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Kishore Chand Ramji Dass v. Commissioner Of Income Tax
Judgment Summary: Kishore Chand-Ramji Das of Ludhiana v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Income-tax References Nos. 5, 6 & 7 of 1964)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns three Income-tax References (Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1964) arising from refusal of registration under Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, of an assessee partnership firm. The partnership deed dated December 3, 1947 (operative from October 25, 1947) described seven partners: four adult partners (Kishore Chand, Ramji Das, Dayal Chand and Roshan Lal), partner 5 consisting of three minor brothers (Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander) who collectively held one-tenth, partner 6 (Surrender Kumar, a minor) who held one-twentieth, and partner 7 (Kaushalya Devi, an adult) who held one-twentieth. The deed was signed on behalf of the minors by their guardian-relatives.
Registration of the firm under Section 26A had been maintained up to assessment year 1952-53. Applications for registration for subsequent assessment years (1953-54, 1954-55 and 1955-56) were made but were not signed by certain partners who had attained majority (Mohinder Paul and Harish Chander) at the relevant times. The Income-tax Officer refused renewal of registration on several grounds (including that minors had been made full partners, that individual shares of the three minor brothers were not specified, and that certain major partners had not signed the application). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and, ultimately, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal addressed these matters; the Tribunal restored the Income-tax Officer's refusal and, under Section 66(1) of the Act, referred three specific questions to the High Court for consideration.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on a true construction of the partnership instrument dated December 3, 1947, the Tribunal was right in holding that the minors Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander were made full-fledged partners and as such the instrument of partnership was void and not entitled to registration?
- Whether the assessee's claim was rightly rejected on the ground that the individual shares of partners Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander were not specified in the instrument of partnership?
- Whether registration was rightly rejected on the ground that the application for renewal of registration was not signed by Mohinder Paul? (This core issue is repeated, in substance, for the subsequent years in References Nos. 6 and 7 with respect to Harish Chander.)
Arguments of the Parties
Revenue's Arguments (Income-tax Officer / Commissioner)
- The Income-tax Officer refused registration on several grounds including: (a) that the minors (partners 5 and 6) had been made full-fledged partners under the partnership deed, rendering the deed void; (b) that the individual shares of the three minor brothers (partner 5) were not specified in the deed; and (c) that the renewal application was not signed by Mohinder Paul (and in other years by Harish Chander), who had become major at the relevant times.
- At least in argument before this Court, the Commissioner relied upon the Gujarat High Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shivlal Dayaram Panchal ([1966] 62 I.T.R. 298) to support the proposition that collective specification of minors' shares without individual allocation justifies refusal of registration.
Assessee-firm's Arguments
- The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (for an earlier stage) considered the absence of Mohinder Paul's signature on the application a mere technicality that could have been cured by obtaining his signature subsequently.
- Counsel for the assessee contended that the power previously vested in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (under the pre-amendment Rule 2(c)) to permit late signing should continue to operate once the matter was pending on appeal—effectively arguing that the appellate authority could permit rectification despite the subsequent amendment of Rule 2. The Court records that this argument could not prevail in view of the amended Rule 2 which removed that power.
- With respect to specification of shares, the assessee relied on a binding Division Bench decision of this Court (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kishore Chand Ramji Dass, [1962] 44 I.T.R. 622) which held that where context makes it clear that minors took collective shares in equal parts, the mere absence of separately stated shares is not a ground to refuse registration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kishore Chand Ramji Dass, [1962] 44 I.T.R. 622 (Division Bench of this Court) | Held that collective specification of minors' shares is not necessarily fatal where context shows that minors took their allotted collective share in equal parts; thus non-specification of each minor's individual share is not a sufficient ground for refusing registration if clarity exists from context. | The Court treated this Division Bench decision as binding and applied it to answer question No. 2 in the present references: the court held that the mere collective description of the three minor brothers' share in the 1947 deed did not justify refusal of registration because context indicated equal individual shares. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shivlal Dayaram Panchal, [1966] 62 I.T.R. 298 (Gujarat High Court) | Held that where a partnership deed did not specify the individual shares of minors but only specified their collective share, the firm was not entitled to registration. | The Court noted that the Gujarat High Court distinguished the Division Bench decision of this Court on facts. Nonetheless, because the Division Bench of this Court is binding, the Court did not follow the Gujarat decision and therefore rejected the Commissioner's reliance on it for question No. 2. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the three referred questions by combining statutory rule interpretation, the terms of the partnership deed, factual findings and precedent.
