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Burmah-Shell Oil Storage And Distributing Company Of India Ltd v. Punjab State
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The matter is a reference under Section 22 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 asking whether the Financial Commissioner is bound to consider a revision petition on the merits despite delay in filing.
The Assessing Authority, Patiala, by order dated 28 July 1954 assessed Burrnah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited to sales tax of Rs. 50,425-14-0 on a taxable turnover of Rs. 16,13,627-13-0 for assessment year 1953-54. The assessee appealed and the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Patiala, on 27 August 1956 allowed the appeal, set aside the Assessing Authority's order and remanded for de novo assessment.
The Excise and Taxation Commissioner revised that order under Section 21(1) by order dated 1 May 1959, directing de novo assessment in respect of inter-State sales made by the assessee from branches outside Punjab for the period subsequent to 1 January 1954. The assessee filed a revision on 29 September 1959 under Section 21(2) before the Financial Commissioner.
The Financial Commissioner dismissed the revision in limine by order dated 11 April 1960 on the ground that it was time-barred: he treated 90 days as the normal period for filing a revision, found that the petition had been filed after 125 days, and after allowing 27 days for obtaining copies concluded the petition was barred by 8 days. No explanation was furnished for the delay.
The assessee applied under Section 22(1) for a reference to the High Court on two questions: (1) whether there is legal justification for holding the limitation for filing a revision under Section 21 to be 90 days; and (2) whether, in the circumstances, the Financial Commissioner was justified in dismissing the revision in limine if it was late by 8 days. The Financial Commissioner declined to make the reference by order dated 19 December 1960, citing an established practice of treating revisions filed after 90 days (excluding time for obtaining copies) as time-barred.
The assessee moved the High Court under Clause (b) to Sub-section (2) of Section 22. A Division Bench ordered on 16 May 1962 that the first question be referred to the Court, and the Financial Commissioner made the present reference on 17 August 1962.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Financial Commissioner is bound to consider a revision petition filed before him on the merits in spite of the delay that had occurred in making the application.
- Whether there is any justification in law for treating the limitation period for filing a revision petition under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, as 90 days.
- Whether, in the circumstances of this case, there was justification in law for the Financial Commissioner to dismiss the revision petition in limine if it was filed 8 days late according to his view of limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Assessee) — Mr. Jain
- Sub-section (3) of Section 21 specifies no period of limitation and vests the Financial Commissioner with power to call for records "at any time"; therefore the Financial Commissioner was not justified in dismissing the revision on the ground that it was filed more than 90 days after the Commissioner's order.
- Relied on a decision (Chaman Lal & Bros.) where the Court held the Financial Commissioner was not justified in dismissing a revision as time-barred because the memorandum containing information about the order was not sent to the assessee — implying that particular facts may excuse delay.
Respondent (State / Respondent Counsel)
- Pointed to an earlier instance where the Excise and Taxation Commissioner entertained a revision after more than two years on facts peculiar to that case, arguing that peculiar facts may justify extension; in the present case there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay.
- Submitted that the unexplained delay (noted as 98 days after excluding time for obtaining copies by one judge) was undue and properly treated as a ground to refuse to entertain the petition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kangra Valley Slate Company, Limited, Ghaniara, District Kangra v. The Punjab State etc. [1961] 12 S.T.C. 362 | The revising authority has discretion to decline to entertain a revision petition on account of delay; whether to dismiss depends on facts and circumstances; no inflexible period is prescribed and discretion must be exercised case-by-case. | The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that Financial Commissioners may refuse to entertain belated revisions where delay is not satisfactorily explained, and that this is an appropriate exercise of discretionary power. |
| Chaman Lal & Bros. (Private) Ltd. v. The Punjab State and Ors., 63 P.L.R. 495 | Where the assessee was not sent the memorandum containing information about the Excise and Taxation Commissioner's order, dismissal as time-barred was not justified — the facts of non-communication excused delay. | The Court distinguished this case on its facts, noting it was decided on particular circumstances (non-communication of the order) and therefore did not control the present matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined Section 21(3) which vests the Financial Commissioner with power to call for records "at any time" and to pass such orders as he may think fit where the final order contains an erroneous decision on an important question of law. The key analytic steps in the opinion are:
- Interpretation of statutory text: The Court observed that Sub-section (3) prescribes no statutory period of limitation for exercise of the Financial Commissioner's revisional power, but that absence of a statutory limit does not prevent the Commissioner from refusing to entertain belated revisions in the exercise of his discretion where there is an unexplained or long delay.
