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Parmeshwari Das And Others v. Soman Devi And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-respondent, Shrimati Soman Devi, sued for recovery of Rs. 5,000 as damages for the death of her husband, Om Parkash. The deceased was a passenger in motor vehicle No. PNF 847 (a 1943 Chevrolet station wagon registered as a private carrier) owned jointly by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 (Sohan Lal and his two sons, Parmeshwari Dass and Omparkash). The vehicle was driven by defendant No. 4, Mast Ram.
According to the plaintiff's case, on 29 November 1953 the vehicle was proceeding from Banjar to Aut in the Kulu hills with thirteen passengers and thirteen bags of potatoes (approximately twenty-six maunds). After about seven miles from Banjar, on negotiating a curve the steering wheel "became free" and the vehicle fell into a khad about seventy feet below. Om Parkash and the cleaner Ishru died instantly; Salig Ram died some days later; others were injured.
The plaintiff filed suit on 6 November 1954 for Rs. 5,000. The pleadings led to six issues being framed: jurisdiction as to defendant No. 1; the marital status of plaintiff; ownership of the vehicle; whether the accident resulted from negligence of the defendants; what damages the plaintiff suffered; and relief.
The trial Court found jurisdiction proper, accepted that the plaintiff was the widow and that defendants Nos. 1–3 jointly owned the vehicle, but on issue No. 4 absolved the defendants of negligence and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed. The Additional District Judge disagreed with the trial Court on issue No. 4, found negligence on the part of the defendants, allowed the appeal, set aside the lower judgment and remanded for a final decision after a finding on damages (issue No. 5).
The defendants filed the present (second) appeal challenging the appellate court's conclusion of negligence and contending that on the proved facts no inference of negligence could be drawn.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit against defendant No. 1.
- Whether the plaintiff is the widow of Om Parkash (the deceased).
- Whether vehicle No. PNF 847 was owned by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 at the time of the alleged accident.
- Whether the accident, as a result of which Om Parkash died, occurred as a result of negligence of the defendants.
- What damages, if any, the plaintiff suffered as a result of the accident.
- What relief should be granted.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Contentions
- The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle was carrying thirteen passengers and an equal number of potato bags (about twenty-six maunds) and that the steering became free, causing the vehicle to fall into a khad, resulting in death of Om Parkash and others.
- Implicit in the plaintiff's case (as reflected in the record and acceptance by the lower appellate court) was the contention that the vehicle was overloaded and that the accident resulted from defendants' negligence in failing to keep the vehicle in a roadworthy condition.
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants contended that, on the proved facts, no inference of negligence could be drawn; they asserted they were not negligent and therefore not liable for damages.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hutchins v. Maunder (1920) 37 T.L.R. 72 | Where steering gear is in imperfect condition by reason of wear such that the driver may lose control, using the vehicle on a highway is necessarily dangerous and amounts to negligence even without knowledge of the defect. | The court relied on this case to support the proposition that a worn steering component (tierod) that can cause loss of control is evidence of negligence by the owner who permitted the vehicle to be driven in that condition. |
| Scott v. The London and St. Katherine Docks Co. | The statement of the res ipsa loquitur principle: where a thing is under the management of the defendant and the accident would not ordinarily happen if proper care were used, this furnishes reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care unless the defendant explains otherwise. | The court quoted Erle, C.J.'s formulation to justify applying res ipsa loquitur where the vehicle was under defendants' management and the accident was not of a kind that ordinarily occurs absent negligence. |
| Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. (1948) 2 All E.R. 460 | Holding that an omnibus leaving the road and falling down an embankment raises a presumption of negligence (res ipsa loquitur), shifting the burden to the defendants to prove they exercised all reasonable care; Asquith, L.J.'s propositions on onus and what rebuts the presumption were cited. | The court used the Barkway exposition (including Asquith, L.J.'s three propositions) to explain the onus on defendants to rebut the presumption of negligence and to show specific non-negligent causes or that they used all reasonable care. |
| Laurie v. Raglan Building Co. Ltd. (1941) 3 All E.R. 332 | Referenced (via Barkway) concerning the limits of attempting to rebut res ipsa loquitur by showing a neutral event (e.g., a tyre-burst) that does not, without more, displace the presumption. | Mentioned as supporting authority for the principle that presenting a neutral immediate cause is not ordinarily sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. |
| Gobald Motor Service Ltd v. R.M.K. Veluswami, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 981 | Authority citing with approval the Hutchins and Barkway rulings on presumption of negligence and res ipsa loquitur. | The court noted that the two English rulings (Hutchins and Barkway) were cited with approval in Gobald Motor Service Ltd, reinforcing the applicable principles in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began from the established proved fact that the tierod connecting the steering wheel to the wheels had become loose, rendering the driver unable to steer and negotiate curves. The court considered whether the cause was overloading or wear and tear but treated that distinction as immaterial to the central legal question: the defendants' duty of care.
