S. Sher Singh v. Raghu Pati Kapur And Another

Mehar Singh, C.J:— These contempt proceedings started with a petition (Criminal Original No. 87 of 1965) on July 5, 1965, by Mr. Sher Singh deceased, petitioner, against Mr. Ragu Pati Kapur and his wife Mrs. Shila Kapur, respondents 1 and 2, under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (Act 32 of 1952).

2. Some time in 1961 Kutail Madhuban Co-operative Cold Storage Limited, through its president, respondent 2, filed a suit against the petitioner for recovery of Rs. 10,257.73 Paise. During the pendency of the suit respondent 1 obtained power-of-attorney from respondent 2 to conduct the proceedings in the suit for the plaintiff. One witness of the petitioner, who was defendant in the suit, named Kartar Singh, was under examination in the Court of Mr. R.P Gaind, Subordinate Judge 1st Class at Karnal, in whose Court the suit was being tried, when on April 25, 1965, respondent 1 made an application under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an inquiry relating to offences under sections 193, 196, 199, 200 and 209 of the Penal Code against witness Kartar Singn, as also against the petitioner, his counsel Mr. Mehtab Singh and Mr. Chuni Lal Malhotra and two others, named Sunder Das and Ram Lal. According to the petitioner, the last-named was to be examined by him as his witness in the suit but on account of this application he refused to appear on his side. It is not necessary to go into the details of the allegations in that application by respondent 1. It is apparent that it was made during the pendency of the suit and while witness Kartar Singh was under examination in the trial Court A copy of that application is annexure ‘A’ to the petition of the petitioner. On June 2, 1965 respondent 1 made an application, copy Annexure ‘B’ to the petition, in the trial Court stating in the heading — “Petition for Enquiry and such proceedings as may be consequently necessary.” With this application respondent 1 filed the original of an anonymous letter and a transliteration of it, copy of which is Annexure ‘C’ to the petition. It is more appropriate to reproduce first Annexure ‘C’—

“Kartar Singh, son of Raja Singh, is working in the factory of Sher Singh situated in Pahewa from several years. Being a Manager there, he is a partner. Kartar Singh himself trades in rice and deposits money et cetera in the State Bank Thanesar.

Punnu Ram, son of Topan Ram, is a barber by caste and is his servant from 14 or 15 years. He used to sell milk before and received Rs. 30/- per mensem as salary and is his manager now in Kalwatri. He is illiterate but does wear a pair of pants.

Sarkaria Sahib and Harbans Singh are putting pressure on the Subordinate Judge.

Your well-wisher.”

3. The application, Annexure ‘B’ reads—

“That on 18-5-1965 the petitioner (respondent 1), on return from Chandigarh, perused the Annexure (meaning Annexure ‘C’) being true copy of a letter received by him by post.

2. That the last paragraph of the letter reads as under;- ‘Sarkaria Saheb va Harbans Singh ki marfat Sub-Judge par dabav dala ja raha hai.’

3. That the petitioner (respondent 1) is personally aware of the fact that Mr. Justice Harbans Singh is on visiting terms with the defendant and Shri Sarkaria, a previous District Judge of Karnal, is also known to the defendant, who in turn makes himself busy socially.

4. That the allegation, if true, reveals a most highly disconcerting state of affairs affecting even the higher schelon of the “judiciary and such as to call for investigation at the highest level.

5. That the letter being in Hindi and obviously from someone in the inner circle of the defendant or liable to getting information from the inner circle can be easily investigated in spite of its lack of signatures.

Prayer: It is prayed that in the interests of purity of administration and especially the judicial system, the vigilance department or a suitable high powered agency be asked to enquire into the matter.”

4. After giving the facts of the case and deciding some preliminary objections, the judgment proceeds as under:

5. There is then the argument of respondent 1 that the summary procedure provided in contempt matters in this Court is discriminatory inasmuch as it is a procedure entirely different from the procedure for the trial of a criminal offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure and thus it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He has referred to section 3(1) of Act 32 of 1952 that the High Court has to follow ‘the same procedure and practice’ in the matter of contempt proceedings, which, as has been pointed out by their Lordships in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case,1 is a summary procedure and has been followed under the law throughout and continues to be so under Act 32 of 1952. Article 215 of the Constitution provides that “Every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.” In a way even the Constitution has recognised the power of a Court of record to punish for contempt of Court summarily as has always been the case. It is a peculiar type of an offence which is a class by itself and therefore, it has a procedure for itself. The classification is intelligible as also the classification has rational relation to the object in that in the matter of contempt the punishment is awarded summarily for that is done not with the object of providing protection to individual Judges but in the interest of administration of justice so that the public confidence in the impartiality of the Judges be not shaken. It is this object with which the proceedings in contempt of Court have been classified as proceedings of a class by themselves with a procedure of their own. So the procedure provide for the summary trial of the contempt of Court is not violative of Article 14.