- Role of administrative practice: The Court noted that Financial Commissioners had, in a number of cases, established a practice of treating revision petitions filed more than 90 days after the Commissioner's order (after excluding time taken to obtain copies) as time-barred unless good grounds were shown. The Court found this practice not so short as to be unreasonable such that the right of revision would be illusory.
- Reliance on precedent: The Court relied on Kangra Valley Slate Co. where a Division Bench held that whether the discretion should be exercised to dismiss for delay depends on the facts and circumstances; in some cases delay can be explained and revision entertained, in others not. This supported the proposition that revisional authorities possess discretionary power to refuse belated petitions.
- Distinguishing other authority: The Court considered Chaman Lal & Bros. and observed it was decided on its particular facts (non-receipt of memorandum by the assessee) and therefore not controlling on the present facts.
- Judicial versus legislative function (additional observations by a concurring judge): One judge added that ordinarily fixation of limitation periods is within the legislative domain; while delegations are possible, the judicial wing should not exercise direct legislative power by fixing a rigid period of limitation. A self-imposed rigid 90-day rule would amount to an abdication of genuine judicial discretion. That judge emphasized that precedents by a Financial Commissioner may be persuasive analogies but cannot be converted into a binding rule excluding exercise of judicial discretion.
- Application to facts: Applying these principles, both judges concluded that, on the facts of this case — notably the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay (the Financial Commissioner had found an effective unexplained delay of 8 days beyond the 90-day practice; another passage notes 98 days after excluding days for copies) — the Financial Commissioner was not bound to consider the revision petition on its merits. The discretionary refusal to entertain the petition in these circumstances was upheld.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference is answered in the negative. The Court held that the Financial Commissioner is not bound to consider a revision petition on the merits where there has been an unexplained and undue delay in filing; it is within the Financial Commissioner's discretion to refuse to entertain such belated petitions.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that, on the facts of this case, the Financial Commissioner's dismissal in limine of the revision petition as time-barred was sustained.
- The Court upheld the principle that revisional authorities have judicial discretion to refuse to entertain belated revisions where delay is not satisfactorily explained, relying on established practice and prior authority; however, the concurring opinion cautioned against converting an administrative practice (a rigid 90-day limit) into a binding rule — the decision emphasizes case-by-case judicial discretion rather than an absolute limitation rule.
- The parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the reference (as recorded in the opinion).
- The Court did not lay down a statutory or fixed rule of limitation; rather it confirmed the discretionary approach and warned against the Financial Commissioner adopting a self-imposed inflexible rule that would amount to abdication of discretion.
Note: This summary strictly reflects only the facts, arguments, reasoning, precedents and outcomes expressly contained in the provided opinion.
1. This is a reference under Section 22 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Punjab Act No. XLVI of 1948) hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the question referred for decision is :
Whether the Financial Commissioner is bound to consider the revision petition filed before him on the merits in spite of the delay that had occurred in making the application ?
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Assessing Authority, Patiala, assessed as per order dated 28th July, 1954, Burrnah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited to sales tax of Rs. 50,425-14-0 on a taxable turnover of Rs. 16,13,627-13-0 for the assessment year 1953-54. The assessee-company then went up in appeal against the aforesaid order and the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Patiala, as per order dated 27th August, 1956, accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the Assessing Authority and remanded the case for de novo assessment. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner thereafter took action under Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act and, as per order dated 1st May, 1959, revised the order dated 27th August, 1956, of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and directed that the Assessing Authority should make de novo assessment in respect of inter-State sales made by the assessee-com-pany from its branches outside the Punjab where the goods were delivered for consumption in the State for the period subsequent to 1st January, 1954. The assessee-company feeling aggrieved filed a revision on 29th September, 1959, under Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act before the Financial Commissioner against the order dated 1st May, 1959, of the Commissioner. The learned Financial Commissioner, as per order dated 11th April, 1960, dismissed the revision petition in limine on the ground of being time-barred. It was held that the time normally allowed for filing of revision petitions was 90 days, while the revision petition had been filed on the expiry of 125 days. Twenty-seven days were found to have been spent in getting copies from the Excise and Taxation Commissioner and as such the petition was held to be barred by 8 days. As no explanation was furnished for the aforesaid delay, the petition was dismissed. The assessee-company then filed an application before the Financial Commissioner under Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act for making a reference to the High Court on the following two questions of law :¦-
(1) Whether there is any justification in law in holding that the limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 21 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, is 90 days ?