The court recalled that the deceased was an invitee and that owners of vehicles owe duties to take proper care regarding the soundness and roadworthiness of the vehicle. This duty includes keeping the vehicle in proper condition so that it can be controlled safely; failure to keep steering in repair such that the driver cannot control the car is evidence of negligence by the owner.
Relying on Hutchins v. Maunder, the court noted that a motor car with steering gear in imperfect condition by reason of wear is dangerous and its use on a highway amounts to negligence even absent knowledge of the defect. Applying that reasoning, the court held that the defective tierod could have been discovered by proper precautions which were not taken, making it difficult to absolve the defendants of negligence.
The court emphasized that owners must ensure roadworthiness before use and must also guard against overloading. Where a defect such as a faulty tierod is proved and no satisfactory explanation is offered, that defect is evidence of negligence, unless the defendants show they exercised proper care and skill and that the defect could not reasonably have been discovered.
The court addressed and dismissed as irrelevant a controversy over whether the deceased was carried gratuitously or for reward: liability to exercise due and reasonable care exists in either case.
The court concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "fully applies" to the facts: the vehicle was under the defendants' management; the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily happen if those in control exercise proper care; therefore a presumption of negligence arises. The burden shifted to the defendants to prove inevitable accident or to identify specific non-negligent causes and to show that the result could not have been avoided in respect of each possible cause. The court found that the defence of inevitable accident was not sustainable on the record.
The court further held the defect was not a latent defect beyond discovery by reasonable care. Although the defendants need not guarantee absolute perfection, carriers owe a high degree of care toward passengers. Quoting Scott v. The London and St. Katherine Docks Co. the court reiterated the evidentiary effect of management plus the kind of accident proved.
The Barkway decision was used to explain the onus: once an omnibus (or similar vehicle) leaving the road and falling is proved, res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption of negligence; defendants must rebut it by proof of specific non-negligent causes or by showing they used all reasonable care.
Applying these principles, the court found two requisite constituents of negligence proved: (1) defendants owed a duty to the passenger, and (2) a careless act existed in that a defect discoverable by ordinary care was not detected. The presumption of fault arising under res ipsa loquitur was not overcome: defendants did not show absence of negligence nor demonstrate a more probable non-negligent cause. The court noted absence of periodic examinations or attempts to detect defects, the driver's absence from testimony (Mast Ram), and that defendant Sohan Lal admitted the vehicle could not be steered at the place of the accident.
The court accepted the lower appellate court's finding that the vehicle was overloaded, and concluded that whether the cause was overloading or wear and tear, defendants' liability remained. On this basis the court held the lower appellate court reached the correct conclusion.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The defendants' appeal against the Additional District Judge's finding of negligence fails and is dismissed.
- There will be no order as to costs.
- The court-fee paid in excess may be refunded.
The opinion applies established principles (including res ipsa loquitur) to the proven facts but does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent beyond the application of those existing authorities to these facts.