1) Central statutory and regulatory framework: The Court examined Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and Rule 2 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922 (as amended by Notification S.R.O. 1953 of November 20, 1952). The amended Rule 2 explicitly required that an application for registration "shall be signed by all the partners (not being minors) personally" and also prescribed specific time limits for making the application (including a June 30 deadline for renewals). The amendment removed the old Rule 2(c) power that had allowed the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to permit late applications; the new Rule 2 instead contained a proviso giving the Income-tax Officer limited discretion to entertain out-of-time applications upon proof of "sufficient cause."
2) Effect of the amended Rule 2 on the signature defect issue: Because the amended rule requires signature by all non-minor partners and eliminated the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's power to permit rectification on appeal, the Court treated the requirement as imperative. In the present cases the relevant partners who had attained majority (Mohinder Paul and Harish Chander) did not sign the applications within the prescribed time, and the Income-tax Officer found no sufficient cause for entertaining the late or unsigned applications under the proviso to amended Rule 2. That factual finding by the Income-tax Officer—that there was insufficient cause—was never challenged by the assessee-firm and therefore stood unassailed before the Court. The Court therefore concluded that omission of the signature by a major partner rendered the application defective and justifiably refused under the statutory/regulatory scheme.
3) On the first question (whether the minors were made full-fledged partners): The Court examined Clauses 4 and 8 of the partnership deed. Clause 4 admitted partners 5 and 6 to the benefits of partnership, but Clause 8 made partners (including the minors) liable for all partnership outgoings, expenses and losses, payable first from profits, then capital, and if necessary by the partners personally in the shares in which they were entitled to net profits or losses. The Court reasoned that the personal liability imposed on the minors by Clause 8, taken together with the admission to benefits, amounted to making them substantial (full-fledged) partners. That status contravened Section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act (which the Court cites in this context), rendering the deed void for purposes of registration. The Court thus agreed with the Tribunal's finding on this point.
4) On the second question (individual shares of the three minor brothers not separately specified): The Court treated the Division Bench decision of this Court (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kishore Chand Ramji Dass, [1962] 44 I.T.R. 622) as binding authority. That decision held that where context makes it beyond doubt that minors took the collectively allotted share in equal parts, lack of separately stated individual shares is not a sufficient ground for refusing registration. Applying that precedent to the present deed, the Court concluded the collective description was clear enough to show equal individual shares and therefore did not justify refusal. The Court rejected the Commissioner's reliance on the Gujarat High Court decision that reached the opposite conclusion, noting that the Gujarat bench distinguished the Division Bench holding and that a Division Bench of this Court binds the Court.
5) Practical disposition and collateral requests: The assessee-firm sought to incorporate applications they purportedly made in 1957 before the Income-tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner into the references. The Court observed that those later applications were made after the expiry of the time limits and that the Income-tax Officer had found no sufficient cause for late filing; that factual finding remained uncontested. Given that the appellate power to permit late filings no longer existed under the amended Rule 2, calling for or admitting those late applications would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, the Court declined to call for those late applications.