(2) Whether, in the circumstances of this case, there was any justification in law for the learned Financial Commissioner, Punjab, to dismiss the revision petition in limine, even if it was filed late by 8 days according to his view of the law regarding limitation ?
3. The Financial Commissioner declined to make the reference and dismissed the application as per order dated 19th December, 1960. It was observed that though there was no statutory limitation in the Act prescribing a period of 90 days, the practice in vogue for the last several years was that a revision petition filed more than 90 days subsequent to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner's order, after allowing the time spent in obtaining copies, should be held to be time-barred. The assessee-company thereupon moved this Court under Clause (b) to Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act with a prayer that the Financial Commissioner be required to state the case and refer it to the High Court on the above two questions. A Division Bench of this Court as per order dated 16th May, 1962, ordered that the question of law mentioned in the first part of this order should be referred to this Court for decision. The Financial Commissioner, accordingly, made the present reference to this Court as per order dated 17th August, 1962.
4. Section 21 of the Act vests the power of revision in the Commissioner and Financial Commissioner under the act. sub-sections (1) to (2-a) of that section deal with the exercise of such powers by the Commissioner, while Sub-sections (3) and (4) pertain to the exercise of such powers by the Financial Commissioner, with which we are concerned in the present reference, and read as under :-
(3) The Financial Commissioner may, at any time, call for the record of any case decided under the preceding Sub-sections and if, in his opinion, the final order contains an erroneous decision on an important question of law, he may pass such order on the case as he may think fit.
(4) No order shall be made under this Section, which adversely affects the rights of an assessee or other person upon whom an obligation is imposed by or under this Act, without giving such assessee or other person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
5. It has been argued on behalf of the assessee-company by Mr. Jain that Sub-section (3) of Section 21 specifies no period of limitation and gives a power to the Financial Commissioner to call at any time for the record of a case decided by the Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner, in the circumstances, according to the learned counsel, was not justified in dismissing the revision on the ground that it was filed more than 90 days, after excluding the days spent in obtaining copies, from the date of the decision of the Commissioner. In this respect I am of the view that though the statute has prescribed no period of limitation for filing a revision, there is nothing in the language of Section 21 which prohibits the Financial Commissioner from refusing to entertain revisions which are filed after a long delay unless a cogent explanation is furnished for that delay. The Financial Commissioners in a number of cases, of which mention has been made in the order of reference, have laid down the rule that revision petitions filed more than 90 days subsequent to the Commissioners' orders, after excluding the days spent in obtaining copies, should be held to be time-barred unless some good ground was shown for the delay in filing the revisions. It would, thus, appear that the Financial Commissioners have fixed a period of 90 days within which their revisional jurisdiction may be invoked. The aforesaid period, in my opinion, is not so short as can be deemed to be unreasonable so as to render the right of approaching the Financial Commissioners in revision illusory. The language of Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act, reproduced above, shows that though a power is vested in the Financial Commissioner to revise an order of the Commissionor on the ground that it contains an erroneous decision on an important question of law, there is no obligation imposed upon him to entertain a revision even if he considers the same to be belated as having been filed more than 90 days of the date of the decision or the order of the Commissioner. In Kangra Valley Slate Company, Limited, Ghaniara, District Kangra v. The Punjab State, etc. [1961] 12 S.T.C. 362, a Division Bench of this Court dealt with a case in which the Financial Commissioner had dismissed a petition for revision under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act on the ground that the petition had been filed after 152 days of the order of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, and it was observed as under :-
It will be a sound exercise of discretionary powers to decline to entertain the revision on account of the delay of 58 days in some cases but it may not be so in some other cases. On the facts and circumstances of each case it will have to be found whether or not the discretion should be exercised to dismiss the petition for revision on the ground of inordinate delay. In some cases the delay may be explained and the revising authority may be satisfied that the person making the petition for revision was not to blame for delay and his petition may be entertained on that short ground. In other cases where the delay is not satisfactorily explained, the revising authority may refuse to exercise its discretionary power of revision in favour of a person who files the belated petition. It is true that no particular period is prescribed in the Limitation Act within which a petition for revision must be filed, but the revising authorities are vested with discretion in the matter of entertaining such petitions and in suitable cases they are in their discretion entitled to refuse to entertain those which are filed after unreasonable delay.
6. Mr. Jain has referred to the case, Chaman Lal & Bros. (Private) Ltd. v. The Punjab State and Ors. 63 P.L.R. 495, decided by my learned brother Dua, J., but on reference to it I find that it was decided on its particular facts. It would appear that in that case the memorandum containing the information about the order of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner was not sent to the assessee. It was in those circumstances that the Court held that the Financial Commissioner was not justified in dismissing the revision petition as time-barred.
