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Smt. Parvati Devi v. Tibbia College Board And Anr

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Jan 4, 1966
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Parvati Devi (the appellant) occupied a quarter in the Tibbia College Hostel compound, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Her husband, Kamal Nain, had been a compounder employed by the Tibbia College Board; he died on 6 June 1959. Two days later Parvati Devi obtained a temporary appointment as an Aya and was allotted the disputed quarter on the condition that she would vacate the quarter if she did not continue in service. She accepted that condition.

Towards the end of December (year not explicitly repeated in the opinion) the department in which she was employed was abolished and her temporary appointment was cancelled. The Tibbia College Board (respondent No. 1) applied to the Rent Controller under Sections 14 and 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 seeking eviction on several grounds: (1) the quarter was given as co-residence while she was an Aya and she was liable to vacate if not finally appointed; (2) her services had been terminated but she failed to vacate; (3) she had sublet or parted with possession without consent; and (4) the premises were bona fide required by the Board for the residence of its employees.

The parties compromised before the Rent Controller and Parvati Devi admitted the Board's claims. An eviction order was passed by the Additional Rent Controller on 28 September 1962; execution was stayed for one year and, during that period, she was to pay damages for use and occupation at Rs. 10 per month.

Pursuant to Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, the Tibbia College Board made an application to the Competent Authority for permission to execute the eviction. The Competent Authority (respondent No. 2) granted the permission (impugned order dated 6 June 1964, referred to as Annexure 'A'), noting that although Parvati Devi could be presumed poor, the Board — as a public institution providing residential accommodation as an amenity to employees — was entitled to the permission, since otherwise houses of public institutions might increasingly be occupied by non-employees. The appellant moved a writ petition under Article 226 challenging that order; the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the Single Judge's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Competent Authority, in deciding an application under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, must give controlling or exclusive weight to the tenant's poverty and lack of alternative accommodation (as read by the appellant from the Supreme Court's decision in Jyoti Pershad), or whether the Competent Authority may weigh other considerations, including the grounds on which the eviction order was made.
  2. Whether the presence of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (permitting eviction where premises are required bona fide by a public institution for the use of its employees) affects the Competent Authority's discretion under Section 19 in cases involving public institutions maintaining residential accommodation for employees.
  3. Whether the subsequent amendment to Section 19 (by the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964) materially alters the Competent Authority's discretion in the manner contended for by the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. B. C. Misra, relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi (AIR 1961 S.C. 1602), arguing that the Supreme Court established a principle requiring the Competent Authority under Section 19 to consider the matter primarily from the tenant's point of view (i.e., the tenant's poverty and lack of alternative accommodation), and that this consideration should prevail even if eviction had been ordered on any of the grounds in Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
  • The appellant's counsel also pointed out that Section 19 had been amended by Section 10 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964 (which came into force in February 1965), and relied on the amended wording (specifically the clause requiring consideration of whether alternative accommodation within the tenant's means would be available) as supportive of the contention that the tenant's plight must weigh heavily in the Competent Authority's decision.

