- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
S. Tarlok Singh S. Sant Singh And Others v. Sardarni Daljit Kaur .
High Court Opinion Summary — Tek Chand, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an order of the Sub-Judge, Patiala, rejecting the plaintiffs' claim to movable property for failure to make up a deficiency in court-fee.
Key facts and procedural chronology (as stated in the opinion):
- S. Mehar Singh died on 16 March 1952, leaving a widow, Daljit Kaur (defendant No. 1).
- On 11 September 1952 the widow applied for a succession certificate; the Court granted the succession certificate and dismissed objections by three plaintiffs on 7 May 1953. A curator had previously been appointed and, after the succession certificate order, the curator's possessions were released in favour of Daljit Kaur.
- The three plaintiffs (Tarlok Singh — father of the deceased; Uttam Singh — brother; Dharambir Singh — alleged adopted son) instituted the present suit on 12 May 1953 seeking a declaration that the order of 7 May 1953 was null and void insofar as the plaintiffs' right of survivorship was concerned, consequential injunctions, return of specified properties (movable and immovable), and costs.
- In the plaint the plaintiffs initially fixed the value for court-fee purposes at Rs. 1,100 under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, while asserting the movable property to be worth Rs. 92,570 and immovable property to exceed Rs. 58,794.
- Procedural history on valuation and court-fee:
- 28 August 1954 — Sub-Judge returned the plaint for presentation to a court of competent jurisdiction (District Judge).
- 28 June 1955 — District Judge considered the plaintiffs' valuation arbitrary and directed plaintiffs to set down the correct value; case remitted to trial Court.
- 12 August 1955 — Plaintiffs filed an amended plaint fixing jurisdictional value at Rs. 10,500 and paid court-fee on that amount.
- 25 March 1958 — District Judge held Section 7(iii) of the Court-fees Act applied and that plaintiffs must pay ad valorem court-fee on the value of movables (Rs. 92,570 as per plaintiffs); the issue of proper stamping was decided against plaintiffs. Revision to the High Court was dismissed on 20 May 1959.
- 6 October 1959 — Plaintiffs were directed to make up the deficiency in court-fee by 16 October 1959. Plaintiffs refused to pay; the trial Court rejected plaintiffs' claim in so far as it related to movable property included in the succession certificate, allowing the rest of the claim covered by the court-fee paid to continue. Plaintiffs appealed to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit, which seeks a declaration that an order granting a succession certificate is null and void and consequential relief returning possession (including movable property), is a suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act (i.e., court-fee determined by the value at which relief is claimed) or whether Section 7(iii) (ad valorem fee on specific substantial relief such as movables) applies.
- Whether a relief for possession or return of movables, claimed as consequential to a declaratory decree avoiding a succession certificate, is a "consequential relief" within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(c) (and the scope of that term as defined in precedent).
- Whether the plaintiffs may arbitrarily fix the valuation of the relief in the plaint for the purpose of computing court-fee, and whether the Court is bound to accept that valuation.
- Whether the court-fee paid on appeal is sufficient where the lower Court held additional ad valorem court-fee due on movables (i.e., the measure of court-fee payable on appeal against an order rejecting a plaint for non-payment of court-fee).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Arguments
- The suit is essentially a declaratory suit: it seeks a declaration that the succession certificate order is null and void as regards the plaintiffs' rights; consequentially, they seek the return of possession, including movables, which follows directly from such a declaration. Thus Section 7(iv)(c) applies and the court-fee payable is determined by the amount at which the relief was valued in the plaint.
- Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision in Vishwa Nath v. Sita Bai (AIR 1952 Punj 335) holding that where a plaintiff seeks a declaration that a decree is not binding and consequential possession flows from that declaration, the suit is under Section 7(iv)(c).
- Argued that the possession passed due to the Court's order granting succession certificate and release by the curator; a declaration undoing that order necessarily entails return of possession and thus the possession claim is consequential to the declaration.
Defendant's (Respondent's) Arguments
- Raised an objection that the plaint was not properly stamped because the plaintiffs' valuation was arbitrary and substantially understated; contended that Section 7(iii) applies and ad valorem court-fee must be paid on the movables (claimed at Rs. 92,570).
