- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Tirloki Nath Shambhu Nath v. The State .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
House No. 345 at Naya Bans, Delhi — formerly vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property — was purchased by Parshotam Das at public auction. Parshotam Das obtained possession and sued for ejectment of Tirloki Nath (a tenant) and others. A decree of ejectment was granted in favour of Parshotam Das.
Because the property lay in a slum area, execution of the decree required prior written permission of the "competent authority" under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (the Act). Parshotam Das applied to the competent authority for that permission. In those proceedings Tirloki Nath asserted that Dev Raj (the co-accused) was occupying a portion of the house as his sub-tenant and produced documents showing rent payments of Rs. 6 per mensem; Parshotam Das denied this.
The competent authority rejected Tirloki Nath's objections, held that execution proceedings could continue, and found the documents produced on behalf of Tirloki Nath to be forged. The matter was reported to the police, investigated, and Tirloki Nath and Dev Raj were sent up for trial under Sections 465, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
Before the trial Magistrate the accused applied that there was a bar to the Magistrate taking cognizance under Clause (c) of Section 195(1) CrPC because no complaint had been filed by the competent authority under the Act. The trial Court dismissed that application; the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, affirmed that order on revision. Tirlolci Nath filed a criminal revision in the High Court challenging the order of the Additional Sessions Judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the "competent authority" appointed under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 is a "Court" for the purposes of Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).
- Whether Clause (c) of Section 195(1) CrPC, which bars taking cognizance of certain offences except on the written complaint of a Court, prevents the trial Magistrate from taking cognizance of offences alleged to arise from documents produced before the competent authority under the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the application before the trial Magistrate)
- The accused contended that Clause (c) of Section 195(1) CrPC applied because the alleged forgery concerned documents that had been produced in proceedings before the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act.
- Accordingly, the accused argued the trial Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offences unless the complaint in writing was made by the competent authority (or a Court to which it is subordinate), as required by Clause (c) of Section 195(1).
The opinion records that Mr. Arora appeared for the petitioner and Mr. Sharma for the State, but the text does not contain a detailed account of any further specific arguments advanced by the State counsel in opposition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 | Distinction between a Court and a quasi-judicial tribunal; authority lacking procedural safeguards (summary inquiry, no right to insist on adducing evidence or summoning witnesses) is not a "Court" for the purpose of Section 195 of the CrPC. | The Court relied on this authority to analogize the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act to the returning officer considered in that case and to conclude that the competent authority does not possess the essential attributes of a Court for the purposes of Section 195(1)(c) CrPC. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the protective purpose of Clause (c) of Section 195(1) CrPC: to guard against irresponsible private prosecutions in matters affecting the administration of justice. The provision operates only where an alleged offence is committed by a party to "any proceeding in any Court" in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding.
The central legal question was whether the "competent authority" under the Slum Areas Act qualifies as a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195(1)(c). The opinion examined the statutory definition of "competent authority" (Section 2(c) of the Act) and the nature of the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act.
The text of Section 19 was analysed: although the competent authority must give the tenant an opportunity to be heard and may make an inquiry into the circumstances, that inquiry is expressly of a summary nature and "as it thinks fit." From this statutory design the Court concluded that parties have no right to insist on producing evidence, summoning witnesses, or compelling production of documents before the competent authority. Those procedural limitations show that the competent authority lacks essential attributes of a Court.
The Court emphasised the distinction between quasi-judicial tribunals and Courts: a Court is charged to decide disputes in a judicial manner and to declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment, which entails an obligation to decide on consideration of evidence adduced and according to law; it also affords parties the right to be heard and to adduce evidence. The Court found support for that distinction in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956 SC 153), where the Supreme Court held that a returning officer conducting summary enquiries under the Representation of the People Act was not a Court for the purpose of Section 195.
Applying that precedent and the statutory features of Section 19, the Court concluded that the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act is a quasi-judicial body that does not possess all the attributes of a "Court" for the purposes of Section 195(1)(c) CrPC.
Consequently, because the competent authority is not a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195(1)(c), the statutory bar in Clause (c) does not apply to the present prosecutions; there is no requirement that the complaint be in writing by the competent authority before the trial Magistrate can take cognizance of the offences alleged (Sections 465, 471 and 120-B IPC in this case).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petition was dismissed and the court held that the competent authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 is not a "Court" for the purposes of Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 CrPC; accordingly, Clause (c) does not bar the trial Magistrate from taking cognizance of the present offences.
Direct implications for the parties: The trial Magistrate is not precluded by Section 195(1)(c) from taking cognizance of the offences allegedly arising out of documents produced before the competent authority; the accused's revision against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge is dismissed.
The opinion does not describe any broader legal consequences or claim to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying the principle from the cited Supreme Court authority to the statutory scheme of the Slum Areas Act; the decision's immediate practical effect pertains to the disposition of this revision and the ability of the trial Magistrate to proceed.