6. Another argument that has been urged by respondent 1 is that procedure is violative of Article 19(1)(a) as affecting the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression, but there is sub-article (2) of Article 19 which says that “Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause * * * * * in relation to contempt of Court.”

7. Respondent 1 has urged that the summary procedure for the offence of contempt of Court is not a reasonable restriction because it deprives the contemner of effective right to defend himself as is available in the case of other offences, but it has already been pointed out that this is an offence of a class by itself and the procedure for it is provided in the public interest for the protection of the public so that they may not lose confidence in the Courts. On this consideration it cannot be said that the procedure provided for the trial of contempt of Court in a summary way is an unreasonable restriction, as has been urged by respondent 1. In State v. Brahma Prakash . A.I.R 1950 All. 556., a similar argument was negatived by the learned Judges. This case went in appeal to the Supreme Court and is reported as Brahma Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh . A.I.R 1954 S.C 10., but the appellant in that case did not even urge this argument before their Lordships. Same view has prevailed in Bijoyananda Patnaik v. Balakrushna Kar . A.I.R 1963 Orissa 249., Rao Harnarain Singh Sheoji Singh v. Gumani Ram Arya,5 The Advocate-General Andhra Pradesh v. Shri D. Seshagiri Rao . I.L.R 1959 A.P 1282. and in the matter of Basunta Chandra Ghosh, Advocate, Patna7, thus there is no force in this argument of respondent 1 either.

8. It has then been contended by respondent 1 that this Court is not competent to proceed with these contempt proceedings. The reason given is that in section 2 of Act 32 of 1952 ‘High Court’ is defined to mean ‘the High Court for a State’ and the common High Court of Punjab and Haryana is not High Court for the State of Haryana, in which the court of the Subordinate Judge 1st Class at Karnal is situated, or for that matter not a High Court for the Union Territory of Chandigarh. In this respect reference has been made to section 89 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (Act 31 of 1966), which gives power to the State of Punjab or Haryana or to the Union Territory of Chandigarh to make the such adaptation and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient and it has been said by the respondents that no such adaptation has been made in relation to section 2 of Act 32 of 1952, which is correct. However, no such adaptation has really been necessary because this High Court is a High Court for the State of Punjab, it is a High Court for the State of Haryana and it is a High Court for the Union Territory of Chandigarh and thus it is within the definition of the expression ‘High Court’ in section 2 of Act 32 of 1952, and in any case, in view of Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897), saying that ‘the words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa’, the words ‘a State’ in section 2 of Act 32 of 1952 shall be read as ‘States’. So this argument is without substance.