Tek Chand, J.:— The facts giving rise to this second appeal from order may be stated as undre. Shrimati Soman Devi, the plaintiff-respondent, had filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 5,000/- as damages on account of the death of her husband Om Parkash. The deceased was travelling in a motor vehicle belonging to defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and it was driven by defendant No. 4 Mast Ram as the driver. It could not negotiate a curve and fell in to a khad. The motor vehicle in question No. PNF 847 is 1943 model of Chevrolet station wagon and was registered as a private carrier and belonged to Sohan Lal and his two sons Parmeshwari Dass and Omparkash defendants. On 29th of November, 1953, according to the plaintiff's case, this vehicle was proceeding from Banjar to Aut in Kulu hills. It carried thirteen passengers and an equal number of bags of potatoes weighing approximately twenty-six maunds. The accident took place after the motor vehicle had traversed a distance of about seven miles from Banjar. On a curve the steering wheel became free and the vehicle fell into the khad seventy feet below. The plaintiff's husband Om Parkash who was one of the passengers and Ishru cleaner died instantaneously. Salig Ram, another passenger, died some days later and other passengers were injured. On 6th of November, 1954, the plaintiff brought a suit for the recovery of Rs. 5,000/-. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:—
1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit against defendant No. 1.
2. Whether the plaintiff is the widow of Om Parkash deceased.
3. Whether vehicle No. PNF 847 was owned by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 at the time of the alleged accident.
4. Whether the accident, as a result of which Om Parkash died, occurred as a result of negligence of the defendants.
5. What damages, if any, the plaintiff suffered as a result of the accident in suit?
6. Relief.
2. The trial Court found that the Court had jurisdiction, that the plaintiff was the widow of Om Parkash deceased, and that the vehicle in question was jointly owned by defendants Nos. 1 to 3. On issue No. 4, which is the material issue now the defendants were absolved from any act of negligence and the suit was accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The plaintiff preferred an appeal. The Additional District Judge disagreed with the conclusion of the trial Court on issue No. 4 and found that the accident was due to the negligence of the defendants. He accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court and remanded the case to the trial Court for final decision after giving a finding on issue No. 5. The defendants have filed the present appeal from the above order of the Additional District Judge and have contended that on the proved facts of this case, inference as to negligence cannot be drawn and the defendants were in no way negligent and therefore liable to damages.
3. The proved facts of this case are that the tierod which connected the steering wheel with the wheels of the car, had be become loose and therefore it was not possible for the driver to steer the car and negotiate the curves. Whether overloading of the car had caused the steering wheel to become free or the tierod became loose in consequence of wear and tear, appears to me beside the point. The real question in this case is that the deceased was an invitee in the vehicle and under the law the defendants owed certain duties to take proper care as to the soundness of the mechanism and the road worthiness of the vehicle. It is the duty of a person in charge of such a vehicle to see that it is under proper control and this involves a duty to keep it in proper condition so that proper control can be exercised. There is imposed upon the owner of a vehicle the duty to take such steps as a prudent owner would take to keep his vehicle in proper state of repair. If he fails to take such care and allows the vehicle to become defective as when the steering of a motor car becomes so worn that the driver cannot control the car that will be evidence of negligence on his part.
4. It was held by Darling, J. in Hutchins v. Maunder . 1920 37 T.L.R 72, that where a motor car which had its steering gear, by reason of wear, in such imperfect condition that the driver was liable to loose control of the steering, was a thing which on a highway was necessarily dangerous to persons using the highway, and to cause the vehicle to be driven on a highway amounted to negligence even in the absence of knowledge of the defect.
5. In this case the imperfect condition of the tierod could have been discovered by taking proper precautions which was not done. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to absolve the defendants from the charge of negligence.
