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Smt. Balwant Kaur v. Jagdish Mitter And Ors

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 20, 1965
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is an elderly mother, Smt. Balwant Kaur, who originally instituted a suit for partition and for separate possession of one-fourth of the property described as 314/CL on Cooper Road. On 21-4-1962, Shri Kartar Singh, Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, on a preliminary objection by the defendants (the petitioner's sons), found that the plaintiff was not in actual possession of the property or any portion thereof. The learned judge recorded that the petitioner had lived in the house with her husband but later had strained relations with him and her sons and had been belaboured and turned out; reference was made to an earlier judgment (Exhibit P.16 dated 26-6-1951) indicating she had become a tenant of Smt. Jamna Devi.

The plaintiff was given adjournment to amend the plaint. She then applied for permission to sue as a pauper because she lacked sufficient means to pay court-fee. Her sons resisted that application. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge (identified in the opinion at one place as Shri Surjit Singh Raikhy) disallowed the pauper petition, holding that the plaintiff had adduced no evidence to show that the subject-matter of the suit was not sufficient to meet the court-fee and treating the plaintiff as admittedly in possession of the property. The court also relied on alleged nondisclosure by the petitioner of certain money in a bank account and a locker. The petitioner filed the present revision against that order.

The High Court attempted to secure an amicable settlement between the mother and her children, granting multiple adjournments and pursuing representations by counsel; the respondents at various times expressed willingness to maintain their mother but were not able to finalize terms. The Court ultimately disposed of the revision on its merits rather than await a settlement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the property which is the subject-matter of the suit (disputed property) could lawfully be taken into account in deciding whether the plaintiff was a pauper under the explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33, Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the lower court committed material irregularity or illegality by treating the petitioner as in possession of the disputed property contrary to its earlier finding (and whether that earlier finding gave rise to a res judicata bar to the contrary conclusion).
  3. Whether the petitioner's omission to disclose certain cash amounts or a bank locker in the pauper petition amounted to bad faith sufficient to justify dismissal of the application for permission to sue as a pauper.
  4. Whether, given the circumstances, the High Court should remand the matter to the lower court for reconsideration or grant the pauper status itself to avoid further delay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner maintained that a prior judicial finding (including Exhibit P.16 and the order of 21-4-1962) established that she was not in possession of any part of the disputed property; therefore, the disputed property could not be taken into account when assessing her means to pay court-fee.
  • She relied on a claimed earlier compromise (with Jagdish Mitter) to pay Rs. 50 per mensem and give her one room, which was not honoured; she also pointed to a decree for maintenance of Rs. 500 which remained unpaid, showing her inability to meet basic needs.
  • The petitioner argued that the explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33, C.P.C. should be read so that the subject-matter of the suit is not counted as part of the means when a fee has been prescribed, and that capacity to raise money (liquidity) is the relevant test.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents resisted the pauper application, arguing that the petitioner had sufficient means to pay the court-fee and had not proved otherwise.
  • They relied on the lower court's view that the plaintiff-applicant had adduced no evidence that the subject-matter of the suit was not sufficient to meet court-fee, and pointed to the petitioner's alleged possession and to undisclosed funds (cash in bank account and a locker) as reasons to deny pauper status.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Exhibit P.16 (Judgment dated 26-6-1951) Used as a prior judicial finding that the petitioner had been belaboured and turned out of the house and had been living as a tenant thereafter. The lower court had referred to this earlier judgment in concluding the petitioner was not in possession; the High Court noted that the lower court relied upon that finding but also observed that the later order of 21-4-1962 had held she was not in possession and that the lower court's later treatment of her as in possession was a material irregularity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court began by emphasizing the human context of the dispute—an old mother versus her sons—and the attempt to secure an amicable settlement before deciding the revision. After efforts at reconciliation failed, the Court proceeded to examine the legal merits.

