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Shri Chand And Others v. Union Of India And Others
Case Summary: Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 103-D & 108-D of 1960
Factual and Procedural Background
Land measuring 2,626 Bighas 14 Biswas in village Khampur was acquired by the Government for construction of a transmitter. A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 9 February 1955. Various persons, including the appellants (claimants Nos. 35 to 56 before the Collector), who claimed to be non-occupancy tenants in part of the acquired land, submitted claims which were considered by the Collector. The Collector made an award on 27 February 1956 and a supplementary award on 13 March 1956.
The appellants asserted that under the Delhi Reforms Act (identified in the opinion as Delhi Reforms Act 8 of 1954 / Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954) they had attained the status of Bhumidars and thus were entitled to compensation payable in respect of the land in their possession, to the exclusion of their landlords. Because of the dispute, on 23 July 1956 the Collector remitted the amount in dispute to the District Judge, Delhi, for determination under the provisions of section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The Additional District Judge (Shri Rameshwar Dial) framed and decided the issue whether Mithan and others were entitled to any relief and whether an enquiry into their allegations was necessary assuming all their allegations were correct. He held that, since the appellants had only applied for a declaration under the relevant provision of the Delhi Reforms Act and no declaration had been made by the Deputy Commissioner, they had no present right to claim compensation.
Aggrieved, the non-occupancy tenants appealed to the High Court under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. A learned Single Judge dismissed that appeal on 3 October 1960, finding no material on record proving that the appellants had acquired Bhurnidari rights and noting the absence of the alleged gazette notification. Two Letters Patent appeals (Nos. 103-D and 108-D of 1960) were then preferred against the Single Judge's judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 lies against the judgment of a Single Judge given on an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (i.e., the competency of Letters Patent appeals in this context).
- Whether the appeal presented by one appellant (Chhelu, appellant No. 2) had abated by reason of his death prior to institution and the absence of his legal representatives on record.
- Whether the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Court's Rules (specifically Rule 1(v) of Chapter 3.B concerning appeals under the Land Acquisition Act involving amounts not exceeding Rs. 5,000).
- Substantive: Whether the appellants (non-occupancy tenants) had any present right to claim compensation in the absence of a formal declaration under the Delhi Land Reforms provisions (i.e., whether an application for declaration, standing alone, vests compensation rights).
- Whether the Additional District Judge was correct in confining the inquiry to whether an enquiry was necessary (assuming the appellants' allegations) and in concluding no present right existed without a declaration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants asserted initially (in their application dated 28 October 1955) that they had applied for a declaration under the Delhi Reforms Act and therefore an enquiry into their allegations was necessary before disposing of the compensation question.
- On appeal to the Single Judge they contended that their position had changed since the application: they claimed that Bhurnidari rights had in fact been conferred on them (with retrospective effect to the commencement of the Act, 20 July 1954), entitling them to compensation as Bhumidars to the exclusion of landlords.
- They challenged the Additional District Judge's approach as improper, contending the real issue before him was only whether an enquiry into their allegations was necessary, not to determine finally whether they had proved Bhurnidari rights.
Respondents' Arguments / Objections Raised
- Preliminary objection that L.P.A. 103-D had abated because Chhelu (appellant No. 2) died before institution of the appeal and his legal representatives were not on record; further, the appellants' counsel did not hold a power of attorney from him.
- Objection to the competency of a Letters Patent appeal against the Single Judge's judgment in an appeal under section 54, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 258) by analogy (which dealt with s.39 of the Indian Arbitration Act).
- Objection (raised but not pursued before the Single Judge) that a Single Judge ordinarily hears appeals under the Land Acquisition Act where the amount involved does not exceed Rs. 5,000 (Rule 1(v), Chapter 3.B), implying a possible want of jurisdiction of the Single Judge.
