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Nazar (Nazir) Singh v. Munshi Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
A pre-emption decree was originally passed on September 30, 1964 in favour of the appellant, conditioned on depositing Rs. 2,950 in the trial Court by December 30, 1964. The deposit was made in time. In defendant's appeal the first appellate Court, by order dated October 29, 1965, increased the pre-emption money by Rs. 1,050 and directed that the additional sum be deposited in the trial Court on or before January 15, 1966, failing which the suit would stand dismissed.
The decree-holder (appellant) applied to the appellate Court to deposit the additional Rs. 1,050 and in fact deposited the full required amount in the appellate Court within the time allowed, but did not deposit that sum in the trial Court. On an application by the vendee-defendant to withdraw the additional amount, the trial Court on June 24, 1967 held the suit dismissed because the additional amount had not been deposited in the trial Court. That finding was affirmed by the first appellate Court on November 8, 1967. The executing Court quoted the operative portion of the appellate decree verbatim and relied on previous authorities to conclude non-compliance. The decree-holder's execution first appeal was dismissed by a brief order. The present proceeding is an Execution Second Appeal raising two specific questions about compliance with Order 20, Rule 14 CPC and whether the appellant substantially complied with the appellate order requiring the additional deposit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether strictly literal compliance with an order passed under Order 20, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is necessary to entitle a decree-holder to the benefits of a pre-emption decree, or whether substantial compliance with the requirements of such an order is sufficient.
- Whether, on the facts found by the lower appellate Court in this case, the decree-holder-appellant can be held to have substantially complied with the first appellate Court's order dated October 29, 1965 requiring deposit of an additional sum of Rs. 1,050.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Balraj Bahl)
- The appellant substantially complied with the appellate pre-emption decree by depositing the entire amount within the time allowed.
- The amount was deposited in the same Court that directed the deposit (the appellate Court) and that Court and the trial Court are in the same town (a "stone's throw" from each other).
- If the appellate Court had explicitly directed that the deposit could not be made there but must be made in the trial Court, the appellant would have complied; the appellant should not be penalised for, at most, an office mistake of the Additional District Judge in accepting the deposit.
Respondent's Arguments (Mr. K.L. Sachdeva)
- The words of Order 20, Rule 14(1) require that the purchase-money be paid "into Court" and that non-payment "so paid" results in dismissal; "Court" must mean the trial Court which passed the original decree, and the deposit had therefore to be made in the trial Court.
- Even if the appellate decree did not specify the Court for deposit, the decree-holder could only enjoy the fruits of the decree if the deposit was made in the trial Court; deposit in the appellate Court would not suffice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kanhaya Lal v. Mohd. Shafi Khan, (1913) 18 Ind Cas 600 (Lah) | Held that where the decree-holder's deposit was deficient (one anna short) Sec.151 could not be used in execution to alter the terms of the decree. | The Court distinguished this case as factually different: there the deposit was deficient; in the present case the full amount was deposited within time, so Kanhaya Lal was not relevant to the present dispute. |
| Ajudhia Prasad v. Gobind Prasad, (1923) 71 Ind Cas 1034 (AIR 1923 All 250) | Interpreted a compromise decree directing money to be paid or tendered to the vendee first, and only on refusal to be deposited in Court; deposit straightaway in Court was held not sufficient in those facts. | The Court held this authority did not assist the present case because in that case the decree required tender to the vendee first and the pre-emptor had not tendered the money; no comparable fact existed here. |
| Surjan Singh v. Harcharan Singh, 69 Pun LR 325 (AIR 1968 Punj 137) | Described the law of pre-emption as a 'piratical law' and suggested restrictive interpretation where two interpretations are possible. | The executing Court had relied on this as a policy reason for a restrictive interpretation; the present Court acknowledged the remark but nonetheless found that substantial compliance should be recognized in the facts of this case. |
| Balmukand v. Pancham, (1888) ILR 10 All 400 | Held that payment of the net balance within the time allowed by the appellate Court satisfied requirements of the appellate decree where the appellate Court had raised the pre-emption money. | The Court cited and followed the principle that making up the difference within the period fixed by the appellate decree constituted satisfaction of the appellate order. |