6) Conclusion on the referred questions: The Court concluded that, for each of the three references, registration was rightly refused because the application was not signed by a partner who had become a major at the time of application (the third question in Reference No. 5 answered in the affirmative and the corresponding questions in References Nos. 6 and 7 likewise answered in the affirmative). As a result, References Nos. 6 and 7 were disposed of completely, and Reference No. 5 was disposed of in substance, making answers to the other two questions in Reference No. 5 unnecessary except as to the first question where the Court also answered in the affirmative regarding minors being made full-fledged partners.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court held that registration of the assessee-firm was rightly refused where the application for registration under Section 26A (as governed by Rule 2 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, as amended) was not signed by a partner who had attained majority; and, in relation to the 1947 deed, the minors were found to have been made substantial partners contrary to Section 30 of the Partnership Act, rendering the instrument incapable of registration.
Implications and consequences:
- The omission of the signature of a partner who had become major on an application required by amended Rule 2 is a fatal defect unless the Income-tax Officer, under the proviso to Rule 2, is satisfied there was sufficient cause for the delay; in these cases no sufficient cause was found and that finding was not challenged.
- The Court applied and followed the binding Division Bench precedent (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kishore Chand Ramji Dass) to conclude that collective specification of minors' share did not of itself preclude registration where context shows equal shares; the Gujarat High Court decision on the contrary was noted but not followed.
- All three references were answered against the assessee-firm: References Nos. 6 and 7 were completely disposed of, and Reference No. 5 was disposed of in substance (with the Court affirming that the minors had been made substantial partners under the deed).
- The Court refused to admit or call for late applications filed in 1957 as they could not cure the failure to obtain the requisite signatures within the time framed by amended Rule 2 and because the Income-tax Officer had found no sufficient cause for delay.
- No novel precedent was laid down by the Court; rather, the decision applies existing rules and binds the parties by a prior Division Bench ruling of this Court.
Disposition and Costs
The references were answered in the manner described above. The assessee-firm was ordered to pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax in all three references with the specified counsel's fees: Rs. 250 in Income-tax Reference No. 5 of 1964, and Rs. 1,000 in each of the other two references.
Judge: Mehar Singh, C.J.; concurrence noted by Bal Raj Tuli, J. ("I agree").
JUDGMENT Mehar Singh, C.J.
1. This will dispose of Income-tax References Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1964, Kishore Chand-Ramji Das of Ludhiana v. Commissioner of Income-tax.
2. The assessee-firm was a partnership constituted under the partnership deed of December 3, 1947, effective and operative from October 25, 1947, in the preamble of which the description of the partners given was
"(1) Kishore Chand, (2) Ramji Das, (3) Dayal Chand, (4) Roshan Lal, (5) Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander, minor sons of Balbir Chand, through Kishore Chand, their uncle, (6) Surrender Kumar, minor son of Balbir, Chand, through Kaushalya Devi, his mother, and (7) Kaushalya Devi, wife of Balbir Chand."So there were seven partners. The first four and the seventh partners were majors whereas the fifth partner consisted of three brothers, namely, Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander, minors, and the sixth partner, another minor. Surrender Kumar. The deed stated the shares of the partners as below :
Kishore Chand ...
1/5th Ramji Das ...
1/5th Dayal Chand ...
1/5th Roshan Lal ...
1/5th Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander, and Romesh Chander ...
1/10th Surrender Kumar ...
1/20th Kaushalya Devi ...
1/20th
3. So the fifth partner consisting of three minor brothers had one-tenth share and the sixth partner, Surrender Kumar, minor, had one-twentieth share. The partnership deed was executed and signed on behalf of the three minors, partner 5 by their uncle Kishore Chand, partner 1, and on behalf of minor, partner 6, by his mother Kaushalya Devi, partner 7.