- Preliminary objection before the High Court that the court-fee paid on appeal was insufficient and that the appellate court-fee should be calculated on Rs. 92,570 less the amount already paid in the lower Court.
- Relied upon precedent (including Zeb-ul-Nisa v. Din Mohammad and the principle discussed in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal) as to the meaning and limits of "consequential relief," suggesting that if the relief claimed is, in reality, a substantial relief (not merely consequential) the plaintiffs must pay court-fee on the substantial relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moti Ram v. Daulat, AIR 1939 Nag 50 (FB) | Support for the view that litigants cannot place an arbitrary value grossly disproportionate to the relief. | Cited (via the District Judge's approach) as authority for the proposition that the court should scrutinise valuations that are arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the relief sought. |
| Salahuddin Hyder Khan v. Dhanoo Lal, AIR 1945 Pat 421 | Authority referenced alongside other Patna Full Bench decisions on valuation and court-fee. | Relied upon by the District Judge to support the need to prevent arbitrary undervaluation of the plaintiff's claimed relief. |
| Mt. Rupia v. Bhatu Mahtcn, AIR 1944 Pat 17 (FB) | Another Full Bench decision cited on valuation/court-fee principles. | Used by the District Judge to justify requiring a correct valuation where the initial valuation was considered arbitrary. |
| Udayanath v. Rahas Pandiani, AIR 1951 Orissa 10 | Cited in the same context as other authorities addressing arbitrary valuations by litigants. | Applied by the District Judge as part of the line of authorities that courts should not permit arbitrary valuations grossly disproportionate to relief. |
| Uday Chand v. Mohan Lal, 1957–59 Pun LR 265 (AIR 1957 Punj 315) | Holds that court-fee payable on appeal against an order rejecting a plaint for non-payment of court-fee is ad valorem on the difference between the fee paid in the lower Court and the fee held to be proper by the lower Court. | Adopted by Tek Chand, J. to reject the respondent's preliminary objection: the court-fee paid on appeal was adequate under this test. |
| Vishwa Nath v. Sita Bai, AIR 1952 Punj 335 (Full Bench) | Holds that where a plaintiff seeks a declaration that a decree is not binding and consequential possession follows, the suit falls under Section 7(iv)(c) (i.e., a declaratory suit with consequential relief). | Relied upon by the appellants and accepted by Tek Chand, J. as directly applicable: the present suit is a Section 7(iv)(c) suit because possession follows naturally from nullifying the succession-certificate order. |
| Harkishan Lal v. Barkat Ali, AIR 1942 Lah 209 (Division Bench) | Explains that where a plaintiff may frame a suit either as a suit for possession or as a declaration with consequential relief, the plaintiff may choose the form; the court-fee is determined by the nature of the suit as framed. | Used to support the proposition that plaintiffs are entitled to choose the form of suit (declaration with consequential relief) where that form is legally open to them; court will determine court-fee on that chosen form. |
| Zeb-ul-Nisa v. Din Mohammad, AIR 1941 Lah 97 (Full Bench) citing Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal | Offers an expansive definition of "consequential relief" in Section 7(iv)(c): lists elements (that it follows directly, valuation not definitely ascertainable, not specifically provided elsewhere, not capable of independent claim as substantial relief). | Quoted and analysed; Tek Chand, J. accepted that the key requirement is that the relief follows directly from the declaration but rejected the other three requirements as unnecessary for the definition in this case. |
| Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, ILR 54 All 812 (AIR 1932 All 485) | Discussed the meaning of "consequential relief" and helped frame the Full Bench approach in Zeb-ul-Nisa. | Referenced as the foundation for the Zeb-ul-Nisa discussion; the Court considered the elements discussed but retained only the "follows directly" element as essential in this context. |
| Emperor v. Ralla Ram, AIR 1946 Lah 94 | Full Bench held that the Court was bound to accept the valuation put by the appellant, however arbitrary. | Noted by the Court; its force was limited by subsequent legislative amendment in Punjab (but that amendment did not apply here because the plaint was instituted before the merger). The High Court observed the decision but found it not decisive for this case's outcome given the timeline. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps addressing preliminary and substantive points:
-
Preliminary objection on appeal-fee adequacy:
- The respondent argued that the court-fee paid on appeal was insufficient (should be on Rs. 92,570 less fee already paid). The Court applied the principle in Uday Chand v. Mohan Lal (1957–59 Pun LR 265 / AIR 1957 Punj 315) that the fee payable on such an appeal is the ad valorem fee on the difference between the fee paid in the lower Court and the fee the lower Court held to be proper. On this basis, the Court held the court-fee on appeal was adequate and overruled the preliminary objection.