| Bhagwana v. Goru, 56 Pun Re 1910 | Similar facts to Balmukand; held that payment of the balance due under appellate decree within time sufficed. | Referenced as another authority supporting that payment of the difference within time complies with the appellate decree. |
| Abul Fatteh v. Fatteh Ali, AIR 1916 Lah 249 | Johnstone, C.J. held payment to decree-holders outside Court not sufficient because such payments were not certified to the Court by the fixed date. | The Court noted this holding but treated it as no longer good law in view of later authorities (notably Bholu Ram). |
| Bholu Ram v. Kanhya, AIR 1963 Punj 133 | Held that payment of pre-emption money out of Court, proved to have been made before stipulated date, suffices as compliance with a decree directing deposit in Court; certification requirement was rendered immaterial by repeal. | The Court relied on and accepted this authority as overruling the earlier position in Abul Fatteh and as supporting substantial compliance even if certification is absent. |
| Kali Charan v. Ravi Datt, 1957-59 Pun LR 204 | Held that mere application to deposit on last day did not constitute valid tender; law requires money to be present and actually offered. | The Court distinguished this authority because in the present case the full amount was deposited within time and there was no suggestion that the appellant did not have or tender the full money. |
| Des Raj v. Des Raj, 1968-70 Punj LR 81 | Held tender must be present and produced to the other party; relevant where tender was defective. | Distinguished on facts: not applicable here because full deposit was made within time. |
| Sukhpal Singh v. Abdul Rahman, AIR 1921 All 159 | Held that payment to vendees out of Court with subsequent application for certificate constituted full compliance with a decree directing deposit to the credit of the vendees within thirty days. | Referred to as a comparatively nearer precedent where out-of-court payment was held to comply with spirit and letter of the decree. |
| Surajmal v. Bheroolal, AIR 1958 Raj 311 | Where decree specified payment should be in Court but payment was made directly to vendees out of Court and certification applied for (but delayed), the court held factum of payment within stipulated time mattered; certification not the substance. | The Court expressed respectful agreement with this authority and treated it as supportive of substantial compliance doctrines. |
| Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, AIR 1961 SC 832 | Held that a litigant deserves protection against defaults or negligence of Court officers. | The Court relied on the principle to support the view that a litigant should not be penalised for mistakes of Court officers. |
| Jang Singh v. Brii Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1631 | Approved the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the Court should prejudice no litigant); held courts should protect litigants from errors of court staff where the litigant acted on their information. | The Court treated this Supreme Court authority as directly applicable, holding that mistakes of court officers that harm litigants must be remedied. |
| Abdus Salam v. Wilayat Ali Khan, ILR 19 All 256 | Supported the proposition that once pre-emption money is deposited in Court it stands to the credit of the vendee. | Used to justify that the appellant's deposit in the appellate Court immediately put the amount to the vendee's credit and therefore satisfied the substantive requirement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed two interlinked legal questions: whether strict literal compliance with Order 20, Rule 14(1) CPC is required, and whether on the facts the appellant had substantially complied with the appellate direction to deposit an additional Rs. 1,050.
On textual interpretation, the Court observed that the term "Court" in Order 20, Rule 14(1) prima facie refers to the Court which passes the decree that requires the deposit. When an appellate Court directs deposit of an additional amount (or directs deposit for the first time), the Court which passes that decree is the appellate Court. Accordingly, in the absence of a definite direction to the contrary, a deposit made in the appellate Court would comply with Order 20, Rule 14(1).
The Court next surveyed prior decisions. It distinguished authorities relied upon by the executing Court where the facts involved either a deficient deposit (Kanhaya Lal) or a decree that required tender to the vendee first (Ajudhia Prasad), finding those precedents inapplicable on the facts of the present case. The Court cited and relied on a line of decisions (Balmukand; Bhagwana; Sukhpal Singh; Surajmal; Bholu Ram) that supported the view that the crucial consideration is whether the full amount required by the decree was paid within the time fixed, and that payment outside Court (or in a different Court in the same station) proved to have been made within time could amount to compliance.
Having established that the substantial criterion is payment in full within the time fixed, the Court turned to the facts. It found:
- The full additional amount was deposited within the time allowed.
- The deposit was made in the appellate Court that had required the additional payment.
- There was no evidence that the appellant deliberately deposited in the wrong Court; on the contrary, the appellant had acted prudently and had carried the money to Court for deposit.