Respondent / Competent Authority's Position (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The Competent Authority observed that although Parvati Devi was an illiterate widow and could be presumed poor, the Tibbia College Board — being a public institution that provided residential accommodation as an amenity to its employees — was entitled to permission to execute the eviction. The Authority reasoned that if protection under Section 19 were afforded to ex-employees generally, public-institution-owned housing might become occupied by non-employees, defeating the institution's purpose in maintaining such accommodation.
  • The learned Single Judge accepted the view of the Competent Authority and dismissed the appellant's writ petition; the appellate court in this opinion concurs with that reasoning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 S.C. 1602 Explained the policy and purpose of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act: the protection under Section 19 is intended to enable poor tenants without other accommodation to remain until alternative provision is made; the Court held that Section 19 was not violative of Article 14 and provided sufficient guidance to the Competent Authority. The court considered Jyoti Pershad carefully and rejected the appellant's broader reading that Jyoti Pershad laid down an inflexible rule requiring the Competent Authority to prioritize the tenant's poverty over all other considerations. The court held that Jyoti Pershad does not preclude the Competent Authority from considering the nature of the eviction ground (for example, certain grounds in Section 14 where statutory conditions or remedies exist) or the special context of public institutions under Section 22.
Vishendas v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1963 Punjab 492 Was cited as a Single Bench decision noting that the Competent Authority and appellate authority had not kept in view criteria from Jyoti Pershad. The court observed that Vishendas does not assist the appellant because that decision merely recorded that the authorities had failed to apply the criteria from Jyoti Pershad; it does not contradict the court's construction that Jyoti Pershad does not impose the extreme rule advanced by the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several steps, each grounded in the statutory provisions and the authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. The court first rejected the appellant's submission that Jyoti Pershad established an absolute or inflexible principle requiring the Competent Authority under Section 19 to consider only the tenant's poverty and to disregard hardship to the landlord or the underlying grounds for eviction. The court emphasized that Jyoti Pershad arose in a different factual context (relating to demolition and reconstruction under a different rent-control provision) and that the Supreme Court there was addressing an Article 14 challenge and the general policy of the Slum Areas Act.
  2. The court observed that Section 19, as originally enacted, required the Competent Authority to make such summary enquiry and either grant or refuse permission; only refusals originally required a brief statement of reasons under subsection (4) (as originally worded). The later amendment (by the 1964 Amendment Act) introduced explicit factors to be taken into account, including whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available, but the court held that this amendment did not convert that factor into an overriding rule mandating refusal of permission whenever alternative accommodation was lacking.
  3. The court then turned to the character of the eviction order sought to be executed. It explained that the various grounds in Clauses (a) to (l) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act are not of equal character and cannot be treated identically when the Competent Authority exercises its discretion under Section 19. The court gave examples:
    • If eviction was ordered because the tenant caused substantial damage (Clause (j)), and the tenant failed to comply with an order to repair or pay compensation (as permitted under Sub-section (10) of Section 14), then the Competent Authority should not be expected to refuse permission merely because the tenant is poor.
    • If eviction was ordered under Clause (k) (tenant's contravention of conditions imposed by Government/Development Authority/Municipal Corporation), Sub-section (11) supplies protective measures (time to comply or pay compensation) and the Competent Authority cannot be taken to nullify those statutory conditions by refusing permission simply on grounds of poverty.
    • Clause (l) (landlord requires premises to carry out building work at the instance of Government or development authorities) likewise involves public improvement schemes which should not be stalled solely because the tenant is poor.
  4. The court further distinguished the present case from Jyoti Pershad on the ground that Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (which permits eviction where the landlord is a public institution and premises are required bona fide for the use of its employees or for the furtherance of its activities) was not in issue in Jyoti Pershad. The court accepted the Single Judge's observation that accommodation maintained by a public institution for its servants is ancillary to the institution's activities and is not maintained for profit; if ex-employees were uniformly protected from eviction in such cases, institutions could lose the ability to provide the amenity of staff accommodation.
  5. On the amendment to Section 19 by the 1964 Act, the court noted that clause (a) (availability of alternative accommodation within tenant's means) was added in view of Jyoti Pershad, but emphasized that it remains only one factor among others to be considered by the Competent Authority. Also noted was the asymmetry in the appeal provision (Section 20) that gives a right of appeal only to persons aggrieved by refusal to grant permission, not to landlords aggrieved by grants of permission; the court treated this as significant in assessing legislative design.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts, the court agreed with the Competent Authority and the Single Judge that the Board (a public institution) was entitled to the permission to execute the eviction in the circumstances of this case, and that the Competent Authority did not misapply Section 19 or fail to consider relevant factors.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The court upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing Parvati Devi's writ petition and affirmed the Competent Authority's grant of permission under Section 19 to execute the eviction order obtained by the Tibbia College Board.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • As a practical concession, the appellant was allowed a period of one month from the date of the judgment in which to vacate the quarter.

Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The court did not announce any novel legal principle overriding or expanding the Supreme Court's guidance in Jyoti Pershad; rather, it interpreted Jyoti Pershad as providing guidance but not an absolute rule that would prevent the Competent Authority from taking account of the nature of the eviction ground or the special position of public institutions under Section 22.
  • The opinion indicates that Section 19 (even as amended) requires the Competent Authority to balance factors (including availability of alternative accommodation within the tenant's means) and does not convert any single factor into a determinative rule in all cases.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal by Parvati Devi, a tenant of a quarter in the Tibbia College Hostel Compound. Karol Bagh, New Delhi, and is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing her civil writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in which her prayer was that the order of respondent No. 2 (copy Annexure 'A') dated 6th of June 1964, be quashed.

2. That order was passed under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act No 96 of 1956 -- herein after to be referred to as the Act) on the application of the management of the Tibbia College Board, Delhi (respondent No. 1 and the only contesting respondent to the petition) for eviction of the petitioner-appellant That application (copy Annexure R-1) was under Sections 14 and 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act No. 59 of 1958) There is no dispute about the facts, which as found by the learned single Judge, are as follows: Parvati Devi's husband Kamal Nain was a compounder in the hospital under the Tibbia College Board. He died on the 6th of June, 1959 and two days after his death the appellant made an application (copy Annexure R-4) for being allowed to work as an Aya for one or two months. She got a temporary appointment of an Aya and was allotted the quarter in dispute on the condition that if she did not continue in service she would have to vacate the quarter. This condition was accepted by her.

