the other defendants had not been served and fresh notices be issued for October 21, 1970. On October 21, 1970, the defendants were served except Chaman Lal. The counsel, however, appeared on behalf of all the defendants, and the case was adjourned to November 16, 1970, for written statement. The order of the Court dated October 21, 1970, is as follows:—
“Present: Counsel for the parties.
For written statement to come up on November 16, 1970.”
5. On November 16, 1970, the parties requested the Court for adjourning the case for compromise. The Court passed the following order on that date:—
“Present: Counsel for the parties.
Counsel for the parties request for adjourment for effecting compromise. The parties to attend on December 24, 1970.”
6. On December 24, 1970, the Court passed the following order:—
“Present: Counsel for the parties.
Compromise not effected. For written statement to come up on January 1, 1971.”
7. From the perusal of the aforesaid orders, it is clear that the counsel for the defendants never requested for an adjournment for filing the written statement. It was the Court who adjourned the case for filing the written statement. From the orders, dated October 21, 1970, and December 24, 1970, it cannot be assumed that the case was adjourned for filing the written statement on the request of the counsel for the defendants.
8. Mr. Bhagirath Dass has very vehemently urged that from the aforesaid orders no other inference can be drawn except that the case was adjourned for written statement on the request of the counsel for the defendants and that it was a step in aid of the proceedings. I regret my inability to subscribe to the views of the learned counsel for the appellants. In case an adjournment had been granted on the request of the counsel for the defendants, it would have been stated so in the order. If an adjournment is granted by the Court for written statement without any request by the counsel for the defendants, it cannot be said that the defendants cannot file an application under section 34 of the Act on the adjourned date. It is only when some step has been taken by the defendants in any legal proceedings from which it appears that they have participated in the proceedings or contributed to their progress that it can be inferred that they had given up their right to file an application under section 34 of the Act.
9. The learned counsel for the appellants has further urged that both the parties requested for an adjournment on November 16, 1970 for effecting a compromise. He also contends that seeking an adjournment for compromise is a step in aid of the proceedings. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. It has been observed in Daulat Ram Rala Ram v. State of Punjab . AIR 1958 Punj. 19., that the true test for determining whether an act is a step in the proceedings is not so much the question as to whether, it is an application but whether the act displays an unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit and to give up the right to have the matter disposed of by arbitration. I am respectfully in agreement with the aforesaid observations of the learned Judge of this Court. Merely requesting for an adjournment to effect compromise does not show that the defendants gave up their right to have the matter disposed of by the arbitration. It has not been disputed that an arbitration clause existed in the partnership deed. The step which is contemplated by section 34 of the Act is soms effective step towards the progress of the suit. A request for adjournment for compromise cannot be held to be a step in the progress of the suit or submission to the jurisdiction of the Court. It has been observed in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra . 1973 2 SCC 96, that taking steps in the suit proceedings connotes the idea of doing something in aid of the progress of the suit or submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. If the aforesaid ratio of Hon'ble the Supreme Court is applied to the present case, it will be seen that the said request does not debar the defendants from filing an application under section 34 of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Amarjit Singh v. Shrimati Saroj Malik . 1971 CLJ 637.. In that case, a request was made by the counsel for the defendants that the case be adjourned for filing a written statement in the suit. The learned Judge observed that it was a step in aid of the execution. It was also observed therein that it was not possible to give an exact definition of what is meant by “a step in the proceedings in the suit” in section 34 of the Act. It was further observed that it would depend upon the circumstances of each case. In my view, the appellants cannot derive any benefit from that case. For the reasons recorded above, I do not find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants and reject the same.
10. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that in the application under section 34 of the Act, the dispute between the parties had not been mentioned and it was necessary under the law to have stated such a dispute in the application. In the circumstances, he submits that the application was liable to be dismissed on this ground. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents states that the filing of the suit itself shows that a dispute exists inter se the parties and it does not make any difference whether it is stated in the application or not. He therefore, urges that there is no sufficient ground for interfering with the order of the Court by which the trial Court in its discretion stayed the proceedings under section 34 of the Act. I have heard the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties. In the application under section 34 of the Act, filed by defendant No. 1, it is stated that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for accounts on the basis of deed of partnership dated January 4, 1963, according to which it was agreed between the parties that if there was any dispute inter se the members of the partnership qua the partnership, that would be decided by Arbitrator and not through civil Courts. The applicant was willing at the time of the suit and subsequently was also ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration. He, therefore, prayed that the proceedings be stayed. The application has been filed only by defendant No. 1. In reply to the application, inter alia it was pleaded that the defendants having failed to disclose in the application the dispute sought to be referred to the arbitration which was necessary under the law to have been stated in the application, the application was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. Thereafter, no application was filed to amend the application under section 34 of the Act and incorporate therein the disputes existing between the parties. In the plaint, it has been stated that due to the sad demise of Shri Tek Chand, plaintiffs had been left unaided and the Firm had been dissolved by operation of law. Defendants 1 to 5 were in possession of the books of account, records material and other assets. Therefore, the plaintiffs prayed that a decree for rendition of accounts of the partnerships named and styled as detailed in paragraph 3 of the plaint, be passed in favour of the plaintiffs, the partnership agreements have not been denied by the defendants. The defendants examined D.W 1 Rattan Chand who deposed that he was the marginal witness of the partnership deed dated January 4, 1963. The contents of the partnership deed were read out to the partners who after admitting the same as correct signed it. He also did not mention the dispute between the parties. It was necessary for the defendants to have mentioned the disputes in the application under section 34 of the Act as the existence of dispute is a condition precedent for referring the matter to the Arbitrator. It has been held in Ladha Singh Bedi v. Raja Sree Sree Jyoti Prasad Singha Deo Bahadur . AIR 1949 Cal 105. that an arbitration presupposes a dispute or difference between the parties and if there is no dispute or difference there is no occasion for an arbitration and a pending suit between the parties ought not to be stayed in such a case. If there is no indication that there was any dispute or difference before suit or in other words where the plaintiff is not aware before the institution of the suit, that there is a difference between him and the defendant or of nature of the difference, he cannot be said to have gone back upon his agreement to refer to arbitration, or was attempting to go back upon it, by rushing to Court. It was further held by the learned Division Bench that the Court under those circumstances would be justified in the exercise of its discretion in refusing to stay the suit. The aforesaid observations of the Division Bench were followed by Kapur J. (as he then was) in Cniranjiv Lal v. The Tropical Insurance Co. Ltd. . AIR 39 1952 Punj 63., in which it was observed that where there was no point of difference before the filing of the suit, there was nothing to refer to arbitration. In a later Division Bench case Bharat Construction Company Limited v. Union of India . AIR 1954 Cal 606. similar view was again expressed by the Calcutta High Court. It was observed by the learned Bench that an application under section 34 should make out that a dispute, as understood in the law of arbitration, had arisen before the institution of the suit or before the filing of the application, that such dispute was the subject-matter of the suit and that the dispute was within the arbitration clause of the contract. Again a similar matter came up before the Circuit Bench of this Court at Delhi in Dwarka Nath Kapur v. Rameshwar Nath . 1966 PLR 91 DS.. Grover J. (as he then was) observed that where the dispute between the parties was not mentioned in the application under section 34 of the Act, there being no point of difference on which any reference could be made to arbitration before the filing of the suit, the proceedings in Court could not be stayed. The ratio in the aforementioned cases applies to the present case. Defendant No. 1 failed to state the differences between the parties in the application filed by him under section 34 of the Act, which he ought to have done. In the circumstances, the proceedings could not be referred to the Arbitrator. The trial Court has erroneously held that the dispute exists between the parties under the agreement which for its resolution require reference to the arbitration. In my view, the approach of the learned trial Court was erroneous. I, therefore, upset the finding of the trial Court.
11. For the reasons recorded above, I accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge and dismiss the application under section 34 of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
12. Appeal dismissed.
Alert