- Substantively, respondents (landlords) disputed the appellants' claim to compensation and contended that, on the appellants' own pleading, they had no present right to compensation absent an actual declaration by the competent authority.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 258 | Authority for the proposition that no Letters Patent appeal lies against a Single Judge's judgment passed on an appeal under section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act (because s.39(2) expressly bars a second appeal). | The Court distinguished this decision: it held that Mohindra Supply Co. rests on the specific wording of s.39(2) of the Arbitration Act which contains an express prohibition, whereas s.54 of the Land Acquisition Act contains no similar prohibition; thus Mohindra Supply Co. was not applicable to s.54 appeals. |
| Hardayal Shah v. Secretary of State for India, I.L.R. 3 Lah. 420 | Held that clause 10 of the Letters Patent gives an express right of appeal and that section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act did not implicitly take that right away; section 54 was an enabling provision extending appellate rights rather than curtailing them. | The Court followed this decision to support the conclusion that a Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 is competent against a Single Judge's judgment on an appeal under section 54. |
| Rangoon Bobat Company Limited v. The Collector of Rangoon, I.L.R. 40 Cal. 21 | Referenced (via Hardayal Shah) for the proposition that amendments (to the Land Acquisition legislation) were intended to extend, not curtail, the right of appeal. | Used as supporting authority (through Hardayal Shah) to interpret section 54 as not taking away the Letters Patent appeal right; the Court treated it as a supporting precedent for construing section 54. |
| Collector of Dacca v. Gholam Kuddus Choudhury, A.I.R. Cal. 688 | Followed the view that Letters Patent appeals remain available and that section 54 does not imply an exclusion of such appeals. | The Court cited and followed this decision in overruling the objection to the competency of the Letters Patent appeals. |
| Narayan Das v. Ganpat Rao, A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 234 | Also followed the line that section 54 does not implicitly oust Letters Patent appeal rights under clause 10. | Applied as precedent to support the competency of Letters Patent appeals in the present context. |
| Haji Mohd. Taqi v. Haji Abdul Rahman, A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 151 | Rule that in a Letters Patent appeal an appellant cannot be heard on a point which was not raised before the Judge from whose judgment he is appealing. | The Court applied this principle to reject the appellants' attempt to advance a different substantive ground (i.e., that they had already acquired Bhurnidari rights) which had not been properly made or established before the Single Judge. |
| Teja Singh v. Gurcharan Singh, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 632 | Same principle as Haji Mohd. Taqi: limitation on raising new points in a Letters Patent appeal. | Relied upon to support the conclusion that the appellants could not introduce a new substantive case in the Letters Patent appeal that had not been urged before the Single Judge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeded in a structured sequence addressing preliminary objections, jurisdictional points, and the merits:
- Abatement of one appellant's appeal: The Court accepted that Chhelu (appellant No. 2) had died before the institution of the appeal and that the appellants' counsel did not hold any power of attorney from him. Consequently the Court held there was no valid appeal on his behalf; this did not, however, affect the rights of the co-appellants who claimed separate interests.
- Competency of Letters Patent appeals under clause 10 against a Single Judge's decision on appeal under section 54: The Court analysed the respondents' reliance on Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. and distinguished it. The distinction was textual: s.39(2) of the Arbitration Act expressly bars a second appeal, whereas s.54 of the Land Acquisition Act contains no similar bar. The Court read the word "only" in s.54 as indicating that the High Court is the forum of appeal (i.e., emphasizing the forum), not as implying that no further remedy by Letters Patent appeal exists. The Court relied on earlier decisions (Hardayal Shah, Collector of Dacca, Narayan Das) holding that clause 10 rights under the Letters Patent survive and that s.54 is enabling rather than curtailing; accordingly, the objection to competency was overruled.
- Jurisdiction of the Single Judge under Rule 1(v), Chapter 3.B: The Court noted the rule which states that, "ordinarily," a Single Judge disposes of appeals under the Land Acquisition Act where the amount involved does not exceed Rs. 5,000. The Court observed that no objection on this ground had been raised before the Single Judge or in the review petition presented to him, and that the appellants had not taken up this plea in the grounds of the present appeal. Given the word "ordinarily" in the rule and the belated nature of raising this point, the Court declined to allow the appellants to introduce it at this stage.
- Merits — substance of the Bhurnidari/compensation claim: The Court analysed the factual and evidentiary posture. The Additional District Judge's framed issue asked whether an enquiry into the appellants' allegations was necessary assuming their allegations were true. The Additional District Judge concluded that a mere application for declaration under the Delhi Reforms Act did not vest Bhurnidari rights and therefore did not give a present right to claim compensation; only once a declaration was actually made (and, if retrospective operation was established), could a claim for compensation arise, and then the appellants could seek relief against those who had been paid.