4. The assessee-firm had been registered under Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act 11 of 1922), for and up to the assessment year 1952-53, but when an application for registration for the assessment year 1953-54 was made on behalf of the firm on June 8, 1953, to the Income-tax Officer, it was signed by partners 1 to 4 and 7, but not by Mohinder Paul out of the three minor brothers as partner 5, though Mohinder Paul had attained majority on September 1, 1951, and the finding of the Income-tax Officer that he had elected to become partner of the assessee-firm on attainment of majority by him has been endorsed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in its order of July 26, 1962. It is a finding of fact which is not open to question in these references and has in fact not been questioned, The copy of the partnership deed is annexure "A" to Income-tax Reference No. 5 of 1964, After the preamble describing the partners, as has been given above, of the terms and conditions of partnership between the parties, as given therein, Nos. 4, 8 and 9 are material for the present purpose, and those are :
"4. That partners 5 and 6 have been admitted to the benefits of partnership,
8. All outgoings and expenses of the partnership and all losses including interest shall be payable first out of the profits, next out of the capital, and in the case of further deficiency by the partners in the shares in which they are entitled to the net profits or losses of the business.
9. The partners are entitled to the net profits or losses of the business in the following shares--Kishore Chand l/5, Ramji Das 1/5, Dayal Chand 1/5 Roshan Lal 1/5, Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander, Romesh Chander 1/10, Surrender Kumar 1/20, Kaushalya Devi 1/20."
5. The Income-tax Officer refused to register the partnership under section 26a of act 11 of 1922, on various grounds including-
(a) the four minors, partners 5 and 6, having been made full-fledged partners under the deed of partnership, thus making that deed void, (b) the individual shares of three minors of partner 5 not having been specified in the deed of partnership, and (c) the application for registration not having been signed by Mohinder Paul out of partner 5.
On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not accept these grounds in support of the refusal of registration pointing out with regard to the third ground that the absence of the signature of Mohinder Paul on the application was a mere technicality which could have been met by obtaining his signature subsequently. On the other two grounds he found that the minors were not full-fledged partners and the individual shares of minors of partner 5 were given. On further appeal, the learned Tribunal restored the order of the Income-tax Officer, and on an application under Section 66(1) of the Act has referred these three questions for consideration to his court:
"(1) Whether, on a true construction of the instrument of partnership, dated December 3, 1947, the Tribunal was right in holding that minors. Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander, were made full-fledged partners and as such the instrument of partnership was void and was not entitled to registration ?
(2) Whether the assessee's claim was rightly rejected on the ground that the individual shares of partners, Mohinder Paul, Harish Chander and Romesh Chander, were not specified in the instrument of partnership ?
(3) Whether registration was rightly rejected on the ground that the application for renewal of registration was not signed by Mohinder Paul ?"
6. This, as stated, arises out of registration of the assessee-firm sought in regard to the assessment year 1953-54.
7. The assessee-firm was reconstituted on October 1, 1953, under the partnership deed, annexure "B" to Income-tax Reference No. 6 of 1964, The only detail that is necessary for the purpose of this reference is that an application was moved by the assessee-firm for registration in regard to the assessment year 1954-55 under Section 26A of the Act on the basis of the new partnership evidenced by the deed of October 1, 1953, though its financial year (accounting year) ended on March 31, 1954. Harish Chander of partner 5 had become major on November 1, 1953, but he had not signed the application for registration of the assessee-firm. This was the ground which prevailed in the end with the Tribunal for maintenance of the order of the Income-tax Officer in this respect and on an application by the assessee-firm under Section 66(1) of the Act in Income-tax Reference No. 6 of 1964 the Tribunal has referred this question :-- "Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, registration was rightly refused?"--for consideration of this court. An exactly similar question in this form--" Whether in the facts arid circumstances of the case, registration was rightly refused to the firm on the ground that the application was not signed by Harish Chander?"--has been referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Income-tax Reference No. 7 of 1964, which concerns the assessee-firm's application for registration for the assessment year 1955-56 and which application was not signed by Harish Chander of partner 5 though he had attained majority on November 1, 1953.
8. It is apparent that the third question in the first reference and the only question in the other two references raise only one matter for consideration, and that is whether the omission by a major partner to sign an application under Section 26A of the Act for registration of the assessee-firm rendered that application defective so that the registration could be refused. In Sub-section (2) of Section 26A of the Act it. is provided that the application shall be made by such person or persons, and at such times and shall contain such particulars and shall be in such form, and be verified in such manner, as may be prescribed; and it shall be dealt with by the Income-tax Officer in such manner as may be prescribed. There are the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, in which Rule 2, so far as relevant here, read:
"'Any firm constituted under an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners may, under the provisions of Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter in these rules referred to as "the Act"), register with the Income-tax Officer, the particulars contained in the said instrument on application made in this behalf.