The Court analyzed the lower court's approach to the pauper petition under the explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33, C.P.C. It observed that the lower court had considered the disputed property as part of the petitioner's means even though an earlier order (21-4-1962) had found that she was not in possession of any part of the property in question. The High Court characterized the lower court's contrary treatment as a "material irregularity and illegality" in the exercise of jurisdiction.

The Court articulated the controlling practical test for paupership: the capacity to raise money (liquidity or property easily convertible into cash) is the real test of sufficient means to pay court-fee, not mere theoretical possession of disputed property. When a plaintiff is not in possession of the disputed property and the property is the subject of litigation, it is difficult to lawfully count that property as available means to deny pauper status.

Regarding the alleged nondisclosure of cash and a bank locker, the Court acknowledged the need for good faith and absolute frankness in pauper petitions and that procedural provisions (Order 33, Rule 3, C.P.C.) are important. However, it held that procedural rules are "bondsmen of justice" and should not operate as traps: unless omission is clearly a conscious act of bad faith, a helpless suitor should not be denied justice. On the record, the Court did not find convincing evidence that the omission to mention cash in the bank was an act of bad faith. The Court also noted that a doctrinaire, literal approach that would force an old woman to spend her last penny on court-fee before being allowed to proceed would be inappropriate.

The Court considered remanding the matter to the lower court to exclude the disputed property from consideration and to allow amendment of the schedule, but decided against remand because the proceedings had already been unduly prolonged, no fresh evidence or arguments were suggested for the lower court, and further delay would likely defeat justice. In the special circumstances, the Court concluded it was appropriate for it to grant pauper status directly.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Allowing the revision, the High Court reversed the order of the Court below and declared the plaintiff a pauper.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The lower court was directed to proceed further in accordance with law and in light of the High Court's observations, and the parties (through counsel) were directed to appear in the Court below on 10-5-1965 for a further short date for proceedings.
  • Costs: There would be no costs of the proceedings in the High Court.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond its application to these facts. The Court emphasized practical application of the pauper test (liquidity/capacity to raise funds rather than mere possession of disputed property) and the principle that procedural non-compliance should not be treated as a trap in the absence of bad faith. If the opinion discusses broader implications, it does so only in the context of guiding the disposition of this case; no new binding precedent beyond this decision is explicitly asserted in the text.
Show all summary ...

1. This is an unfortunate controversy between a mother and her real sons. The mother had originally instituted a suit for partition and for separate possession of one-fourth of the property in question but on 21-4-1962, Shri Kartar Singh, Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, on a preliminary objection by the defendants, who are the petitioner's sons came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not in actual possession of the property 314/CL on Cooper Road or any portion thereof. According to the finding of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, she had undoubtedly been living in this house with her husband but later her relations with her husband and sons became strained and that she was actually belaboured and turned out of the house. For this purpose, reference was made to an earlier judgment of the Court, Exhibit P. 16 dated 26-6-1951 in which it was observed that the petitioner had been belaboured and turned out of the house whereafter she started living with one Smt. Jamna Devi as a tenant. The argument that on her husband's death she should be deemed to have become constructively in possession of the property left by her husband so far as her right of inheritance is concerned was also repelled. The Court with these observations granted to the petitioner-plaintiff adjournment to apply for amendment of the plaint. It was in these circumstances that she applied for permission to sue as a pauper because she was not possessed of sufficient means to be able to pay court-fee. On this prayer being resisted by her sons, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, Shri Surjit Singh Raikhy, held that the plaintiff-applicant had adduced no evidence to show that the subject-matter of the suit in which she was claiming interest was not sufficient from which she could meet the expenses of the court-fee. Observing that she was admittedly in possession of the same and, therefore, it had to be considered in this enquiry and she having adduced no evidence as to the value of the same, the learned Judge on this ground as also on some other technical ground disallowed this petition. The other grounds, it appears, are that the petitioner had not disclosed certain money lying in the bank in her account which she had withdrawn a few months before her statement recorded on 25-10-1962. She had also, according to the Court not disclosed that she had a locker in a bank. It is against this order that the present revision has been preferred.