- The office of the appellate Court had acted negligently: the appellant's application for acceptance of the deposit carried an endorsement from the office authorizing deposit "on the responsibility of the applicant" and the presiding judge signed without dating or ensuring accuracy; proper office inquiry was not made.
The Court applied the equitable and supervisory principle that acts of the Court or its officers should not prejudice a litigant (actus curiae neminem gravabit). It relied on Supreme Court authority (Jagat Dhish Bhargava; Jang Singh) to hold that where the litigant acts on the information or procedure of the Court and is harmed by a mistake of court officers, the litigant merits protection and restoration to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake.
On these bases the Court concluded that the appellant had substantially complied with the terms of the appellate decree: the deposit, made in time and in the appellate Court which had required it, stood to the credit of the vendee and satisfied the essential requirements of Order 20, Rule 14(1). The Court therefore found no basis to penalise the appellant for a technical non-compliance compounded by the negligence of the appellate Court's office.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court allowed the second appeal and held that the appellant had substantially complied with the terms of the appellate pre-emption decree under Order 20, Rule 14(1) CPC.
Consequences and direct effects on the parties:
- The Court set aside the judgments and orders of the lower Courts which had held the suit dismissed for non-deposit.
- The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.
- The application of the vendee for withdrawing the pre-emption money was allowed: the vendee is entitled to withdraw the enhanced amount from the lower appellate Court and the original amount (if not already withdrawn) from the trial Court.
Implications as articulated by the Court:
- The decisive consideration under Order 20, Rule 14(1) is payment of the full amount within the time allowed; minor or inadvertent departures from non-essential directions of a decree (for example, deposit in the appellate Court instead of the trial Court where no contrary direction appears) do not necessarily nullify the decree.
- The acts or negligence of court officers that materially contribute to a litigant's non-compliance should not be allowed to prejudice the litigant; courts should protect litigants harmed by such mistakes (following actus curiae neminem gravabit).
The Court's decision therefore recognizes and applies a substantial compliance doctrine in the context of pre-emption decrees under Order 20, Rule 14 CPC, while emphasizing that the two essentials of that rule remain strict payment of the full amount and payment within the time fixed.
1. Two questions call for decision in this Execution Second Appeal, namely:—
(i) Whether strictly literal compliance with the order of the Court passed under Order 20, Rule 14 of the CPC is necessary to entitle a decree-holder to reap the benefits of a pre-emption decree passed in his favour or whether substantial compliance with the requirements of such an order is enough; and
(ii) Whether on the facts found by the lower appellate Court in this case, the decree-holder-appellant can or cannot be held to have substantially complied with the order of the first appellate Court, dated October 29, 1965, requiring him to deposit the additional sum of Rs. 1,050/-.
2. The brief facts of the case are that on September 30, 1964, a pre-emption decree was passed in favour of the appellant by the trial Court conditional on the appellant depositing in that Court Rupees 2,950/- on or before December 30, 1964, that the requisite deposit was made within time, that in defendant's appeal against the decree of the trial Court, the preemption money to be deposited by the decree-holder was raised by the order of the first appellate Court, dated October 29, 1965, by an additional sum of Rupees 1,050/- which was required to be deposited in the trial Court on or before January 15, 1966, failing which the suit of the appellant was to stand dismissed, that the decree-holder made an application for depositing the requisite additional sum of Rs. 1,050/- to the appellate Court and deposited the full required amount in that Court within the time allowed under the appellate decree, but did not deposit the same in the trial Court, that on an application of the vendee-defendant-judgment-debtor to withdraw the additional amount, the trial Court held on June 24, 1967, that the suit for pre-emption stood dismissed as the additional amount had not been deposited in the trial Court, and the same finding has been affirmed in the decree-holder's first appeal by the Court of Shri Shanti Swarupa, Additional District Judge, Ferozepore, on November 8, 1967. The executing Court wrote a detailed order wherein the operative portion of the pre-emption decree passed by the first appellate Court was quoted verbatim. It appears to be necessary to quote the same here.—
(1) “That Nazar Singh is now to further deposit Rs. 1,050/- for payment to Munshi Singh in the Court of the Subordinate Judge II Class, Ferozepore (i.e, the trial Court) on or before January 15, 1966;
(2) That if he (Nazar Singh) fails to deposit the said amount of Rupees 1,050/- in the said Court on or before the said date as directed under (1) above, or that he had failed to deposit Rs. 2,950/- in the Court on or before December 30, 1964, as already directed by the decree of the trial Court, the suit shall stand dismissed.”
