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Bhagwan Singh And Ors. v. Additional Director Of Consolidation, Punjab, Ferozepore And Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition was instituted on 22-2-1966 by Smt. Kaki and her brother Bhagwan Singh of village Khusla, and one Jagta Singh of village Fategarh Sahianwali, Tehsil Mansa.
Consolidation operations took place in village Sahianwali in 1962. On repartition, some land was allotted to the petitioners in accordance with the consolidation scheme. Surjit Singh (respondent No. 2) unsuccessfully appealed against that allotment to the Settlement Officer, Bhatinda, and his further appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolidation under Section 21(4) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (50 of 1948) was also dismissed.
Surjit Singh then made an application under Section 42 of the Act to the Additional Director of Consolidation (respondent No. 1). He did not implead the petitioners in those proceedings. The Additional Director is alleged to have illegally made changes in the "taks" of the petitioners in the presence of Kirpal Singh (son of petitioner Jagta Singh), who allegedly had no authority to represent them and had nothing to do with the land. The petitioners sought quashing of the order dated 9-12-1965 passed by respondent No. 1 and appropriate writ relief.
On 14-7-1967 respondent No. 2 (Surjit Singh) filed Civil Misc. No. 2352 of 1967, alleging that petitioner Jagta Singh had died on 26-1-1967 and that the remaining two petitioners had no present right, title or interest, rendering the writ petition not maintainable. On 17-7-1967, Sukhdev Singh and Gurcharan (Gux-charan) Singh (a minor), sons of Kirpal Singh and grandsons of the deceased Jagta Singh, filed Civil Misc. No. 2367 of 1967 seeking to be brought on the record as legal representatives of the deceased (legatees under his will). The Judge's order disposes of both these applications together.
It was conceded by counsel for respondent No. 2 and accepted by counsel for the applicants that Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh had transferred all their right, title and interest in the land by a registered sale deed dated 22-2-1966 to Kirpal Singh.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh, having transferred their rights by registered sale deed dated 22-2-1966, retained any legal right or locus standi to maintain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
- Whether proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are "proceedings in a Court of civil jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby attracting the procedural provisions of the Code (specifically Order 22, Rules 3 and 4) and Article 177 of the Indian Limitation Act.
- Whether the application of Sukhdev Singh and Gurcharan Singh to be substituted as legal representatives of the deceased petitioner Jagta Singh was time-barred (more than 90 days after death) or otherwise barred by laches, and whether the court should exercise its discretion to allow substitution in the interest of justice.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent No. 2 (Surjit Singh) — contentions
- Alleged that Jagta Singh had died on 26-1-1967 and that the remaining petitioners (Kaki and Bhagwan Singh) had no present right, title or interest; hence the writ petition was not maintainable (Civil Misc. No. 2352/1967).
- Contended that the provisions of Order 22, Rules 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 177 of the Indian Limitation Act apply to these proceedings and that the application of Sukhdev and Gurcharan for substitution, being made more than 90 days after the death, is barred by time.
- Alternatively argued that even if those provisions do not apply in terms, the application by legal representatives was made about six months after death without satisfactory explanation and should be dismissed on the ground of laches.
- It was also conceded that Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh had transferred their rights to Kirpal Singh by registered sale deed dated 22-2-1966.
Counsel for the petitioners (as stated in the opinion)
- Contended that the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 is special and not a "court of civil jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure; consequently, the provisions of Order 22 CPC have no application to writ proceedings.