2. On 20-11-1964, after hearing the arguments for sometime, I felt that the dispute being between an old mother and her children, this was a fit case in which, if possible, there should be a mutual settlement and reconciliation between the mother and her children. The counsel at the bar also assured me that they would try their best to sound their clients and so far as possible to impress upon them the desirability of a mutual settlement. As a matter of fact, even before that date, there was a suggestion for a settlement and the counsel had tried to contact their clients but for certain reasons, this was not possible. On 20-11-1964, the counsel promised to see that the differences between the mother and her children were ironed out with good will. I thereupon adjourned the case for about a month for an attempt at settlement. On 26-2-1965, Shri Manchanda, learned counsel for the respondents suggested that his clients may be willing to maintain their real mother who is the applicant in this Court and on my enquiry as to how much they were willing to pay to her by way of maintenance, the learned counsel promised to enquire from his clients. At the request of the counsel, the case was adjourned to 12-3-1965. On that date, the petitioner's counsel was ill but the learned counsel for the respondents informed me that his clients had written to him that they would come here the following month. In any case, he desired that the case be adjourned to 26-3-1965. On that day, the respondents' counsel submitted that his clients could not find time to come, though they were willing to have an amicable settlement with their mother and at least one of them, according to the learned counsel, was anxious to support her. He, however, wanted his mother to make a definite commitment as to what was the amount that she wanted. I somehow got the impression that the respondents were not serious in coming to a real settlement, with the result that I am going to dispose of the revision on the merits.

3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was a compromise between the petitioner Smt. Balwant Kaur and Jagdish Mitter agreeing to pay Rs. 50/- per mensem to the petitioner and to give her one room in the house at Amritsar to live in but nothing was paid to her. Her suit for maintenance for Rs. 500/- was thereafter decreed but again nothing has been realised. On 1-3-1960, as a last resort, the present litigation was started by her. As already mentioned, on 21-4-1962, Shri Kartar Singh, Senior Subordinate Judge, directed the plaint to be amended and ad valorem court-fee to be paid. The following day the plaint was amended and application for permission to sue as a pauper filed. On 17-5-1963, she was held not to be a pauper and since then the present application for revision is pending in this Court. Again, the defendants raised the preliminary objections on which on 5-5-1962 (though the original order does not bear any date) the Court declined to allow the amendment sought but considered it proper to allow the plaintiff one more opportunity to amend the plaint in the light of that order and the previous order dated 21-4-1962.

On 14-5-1962 the learned Senior Subordinate Judge observed that an application had been made by the plaintiff for being permitted to continue the suit in forma pauperis of which the Court gave notice to the Collector. He declined to proceed with the suit till that application was decided. Then came the impugned decision. It has been very strongly argued that the Court below has completely ignored that at an earlier stage of the present proceedings, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge had on 21-4-1962 found that the plaintiff-petitioner was not in possession of any part of the property of which partition and possession were sought. The present conclusion that she was in possession of a part of that property is, according to the learned counsel, wholly erroneous and is indeed hit by the principle of res judicata. But this apart, he has also emphasised that no part of the property which is the subject-matter of controversy can be taken into account for considering the means of the plaintiff to pay court-fee. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33, Code of Civil Procedure, according to which a person is a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit or where no such fee is prescribed, when he is not entitled to property worth Rs. 100/- other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject-matter of the suit. Whether or not the subject matter of the suit has any reference to the first part of the explanation, namely, where a fee has been prescribed by law for the plaint, it seems to be clear that in the case in hand she was not possessed of any part of the property in suit and was for that purpose non-suited at the instance of the defendants on 21-4-1962 by the Senior Subordinate Judge, in so far as her suit for partition and separate possession is concerned. Failure on the part of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge while passing the impugned order dated 17-5-1963 is, in my opinion, a material irregularity and illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction. Sufficient means really connote means which can enable the plaintiff to have sufficient liquid cash available for paying the court-fee, or property easily convertible into cash. When the petitioner-plaintiff is not even in possession of any part of the property to which she may be claiming title, I find it exceedingly difficult to hold that such property could lawfully and justly be taken into account for throwing out the petitioner's application for permission to sue as a pauper on the ground of her being possessed of sufficient means. Capacity to raise money is the real test and not mere possession of some property as the court below appears, to think.