7. As a result of the above, I would answer the reference in the negative. The parties, in the circumstances, are left to bear their own costs of this reference.
Inder Dev Dua, J.
8. I agree that the reference be answered in the negative. I may, however, add a few words.
9. The petitioners' cbunsel has with some eloquence argued that on an earlier occasion pertaining to assessment for the year 1951-52, a revision was entertained by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner after the expiry of more than two years at the instance of the State against the petitioners, even though a period of 180 days has been prescribed as the period of limitation by Section 21(2) in that case, whereas now when the petitioners have approached the Financial Commissioner on revision, he has declined to entertain the revision merely on account of delay of 8 days after the expiry of 90 days, though no period of limitation for such revision has been fixed by the statute.
10. The respondent's counsel has submitted that in the earlier case the facts were peculiar and the Excise and Taxation Commissioner perhaps found satisfactory grounds for extending the period whereas in the case in hand, there is absolutely no explanation for the delay of 98 days after excluding the days spent for obtaining copies and that this delay has been rightly considered to be undue.
11. I may appropriately observe that where a right is conferred by Legislature on a party to approach a judicial tribunal for adjudication of a controversy, the fixation of period of limitation for so approaching would ordinarily also pertain to legislative sphere. True, undoubtedly it is, that power in this respect can lawfully be delegated, but, at the same time, the judicial wing of the administration may not, in my view, legitimately exercise direct legislative power by fixing a rigid period of limitation for exercising the right conferred by the Legislature. On behalf of the respondent also, in the case in hand, it is not claimed and, in my opinion, rightly that the Financial Commissioner could in the course of adjudication of controversies fix a rigid period of limitation beyond which a revision petition cannot be entertained and indeed even the observations from the judgment in Kangra Valley Slate Company's case [1961] 12 S.T.C. 362, do not support any such claim. It is in each case that the Financial Commissioner has to decide in his judicial discretion by looking at all the relevant attending circumstances whether or not the delay is so inordinate as to justify refusal to afford a hearing on the merits to the aggrieved party. Drawing of an arbitrary line of 90 days for all cases, in my opinion, partakes more of a legislative rather than of a judicial function, for judicial power is only concerned with. what law is or has been, and legislative, with what law shall be. A precedent in the form of a decision by a Financial Commissioner may serve as a helpful analogy on the question of undue delay but it cannot constitute a rigid rule of law partaking of a legislative mandate excluding exercise of judicial discretion in future cases in a disciplined and responsible manner on the facts and circumstances, on each occasion, as if the officer concerned has already made up his mind in the sense of being bound by a law-giver's command. An authority, if I may so put it, may offend even by adopting a self-imposed rigid rule resulting virtually in abdication of genuine discretion. Power to decide, in my view means to come to a decision with reference to the merits by forming judgment on the facts as intended by the statutory enactment.
12. There is one other aspect, which also deserves to be borne in mind in cases like the present. The right of revision is undoubtedly conferred on the Financial Commissioner without conferring a right on the aggrieved party to approach him. It may, therefore, be argued from one point of view, as indeed a suggestion has been thrown at the Bar before us also, that it is in the absolute discretion of the Financial Commissioner whether or not to exercise the suo molu power of revision. But in so far as an order of the Financial Commissioner passed on revision involves a question of law, it confers on the aggrieved party an express and affirmative right to have, according to the prescribed procedure, the question referred to this Court for authoritative decision. That right does not depend on the discretion either of the Financial Commissioner or of this Court, for there is a legal obligation on the Financial Commissioner to refer and on this Court to decide the question of law involved though the jurisdiction of this Court partakes of an advisory nature. This would seem to suggest that in the suo motu exercise of power of revision by the Financial Commissioner, the dealer whose liability is affected by the order would have vital interest at least for the purpose of exercising his legal right of reference under Section 22, and from that point of view, a right to move the Financial Commissioner might well be considered to be inherent or implied without the statute expressly saying so.
13. Now, if that be so, then it may give rise to a more serious challenge to the power of the Financial Commissioner in fixing an arbitrary and rigid period of limitation of 90 days beyond which no revision should be entertainable, thereby, denying to the aggrieved party adjudication of his grievance.
14. Be that as it may, it is unnecessary on this occasion to pursue this matter any further because on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Financial Commissioner was, in my view, not bound to consider the revision petition on the merits because of the unexplained delay in making the same and I agree with my learned brother in the answer.
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