Towards the end of December respondent No. 1 abolished the department in which the petitioner-appellant was temporarily employed and hence her appointment was cancelled and she was asked to vacate the quarter On her failing to do so, the Rent Controller was moved by an application under Sections 14 and 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (copy annexure R-1) for her eviction and the grounds on which her eviction was sought were as follows:--

1. That the quarter had been given out Co-residence to Parvati Devi as she was an Aya in the temporary employment of the Tibbia College Board, but she was not to pay any monthly rent and was liable for the electric and water charges and the condition was that she was liable to vacate the quarter in case she was not finally appointed and her services were terminated by the Board:

2. That Parvati Devi's services were actually terminated but she had failed to vacate the quarter:

3. That she had sublet or parted with the possession of the premises without the knowledge or consent of the Board; and

4. That the premises were bona fide required by the Tibbia College Board, which was a corporate body, for the residence of its employees.

As established from the document placed on the record (copy Annexure R-2/A) and as found by the learned Single Judge, the parties compromised and Parvati Devi admitted that the claim of the Board on the grounds mentioned in the petition was true and correct and an order of eviction against her be passed. The execution, however, was not to be taken out for one year and during that period of one year Parvati Devi was liable to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. These terms were embodied in the eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller on the 28th of September. 1962.

3. Thereafter, as required by Section 19 of the Act. the Tibbia College Board put in the application (copy Annexure R-2). It was on that application that the impugned order was passed and the Competent Authority (respondent No. 2) after narrating the facts observed that Parvati Devi being an illiterate widow of a compounder could be presumed to be poor but all the same the Tibbia College Board was entitled to the permission prayed for because as a public institution it had provided residential accommodation for allotment to its employees and if the protection envisaged by Section 19 of the Act be afforded to the ex-employees then what would happen in a few years time would be that most of the houses owned by the public institutions would be occupied by the non-employees.

4. The learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal has approved the view taken by the Competent Authority and Mr. B. C. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant, has pressed before us the same argument which was addressed to the learned Single Judge. This is based on what he considers to be the policy and purpose of the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 S.C. 1602. That was a case in which petitioner Jyoti Pershad had obtained decrees from Civil Courts for eviction of the tenants on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(g) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, that is, the house was old and required to be demolished and reconstructed. He then made applications under Section 19 of the Act for permission to execute the decrees for eviction against the tenants which had been rejected by the Competent Authority on the ground that if the decrees were allowed to be executed the tenants would be thrown out and they being very poor it would be impossible for them to get accommodation in the reconstructed building.

The attack before the Supreme Court to the validity of the order of the Competent Authority under the Act was made on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution, the ground being that Section 19 of the Act did not lay down the guiding principle to be considered by the Competent Authority while deciding whether it should or should not grant the permission for eviction sought by the landlord. It was while considering this objection that their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the observations (at page 1611). which have been relied upon by Mr. B. C. Misra and are follows:--

"Obviously, if the protection that is afforded is read in the context of the rest of the Act, it is clear that it is to enable the poor who have no other place to go to. and who if they were compelled to go out, would necessarily create other slums in the process and live perhaps in less commodious and more unhealthy surroundings than those from which they were evicted, to remain in their dwellings until provision is made for a better life for them elsewhere. Though therefore, the Act fixes no time limit during which alone the restraint on eviction is to operate, it is clear from the policy and purpose of the enactment and the object which it seeks to achieve that this restriction would only be for a period which would be determined by the speed with which the authorities are able to make other provisions for affording the slum dweller-tenants better living conditions. The Act. no doubt, looks at the problem not from the point of view of the landlord, his needs, the money he has sunk in the house and the possible profit that he might make if the house were either let to other tenants or was reconstructed and let out. but rather from the point of view of the tenants who have no alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the open if an order for eviction were passed. The Act itself contemplates eviction in cases.

"Where on the around of the house being unfit for human habitation it has to be demolished either singly under Section 7 or as one of a block of buildings under Chapter IV. So long therefore as a building can, without great detriment to health or safety, permit accommodation, the policy of the enactment would seen to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him.

In view of the foregoing we consider that there is enough guidance to the Competent Authority in the use of his discretion under Section 19(1) of the Act and we, therefore, reject the contention that Section 19 is obnoxious to the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution."

5. What Mr. B. C. Misra seeks to gather from these observations is that the Supreme Court laid down an inflexible principle that while dealing with an application under Section 19 the Competent Authority is to consider the matter only from the point of view of the tenant and is not concerned with there being any hardship to the landlord if the permission sought for is refused or with the grounds on which the order for eviction had been made. According to his submission, it would not matter in the slightest if eviction had been ordered under any of the grounds (a) to (1) as given in Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958.