Such application shall be signed by all the partners (not being minors) personally, and shall be made-
(a) before the income of the firm is assessed for any year under Section 23 of the Act, or ...
(c) with the permission of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner hearing an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, before the assessment is confirmed, reduced, enhanced or annulled, or ..."
9. This rule was amended by Notification No. S. R. 0. 1953 of November 20, 1952, of the Central Board of Revenue, and in the amended form this rule reads-
"2. Any firm constituted under an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners may, under the provisions of Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter in these rules referred to as "the Act"), register with the Income-tax Officer, the particulars contained in the said instrument on application made in this behalf.
10. Such application shall be signed by all the partners (not being minors) personally, or in the case of dissolved firm by all persons (not being minors) who were partners in the firm immediately before dissolution and by the legal representative of any such partner who is deceased, and shall, for any year of assessment up to and including the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953, be made before the 28th February, 1953, and for any year of assessment subsequent thereto, be made-
(a) where the firm is not registered under the Indian Partnership Act. 1932 (IX of 1932), or where the deed of partnership is not registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), and the application for registration is being made for the first time under the Act,--
(i) within a period of six months of the constitution of the firm or before the end of the 'previous year' of the firm whichever is earlier, if the firm was constituted in that previous year,
(ii) before the end of the previous year in any other case;
(b) where the firm is registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (IX of 1932), or where the deed of partnership is registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), before the end of the previous year of the firm, and
(c) where the application is for renewal of registration under Rule 6 for any year, before the 30th day of June of that year :
Provided that the Income-tax Officer may entertain an application made after the expiry of the time-limit specified in this rule, if he is satisfied that the firm was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the specified time."
11. It is clear from Rule 2(c) of these Rules that an application for registration by the assessee-firm had to be made for the year 1953-54 by June 30, 1953, for the year 1954-55 by June 30, 1954, and for the year 1955-56 by June 30, 1955. The application is required to be signed by all the partners, leaving out the minors, and this is an imperative requirement. In these cases the application, in each case, was not signed by one of the partners who had become major by the time the application came to be made. If Rule 2 before its amendment by Notification No. S.R.O.1953 of November 20, 1952, was applicable, such an application could be made under Rule 2(a) at any time before assessment was made, and even at a later stage with the permission of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner before the assessment was confirmed, reduced, enhanced or annulled according to Rule 2(c), but the amendment of this rule operative with the said notification altered both these provisions in the rule. The first has been altered to require the making of the application before June 30 of the year for which renewal of registration is sought, and the second has been completely deleted. The effect of deletion of the old Rule 2(c) has been that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has now completely lost power to give permission for the making of an application under Section 26A of the Act.
12. In the new rule there is a proviso which gives power to the Income-tax Officer to entertain an application made out of time if he is satisfied that the applicant-firm was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within time. In the present cases the minors who had become majors did not sign the applications so far as these references are concerned for registration of the assessee-firm until some time in 1957. The Income-tax Officer has not found any sufficient cause for entertaining those applications according to the proviso to Rule 2 of the Indian Income-tax Rules of 1922. This finding of the Income-tax Officer has never been questioned by the assessee-firm at any stage and it is not the subject-matter of consideration in any of these references. It is true that in the first reference the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was of the opinion that the omission of the signature of Mohinder Paul of partner 5 was a mere technicality and he permitted him to sign the application, but that was after the old Rule 2(c) had been repealed and its place had been taken by the new Rule 2 which has taken away the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that previously resided in him under the old Rule 2(c). The learned counsel for the assessee-firm has contended that the original power in the Income-tax Officer must be taken to continue with the appeal in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as soon as the matter becomes pending in appeal. Whatever may have been the force of this contention otherwise, now in view of the present shape of Rule 2 this argument cannot prevail, because this present shape of Rule 2 has come about after such power in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, which was with him under the old Rule 2(c), has been taken away altogether under the new Rule 2. So this argument cannot prevail. The learned counsel for the assessee-firm is unable to further the argument on this aspect of the matter. The consequence then is that so far as each one of the three references is concerned, the application for registration of the assessee-firm was rightly refused because of it not having been signed by one of its partners. The answer to the third question in Income-tax Reference No. 5 of 1964 is in the affirmative and so also to the only question in each one of the remaining two Income-tax References Nos. 6 and 7 of 1964. This disposes of completely Income-tax References Nos. 6 and 7 of 1964, and also in substance Income-tax Reference No. 5 of 1964, rendering it really unnecessary to provide an answer to the other two questions referred to this court.