-
Whether Section 7(iv)(c) or Section 7(iii) applies:
- Plaintiffs contended the suit was a declaratory suit under Section 7(iv)(c) with consequential relief for the return of possession (including movables), and the court-fee is determined by the valuation in the plaint.
- The respondent argued Section 7(iii) applied as the relief sought (return of movables) was a substantial relief requiring ad valorem fee on the movables' value.
- The Court examined precedents (notably Vishwa Nath v. Sita Bai and Harkishan Lal v. Barkat Ali) and analyzed the meaning of "consequential relief" as discussed in Zeb-ul-Nisa and Kalu Ram.
- Tek Chand, J. distilled the essential element of "consequential relief": the relief must follow directly from the declaration (i.e., a necessary or natural consequence). He rejected the additional requirements extracted from Zeb-ul-Nisa (that consequential relief must be incapable of definite valuation, not provided elsewhere, and not independently claimable) as unnecessary for defining the term in the present context.
- Applying that approach, the Court held that where a declaration nullifies an order granting a succession certificate which, by operation of the Court's earlier orders, caused possession to pass to the defendant, the natural consequence of declaring the succession certificate void is that possession (including movables handed over under that order) must be restored to the party from whom it was taken. Thus the claimed relief for return of movables is a "consequential relief" within Section 7(iv)(c).
-
Whether plaintiffs could arbitrarily value the relief:
- The Court reviewed conflicting Full Bench authority. The Lahore Full Bench in Emperor v. Ralla Ram held the Court must accept the valuation put by the appellant however arbitrary, and that view had been followed by the Full Bench in AIR 1952 Punj 335. By contrast, the District Judge had relied on decisions (Moti Ram and others) to require scrutiny of valuations that were grossly disproportionate to the relief.
- The Court observed that the Punjab legislature had later amended Section 7 to require, in certain suits under sub-clause (c), a minimum valuation tied to clause (v) valuation — but that amendment did not apply here because the plaint was filed on 12 May 1953 in a Pepsu Court prior to the merger and the subsequent Punjab amendment.
- Given the facts — that possession originally rested with the plaintiffs and passed by virtue of court orders to the curator and then to the respondent — the Court concluded that the plaintiffs' suit was legitimately framed as a declaration with consequential relief and that the court-fee paid under Section 7(iv)(c) was correctly applied in the circumstances.
-
Disposition in light of reasoning:
- On the basis that the suit properly falls within Section 7(iv)(c), and taking into account the temporal inapplicability of the Punjab amendment, the Court held that the plaintiffs had paid court-fee in accordance with Section 7(iv)(c).
- Consequently, the Court set aside the Sub-Judge's order of 18 October 1959 rejecting the plaintiffs' plaint as to movable property for non-payment of additional court-fee, and directed the trial Court to proceed with the case on its merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL ALLOWED. The order of the Sub-Judge dated 18 October 1959 rejecting the plaintiffs' plaint (insofar as it related to movable property) for failure to make up a court-fee deficiency is set aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the case on the merits. The costs of the appeal shall abide the event.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs' plaint is reinstated (the rejection insofar as it related to movables is set aside), and the trial Court must continue to hear the suit on its substantive merits. The appeal's costs are reserved to be decided depending on outcome ("shall abide the event").
- On precedent and broader law: The opinion accepts the view that a declaratory suit nullifying an order which caused a change of possession may attract Section 7(iv)(c) as the possession claim is consequential; it narrows the definition of "consequential relief" to its core requirement — that the relief follow directly from the declaration — and rejects the necessity of additional criteria suggested in some earlier authorities. The opinion notes that a later Punjab legislative amendment limiting plaintiffs' freedom to under-value such suits does not apply to plaints filed prior to the merger. The Court did not state that it was laying down a novel principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts at hand.