6. I, however, do not consider that any such general principle, as submitted by Mr. Misra, has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and in fact they were considering the matter from the angle as to whether the impugned legislation was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution or not, Section 19, as originally enacted, merely provided that after making such summary enquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit the Competent Authority shall by order in writing either grant such permission or refuse to grant such permission and under Sub-section (4) it was only when the Competent Authority refused to grant the permission that it was required to record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal. If one looks at the various provisions in Clauses (a) to (1) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it would be obvious that they cannot all be treated at par while the Competent Authority is considering whether permission to execute the decree or order be given or not.

For instance, one of the grounds for eviction as given in Clause (j) is that the tenant has caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises. Sub-section (10) of Section 14 provides that if the tenant within such time as may be specified by the Controller, carries out repairs to the damage or pays to the landlord such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct then the order for eviction would not be made. Now suppose that in spite of the order of the Controller the tenant has neither repaired the damage nor paid compensation to the landlord and the Controller, therefore, orders his eviction would the Competent Authority be competent to refuse permission under Section 19 merely because the tenant is poor? The answer to this question should, I think, be in the negative and the same observations would apply, and perhaps with even greater force, to any order of eviction made by the Controller on the ground mentioned in CLAUSE (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14.

Under Clause (k) the ground is that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate. Sub-section (11) of Section 14 provides that no order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on this ground if the tenant within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Controller complies with the condition imposed on the landlord by any of the authorities referred to in that clause or pays to that authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct. The observations of the Supreme Court, which are relied upon by Mr. Misra, could not surely be interpreted in a way to make ineffective the conditions imposed on the landlord by the specified authorities.

Clause (1) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Article 1958, is as follows:--

"That the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme and that such building work cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated."

Here again, the mere fact of poverty of the tenant could not stay in the way of blocking the improvement scheme or development scheme made by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that Section 19, as originally enacted, had been amended by Section 10 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964 which came into force in February 1965, that is, after the date of the order (copy Annexure 'A') Sub-section (4) as originally enacted has now become Sub-section (5) and the original Sub-section (4) has been substituted as follows: --

"(4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under Sub-section (3). the competent authority shall take into account the following factors, namely:-- (a) Whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; (b) Whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas: (c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed."

clause (a) of sub-section (4) as it exists now was framed in view of the judgment of fee Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad's Case, but by the amendment the position has not been materially altered because even now the question, whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted, is only one of the matters which are to be taken into account by the Competent Authority, and this section does not lay down the extreme proposition put forward by Mr. Misra that in all cases where alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant could not be available to him the Competent Authority must refuse the permission. It is also significant that under Section 20, as it originally stood, as well as under Section 20 as amended, the right of appeal is conferred only on the person who is aggrieved by an order of the Competent Authority refusing to grant the permission for eviction and there is no right of appeal if permission for evicting the tenant is granted to the landlord.

8. In connection with the interpretation of Section 19 the learned counsel for the appellant also cited a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Vishendas v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1963 Punjab 492 This was in fact a writ petition by the landlord against the rejection of his application under Section 19 of the Act by the Competent Authority, whose order had been maintained in appeal also under Section 20. All that the learned Judge said was that while dealing with the case the Competent Authority as well ass the appellate Authority under the Act had not kept in view the criteria laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 S.C 1602 at p. 1611. The case cited, therefore, does not advance the matter so far as the appellant is concerned.

9. It must further be remembered that the application by the Tibbia College Board before the Rent Controller was not only under Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, but also under Section 22, which is as follows: --

"Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the ease of public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Controller is satisfied -- (a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when, he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises; or (c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises; or (d) that the premises are required bone fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation. -- For the purpose of this section, 'public institution' includes any educational institution, 'library, hospital and charitable dispensary."

The provisions of section 22 did not arise for consideration at all in Jyoti Pershad's case AIR 1961 SC 1602. The learned Single Judge rightly observed that

"the facts of Jyoti Pershad's case AIR 1961 SC 1602 had no relation to the situation in the instant case because the residential accommodation provided by an institution as respondent No. 1 is maintained not for the purpose of letting out for profit and gain but only as an ancillary to the institution so as to provide an amenity to its servants. If the argument for the petitioner were to succeed and it should so happen that a considerable number of employees of such an institution were either to resign or were to be dismissed, an impossible situation will arise in this that the institution would lose such accommodation for all practical purposes and would not be able to pursue the purpose for which the accommodation was being maintained. In other words, the institution would not be able to provide any such amenity to its employees."
With these observations, we are in entire agreement.

10. The result, therefore, is that the order of the learned Single Judge is upheld and the appeal dismissed with costs. However, on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, she is allowed a period of one month from today to vacate the quarter.