3. The executing Court had relied on a Single Bench judgment of Chevis, J. in Kanhaya Lal v. Mohd. Shafi Khan, (1913) 18 Ind Cas 600 (Lah) and on the judgment of the Allahabad High, Court in Ajudhia Prasad v. Gobind Prasad, (1923) 71 Ind Cas 1034 (corresponding to AIR 1923 All 250) in support of its decision, and had further held that in view of the fact that the law of preemption is a piratical law as held in Surjan Singh v. Harcharan Singh, 69 Pun LR 325 : (AIR 1968 Punj 137) an interpretation which restricts the operation of the law of preemption should be preferred in a case where two interpretations are possible. Inasmuch as the decree-holder had neither deposited the decretal amount in the trial Court as directed in the appellate decree, nor informed the trial Court or the judgment-debtor about the deposit having been made in the first appellate Court, the decree-holder had, according to the decision of the executing Court, failed to comply with the specific requirements of the decree, and so his suit stood dismissed in terms of the appellate decree.
4. The decree-holder's execution first appeal against the abovesaid order of the trial Court has been dismissed by an extremely sketchy order of the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozepore. In ultimate analysis the first appellate Court has merely held that the appellant having failed to deposit the amount in question in accordance with the decree of the appellate Court, the suit had been rightly treated as dismissed by the trial Court.
5. Mr. Balraj Bahl, the learned counsel for the decree-holder-appellant has vehemently submitted:—
(i) that his client has substantially complied with the appellate pre-emption decree, that he has deposited the entire amount in question within the time allowed by the decree, that the amount has been deposited in the very Court which directed the deposit, that the appellate Court and the executing Court are at a stone's throw from each other, in the same town;
(ii) that if the appellate Court had on the application of the decree-holder directed that the deposit could not be made there, but was to be made in the trial Court, the appellant would have complied with the direction to that effect, and that the appellant should not now be penalised for what was at least partially a mistake of the office of the Additional District Judge in allowing and accepting the deposit of the enhanced pre-emption money.
6. Sub-rule (1) of R. 14 of O. 20 of the CPC, inter alia, that where the purchase-money has not already been paid into the Court before the passing of a pre-emption decree, the Court shall specify in the decree a day on or before which the purchase-money shall be paid Into Court, and that if the purchase money and the costs, if any, awarded under the decree are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs. The contention of Mr. K.L Sachdeva, the learned counsel for the respondent, was that even if no specific direction had been given in the appellate decree about the Court in which the balance of the pre-emption money had to be deposited, the decree-holder could enjoy the fruits of the decree only if he had made the requisite deposit in the trial Court, and his suit would have been liable to be dismissed if he had made the deposit in the appellate Court. He seeks to derive strength for this proposition from the language of the opening part of sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 wherein it is stated that “the purchase-money has not been paid into Court” and from the language employed in Cl. (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 which requires that if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) “are not so paid” the suit shall be dismissed with costs.
7. Counsel submits that “Court” in R. 14(1) means the trial Court, and “not so paid” implies that it is the non-payment of the amount in the trial Court that results in the dismissal of the suit. It is really not necessary to decide this point as the appellate Court had given a specific direction in its decree in the present case. I may, however, state that as at present advised, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. K.L Sachdeva. The “Court” referred to in Order 20, Rule 14(1) is prima facie intended to refer to the Court which passed the decree in pursuance of which it has become necessary to make the requisite deposit. When an additional amount is directed to be deposited by an appellate Court by way of pre-emption money, or when in an appeal against the dismissal of a pre-emption suit an order is made for depositing the preemption money for the first time by the appellate Court, the Court which passes the decree for such deposit is the appellate Court, and in the absence of a definite direction to the contrary in the appellate decree, the deposit made in the appellate Court would, in my opinion, comply with the requirements of O. 20, R. 14(1).