9. Of the four counts in regard to which contempt of Court is alleged to have been committed by the respondents, count 2 refers to paras 9 to 18 of the transfer application made on September 13, 1965, by respondent 2 through respondent 1, in the Court of the District Judge at Karnal to obtain transfer of the case between the respondent's society and the deceased petitioner to some other Court. Briefly, the substance of what is stated in those paragraphs, which is objectionable, is that the Subordinate Judge (Mr. R.P Gaind) by his order of June 4, 1965. Annexure IV to the rejoinder of the respondents, in saying that no approach had been made to him by anybody in the case between the parties and by refusing to hold inquiry into the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, created serious apprehension in the minds of the respondents as to his motive in not ordering probe into the alleged conduct of the petitioner (defendant) and that the return of the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, was delayed for nearly three to four weeks, thus, according to the respondents, giving security to the petitioner (defendant) by what has been described by them as a collusive act of the Subordinate Judge which enabled him (the petitioner) to file his first contempt petition in the High Court on his own choosing of time and forum. The contempt of Court imputed to the respondents in this respect, so far as the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Mr. R.P Gaind, is concerned, is broadly on the basis of imputation of motive to him in not ordering probe into the contents of Annexure ‘C’ and in the delay of the return of that letter and the alleged collusive act by him in this respect to enable the petitioner to file the contempt petition. These allegations were made by the respondents in the transfer application under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure as stated. The respondents have explained that in such an application, in the nature of things, allegations personal to a presiding judicial officer have to be alleged so as to be aground for transfer. And it is said that the same were made by the respondents in good faith having regard to the circumstances, though it becomes clear from the comments of Mr. R.P Gaind, Subordinate Judge, given on the transfer application, a substantial part of which has already been reproduced above, that he was not responsible for the delay and had no motive in not ordering the inquiry as he was not approached and that it was respondent 1, who was responsible for delay. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravashankar . 1959 S.C.R 1367 at pp, 1382, 1383., there is reference to the matter of a transfer application and allegations therein against a judicial officer and the intention with which the allegations may have been made. But the consideration is in relation to the question of intention to offer insult under section 228 of the Penal Code and the discussion is confined to that aspect only. So those observations are of no assistance in the present case. Although the facts in M.Y Shareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur . 1955 1 S.C.R 757., are not parallel to the facts of the present case, but in that case their Lordships did take into consideration the mistaken view of the contemners of their rights and duties in subscribing to the transfer application by their client making aspersions against the Judges, which were said to amount to contempt of Court. The respondents have obviously taken a mistaken and a misconceived view of the facts on the basis of which they have drawn unjustified inferences, as appears clear from the comments of the learned trial Judge on the state of facts in this behalf, in regard to the manner in which the learned Subordinate Judge handled the question of the application of respondent 1 accompanying the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’. So that it becomes doubtful whether with such mistaken and misconceived approach the offence of contempt of Court in this respect can be said to have been committed by the respondents substantially and in any case, it amounts to no more than a technical contempt of which the Court does not take notice. This, however, does not mean that merely because allegations amounting to contempt of Court have been made in a transfer petition no action will betaken in a proper case. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of a case whether action is called for and an instance of such a case is Ravashankar's case. The substance of the charge under cour 3 is an indirect imputation of extraneous consideration on which Narula, J., made the order of July 6, 1965, on the first contempt petition of the petitioner, but this is shrouded in a jumble of facts and does not come out very clearly. Respondent 1 in his replies of December 6, 1965 and January 3, 1966, refers to relationship between Harbans Singh, J. and Narula, J., the fact of Harbans Singh, J.'s son having business connections with the petitioner and also the fact of Narula, J. before his coming to the Bench, having been counsel for or against the respondents. In this application of December 10, 1965, respondent 1, in addition, refers to some kind of negotiations said to have been carried on for the letting of the Delhi house of Narula, J. which respondent 1 alleges that he refused to take on rent. After referring to all these allegations respondent 1 has said that Narula, J. should not have entertained the contempt petition of the petitioner on July 6, 1965. There is then reference to paragraphs 14 and 16 from the transfer application of the respondents made on September 13, 1965, in which the respondents said that the deceased petitioner (defendant) got an order from Narula, J. on his contempt petition and then there is reference to the delay in the return of the anonymous letter. Annexure ‘C’, by the trial Judge with an allegation of his thus being a party to a collusive act to enable the deceased petitioner to file the contempt petition in the High Court on his own choosing of time and forum. The respondents have explained that by what is stated in those application all that they were pressing was that in the circumstances Narula, J. should not have passed an order on the contempt petition of the petitioner. The contents of those applications largely touch upon the conduct of deceased the petitioner (defedant) and it can only be said in an indirect way that by saying that the petitioner got an order on his contempt petition in the High Court on his own choosing of time and forum, they have in some way hinted upon Narula, J. having made the order on an extraneous consideration, which does not mean that the learned Judge did so. This, however, does not quite clearly come out, as has been stated; and as the contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings, so in this respect the respondents are entitled to the benefit of doubt. So the contempt proceedings against both the respondents on counts 2 and 3 are, in the circumstances, dropped.

10. In regard to count I referring to the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, with the application Annexure ‘B’, by respondent 1, it has been clearly stated by respondent 1 in paragraph 19 of the respondents' rejoinder, dated December 6, 1965, that he, “never received any instructions from respondent 2 to file the petition at Annexure ‘B’ or the consequential petitions”. So respondent 2 has no responsibility for that act of respondent 1. Similarly Annexure VII, a copy of the second anonymous letter, was filed with the same rejoinder of the respondents, but the rejoinder is signed by respondent 1 for himself and for respondent 2. It follows that the responsibility of filing of Annexture VII in this Court cannot directly be referred to respondent 2. In the circumstances, the contempt proceedings are dropped against respondent 2 even in regard to counts 1 and 4.