- Argued that to do substantial justice the court should permit the legal representatives of Jagta Singh to continue the proceedings, and explained the delay by stating that the applicants were not aware of the institution of the writ petition by their grandfather.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Calcutta Gas Co. (Private) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 | Affirms that the existence of a legal right is the foundation for exercise of High Court jurisdiction under Article 226. | The court relied on this principle to conclude that since Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh had transferred their rights, they ceased to have any enforceable right and therefore lacked locus standi to maintain the petition. |
| Annam Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 16 | Held that an application under Article 226 is a proceeding in a Court of 'civil jurisdiction' and that Section 141 CPC is therefore attracted. | The court reviewed this view but expressly disagreed with it, describing the Andhra Pradesh High Court view as not appearing to be correct for the reasons given in the opinion. |
| Bharat Board Mills Ltd v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1957 Cal 702 | Calcutta High Court view that Article 226 is a special and limited jurisdiction and Section 141 CPC does not apply literally to writ proceedings. | The court cited this authority as representing the contrary view to Annam Adinarayana and considered it in concluding that the provisions of the CPC do not, in terms, govern Article 226 proceedings. |
| Management of Rainbow Dyeing Factory Salem v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1959 Mad 137 | Division Bench held that provisions of Order 1 CPC cannot be applied to writ proceedings under Article 226, since a writ proceeding cannot be held to be in the nature of a civil suit. | The court cited this decision in support of the proposition that writ proceedings are special and not governed in terms by the procedural code for suits. |
| Uma Shankar Rai v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, AIR 1960 All 366 | Held that writ jurisdiction is special, for enforcement of an individual right, and Order 1 CPC cannot be applied to such proceedings. | The court relied on this reasoning to support the view that technical provisions of the CPC do not govern Article 226 proceedings, while still allowing the court to apply underlying principles where appropriate. |
| Revenue Patwaris Union, Punjab v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 Punj 55 | Division Bench held that similar individual grievances do not provide basis for a joint writ petition, and by implication that relevant provisions of the CPC do not apply as such to writ proceedings. | The court cited it as additional authority indicating that CPC provisions do not as such apply to writ proceedings. |
| Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, AIR 1965 All 517 | Division Bench held that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code do not govern a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. | The court referenced this decision as part of the jurisprudential context supporting the non-application of CPC procedural rules to writ proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a sequence of legal determinations:
- Locus of Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh: Applying the principle that the existence of a legal right is foundational to the High Court's exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 (as illustrated by the Calcutta Gas Co. authority), the court held that because these two petitioners had transferred all their rights by a registered sale deed dated 22-2-1966 to Kirpal Singh, they "ceased to have any right, interest or title in the subject-matter" and therefore had no locus standi to maintain the petition.
- Applicability of CPC procedural provisions to Article 226 proceedings: The court examined conflicting decisions. It noted the Andhra Pradesh decision (Annam Adinarayana) treating Article 226 proceedings as proceedings in a Court of civil jurisdiction and thereby attracting Section 141 CPC, and contrasted that with several other High Court decisions (Calcutta, Madras, Allahabad, Punjab, etc.) which held that the CPC provisions do not, in terms, apply to writ proceedings because writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is special and not in the nature of a civil suit.
- The court's view: The judge expressed disagreement with the Andhra Pradesh High Court's approach and held that a High Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be said to be a "Court of civil jurisdiction" for the purposes of importing the procedural provisions of the CPC by Section 141. The reasoning emphasized that writ jurisdiction is intended to provide a speedy and efficacious remedy, and that importing the elaborate and technical rules of Civil Procedure would defeat that purpose.
- Distinction between technical provisions and underlying principles: Although the court held CPC provisions do not govern writ proceedings in terms, it nevertheless stated that the High Court may, in appropriate cases, apply the principles underlying provisions such as Order 22, Rules 3 and 4 (relating to substitution) in the exercise of its discretion on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience.
- Application of discretion to the facts: Turning to the applicants Sukhdev and Gurcharan (grandsons and alleged legal representatives of deceased Jagta Singh), the court examined whether equity favoured substitution. It found no such equity: Jagta Singh died on 26-1-1967, but Kirpal Singh (his son) and the grandsons "slept over the matter" and made no attempt to be substituted until the abatement point was raised by respondent No. 2 on 14-7-1967. The substitution application was filed on 17-7-1967. The court found no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The assertion that the applicants were unaware of the proceedings was rejected because Kirpal Singh had been actively prosecuting the matter before the consolidation authorities and was present when the impugned order was passed and that the order purportedly was made with Kirpal's consent.
- Exercise of discretion: Given the delay, lack of satisfactory explanation, the admitted presence and participation of Kirpal Singh in prior proceedings, and the absence of equity in favour of the applicants, the court refused to exercise its discretion to allow substitution.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding:
The preliminary objections in Civil Misc. No. 2352 of 1967 succeed; Civil Misc. No. 2367 of 1967 (application for substitution by Sukhdev Singh and Gurcharan Singh) is dismissed; and, consequentially, the writ petition itself fails and is dismissed.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- Because Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh had transferred their rights prior to these proceedings, they were found to lack locus standi and cannot maintain the petition.