8. Before deciding the direct questions which arise in this case, it appears to be appropriate to notice certain previous decisions to most of which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the parties at the Bar. In Balmukand v. Pancham, (1888) ILR 10 All 400, the decree-holder withdrew the amount of costs awarded to him against the judgment-debtor out of the pre-emption money deposited by him in Court within time. In an appeal against the decree of the trial Court, the pre-emption money was raised and the order for payment of costs was reversed. Within the time allowed by the appellate Court, the pre-emptor paid the net balance of the amount which was necessary to make up the total amount payable under the appellate decree. The contention of the vendee to the effect that the pre-emptor had failed to pay the full enhanced pre-emption money within the prescribed period was repelled and it was held that the requirements of the appellate decree had been satisfied. The facts of the case of Bhagwana v. Goru, 56 Pun Re 1910, were almost similar to those of Balmukand's case (supra). The Division Bench of the Chief Court of Lahore followed the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Balmukand's case, (1888) ILR 10 All 400 and held that the payment of the difference between the amount deposited under the decree of the lower Court and the amount due under the appellate decree within the time allowed without paying the costs which had already been realised by the decree-holder was a sufficient compliance with the decree of the appellate Court and the vendee could separately recover his costs.
9. The solitary reason why Johnstone, C.J, held payment of the pre-emption money to the decree-holders outside Court as being not sufficient to comply with the pre-emption decree in spite of the factum of the payment having been made within time having been admitted in Abul Fatteh v. Fatteh Ali, AIR 1916 Lah 249, was that the payment to the judgment-debtors had not been certified to the Court by the fixed date. The observations of Johnstone, C.J, in Abul Fatteh's case, AIR 1916 Lah 249 are no longer good law in view of the subsequent judgment of Harbans Singh, J., in Bholu Ram v. Kanhya, AIR 1963 Punj 133. In Bholu Ram's case, AIR 1963 Punj 133 it has been held that if payment of pre-emption money is made out of Court, and such payment has been proved to have been made before the stipulated date, it should be treated as sufficient compliance with the pre-emption decree in which the direction given under O. 20, R. 14(1) is to make the deposit in the Court. It was further held in that case that sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of O. 21 having been repealed in Punjab, the non-certification of the payment to the Court makes no difference.
10. The first case on which the trial Court placed reliance for deciding against the pre-emptor is the judgment of Chevis, J. in (1913) 18 Ind Cas 600. The question involved in that case was entirely different from the one which arises in the present litigation. The amount actually deposited by the decree-holder in that case was found to be one anna less than the amount required to be paid under the pre-emption decree. The plaintiff-decree-holder had admittedly not complied in full with the requirements of O. 20, R. 14. In terms of the decree the suit had to be regarded to have been dismissed. The Divisional Judge had invoked Section 151 of the CPC in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court held that Sec. 151 did not authorise the Court in execution proceedings to alter the terms of the decree under execution. In the present case there is no such dispute. The full amount has admittedly been deposited by the decree-holder within time. The judgment of the Punjab Chief Court in Kanhaya Lal's case, (1913) 18 Ind. Cas. 600 is, therefore, not relevant for deciding the instant dispute.
11. Nor does the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1923 All 250 (corresponding to 71 Ind. Cas 1034) help in the decision of the issue before me. The compromise preemption decree in that case directed that the money had to be paid or tendered to the vendee, and it was only on the refusal of the vendee to accept it that it was to be deposited in Court within thirty days. It was found on facts that the decree-holder had never tendered the money to the vendee out of Court, but that he deposited it straightway in Court within the period of thirty days. The trial Court, the first appellate Court, as well as the High Court held that the deposit in the Court, in the abovesaid circumstances, was not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree. The High Court further found that the vendee made an application to the Court that the decree-holder was present with the money and would be required to pay it: that the Court Officer called for the decree-holder, but he was not to be found and on the same day the decree-holder, instead of paying the money to the vendee, deposited it in Court. That appears to be a case in which the pre-emptor showed deliberate disregard to the terms of the decree. No right to reap the fruits of the decree by depositing the money in Court could accrue to the pre-emptor in that case without the amount being first tendered to the vendee. No such thing has happened in this case.