1. The question as to whether the competent authority appointed under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act (No. 96 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), constituted a Court for the purpose of Section 195 of the Cr PC, arises for determination in this criminal revision filed by Tirlolci Nath against the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, affirming on revision the order of the trial Court. It has arisen in the following circumstances:—
House No. 345 situate at Naya Bans, Delhi, which previously vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property, was purchased by Parshotam Das in a public auction. After obtaining possession of the house, Parshotam Das filed a suit for ejectment from the house in question against Tirloki Nath and others. Tirloki Nath, it may be stated, was residing in a portion of the house as a tenant. In the aforesaid suit a decree was awarded in favour of Parshotam Das against Tirloki Nath and others. As the house was situated in a slum area and the tenants could not be evicted therefrom without obtaining the permission of the competent authority under S. 19 of the Act, Parshotam Das moved the competent authority for grant of the requisite permission. Tirloki Nath in those proceedings pleaded that Dev Raj accused was residing in a portion of a house as Tirloki Nath's sub-tenant. This fact was denied Parshotam Das in support of the plea, Tirloki Nath filed certain documents to show that Dev Rai was occupying a portion of the house in question as sub-tenant and was paying rent at the rate of Rs. 6 per mensem. The competent authority repelled the objections raised by Tirloki Nath and passed an order that execution proceedings for the ejectment of Tirloki Nath could continue. The documents filed on behalf of Tirloki Nath were found to be forged. Subsequently on matter having been reported to the police, the matter was investigated and Tirloki Nath and Dev Raj were sent up for standing trial under Ss. 465, 471 and 120-B I.P.C
2. An application was filed on behalf of the accused before the trial Magistrate that there was a bar to his taking cognizance of the offence under Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr PC as the complaint had not been filed by the competent authority under the Act.
3. This application was dismissed by the trial Court and its order, as stated earlier, was affirmed on revision by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Delhi.
4. I have heard Mr. Arora on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Sharma on behalf of the State and am of the view that there is no merit in the revision petition. Clause (c) of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S. 195 of the Code read as under:—
“195(1) No Court shall take cognizance.
(2) ***
(b) ***
(c) of any offence described in S. 463 or punishable under S. 471, S. 475, or S. 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.
(2) In Cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) the term ‘Court’ includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877 (III of 1877).”
5. Clause (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 195 reproduced above has been enacted with a view to provide a safeguard against irresponsible and reckless prosecutions by private individuals in respect of offences which relate to the administration of justice. It is, however, essential, before the above provision is invoked, to show that the offence in question was committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in such proceeding. Where the offence alleged to have been committed is not by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, the above provision of law would obviously be not attracted. As the documents, which are alleged to be forged in the present case were produced in proceedings under the Act before the competent authority the matter, which needs adjudication, is whether the competent authority is a Court under the above provision of law. Competent authority has been defined in Cl. (c) of S. 2 of the Act as meaning such officer or authority as the Administrator may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint as the competent authority for the purpose of the Act. Section 19 of the Act deals with the scope of proceedings when a landlord applies to the competent authority for permission to execute a decree for ejectment, and reads as under:—
“19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area shall be entitled to execute such decree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority.
(2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-s. (1) shall make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of such application the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to the tenant of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing either grant such permission or refuse to grant such permission.
(4) Where the competent authority refuses to grant the permission it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant.”
6. Perusal of S. 19 reproduced above goes to show that though the competent authority has to give an opportunity to the tenant of being heard in the matter and though it has to make an inquiry into the circumstances of the case, it is also clear that the inquiry has to be of a summary nature and to be such as is considered fit by the competent authority. This would go to show that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence and summoning witnesses or of compelling production of the documents. It cannot, therefore, be said that the competent authority possesses all the attributes of a Court. It is no doubt true that the orders made by the competent authority are of a quasi-judicial nature, all the same the fact remains that the essential attributes of a Court are not possessed by the competent authority. The distinction between a quasi-judicial Tribunal and a Court has to be kept in view and from the mere fact that a Tribunal is entrusted with quasi-judicial powers, it would not necessarily follow that the Tribunal constituted a Court, I am fortified in this view by the dictum laid down in case Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State Of Punjab , (S) AIR 1956 SC 153. Their Lordships in that case were dealing with the question as to whether a returning officer deciding on validity of nomination paper under Section 30 of the Representation of the People Act was a Court. The question was answered in the negative. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., who spoke for the Court, observed:
“It is unnecessary to traverse the same ground once again. It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it.”
“And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.”
7. It was further observed:
“Under S. 36(2), the returning officer has to examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be made thereto. This power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in exercising this power, he is authorised to come to a decision ‘after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary’. That means that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence which they may desire to adduce in support of their case.
There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses, or of compelling production of documents in an enquiry under S. 36. The returning officer is entitled to act ‘Suo motu’ in the matter. When one compares this procedure with that prescribed for trial of election petitions by the Election Tribunal under Ss. 90 and 92 of the Act, the difference between the two becomes marked. While the proceedings before the Election Tribunal approximate in all essential matters to proceedings in civil courts, the proceedings under S. 36 present a different picture.
There is no ‘Lis” in which persons with opposing claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner, but an enquiry such as is usually conducted by an ‘ad hoc’ tribunal entrusted with a quasi-judicial power. In other words, the function of the returning official acting under S. 36 is judicial in character, but he is not to act judicially in discharging it. We are of opinion that the returning officer deciding on the validity of a nomination paper is not a Court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr PC, and the result is that even as regards the charge under S. 193, the order of the Magistrate was not appealable, as the offence was not committed in or in relation to any proceeding in a Court.”
8. The above observations have a direct bearing on the case. I would, accordingly, hold that the competent authority under the Act is not a Court and Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr PC does not constitute a bar to the taking of cognizance of the present case by the trial Magistrate. The revision, consequently, fails and is dismissed.
EJ/VGW/D.V.C
9. Revision dismissed.
Alert