11. On count 1, the learned Deputy Advocate-General having regard to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Bhathina Ramakrishna Reddy10 and Brahma Parkash Sharma has said that so far as that count refers to Harbans Singh. J., it cannot be supported. There is under this court, however, the question of contempt of Court of Mr. R.P Gaind, Subordinate Judge 1st Class at Karnal, having been committed by the production of the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’ with the application, Annexure ‘B’ by respondent 1 on June 2, 1965. In the anonymous letter Annexure ‘C’, after reference to two witnesses named Kartar Singh and Pannu Ram as being interested in the deceased petitioner, the letter says that Sarkaria Sahib and Harbans Sihgh were putting pressure on the Subordinate Judge and the contents of the accompanying application, Annexure ‘B’, makes it clear, according to respondent 1, that the reference to those names in the anonymous letter is to Harbans Singh, J. and the Registrar of this court, Mr. Ranjit Singh Sarkaria. When the contents of the anonymous letter and the accompanying application are considered together, it is apparent on the face of those documents that the production of the same was calculated to embarrass the trial Judge and also to affect his mind and to deflect him from the strict performance of his duties in the trial of the suit between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner. There is a clear allegation in the document that the Subordinate Judge was being approached by one Judge of this Court and the Registrar in connection with the case between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner. This apparently was bound to affect the mind of the Subordinate Judge because he is an officer subordinate to the High Court and then if in this manner an imputation is made in regard to a Judge of the High Court as interfering with the administration of justice in a Subordinate Court, the subordinate Judge would not what he was to expect next even so far as he himself was concerned. It was thus patent that by the production of that anonymous letter with the application not only was the mind of the Subordinate Judge likely to be affected by it, the production of those document was calculated to embarrass him and was an attempt to influence him as a Judge in the cause the respondents' society and decased petitioner. It created an atmosphere calculated to make it difficult for the trial Judge to proceed with the with the trial of the case. It is setlled that so far as the offence of contempt of coust is concerned, assence of the matter is the tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. Any act or publication calculated to create an atmosphere in which administration of justice would be difficult (In re Subrahmanyan,11) or which is an attempt to influence a Jugde (Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd. . 1960 3 All. E.R 289.., or which might impede the due administration of justice (Arthur Reginald Perera v. The King . 1951 A.C 482 at p. 488. or which is an attempt to impair the administration of justice (Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago . A.I.R 1936 P.C 141 at p. 146.), or which is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of is judicial duties (Brahma Prakash Sharma's case at page 14), or which would affect the mind of the Judge and would deflect him from the strict performance of his duties as such (Brahma Prakash Sharma's case at page 15 and in re. Hira Lal Dixit15), is contempt of Court in the present case the production of the anonymous letter with the application by respondent 1 was not only an attempt to influence the Judge in the trial of the suit before him but it was calculated to embarrass him in and deflect him from the strict performance of his duties as a Judge in the cause. It has been contended by respondent I that the fact is that the Subordinate Judge was not at all embarrassed or affected by the production of those documents, a consideration which is irrelevant in these proceedings, because what has to be seen is whether what is done is likely or has tendency or is calculated to interfere with the due course of administration of justice and that is to maintain the public confidence in the administration of justice so that the impartiality of the Judges is not impaired. The production of those documents, as stated, created an atmosphere in the Court of the trial Judge in which due and proper administration of justice was randered difficult. At page 72 has further been urged by respondent 1 that all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which those documents were produced have to be taken into consideration as held by their Lordships in Brahma Prakash Sharma's case, at page 15. What then are the circumstances in which those documents were produced in Court? In the transfer application of September 13, 1965, respondent 2, through respondent 1, said that the suit between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner had been instituted in June 1961 but it had not reached any conclusive stage, so tired of the provicating attitude (which possibly may refer to the deceased petitioner, but the matter is not clear), the respondents' society decided to appoint respondent 1, a director of it, as its attorney to conduct the suit. The trial Judge in his comments on the allegetions in the transfer application, the details of which have already been reproduced above, said that the parties were at daggers drawn and wanted to use the litigation between them for personal vandetta that the attorney for the plaintiff society said that he was not interested in the suit so much as in the prosecution of the defendant (deceased petitioner), that the case was being conducted by a very senior and able Advocate from Ambaia but just to have a personal bettle of wits, the attorney, respondent 1, entered the field to replace the counsel and that perhaps by his personal influence respondent expected to dictate judicial orders of his own choice but that was not possible in civil Courts. In his reply to the transfer application, the deceased petitioner in paragraph 2 said that “the applicant (respondent 1) has mentioned various facts which are absolutely false and others are prevaricated. Although the petitioner, Mr. R.P Kapur, is a very high I.C.S officer, he assumes the rule of a practising lawyer, which unfortunately he is not and thereby he assumes things not permitted by law.” The reply further goes on to say that “Mr. Kapur came in first in the role of a counsel and submitted the so-called memo of appearance on 22.4.1965, couched in language unworthy of an officer and which itself was a contempt of Court. When he could not be permitted to appear like that he brought in the power of attorney signed by his wife.