12. The next case on which Mr. K.L Sachdeva relied was the judgment of Tek Chand, J. in Kali Charan v. Ravi Datt, 1957-59 Pun LR 204. On the facts of that case it was held that the pre-emptor did not have or tender the money in Court till the last day allowed by the decree and the mere fact that he presented an application to the Court for depositing the amount on the last day did not constitute a valid tender. It was observed that the law required the tenderer to have the money present and ready and to produce and actually offer it to the other party. To the same effect is the judgment of P.C Pandit, J. in Des Raj v. Des Raj, 1968-70 Punj LR 81, on which the learned counsel for the respondent relied. Neither of these two cases is relevant for settling the present controversy as it is nobody's case that the appellant did not have the fall money with him or did not tender the same. On the contrary it is the admitted case of both sides that the full requisite amount was actually deposited by the appellant in Court within time. In each of the above cases on which the respondent has relied either the full amount was not tendered within time at all or the amount deposited was deficient. A case which is comparatively nearer to the facts involved in the present litigation was decided by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sukhpal Singh v. Abdul Rahman, AIR 1921 All 159. In that case, the preemption decree directed the plaintiff to deposit the amount to the credit of the vendees within thirty days. Instead of paying the amount in Court, the decree-holder paid it to the vendees outside the Court and applied to the Court within time for certifying the payment. The Allahabad High Court held that the plaintiff having paid the full amount due to the vendees into the hands of the vendees out of Court, he had fully complied with the spirit as well as the letter of the decree. The learned Judges observed that it would be absurd to hold otherwise.
13. A somewhat similar question arose before the Rajasthan High Court in Surajmal v. Bheroolal, AIR 1958 Raj 311. In that case the decree specifically provided that the payment should be made in Courts but the decree-holder did not pay the amount in Court but paid it directly to the vendees. Certification of the payment was applied for but could not be done within time allowed for payment by the decree for payment. I.N Modi, J. held that certification was not the substance of the matter, but it was the factum of payment within the stipulated time which was the real consideration. The learned Judge further observed that when it had-been established that the payment had been made, although out of Court, within time, there was no reason for holding that it was not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of law. The Rajasthan High Court differed from the view adopted by Johnstone, C.J in AIR 1916 Lah 249. The view adopted by the Rajasthan High Court appears to have been approved by Harbans Singh, J. in Bholu Ram's case, AIR 1963 Punj 133. I am also in respectful agreement with the observations of Modi, J. in Surajmal's case, AIR 1958 Raj 311. In any case certification is not relevant for our purposes as laid down by Harbans Singh, J. in Bholu Ram's case, AIR 1963 Punj 133.
14. The only material consideration in such cases is whether the full amount required by the decree has or has not been paid by the pre-emptor within the time allowed by the decree. The mere fact that the amount has been paid directly to the vendees instead of being deposited in Court, or due to some bona fide error it has been deposited in a wrong Court in the same station or in the appellate Court instead of the original Court cannot by itself be held to nullify the decree. In my opinion, the pre-emptor is entitled to reap the fruits of the decree obtained I him if he substantially complies with the terms of the pre-emption decree imposed therein, under Rule 14 of Order 20 of the CPC. It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that it is absolutely literal compliance with every possible hypertechnical detail of the requirements of the decree that alone would entitle a pre-emptor to obtain possession of the pre-empted property. If the preemption money is not paid in full, even though it is short by an insignificant amount, or if the pre-emption money is not paid within the time allowed by the decree, the pre-emptor must fail. These are the two matters which are of the essence of Order 20, Rule 14(1) of the Code. Whether inadvertent non-compliance with some other minor direction contained in the decree would or would not disentitle a plaintiff to obtain possession of the property would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
15. For the second question posed by me in the opening sentence of this judgment I have no manner of doubt that the appellant did, on the facts found by the Courts below, substantially comply with the requirements of the appellate decree. As soon as the pre-emption money was deposited in the appellate Court, it stood to the credit of the vendee and became vendee's money. (This has been laid down in several cases including the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Abdus Salam v. Wilayat Ali Khan, ILR 19 All 256). Full amount was deposited. The deposit was within time. The deposit was made in the very Court which had required the additional money to be paid. There is no evidence on the record of this case to show that the appellant had obtained a copy of the appellate decree before making the deposit. Normally the lower Courts merely pronounce the operative part of their orders to the parties and such details as are said to have been ignored by the appellant are left to be read by the parties or their counsel. I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Sachdeva that the appellant deliberately deposited the money in the wrong Court. Such a course could not have been adopted by any ordinary prudent as much less a litigant who had fought right up to the appellate stage.