- No new sweeping precedent was expressly announced; the decision applies existing authorities (Full Bench decisions and division bench reasoning) to conclude that Section 7(iv)(c) governs the present suit and that the court-fee paid was correct in the circumstances.
Judge(s): Tek Chand, J.; K. L. Gosain, J. (concurring). Final line of the opinion: "Appeal allowed."
Tek Chand, J.:— This is an appeal from the order of Sub-Judge, Patiala, rejecting the plaintiff's claim to the movable property for failure to make up the deficiency in the court-fee.
2. The plaintiff Tarlok Singh is father, of Air Commodore Mehar Singh deceased and Uttam Singh plaintiff is the brother of the deceased. The third plaintiff, Dharambir Singh, is alleged to be the adopted son of the deceased. S. Mehar Singh died on 16th March, 1952, leaving his widow Daljii Kaur, the defendant in this case. On 11th September, 1952, she made an application for the grant of succession certificate. Under orders of the Court succession certificate was granted to the widow of the deceased and the objections raised by the three plaintiffs were dismissed on 7th May, 1953. A curator had been appointed of the properties, both immovable and movable, and after the order granting succession certificate was passed the properties in possession of the curator were released in favour of Daljit Kaur.
3. On 12th May, 1953, the three plaintiffs instituted the present suit. It was prayed that as decree for a declaration should be passed to the effect that the order dated 7th May, 1953, passed by the Court of the Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Patiala, granting succession certificate and possession of the properties of S. Mehar Singh deceased was null, void and ineffective and, therefore, liable to be set aside qua the plaintiffs' right of survivorship. As a result of the above declaration a prayer was made for the issuance of an injunction to the defendants (the second defendant being the curator) that they should not interfere with the plaintiffs' possession of the bungalow and agricultural land specified in the plaint and the properties, both movable and immovable, should be returned to the curator in order to enable the plaintiffs to get it back from him or, in the alternative, “defendant No. 1 may be directed to return the articles mentioned in the lists attached, to the plaintiffs.” There was also prayer for grant of costs and for any other alternative or additional relief. This suit was contested by defendant No. 1, widow of the deceased, on several grounds which need not be mentioned for purposes of this order except the one relating to court-fee. In the petition of plaint the value of suit for purposes of court-fee was fixed at Rs. 1,100/- under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. It was contended that it was actually much higher. The value of the movable property was said to be Rs. 92,570/- and the worth of the immovable property was said to exceed Rs. 58,794/-.
4. By order dated 28th August, 1954, the Sub-Judge, without determining the valuation, ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to a Court of competent jurisdiction which, according to him, was the Court of the District Judge. The District Judge, by his order dated 28th June, 1955, thought that the plaintiffs had put an arbitrary value which was unreasonable and following the view expressed in Moti Ram v. Daulat, AIR 1939 Nag 50 (FB), Salahuddin Hyder Khan v. Dhanoo Lal, AIR 1945 Pat 421, Mt. Rupia v. Bhatu Mahtcn, AIR 1944 Pat 17 (FB), and Udayanath v. Rahas Pandiani, AIR 1951 Orissa 10, said that the litigants could not be allowed to place an arbitrary value which was grossly disproportionate to the relief.
5. According to the District Judge, the movable property was worth Rs. 92,570/- and the house alone was worth Rs. 58,794/-. He ordered that the plaintiffs should set down the correct value regarding the subject-matter of their suit and if the new valuation disclosed the suit to be beyond the competency of the Court of the Sub-Judge then only a proper order regarding the return of the plaint should be passed. The case was sent back to the trial Court. On 12th August, 1955, instead of getting the value determined, the plaintiffs filed an amended plaint after fixing the jurisdictional value at Rs. 10,500/- and paid court-fee on that amount.
6. The defendant again raised an objection before the District Judge saying that the plaint was not properly stamped. The District Judge, by his order dated 25th March, 1958, said that the provisions of Section 7(iii) of the Court-fees Act were attracted and the plaintiffs must pay ad valorem court-fee on the value of the movable property which according to the plaintiffs themselves came to Rs. 92,570/-. The issue whether the suit is properly stamped was, therefore, decided against the plaintiffs. From this order the plaintiffs filed a revision in this Court which was dismissed on 20th May, 1959, by Shamsher Bahadur, J. Later on, this case was sent to Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Patiala, for disposal. On 6th October, 1959, the plaintiffs were directed to make up the deficiency in the court-fee by 16th October, 1959.