12. The result of Mr. Kapur's entry on the scene has only been the innate prolongation of the proceedings resulting only from the fact that he could not judge the relevancy or irrelevancy of his questions.” After referring to the filing of the documents now under consideration the reply goes on, at another place, to say—“Mr. Kapur had done this only to overawe the Sub-Judge and the counsel and the witnesses which he had previously done by making an application under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, on 25.4.1962 alleging fabrication of documents, the genuineness of which he himself proved by producing confirmatory document from his own possession and putting the same to Shri Kartar Singh witness in his cross-examination” and at a later stage in the reply this is what was said—“Mr. Kapur was repeating various questions, to which answers had already been given and the clarification of which was on the record. As he was not a practicing lawyer, Mr. Kapur could not realise that there is a certain procedure only in examination and cross-examination of witnesses.” The only other matter that may be added to this is that the learned District Judge of Karnal, considering the transfer application said in his order that “it seems that the relations between the plaintiff's attorney (respondent 1) and Shri Sher Singh defendant (deceased petitioner) in the case are strained and that had made the conduct of the case in the Court of the Sub-Judge difficult at times. The Sub-Judge now strongly feels unhappy about this and seems to think, as his comments indicate, that the plaintiff's attorney was mainly at fault in the matter.” When all these matters are taken into consideration together it becomes clear that the entry of respondent 1 on the scene on the side of the respondents' society, as an attorney for the society to conduct the case of the plaintiff, not only created a tense atmosphere in the trial but the learned trial Judge was left in no doubt that what respondent 1 wanted was the prosecution of the deceased petitioner with not so much interest in the suit itself. It also comes out from the comments of the trial Judge that he did not succumb to the overbearing attitude of respondent 1 during the trial of the suit. It was in that atmosphere that the anonymous letter with the application was produced in the trial Court. These are the surrounding facts and circumstances in which those documents were produced and if anything, they support the conclusion that the object in the production of those documents was to influence the Judge and to impede the course of justice and it was calculated to embarrass the Judge. The fact that the Judge did not succumb to this attempt is, as I have already said, entirely besides the point. From the day those documents were produced by respondent 1 to the last day of his arguments in these proceedings there has been one theme which has run persistently and constantly and that is the position taken by respondent 1 that his main and dominant object in the production of the anonymous letter in the Court of the trail Judge was to have an inquiry and not to interfere with the due course of justice. In paragraph 10 of his application of December 10, 1965, he refers to his having had enough of Court proceedings in earlier cases in which he has been involved. With his experience he could not thus reach a conclusion that a trial Judge, as the First Class Subordinate Judge at Karnal, could order an inquiry into the allegations in regard to the conduct of a Judge of this Court. He says in his application for the return of those documents, which he made on June 12, 1965, that he was conscious of his right to approach the Vigilance Commission direct, but he should know very well that the Vigilance Commission can have no possible jurisdiction in so far as a Judge of this Court is concerned, for in his various petitions he has repeatedly referred to the provisions of the Constitution on the question of action that can be taken against a Judge on account of misbehaviour and in fact in his application of October 18, 1966, he even refers to Article 124 of the Constitution in this respect. The Vigilance Commissioner would have no jurisdiction to enter upon any such inquiry—At the hearing in these proceeding? respondent 1 said that the Subordinate Judge could well have forwarded the matter of inquiry to the Registrar of this Court, who, being himself named in the anonymous letter, would have put up the matter before either the Administration Judge or the Cheif Justice, but he seems to forget that no Judge of this Court, including the Chief Justice, can enter upon any inquiry in so far as a Judge of this Court is concerned. The reference to the provisions of the Constitution in his various petitions leaves no manner of doubt that respondent 1 could not have been unaware of this position and he has not been. In the circumstances, inference is irresistible that he produced those documents deliberately in the trial Court not with the object of having any inquiry but with the object of influencing the trial Judge in the course of the trial of the cause. Respondent 1 has kept this smoke screen of an inquiry as a shield before him throughout and he feels that with that shield in front of him he can commit contempt of Court with impunity in the manner of producing a document of the type as the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, in this case with the accompanying application, Annexure ‘B’, during the trial of the suit in which he was an attorney for the plaintiff-society of which the obvious and the patent tendency is what has already been described in detail above. Having produced the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’ in the Court, in the prayer paragraph of his application, Annexure ‘B’, respondent 1 said that “in the interest of purity of administration and especially the judicial system, the Vigilance Department or a suitable high-powered agency may be asked to inquire into the matter.” The trial Judge could not inquire into a matter in which a Judge of this Court had been brought in, nor could he order an inquiry by any other agency. This is apart from this that the prayer has been worded in a vague and a general way and not in a specific manner. Why this was done has to be considered in the circumstances in which the documents were produced. If in fact the object was an inquiry into the contents of the anonymous letter, respondent having received that letter on May 18 would not have waited for its production till June 2, 1965, when according to the deceased petitioner, in between, there were two hearings of the suit. It has not been explained why the production was delayed in this manner, except on this clear inference that respondent 1 produced it when he thought the atmosphere in the Court would be more suitable to his approach in the matter. When the trial Judge made an order on June 4, 1965, saying that he had not been approached, respondent 1 applied for the return of the document and while respondent 1 says it was the Subordinate Judge who delayed the return of the document, it is clear from the comments of the Subordinate Judge on the transfer application that he was not to blame for that. But what is more significant is that in the transfer application respondent 1, for respondent 2, has said that he was surprised by the trial Judge refusing to hold an inquiry. This is an extraordinary statement because once the Judge had categorically said that he had not been approached, there was nothing more to be done in the matter so far as he was concerned. Respondent 1 has tried to emphasise the last part of the order of the trial Judge that the latter said that respondent 1 can have further inquiry from the proper authority if he was not satisifed, but nothing turns on this because even if no such thing was stated by the trial Judge, nothing stopped respondent 1 to proceed in his own way. After that respondent 1 made every effort to get the document back and in fact in the transfer application insinuated collusion by the trial Judge with the deceased petitioner in delaying the return of the document to enable the petitioner to file the contempt petition and this is clear indication that respondent 1 realised the importance of the document and not only that, also the importance of getting the document back. And that was why that the deceased petitioner's counsel was making frantic efforts to stop the return of the document because he thought that the same might never see the light of the day. If the main object of respondent 1 was an inquiry into the contents of the anonymous letter, what stopped him to approach the proper authority under the Constitution for an inquiry? At the hearing the respondent said that he had not the original with him, but surely he cannot say so with his experience for he could have made the application with a copy and a note on the application that the original was in a Court of law. In paragraph 9 of the transfer application the reference was to a probe into the alleged conduct of the defendant, that is to say, the deceased petitioner. In the prayer clause of their parawise reply of January 4, 1966, the respondents said that the conduct of two Judges was involved. Respondent 1 in para 9 of his reply of October 24, 1966, again referred to this matter of inquiry and said that the conduct of two Judges was involved and an inquiry by a larger Bench was called for and not only this, in paragraph 10 hesaid that “two learned Judges (Harbans Singh and Narula, JJ.) committed contempt of Courts’. In paragraph 13 of his application of November, 21st, 1966, under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1207 of 1966) respondent 1 said that this Court “be please to hold an inquiry into the material on the record pertaining to Narula, J. and Harbans Singh, J. as without such inquiry it cannot be ascertained whether their was fair criticism or fair belief permitted by the law of contempt or contempt of Court”. However, in his final reply of February, 13th, 1967, in paragraph 3(c) with regard to merits he said that “it is further submitted that an enquiry in its scope was not calculated to be against a Judge but could equally be against the actions of Sher Singh the defendant in the suit or or even the petitioner herein”. These are the various stands that respondent 1 has been taking in regard to the nature and scope of the inquiry upon which he has been basing his defence throughout, obviously in anticipation of proceedings of the type as these. During the arguments in these proceedings respondent 1 said that he wanted investigation into the conduct of the deceased petitioner but not only that he also wanted an inquiry into the ramification of the anonymous letter and into the conduct of the deceased petitioner, the Judge named, the Registrar, respondent 1 himself and the author of the letter. Apparently it seems that respondent 1 is not quite clear what he wants. He wants to have some kind of a rambling inquiry into the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, but, as has been shown, at least the circumstances make it clear that as a Judge of this Court was involved, respondent 1 cannot be heard to say that he did not know that the trial Judge could do nothing in the matter except to make his own position clear, which he in fact did. It is evident that the main and the dominant purpose of the production of this document in the trial Court on June 2, 1965, was not any kind of inquiry but to influence and embarrass the Judge in the trial of the cause and to affect and deflect his mind from due performance of his duties and to interfere with due course of justice. The fact of the respondent was calculated to have those effects.