16. I also find force in the second argument of Mr. Balraj Bahl. When the appellant made an application to the appellate Court for receiving the enhanced amount directed to be paid by the appellate decree, it was the duty of the Court to obtain a report from its office, and if a correct report had been made by the office, it would have immediately transpired that the money was not required to be deposited there but in the trial Court. The original application in Gurmukhi dated January 10, 1966, was called for from the first appellate Court. It is thumb-marked by Nazar Singh and bears the signature of his advocate. It was filed in the Court of Shri Muni Lal Verma, Additional District Judge, Ferozepore, on January 10, 1966. The Reader or other official of the Court, to whom the application went in the first instance, did not care to look up the register of appeals or the record of the case to find out as to whether the amount was liable to be deposited in that Court or not. He made an endorsement on the application for the signature of the learned Additional District Judge in the following words—
“Rs. 1,050/- be deposited on the responsibility of the applicant.
II A.D.J”
17. When that endorsement was put up to the Presiding Officer of the Court, he merely signed at the point where his designation had been written. Neither the office of the Court nor the learned Additional District Judge put any date on the order. The words “on the responsibility of the applicant” appear to have been added by the office of the Court, as only four days had been left and an argument might have been advanced in case of delay in actual payment in the treasury, about the order of the Court having been passed within time. Though it is impossible to conjecture as to what the Reader or the Ahlmad of the Court of the Second Additional District Judge meant by using that expression, the only other possible intention of the person who made that note that suggests itself to me is that the office of the Court was taking no responsibility for allowing the payment to be made. Judicial orders have to be passed with full sense of responsibility and it is not open to a judicial officer to say that, while passing the order, he leaves the responsibility for the correctness of the order to the litigant. It is on this account that I have presumed that when the Additional District Judge signed the abovesaid order, he could not have meant to shift the responsibility for the correctness of the order on the appellant if the office of the lower appellate Court had done its duty properly, the record of the case would have been seen and the application had either to be rejected as no deposit was to be made in that Court or had to be returned with the endorsement that it may be presented to the trial Court. It is, therefore, patent from the abovementioned facts that the office of the lower appellate Court acted rather negligently in this matter and by such negligence substantially contributed to the mistake in the requisite deposit being made in the appellate Court in place of the trial Court.
18. Detailed procedure is laid down in the Code for facilitating a fair and just trial of suits. It is not intended to create traps for the litigants into which they may be invited to fall by contributory acts of negligence or defaults of the Courts or their officials. In Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, AIR 1961 SC 832, it was held that a litigant deserves to be protected against the default committed or negligence shown by the Court or its officers in the discharge of their duties. Again in Jang Singh v. Brii Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1631, the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit was approved and it was held that the acts of a Court should do no harm to a litigant. Jang Singh's case, AIR 1966 SC 1631 related to a suit for possession in exercise of right of pra-emption. The decree directed the pre-emptor to make the deposit by certain date. Though the deposit was made within time, it turned out to be less by one rupee. This deficiency was due to an error on the part of the officers of the Court in filling the chalan on the basis of which the deposit had to be made.
19. Hidayatullah, J. (now the learned Chief Justice of India), who prepared the judgment of the Court, held reversing the judgment of the Punjab High Court, that it was no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks for the assistance of the Court so that his obligation under a decree might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct information is furnished to him. The learned Judge further observed that if the Court in supplying the information asked for by a litigant makes a mistake, the responsibility of the litigant though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that information, the Court cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. Hidayatullah, J. held that there is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court, he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. I think the observations of the Supreme Court in Jang Singh's case, AIR 1966 SC 1631 have a direct and full impact on the present litigation. Only if the lower appellate Court had followed the normal procedure and had after obtaining office report, rejected the application of the pre-emptor for making the deposit in that Court, and told him that the deposit was required to be made in the trial Court, the appellant, who had still four more days at his disposal, would not have fallen in the pit in which he finds himself. His fall being due to a mistake of the Court, it is the duty of the Court itself to bring the appellant out of the ???. This duty the lower appellate Court has not performed in the present case.
20. From whatever angle the matter is looked at, it appears to me that this is not a case where the appellant should have been penalised for mere technical non-compliance with a direction of comparatively unimportant detail particularly when the negligence of the lower appellate Court substantially contributed to the non-compliance. I, therefore, allow this appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgments and orders of the Courts below and hold that the appellant has substantially complied with the terms of the decree.
21. The application of the vendee for withdrawing the pre-emption money is allowed. The vendee will be entitled to withdraw the enhanced amount from the lower appellate Court and the original amount (if not already withdrawn) from the trial Court.
22. Appeal allowed.
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