4. The other ground on which the learned Senior Subordinate Judge has non-suited the petitioner is that she did not with meticulous accuracy disclose certain cash amounts which she perhaps had in her account with the Punjab National Bank. It has further been noticed that at an early stage of the suit proceedings, she had also filed an affidavit on 9-5-1960 that she had got some land in Kangra district and after selling the same had purchased the property in question. So far as this last reason is concerned, it is again unfortunate that the learned Senior Subordinate Judge should have ignored the final order dated 21-4-1962 and should merely have drawn an adverse inference from an affidavit. And then mention of the factum of a prior sale in the application for permission to sue as a pauper filed in May, 1962 could scarcely be considered as mandatory so as to go to the root of the validity of the application. Besides, it appears also to have been ignored that this old lady has to maintain herself out of the little cash she may have with her and it is not the law that she must spend on court-fee the last penny that she may possess and then starve. The question of sufficient means to enable to pay the fee prescribed has to be approached in a practical way and a doctrinaire approach would clearly be inappropriate. To be too technical in following the bald literalness of the language in this respect is likely to defeat rather than promote the cause of justice. I am not unmindful of the requirement of good faith and absolute frankness on the part of suitors seeking to have their controversies adjudicated upon without paying the court-fee normally payable by all suitors. I am also aware of the reluctance of this Court lightly or too readily to interfere on revision with orders of the Courts below unless they are tainted with the requisite infirmity resulting in injustice. Indeed, I have myself in some cases declined to interfere on revision when the interests of justice so demand: every case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.

But at the same time, the provision of law contained in Order 33, Rule 3, C. P. C., it may be kept in view, relates to procedure and the rules of procedure are bondsmen of justice--of course justice according to law--their sole master and guide. If the cause of substantial justice so requires, non-compliance with this provision might well be held fatal. However, this provision of procedure is certainly not designed as a trap and unless the omission is clearly a conscious act of bad faith, a helpless suitor like the present plaintiff seeking maintenance from her sons should not be denied justice on account of her poverty or a breach of a rule of procedure. On the existing record, it is not easy to hold, and indeed nothing convincing has been said to persuade me to come to a finding, that the omission to mention in the schedule the cash in the Bank was an act of bad faith in the circumstances of the present case. In any event, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the petition could have been returned for suitable amendment, and this would perhaps have been more in consonance with justice. It is also not clear, and indeed I have doubt, if the Court below would have rejected the petition for permission to sue as a pauper on account of this omission, had it taken the right view that the property in dispute should be ruled out of consideration. Looked at from this point of view, I, at one stage, thought of remanding the case to the Court below for coming to a fresh decision after excluding from consideration the property in dispute and securing a formal amendment in the schedule. But, on deeper thought, I have come to the conclusion that interests of justice demand that the permission to sue as a pauper should more appropriately be granted by this Court, rather than cause further delay by remanding the case. The proceedings have already been unduly prolonged and neither any fresh evidence nor any fresh argument in the Court below are suggested; the dictates of justice clearly demand speedy disposal of this controversy on the merits, for any further delay in the circumstances of this case may defeat the cause of justice. By now, what little cash the petitioner had would in all probability have been spent up and there can be little doubt of her being a pauper now. To allow her to sue as a pauper cannot cause any injustice to the respondents in this case.

5. The result, therefore, is that allowing this revision I reverse the order of the Court below and declare the plaintiff a pauper. The Court below is directed to proceed further in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above with due despatch. Parties are directed through their counsel to appear in the Court below on 10-5-1965 when another short date would be given for further proceedings. There would be no costs of the proceedings in this Court.