- The appellants had shifted their stance on appeal to the Single Judge, asserting that a declaration had in fact been granted (with retrospective effect). The Single Judge found no material evidence on record to support that assertion (no gazette notification was produced and no other proof was placed on record). The present Division Bench agreed with the Single Judge that there was no material before the Court to substantiate the appellants' new contention.
- Procedural limitation on raising new grounds in a Letters Patent appeal: The Court emphasised the established rule — supported by Haji Mohd. Taqi and Teja Singh — that an appellant in a Letters Patent appeal cannot be permitted to be heard on a point not raised before the Judge from whose judgment the appeal lies. Applying that principle, the Court rejected the appellants' attempt to assail the award on a different ground than that argued previously.
- The Court also reiterated that the Additional District Judge's observation that a retrospective declaration (if granted later) would leave open the appellants' remedy to claim compensation remained valid; the present proceedings did not establish such a declaration.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEALS DISMISSED.
Implications and direct effects:
- The Letters Patent appeals Nos. 103-D and 108-D of 1960 were dismissed with costs.
- The appeal filed on behalf of Chhelu (appellant No. 2) was treated as abated because he died prior to the institution of the appeal and no power of attorney or representative appearances were on record for him; this does not affect the separate rights of the co-appellants.
- The Court held that section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not impliedly bar a Letters Patent appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent and followed earlier authorities so as to permit such appeals in appropriate cases; however, the decision in the present case turned on lack of evidence and procedural limitations rather than creating a new rule of law.
- The direct consequence for the appellants is that, in the absence of proof that a declaration conferring Bhurnidari rights had been made with retrospective effect, they have no present right to the compensation awarded; the Court noted that if at a subsequent time a retrospective declaration is granted, the appellants may have a remedy to claim compensation then.
- No broader new precedent was announced; the decision affirms existing principles about (a) the availability of Letters Patent appeals against Single Judge judgments in respect of section 54 appeals, and (b) the limitation on raising new points in a Letters Patent appeal where those points were not previously argued.
Disposition: Appeals dismissed.
Capoor & Gurdev Singh, JJ.:— This judgment will dispose of two Letters Patent appeals Nos. 103-D and 108-D of 1960 against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. Land measuring 2,626 Bighas 14 Biswas situate in village Khampur was acquired by the Government for construction of a transmitter. The requisite notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 9th February 1955. Various persons, including the appellants, who claim to be non-occupancy tenants in a part of the acquired land, put in their claims which were gone into by the Collector who gave his award on 27th February, 1956. A supplementary award was made on 13th March, 1956. The appellants, who were claimants Nos. 35 to 56 before the Collector, objected, to the payment of the compensation to their landlords, contending that under the provisions of the Delhi Reforms Act 8 of 1954, they had acquired the status of Bhumidars, and as such were entitled to receive the payment of the compensation for the land in their possession to the exclusion of their landlords. Thereupon on 23rd July, 1956, the Collector addressed a communication to the District Judge, Delhi, remitting the amount in dispute with the prayer that is be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The matter came up for adjudication before Shri Rameshwar Dial, Additional District Judge, Delhi. The landlords, to whom notices of the proceedings had been issued, disputing the right of the appellants to claim compensation, contended that even on the basis of the allegations contained in the appellants' application, dated 28th October, 1955, made to the Collector, they had no present right to compensation and, consequently, no further investigation was necessary. The learned Additional District Judge thereupon proceeded to try the following issue:—
“Are Mithan and others entitled to any relief, and should there be an enquiry into the allegations made in their application, dated 28th October, 1955, before the Collector, assuming that all the allegations made in the application are correct.”