7. On the latter date the plaintiffs expressed their unwillingness to pay more court-fee and in these circumstances the plaintiffs' claim was rejected in so far as it related to movable property included in the succession certificate and the rest of the claim covered by the court-fee paid was allowed to continue. The plaintiffs were directed to put in an amended plaint containing a relief for declaration which would be covered by the court-fee already paid by him. From this order the plaintiffs have come up in appeal to this Court.
8. Mr. Puran Chand, learned counsel for the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection that the court-fee paid on appeal is insufficient. According to his contention the court-fee should be paid on Rs. 92,570/- less court-fee already paid. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is without merit. It was held by a Division Bench in Uday Chand v. Mohan Lal, 1957-59 Pun LR 265 : (AIR 1957 Punj 315), that the court-fee payable on appeal against an order rejecting a plaint for non-payment of court-fee held by the Court to be due, was an ad valorem court-fee on the difference between the court-fee as paid by the plaintiff in the lower Court and the court-fee held to be the proper court-fee by the lower Court. According to this test the court-fee on appeal is adequate.
9. On the question of court-fee paid on the plaint it was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants that the relief was covered by S. 7(iv)(c) as the suit was filed to obtain a declaratory decree with a prayer for consequential relief and the court-fee payable was according to the amount at which the relief sought was valued in the plaint and this could be an arbitrary figure. The plaintiffs had sought declaration to the effect that the order granting succession certificate was null and void.
10. The plaintiffs claimed that the property was jointly owned and possessed by them and the deceased S. Mehar Singh, and that they had been deprived of their possession by the order appointing curator and by the subsequent order directing the curator to release the property in favour of Daljit Kaur defendant. The consequential relief sought in the plaint is that defendant No. 1 should be directed to return the articles mentioned in the lists attached to the plaint.
11. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that it is by the Court's order granting succession certificate that possession of the suit property has been made over to the defendant. If that order is declared to be a nullity the consequence is that the possession is to be returned to the plaintiffs. Reliance has been placed upon a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Vishwa Nath v. Sita Bai, AIR 1952 Punj 335. In that case it was observed:
“Although the object of his suit is to obtain possession of the land he (plaintiff) cannot do so unless the decree is declared ineffective against him and that being so, it is clear that the plaintiff must of necessity ask for a declaration that the decrees is not binding upon him and, until this is done, he cannot sue for possession and, in this view of the matter, the suit must be held to be a suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act.”
12. The appellants' counsel maintains that the above reasoning equally applies to the present case where the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that the order granting succession certificate is not-binding upon them.
13. In Harkishan Lal v. Barkat Ali, AIR 1942 Lah 209, which is a Division Bench decision, Dalip Singh, J. said:
“If the plaintiff chooses to frame his suit which is essentially a suit for possession and asks that it be declared that he is the owner or a limited owner of certain property and then asks for possession as a consequential relief such a suit is in substance no more than a suit for possession and the plaintiff cannot merely by splitting the relief of possession into two distinct reliefs, namely, one for a declaration declaring his right to possess and another for actual possession, convert the suit for possession into a suit for a declaration coupled with a consequential relief. But there may be other classes of cases where, though the plaintiff may be entitled to bring a suit for possession pure and simple yet he is also entitled to bring a suit for declaration coupled with ??? relief by way of possession. Such cases are generally cases where the plaintiff alleges that he has a right to possess but a certain decree or other document whether by way of alienation or otherwise stands in the way of his right to possess which would arise from his title. In such a case it may be open to the plaintiff to ignore the decree or document entirely treating it as a nullity and bring a suit for possession pure and simple. But there is no compulsion on him to do so and if he chooses to bring a suit in the form of a declaration that the document in question does not bind him and that, therefore, his title to the property gives him a right to possession he is entitled to do so, provided there is no other objection to the form of the suit.”