13. However, it may be stated, so far as Income-tax Reference No. 5 of 1964 is concerned, that the answer to the first question has to be in the affirmative because while Clause 4 of the partnership deed says that partners 5 and 6 have been admitted to the benefits of the partnership, Clause 8 makes them liable for all losses payable not only out of profits and capital, but in the case of further deficiency by the partners in the shares in which they are entitled to the net profits or Josses after the profits and capital should not meet the total losses. It is this personal Liability of the minors, partners 5 and 6, who were admitted only to the benefits of the partnership according to Clause 4, that supports the conclusion of the learned Tribunal that the minors were in fact made substantial partners contrary to Section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1930, and thus the registration of the partnership was rightly refused as being void because it was hit by Section 30 of the said Act.
14. In so far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is already answered by a decision of a Division Bench of this court with regard to the very assessee-firm and is reported as Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kishore Chand Ramji Dass, [1962] 44 I.T.R. 622, in which the learned judges had held with regard to the partnership deed of December 3, 1947, that the mere fact that the shares of some minors in a firm were shown collectively and the share of each one of them was not separately stated in express words, is not a sufficient ground for refusing registration of the firm, if it is clear from the context beyond doubt that the minors took the shares allotted to them collectively, in equal shares, and the learned judges observed that this was so in the case of the assessee-firm under the partnership deed of December 3,1947. aS against this, the learned counsel for the Commissioner of Income-tax has relied upon the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shivlal Dayaram Panchal, [1966] 62 I.T.R. 298, in which the learned judges of the Gujarat High Court held that, where a partnership deed did not specify the individual shares of minors admitted to the benefits of partnership but merely specified the collective shares of the minors, the firm was not entitled to registration. The learned judges considered the case of Kishore Chand Ramji Dass decided by a Division Bench of this court, but distinguished it on facts. In the first place, we are bound by the decision of a Division Bench of this court, and, secondly, the learned judges of the Gujarat High Court themselves distinguished the case before them from the case decided by the Division Bench of this court as referred to above. So the answer to the second question is in the negative.
15. In these references applications have been moved by the assessee-firm praying that the applications made before the Income-tax Officer under Section 26A of the Act in the year 1957 and that made before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner be called for and made part of the case so far as each reference is concerned, but at this stage it is not denied on the side of the assessee-firm that no such application was competent to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in view of new Rule 2 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, and it cannot be denied that no useful purpose could possibly be served by calling for the applications made to the Income-tax Officer under Section 26A of the Act in any one of these cases, because, as stated, at no stage has the finding of the Income-tax Officer been challenged by the assessee-firm that there was not sufficient cause with the assessee-firm for not having those applications signed by all the partners within the time prescribed by the new Rule 2 of the said Rules. So those applications are dismissed.
16. The references are answered in the manner as above and so far as costs are concerned, the assessee-firm shall pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax in all the three references, counsel's fee in Income-tax Reference No, 5 of 1964 being Rs. 250, and in either of the other two references, Rs. 1,000.
Bal Raj Tuli, J.
17. I agree.
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