3. The appellants claimed compensation as Bhumidars, but in view of the averment in their application, dated 28th October, 1955, that they had only applied for a declaration, under section 13 of the Delhi Reforms Act, the Court held that since the requisite declaration in their favour had not been, made by the Deputy Commissioner they had no present right to claim compensation in respect of the land of which they claimed to be non-occupancy tenants. In disposing of the relevant issue, the learned Additional District Judge observed as follows:
“Unless a declaration is obtained no rights as Bhumidars vest in non-occupancy tenants. No interest is, therefore, created in the land, and as such they do not have any present right to claim compensation which represents the money value of the acquired land. If at any subsequent time, the declaration is granted, and it is further established that the declaration has retrospective effect as to have vested proprietary rights in them on the date of the enforcement of the Act, it should not be difficult for them to claim relief against persons to whom compensation may be paid. These rights are left unaffected by the Land Acquisition Act. The Court is not empowered to postpone the matter till the declaration is obtained………”
4. Aggrieved by this decision of the Court, dated 8th December, 1956, the non-occupancy tenants preferred an appeal to this Court under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. It came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court and was dismissed on 3rd October, 1960. As the appellate judgment shows, the contention put forward before the learned Single Judge was that though in their application, dated 28th October, 1955, to which a reference is made in the relevant issue quoted earlier, the appellants had asserted that they had merely applied for grant of Bhurnidari rights, the position had changed since then and they had, in fact, acquired Bhurnidari rights entitling them to claim compensation. The learned Single Judge, however, found that there was nothing; whatsoever on the record to prove that the appellants had acquired Bhurnidari rights, and after noting that even the gazette notification, which was claimed to have been issued in the appellants' favour, had not been produced, he affirmed the findings of the Additional District Judge and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by this decision of Tek Chand J. dated 3rd October, 1960, two sets of appeals under clause 10 of the Letters Patent have been preferred.
5. Before dealing with the merits of the appeals, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents. It is contended that L.P.A 103-D of 1960 has abated as Chhelu, son of Nata, appellant No. 2, had died prior to the institution of the appeal on 25th August, 1959, and his legal representatives had not been brought on record. The fact that Chhelu had died prior to the institution of the appeal is not disputed, and on perusal of the record, we find that the appellants' counsel, Shri R.S Narula, did not hold any power of attorney from him. In these circumstances, there is no valid appeal on his behalf, and there is thus no question of impleading his legal representatives. This, however, does not affect the right of his co-appellants, who claim separate and individual interest in the acquired property.
6. The other preliminary objection, which is common to both the appeals is that no Letters Patent appeal is competent against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. Reliance in this connection is placed upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Union Of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. . A.I.R 1962 S.C 258., where it was held that no appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent lies against the Judgment of single Judge passed on an appeal under section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act. This decision, how ever, proceeds upon the wording of sub-section (2) of section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1920, which expressly provides that no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under sub-section (1) of section 39, except an appeal to the Supreme Court.
7. The provision regarding appeals against the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act is contained in section 54 of that Act, which runs a follows:—
“Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1905 (5 of 1908), and in Order XLV thereof.”
8. It will be noticed that this section does not contain any prohibition against filing a second appeal as is found in sub-section (2) of section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act. The word “only” occurring in section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not indicate that only one appeal is provided against the award of the Court, but emphasizes the fact that the forum of appeal in all such cases would be the High Court.
9. A similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court presided over by Shadi Lal C.J in Hardayal Shah v. Secretary of State for India . I.L.R 3 Lah. 420., and it was held:—
It is beyond dispute that clause 10 of the Letters Patent gives in express terms a right of appeal, and I cannot hold that right has been impliedly taken away by section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, more especially when I find that the section is merely an enabling section and was enacted in order to give a right of appeal to his Majesty in Council, which right was not, as held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rangoon Bobat Company Limited v. The Collector of Rangoon . I.L.R 40 Cal. 21. recognized by the old section, as it exited prior to the Ace of 1921. The object of the amendment was to extend the scope of the right of appeal and not to curtail any existing right.”
10. This decision was followed in Collector of Dacca v. Gholam Kuddus Choudhury . A.I.R Cal. 688., and Narayan Das v. Ganpat Rao . A.I.R 1941 Nag. 234.. No decision to the contrary has been cited. We, accordingly, over rule the objection to the competency of the appeal.