13. In this respect respondent 1 has stressed that he is entitled to an opportunity to produce evidence obviously in justification of his conduct in the production of the document in the trial Court in paragraph 9 of his Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1059 of 1966, made under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on October 18, 1966, respondent 1 said that he had a right to adduce evidence and to file an affidavit and that he would like to cross-examine the deceased petitioner with respect to the veracity of his knowledge as claimed in the affidavit in support of the contempt petition; a claim for evidence to that stage was limited in this manner. During the hearing of the arguments respondent 1 made an application for summoning of eight witnesses, two of whom are Judges of this Court, the third and the fourth are respectively the trial Judge and the Deputy Advocate-General, the fifth was a counsel for the deceased petitioner in the trial Court and the remaining three were witnesses or were intended to be witnesses at the trial. It has not been explained in what manner any one of those persons could throw any light in regard to the conduct and the object of respondent 1 in producing the anonymous letter with the accompanying application in the trial Court on June 2, 1965. On the last day of the hearing, on February 17, 1967, respondent 1 made an application which has already been reproduced above in full. The substance of the application has been that the respondent wanted to lead evidence to show whether or not the production of the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, with the application, Annexure ‘B’, was calculated or likely to impair confidence in the trial Court. He said in the application that he wanted to examine responsible public men to prove whether those documents were calculated to interfere with the course of justice in a substantial manner. During the arguments he said he wanted to examine some Advocates of Karnal that the production of those documents had not the tendency or was not calculated to interfere with the course of justice in embarrassing the trial Judge in the trial of the cause between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner or influencing him in that or impeding the course of justice. This obviously is again misconceived because it is for the Court to decide whether the documents produced in the trial Court are of that nature and character and it is not the opinion of those outside the Court in a case like this that has any meaning. Respondent 1 also said that application was merely a start and that he wanted to make a further application giving further names of respectables and Advocates of Karnal to prove what has been stated adove. That evidence apparently would be irrelevant in these proceedings. He also said during the arguments that the Court was bound to examine witnesses, whether necessary or not and it had no power to stop the production of such witnesses. Then he reiterated that the defence could neither be shut out nor anticipated and that a Court cannot ask a person what is going to be is defence and what he wishes to establish in defence. None of these propositions can obviously be accepted. Of course where a contemner wishes to defend himself he is to be given every opportunity having regard to the nature of summary proceedings in the trial of contempt matters, but the type of evidence which respondent 1 said he wanted to produce was quite irrelevant and besides the point. In this respect one of his arguments has been that why it was necessary to produce respectables and Advocates of Karnal to prove the tendency or likelihood of interference in the course of justice by the production of anonymous letter in the trial Court was that an objective conclusion could be arrived at in this respect and that the Court could not reach a subjective conclusion on this. When a Court in proceedings like these considers a matter of this type having regard to the contents of the document, like the one in question, produced in a Court during the pendency of a trial, it is utterly wrong to say that the Court reaches a conclusion subjectively and that it can only reach a conclusion objectively by the opinion of some outsiders. What the Court does in reaching its conclusion is to consider the document objectively and its likely effect or its tendency to effect the course of justice and the mind of the trial Judge before whom it is produced.