- The court held that the technical procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not, in terms, govern writ proceedings under Article 226; however, the court may apply the underlying principles (for example, in relation to substitution) in the exercise of its equitable discretion.
- On the facts, the court declined to exercise such equitable discretion to allow substitution for the deceased petitioner due to delay, lack of satisfactory explanation, and the conduct of the deceased's representatives (presence and participation of Kirpal Singh in earlier proceedings).
- No order as to costs was made.
Note: This summary is confined to the matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not extend beyond the text supplied.
ORDER R.S. Sarkaria, J.
1. This is a writ petition instituted on 22-2-1966, by Smt. Kaki and her brother Bhagwan Singh, of village Khusla, and one Jagta Singh of village Fategarh Sahianwali, Tehsil Mansa.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are, that consolidation operations took place in village Sahianwali in 1962. On repartition, some land was allotted to the petitioners in accordance with the consolidation scheme. Surjit Singh, respondent 2, unsuccessfully appealed against that allotment to the Settlement Officer, Bhatinda. His further appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolidation under Section 21 (4) of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (50 of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). was also dismissed.
Surjit Singh, then, made an application under Section 42 erf the Act to the Additional Director of Consolidation (respondent No. 1). He did not implead the petitioners therein. This Additional Director illegally made changes in the 'taks' of the petitioners in the presence of Kirpal Singh, son of Jagta Singh, petitioner, who, it is alleged, had no authority to represent them and had nothing to do with the land in question. On these facts, the petitioners prayed that the order, dated 9-12-1965, passed by respondent No. 1, be quashed, and an appropriate writ order or direction issued.
3. On 14-7-1967, Surjit Singh, respondent No. 2, filed an application (C.M- No. 2352 erf 1967) alleging that Jagta Singh, one of the petitioners, had died on 26-1-1967, while the other two petitioners had no present right, title and interest in the land in question, and, consequently, the writ petition was no longer maintainable. On receiving notice of this application, on 17-7-1967, Sukhdev Singh and Gux-charan Singh (minor), sons of Kirpal Singh, i.e., grandsons of Jagta Singh, deceased (petitioner), made an application (Civil Misc. No. 2367 of 1967), praying that in the interest of justice, they may be brought on the record as legal representatives of Jagta Singh, deceased, being legatees under a will made by him. This order will dispose of both these applications,
4. The learned counsel for Surjit Singh, Singh, respondent 2, contends, and the learned counsel for Gurcharan Singh and Sukhdev Singh, applicants, concedes, that Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh had transferred all their right, title and interest in the land in dispute, by a registered sale deed, dated 22-2-1966, to Kirpal Singh.
5. It is well settled that the existence of a legal right it the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The legal right that can be enforced under Article 226, must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief, though in the case of some of the writs, like habeas corpus or quo (sic) this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this point is reported as AIR 1962 SC 1044, Calcutta Gas Co. (Private), Ltd. v. State of West Bengal. Since Mst. Kaki and Bhagwan Singh, petitioners, because of the admitted transfer, ceased to have any right, interest or title in the subject-matter of this petition, they have no locus statidi to maintain it.
6. As regards the case of Jagta Singh, deceased, petitioner, the learned counsel for Sur-jit Singh, respondent, contends that the provisions of Order 22, Rules 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 177 of the Indian Limitation Act apply to these proceedings; and that the application of Sukhdev Singh and Gur-charan Singh for being brought on record, having been made more than 90 days after the death of Jagta Singh, is barred by time. In the alternative, it is argued that even if the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not, in terms, apply to those writ proceedings, the application by the legal representatives of the deceased Having been made about six months after the death of the deceased without any satisfactory explanation of the delay, should be dismissed on the score of laches alone.
7. On the other hand, Mr. Surjit Singh, counsel for the petitioner, contends that the jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Article 226 of the Constitution, is a special type of jurisdiction and in the instant case, the impugned orders were not passed by "any Court of civil jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, consequently, the provisions of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code, had no application. This Court, in order to do substantial justice, should allow the legal representatives of Jagta Singh, deceased, to continue these proceedings. The delay, in making the application, according to the counsel, occurred because the applicants were not aware of the institution of this writ petition by Jagta Singh, deceased.