11. Besides assailing the judgment on merits, the appellants' learned counsel contended that the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In this connection he referred to rule 1(v) of Chapter 3. B of the Rules and Orders of the High Court, Volume V, which provides:—
“Subject to the provisos hereinafter set forth the following classes of cases shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone:—
……………………………
(v) an appeal under the Land Acquisition Act if the amount involved in the appeal does not exceed Rupees 5000/-……”
12. No such objection to the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge to hear the appeal, was taken either in the course of the hearing before him or even subsequently when a petition for review was presented to him by the appellants themselves. Even in the grounds of the present Appeal, this point was not put forward and we see no justification for permitting the appellants to take up this new plea at such a belated stage, especially when the use of the word “ordinarily” in the relevant rule indicates that there is no absolute bar to such an appeal being heard by a Single Judge.
13. Coming to the merits, the appellants' counsel, Shri R.S Narula, complained that the learned Single Judge had not properly appreciated the question that required his consideration, and he ignored the fact that the issue that the Additional District Judge was called upon to decide was merely whether an enquiry into the allegations contained in the appellants' application, dated 28th October, 1958, was necessary, and not whether the appellants had proved that they were Bhumidars. In their application, dated 28th October, 1958, the appellants had asserted their claim to the compensation on the plea that they had applied to the Deputy Commissioner for being declared as Bhumidars, and on obtaining the requisite declaration, they would be entitled to all the benefits of Bhurnidari rights with retrospective effect from 20th July, 1954, when the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, came into force. The learned Additional District Judge found that even if the appellants' allegation that they had applied for grant of Bhumdari rights be correct, they were not entitled to claim compensation, as they had no present right to it. The appellants seem to have realized the weakness of their case and, as the judgment under appeal goes to show, when the matter came up before the learned Single Judge they took up the position that a declaration under section 14 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act 8 of 1954 had been issued, and they had thus acquired the Bhurnidari rights, entitling them to receive the compensation. They, however, failed to satisfy the learned Single Judge about the correctness of their assertion, and finding that even a copy of the notification, alleged to have been issued in the appellants' favour, had not been produced, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. The relevant part of his judgment runs as follows:—
“The argument which has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants is that his clients have become Bhumidars with retrospective effect and, therefore, they alone are entitled to receive compensation to the exclusion of the landlords. There is, however, no material before me at all in substantiation of this allegation. According to the statement of the learned counsel for the appellants made at the Bar Bhurnidari rights were granted to his clients on 23rd June, 1956, and they were given retrospective effect from the date of the enforcement of the Act, i.e, from 20th July, 1954. It is rather extraordinary that no evidence has been placed on the record of this case in support of this claim on the part of appellants Nos. 1 to 21, although it is alleged that their status as Bhumidars was recognized as early as 23rd June, 1958…”
14. It appears to us that realizing the validity of the opposing contention that mere making of an application for being declared as Bhumidars did not invest the appellants with any right to claim compensation, they deliberately shifted their stand when the matter came up in appeal before the learned Single Judge, and took up the position that their application had been accepted and they had, in fact, acquired the Bhumidari rights in the land. Having failed to substantiate their plea about the acquisition of Bhumidari rights before the learned Single Judge, as well as in this appeal, the appellants cannot be permitted to assail the award of the Additional District Judge on a different ground. It is a well-recognized rule that in an appeal under the Letters Patent, an appellant is not entitled to be heard on a point which had not been raised before the Judge from whose judgment he is appealing. Reference in this connection may be made to Haji Mohd. Taqi v. Haji Abdul Rahman . A.I.R 1923 Lah. 151. and Teja Singh v. Gurcharan Singh . A.I.R 1930 Lah. 632..
15. Even otherwise, we are of the opinion that the decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing the appeal was correct. The appellants could not claim the compensation without proof of the fact that they had acquired Bhumidari rights, and the learned Additional District Judge acted rightly in rejecting their claim, but observing that if at any subsequent time the declaration is granted to the appellants with retrospective effect it would not be difficult for them to claim compensation. The real grievance of the appellants in this appeal appears to be that their right to receive compensation after Bhumidari rights are conferred on them (which was recognized by the Additional District Judge) had been prejudiced by the observations made by the learned Single Judge in his order. We, however, see nothing in the judgment under appeal to justify this apprehension. The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the appeal had affirmed the findings of the Additional District Judge, and the position remains the same as it was when that appeal was filed.
16. For the reasons stated above, we find no force in any of these appeals, and dismiss both of them with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
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