14. Another argument of respondent 1 has been that the production of the letter Annexure ‘C’, with the application, Annexure ‘B’, was insult to the trial Judge and having said this, he then immediately said that he was not prepared to say so, but the otherside, although they did not say that, really meant that. It has been nobody's case that the production of the letter in the trial Court was an insult to the trial Judge and hence the act of respondent 1 comes under section 228 of the Penal Code. It was more than an insult as has already been shown above. Respondent 1 has further pressed that in a case of this type defamation as such, as defined in section 499 of the Penal Code, has to be establised first, with an opportunity to take all defences available in defending that offence and even after that it is to be seen whether what is alleged is also contempt or not. A complete answer to this whole argument is provided by this observation of their Lordships in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy's case “What is said is, that if a libel is published against a judge in respect of his judicial functions, that also is defamation within the meaning of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and as a such libel constitutes a contempt of court, it may be said with perfect propriety that libel on a judge is punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code. We do not think that this contention can be accepted as sound. A libellous reflection upon the conduct of judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly come under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and it may be open to the judge to take steps against the libeller in the ordinary way for vindication of his character and personal dignity as a judge; but such libel may or may not amount to contempt of court. As the Privy Council observed in Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court . I.L.R 10 Cal. 109 at p. 131., ‘although contempt may include defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character’. When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law, it would certainly amount to contempt. The offence of contempt is really a wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of courts of law which exist for their good. As was said by Willmot, C.J—

‘attacks upon the judges excite in the minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations…………and whenever man's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsoever; not for the sake of the judges as private individuals but because they are the channels by which the King's justice is conveyed to the people.’

15. What is made punishable in the Indian Penal Code is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as contempt of court. If the defamation of a subordinate court amounts to contempt of court, proceedings can certainly be taken under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, quite apart from the fact that other remedy may be open to the aggrieved officer under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.”

16. There remains one other argument of respondent 1 to notice in this respect so far as this count is concerned, though same argument has been also advanced in relation to court 4. It is an attempt at plea of justification, although in Brahma Prakash Sharma's case, paragraph 19 of the judgment, their Lordships observed that “It may be that pleas of justification or privilege are not strictly speaking available to the defendant in contempt proceedings.” In spite of this it has been argued by respondent I that intention is material in such cases (Homi Rustomji Pardivala v. Sub-Inspector Baig)17, the contemner should have acted with untruth or malice (Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago) Bathina Rama Krishna Reddy v. The State of the Madras, and Revashankar's case, or with improper motive (Brahma Prakash Sharma's case), or in absence of bona fides (again Brahma Prakash Sharma's case or without prejudice Rizwan-Ul-Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh,18 or without reasonable care and caution (Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy's case) or in an unwarranted manner (Brahma Prakash Sharma's case, and Revashankar's case, or without a prima facie ground (again Revashankar's case). Respondent 1 has further urged that what he has done has been in public good and thus cannot be contempt according to Brahma Prakash Sharma's case. It has already been shown that it is not correct that the main and the dominant purpose of respondent 1 introducing the document in the trial Court was a demand for a genuine inquiry, but the purpose was to embarrass the trial Judge, to impede and interrupt the course of justice and to affect the mind of the trial Judge and to deflect him from the right course in the administration of justice in the trial of the cause between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner. In the circumstances how can respondent 1 urge that he had intention other than what is apparent from the circumstances of the case, or how was his conducts warranted, or done with reasonable care and caution, or in public interest. Although the facts of all the cases cited above are entirely different from those of the present case and the observations of their Lord-ships have to be understood having regard to the facts of each case, but even so none of these factors is, in the circumstances of this case, in favour of respondent I or supports his cause in any way. He has contended that he is entitled to lead evidence to prove all these matters to justify his conduct and in this respect relies upon some reported cases. The first case is Debi Prasad Sharma v. Emperor . A.I.R 1943 P.C 202., in which certain statement made by a District Judge about a circular issued by the Chief Justice of Allahabad led to contempt proceedings and evidence was adduced to prove whether or not the District Judge made the statement. The second such case was of Homi Rustomji Pardivala, in which the evidence was directed to whether the petition given by the petitioner in that case had or had not been received by a certain date, because it was said that by the time it was received the petitioner had already been released or was immediately due to be released. In Bathina Ramakrishna Redy's case the contemner was found not to have been able to substantiate allegation against a magistrate based on hearsay. In in re Hira Lal Dixit, the only question of evidence that arose was whether or not a pamphlet had been published and circulated in the premises of the Supreme Court. And lastly in Revashankar's case their Lordships observing that prima facie what was stated in the transfer application amounted to contempt, did not say anything in regard to the truth or otherwise of the allegations and sent the case back to the High Court for decision on merits in accordance with law. In not one of these cases was evidence allowed to be introduced in justification on the matters listed above on which respondent 1 has said that evidence should have been allowed it has already been shown that the list of witnesses filed by him and the subsquent application saying what he wanted to establish, referred to none of these matters.