14. In the same decision it was also held that where it was open to the plaintiff to frame his suit in one or two ways there was no obligation in law that he should frame his suit in any other way than he would choose to frame it. If it is open to the plaintiff to bring a suit for possession or to bring a suit for a declaration with consequential relief for possession; it is entirely for the plaintiff to choose in which form he brings the suit and the question of court-fee payable is wholly irrelevant as the court-fee will be determined on the nature of the suit as framed at the choice of the plaintiff whether it is legally open to him to do so.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the principle of the Full Bench decision is not applicable as there is no legal impediment created by the order granting succession certificate. But in this case the possession of the suit property, both movable and immovable, was originally with the appellants and in obedience to the order of the Court it was handed over to the curator and the latter at the bidding of the Court released the possession to the respondent. Had it not been for the order of the Court the plaintiffs-appellants would still have retained the possession.
16. The necessity of making a prayer in the plaint had arisen on account of the fact that it was in pursuance of the order of the Court granting the succession certificate that the possession changed hands. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Section 209 of the Indian Succession Act which saves the right to bring a suit. It is true that the right of the aggrieved party to establish his title by filing a regular suit is not affected by the order of the Court granting succession certificate. But from this fact it cannot be argued that the plaintiff must pay court-fee as required by Section 7(iii) of the Court-fees Act.
17. The next argument of Mr. Puran Chand is based upon the following observations of a Full Bench decision in Zeb-ul-Nisa v. Din Mohammad, AIR 1941 Lah 97.
“The meaning of the expression consequential relief as used in Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (consisting of five Judges) in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, ILR 54 All 812 : (AIR 1932 All 485), and it was held that the expression ‘consequential relief’ means some relief, which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a ‘substantial relief’. It follows, therefore, that if the relief claimed in any case is found in reality to be tantamount to a substantial relief and not a mere ‘consequential relief’ in the above sense the plaintiff must pay court-fee on the substantial relief.”
18. According to the above definition the meaning of the expression ‘consequential relief’ is enlarged so as to indicate the following elements:
(a) The relief must follow directly from the declaration given,
(b) The valuation of the relief must be such as not capable of definite ascertainment,
(c) The relief sought must not be provided specifically elsewhere in the Act, and
(d) The relief must be one which cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief.
19. Barring the first element, the other ingredients do not fall within the connotation of the term. The other three requirements are otiose and I cannot persuade myself to treat them as necessary concomitants of the expression ‘consequential relief’.
20. A relief is consequential if it follows something on which it depends. What ensues or follows must have a necessary connection with the cause. ‘Cause’ and ‘consequence’ are co-relative terms, one implying the other. What the Courts have to see under S. 7(iv)(c) is whether the relief of possession where a declaratory decree is prayed for follows as a natural sequence from the declaration. In a case like the present, the moment a declaration is granted avoiding or nullifying an order granting succession certificate, the result which must follow in the course of natural event is that the possession which has been ordered by that. Court to be given to the applicant by the curator must be restored to the party from which it had been originally taken by the curator.
21. In this case the legal impediment in the way of the plaintiffs is that the defendant is in possession of the suit property under order of a Court. In my view, to a case like the present the provisions of S. 7(iv)(c) apply. The principle underlying the Full Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1952 Punj 335, fully applies to this case and the court-fee has been correctly paid in accordance with the requirements of S. 7(iv)(c).
22. The next question is, whether it is open to the plaintiffs to put an arbitrary value and whether the Court is bound to accept the valuation. This matter was considered by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Emperor v. Ralla Ram, AIR 1946 Lah 94, where it was held that the Court was bound to accept the valuation put upon his relief by the appellant however arbitrary it might be. This decision was followed in the latter Full Bench decision in AIR 1952 Punj 335.
23. The law in Punjab has been amended by the Punjab Court-fees (Punjab Amendment) Act (XXXI of 1953) by the addition of following proviso to cl. (iv) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, 1870,
“Provided further that in suits coming under sub-s. (c) in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of this Act.”
24. This amendment, however, does not affect the decision in this case because the plaint was instituted in a Pepsu Court on 12th May, 1953 before the merger of Pepsu in the State of Punjab.
25. For reasons stated above the plaintiffs' appeal deserves to succeed. The order rejecting the plaintiffs' plaint passed by the Sub-Judge on 18th October, 1959, is, therefore, set aside.
26. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the case now on the merits.
27. The costs of this appeal shall abide the event.
28. K.L Gosain, J.:— I agree.
FE/M.F
29. Appeal allowed.
Alert