8. The aforesaid contentions resolve themselves first, into the issue, whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a 'proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction' within the contemplation of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Annam Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 16, that Court has taken the view that an application under Article 226 is a proceeding in a Court of 'civil jurisdiction, and Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, therefore, directly attracted. The Calcutta High Court, however, has taken a different view According to that Court, the jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Article 226 is a special and limited jurisdiction. section 141 of the code, therefore, does not apply literally to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution (See Bharat Board Mills, Ltd v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner AIR 1957 Cal 702). In Management of Rainbow Dyeing Factory Salem v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1959 Mad 137, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has also taken the view that the provisions of Order 1 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be applied to writ proceedings under Article 226, on the strength of the rule laid down by section 141 of that code inasmuch as a writ proceeding cannot be held to be in the nature of a civil suit.
9. In Uma Shankar Rai v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, Lucknow, AIR 1960 All 366, it was held that the writ jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction and is for the enforcement of an individual right and there can be no question of the application of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to such proceedings. Similarly, in Revenue Patwaris Union, Punjab v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 Punj 55, the Division Bench consisting of Gosain and Grover, JJ., held that the fact that the relief prayed for by the several individuals each of whose individual right is alleged to have bean invaded improperly by the impugned order, is grounded on a common objection does not afford any basis for a joint writ petition by several petitioners, aggrieved by similar orders.
By implication, it was held that the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code did not as such apply to these writ proceedings. Recently, in Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co., Tantanpara v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U. P., Lacknow, AIR 1965 All 517, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code do not govern a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
10. If I may say so, with respect, the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court does not appear to be correct. What is provided in Section 141 to, that the procedure laid down in the Code in regard to suits is to be followed so far as it can be, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. A High Court, when it exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot in my opinion, be said to be a Court of civil jurisdiction. This special jurisdiction of a High Court aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy, 'to a person' whose legal or constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules of Civil Procedure laid down in the Code, were to be imported through section 141 of the code into these writ proceedings, their very purpose is likely to be defeated by their becoming bogged in procedural delays. In short, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not, in terms, govern writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
11. This Court will, however, apply the principles as distinguished from the technical provisions of Order 22, Rules 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to substitution in appropriate cases in the exercise of its discretion on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience. This further raises the question, whether in the present case, then it any equity in favour of Sukhdev Singh and Gurcharan Singh, grandsons of Kirpal Singh, deceased, in my opinion, the answer to this question must be an emphatic 'no'. Jagta Singh, deceased, died as far back as 26-1-1967. His son Kirpal Singh and his grandsons, Sukhdev Singh and Gurcharan Singh, petitioners, who claim under a will left by the deceased, slept over the matter.
They made no attempt whatever to get themselves substituted in place of the deceased till the question of abatement was raised by respondent No. 2 in his petition on 14-7-1967. The application for substitution was made on 17-7-1967, No explanation worth the name of this delay in making the application, is coming forth. Counsel, however, says that the applicants were not aware of these proceedings instituted by their grandfather. This, on the very face of it appears to be incorrect. One of the admitted facts in this case is, that Kirpal Singh, son of the deceased and the father of the petitioners, was prosecuting these proceedings before the consolidation authorities, He was present when the impugned order was passed under Section 42 of the Act by the Additional Director of Consolidation. Indeed, that order purports to have been made with the consent of Kirpal Singh. I am, therefore, not prepared to believe that the petitioners, one of whom is a major, were not aware of these proceedings instituted by the deceased jointly with others.
12. The Court is, therefore, loath to put a premium on this procrastination, laxity and negligence on the part of the petitioners, and refuses to exercise its discretion in their favour.
13. For all the reasons aforesaid, prelimi nary objections raised in Civil Misc. No. 2352 of 1967 succeed, and Civil Misc. No. 2367 of 1967, filed by Sukhdev Singh and Gurcharan Singh, is dismissed. As a result of the deci sion of the preliminary objections, the writ peti-
tior. automatically fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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