17. So in far as count 1 is concerned, there is no manner of doubt that the anonymous letter, Annexure ‘C’, with the application, Annexure ‘B’ was calculated to embarrass the judge and influence him in the trial of the suit between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner. It was likely to impede the due course of justice and affect the mind of the trial Judge as also to deflect him from persuit of his duty as a Judicial officer. So on this count respondent 1 committed contempt of Court of the Court of Mr. R.P Gaind, Subordinate Judge 1st Class at Karnal.

18. As to count 4, respondent 1 produced Annexure VII, copy of another anonymous letter with the respondents' rejoinder of December 6, 1965. In this the clear statement is that “I have already informed you that pressure is being put through the High Court” and then the name of a third Judge is brought in as has already been stated above. This is a statement alleging interference by the High Court with the administration of justice in a subordinate court and this is patently calculated to impair the administration of justice by creating an impression that the High Court whose duty it is to uphold and administer Justice is itself interfering with the due course of justice. It is likely immediately to bring this Court and the administration of Justice into disrepute. The attack is on the Court as a whole and it is calculated to undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of this Court. It scandalises it in such a way as to create distrust in regard to its integrity and capacity not only to administer justice in a fair and impartial way but imputes to it interference with the impartial administration of justice in the courts below. That this amounts to contempt of Court admits of not the least possible doubt. In Rex v. Editor of the New Statesman,20 at page 302, Lord Hewart, C.J referred to this observation of Lord Russel in Reg. v. Gray, (1900) 2 Q.B 36. Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court”; in Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, a case approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Brahma Parkash Sharma's case, the Privy Council held that an attempt to impair the administration of justice was contempt of Court; in Brahma Parkash Sharma's case their Lordships observed that scandalising the Court might manifest itself in various ways but, in substance, it is an attack on the Court as a whole or without reference to particular cases casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character and ability of the judges; in In re Hira Lal Dixit's case their Lordships held that what was calculated to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the Judges was contempt of Court; and in Revashankar’ case it was observed that aspersions which scandalise the Court in such a way as to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the Court is contempt of Court. The contents of Annexure VII answer the description of the contempt of Court as in each one of the above cases. It has already been stated that respondent I cannot shield himself behind this that it is an anonymous letter for which he is not responsible, because not knowing who had sent the letter to him he should never have produced that in Court. What respondent I has said is that he has produced not only this anonymous letter but also the first one in Court and not in the bazar and with the dominant purpose of asking for an inquiry. But even the production of a letter like this in Court is calculated to create distrust in the public so far as this Court is concerned and to shake their confidence in its integrity, which brings it into disrepute and lower its authority in the estimation of the public who have resort for justice to it.

19. The contentions of respondent 1 on other matters raised have been fully considered under count 1 and the position under this count is the same on those aspect of his arguments.

20. So respondent 1 has committed contempt of Court of this Court under count 4.

21. In consequence, the two respondents are discharged in these proceedings so far as counts 2 and 3 are concerned and respondent 2 is also discharged so far as counts 1 and 4 are concerned. But respondent 1 is held guilty of contempt of Court of the Court of Mr. R.P Gaind, Subordinate Judge 1st Class at Karnal, on count 1 and of this Court on count 4. No apology has been tendered by respondent 1 for his conduct, rather he has persistently held on to what he has done. Consequently, in the matter of sentence, under count 1, for contempt of Court of the Court of Mr. R.P Gaind, Subordinate Judge 1st Class at Karnal, respondent 1 is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 150/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for ten days and on count 4, for contempt of Court of this Court, he is ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-, or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days, but he is given thirty days from today within which to make payment of the two amounts of fine.

22. A.N Grover, J.:— I agree.

23. P.C Pandit, J.:— I also agree.

24. Application allowed.