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Mukhtiar Singh And Others v. The State Of Punjab And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, issued an order dated August 12, 1966 (Annexure 'B') in favour of the appellants. On March 22, 1967 the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Chandigarh (Shri Ajit Singh) passed an order (Annexure 'C') at the instance of Sardara Singh (respondent No. 2) setting aside the Assistant Director's earlier order. The Additional Director's order was passed without giving notice to the appellants or affording them an opportunity to be heard.
The appellants challenged the Additional Director's order in Civil Writ 1431 of 1967 on the ground that the Additional Director had no jurisdiction to pass an order to their prejudice without issuing notice and affording a hearing. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated July 19, 1968, on the sole ground that, although the Additional Director had acted without notice and hearing, no injustice (or manifest injustice) had been caused to the appellants.
The appellants appealed by letters patent. Mr. S.P. Goyal, for the appellants, argued that the Additional Director's order violated the mandatory proviso to section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 50 of 1948, and was therefore liable to be quashed ex debito justitiae.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Additional Director had jurisdiction under section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings Act to vary or set aside the Assistant Director's order without giving the parties interested notice to appear and an opportunity to be heard, in the absence of any satisfaction by the State Government that the proceedings were vitiated by unlawful consideration.
- Whether an order passed in breach of the proviso to section 42, i.e., without notice and an opportunity of being heard, necessarily results in injustice warranting quashing of the order by the High Court under its supervisory jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The learned Single Judge erred in finding that no injustice was caused by the Additional Director's order; the order violated the mandatory proviso to section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings Act and therefore should be quashed ex debito justitiae.
This opinion does not contain a detailed account of any arguments advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 or the State Government.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Joginder Singh v. The Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property, Mussoorie, Civil Appeal No. 457 of 1958, decided on March 26, 1962 | The principle that where an inferior tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction its action necessarily results in injustice to the affected party, and that the High Court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in such cases. | The court relied on this authority to conclude that the Additional Director's order—having been passed without complying with the proviso to section 42 and hence beyond jurisdiction—must be deemed to have resulted in injustice to the appellants, warranting quashing of the impugned order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded on the undisputed facts that the Assistant Director's order (Annexure 'B') was in favour of the appellants and that the Additional Director set that order aside without giving notice to the appellants or hearing them, exercising powers under section 42 of the Act.
The proviso to section 42 was quoted and considered: "Provided that no order, scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration."
The court observed that neither the State Government nor the Additional Director was, in this case, satisfied that the Assistant Director's proceedings had been vitiated by unlawful consideration, and no such finding was recorded in the impugned order. Accordingly, the Additional Director lacked authority to set aside or vary the Assistant Director's order without complying with the mandatory proviso.
The court noted that the Additional Director's order contained observations going to the merits and the root of the controversy, and although the Additional Director stated that a final order should be passed by the Assistant Director after hearing the appellant Mukhtiar Singh (who was not present), little was actually left for the Assistant Director to decide on merits; the grounds on which the Assistant Director had decided for the appellants were not fully addressed by the Additional Director.
Applying the principle from Joginder Singh (supra) that action by an inferior tribunal beyond jurisdiction necessarily results in injustice, the court concluded that the impugned order, having been passed beyond jurisdiction (by failing to comply with the proviso), must be deemed to have caused injustice to the appellants. The court therefore found the Single Judge's conclusion— that an order passed without complying with the proviso did not result in injustice—contrary to the cited Supreme Court authority.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the writ petition is allowed; the impugned order of the Additional Director dated March 22, 1967 (Annexure 'C') is quashed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The appellants' writ petition has been allowed and the impugned order quashed.
- The judgment of the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition is set aside.
- Nothing in this judgment precludes the State Government from rehearing and redeciding the application of respondent No. 2 under section 42 of the Act in accordance with law after due compliance with the proviso to section 42.
- Costs awarded to the appellants; counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 100/-.
R.S Narula, J.:— The order of Shri Ajit Singh, Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Chandigarh, dated March 22, 1967 (Annexure ‘C’ to the writ petition) passed at the instance of Sardara Singh respondent No. 2, whereby the earlier order of the Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, dated August 12, 1966 (Annexure ‘B’) in favour of the appellants was set aside, was impugned by the appellants in Civil Writ 1431 of 1967, on the solitary ground that the Additional Director had no jurisdiction to pass an order to their prejudice without issuing notice to them and affording them a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The learned Single Judge before whom the writ petition came up for final disposal, dismissed the same by his order, dated July 19, 1968, on the solitary ground that no injustice, what to say of manifest injustice, had been caused to the appellants by the impugned order though it had no doubt been passed by the Additional Director without any notice to them and without bearing them.
2. In this letters patent appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, Mr. S.P Goyal has submitted on behalf of the appellants that the approach of the learned Single Judge was not quite correct, and that the impugned order having been passed in violation of the mandatory requirements of the proviso to section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 50 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act), the appellants were entitled to have the same quashed ex. debito justitiae.
3. It is not disputed that the order of the Assistant Director (Annexure ‘B’) was in favour of the appellants. It is also beyond question that the said order was set aside by the Additional Director without notice to the appellants, in exercise of his powers under section 42 of the Act. The proviso to section 42 reads:—
“Provided that no order, scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.”
4. It is nobody's case that the State Government, or, for the matter of that, the Additional Director, was satisfied in the present case that the proceedings before the Assistant Director had been vitiated by unlawful consideration. Nor is any such finding recorded in the order. That being so, the Additional Director had no authority to set aside or vary the order of the Assistant Director without complying with the mandatory requirements of the above quoted proviso. Observations have been made in the order of the Additional Director which go to the merits and root of the controversy between the parties. Though the Additional Director has not doubt left the passing of a final order to the Assistant Director on the ground that Mukhtiar Singh appellant was not present before him, and he would not like to decide the case in his absence, and that the final order be passed after hearing him afresh, very little has been left by the Additional Director to be decided by the Assistant Director on merits. The grounds on which the Assistant had decided in favour of the appellants have not been fully dealt with by the Additional Director.
5. In any event, the impugned order having been passed in a manner prohibited by law, it cannot be said that it has not caused any injustice to the appellants. In Joginder Singh v. The Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property, Mussoorie1, Civil Appeal No. 457 of 1958, decided on March 26, 1962, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that where an inferior Tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction, its action necessarily results in injustice to the party against whom action has been taken, for justice has to be done according to law, and the high court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution where it finds that an inferior Tribunal has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As already held above, the Act specifically prohibits the State Government from exercising its jurisdiction under section 42 with a view to vary or reverse the order of a lower authority under the Act without complying with the statutory requirements of the proviso to that section. The impugned order of the Additional Director having been passed beyond his jurisdiction in the above sense, must necessarily be deemed to have resulted in injustice to the appellants. We are, therefore, constrained to observe that the observations of the learned single Judge to the effect that an order passed without complying with the requirements of the proviso to section 42 of the Act did not result in injustice, much loss manifest injustice to the appellant, were not in accord with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Singh (Supra).
6. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, allow the writ petition of the appellants, and quash the impugned order of the Additional Director, dated March 22, 1967 (Aunexure ‘C’), Nothing stated in this judgment will, however, be deemed to stand in the way of the State Government rehearing and redeciding the application of respondent No. 2 under Section 42 of the Act in Accordance with law after due compliance with the proviso to section 42. Counsel's Fee Rs. 100/-.
7. Mehar Singh, C.J:— I agree.
8. Petition allowed.
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