6. The defendants, in the case of motor vehicles, are required to see not only that the vehicle is in a roadworthy condition before it is used on the road but also to see that it is not overloaded. The defect in the tierod is evidence on which, in the absence of satisfactory explanation, negligence on the part of the defendants can be rightly found. Of course, the defendants would not be considered to be at fault if despite having exerted proper care and skill the defect could not be discovered.
7. There was some irrelevant controversy as to whether the deceased was being conveyed for reward or gratuitously. The liability remains unaffected in either case. A person is bound to exercise due and reasonable care even if he was conveying another in his vehicle gratuitously.
8. In the circumstances of this case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur fully applies to the facts of this case. The burden of proving inevitable accident is upon the defendants. They must either show what was the cause of the accident and as a result of that cause the accident was inevitable. They may even show all the possible causes, one or the other of which produced the effect and must further prove with regard to everyone of these possible causes that the result could not have been avoided. The defence of the inevitable accident is not sustainable on the facts of this case.
9. The accident in question in my view is not due to a latent defect which could be said not to be discoverable by reasonable care. If the defect was of such a character that no skill, care or foresight could have detected its existence, the defendants would be free from blame. The defendants need not ensure that the vehicle, in which the deceased was travelling, was in all respects perfect for its purpose and was free from all defects likely to cause peril, but a high degree of duty is owed by a carrier to the passenger.
10. Erle, C.J in Scott v. The London and St. Katherine Docks Co., stated the rule in the following words:—
“Where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management, use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.”
11. In Barkway v. South Wales Trans port Co. Ltd. . 1948 2 All E.R 460, an omnibus went over to the off-side of the road, mounted the pavement, crashed into some railings, and fell on its side down an embankment on to some railway trucks, killing four of the passengers and injuring others. It was held that the fact that the omnibus left the road and fell down the embankment raised a presumption of negligence against the defendants, requiring them to prove affirmatively that they had exercised all reasonable care. The rule of law was stated by Asquith, L.J in the following words:—
“The position as to onus of proof in this case seems to me to be fairly summarised in the following short propositions. (i) If the defendants' omnibus leaves the road and falls down an embankment, and this without more is proved, then res ipsa loquitur, there is a presumption that the event is caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, and the plaintiff succeeds unless the defendants can rebut this presumption. (ii) It is no rebuttal for the defendants to show, again without more, that the immediate cause of the omnibus leaving the road is a tyre-burst, since a tyre-burst, per se is a neutral event consistent, and equally consistent, with negligence or due diligence on the part of the defendants. When a balance has been tilted one way, you cannot redress it by adding an equal weight to each scale. The depressed scale will remain down. This is the effect of the decision in Laurie v. Raglan Building Co. Ltd. . 1941 3 All E.R 332, where not a tyre-burst but a skid was involved. (iii) To displace the presumption, the defendants must go further and prove (or it must emerge from the evidence as a whole) either (a) that the burst itself was due to a specific cause which does not connote negligence on their part but points to its absence as more probable, or (b) if they can point to no such specific cause, that they used all reasonable care in and about the management of their tyres.”
12. The above two rulings were cited with approval in Gobald Motor Service Ltd v. R.M.K Veluswami . A.I.R 1953 Mad. 981.
13. In this case the two constituents which require substantiation in a cause of action for negligence have been proved. Firstly, a duty was imposed upon the defendants towards the person who was being conveyed in the vehicle, and secondly, there was a careless act in so far as a defect, which could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, was not detected. The circumstances under which the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies are proved to exist. This rule raises a presumption of fault against the defendants which the latter have not been able to over-come by contrary evidence. The defendants have not shown either that in fact there was no negligence on their part, or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote their negligence. In my view, if requisite care had bestowed on the vehicle, the tragedy that took place might have been averted.
14. Whether the accident was occasioned in consequence of overloading or as a result of tierod having become defective due to wear and tear, the liability of the defendants in either case is inescapable. In this case it has not been shown that the defendants had subjected the vehicle to periodical examination or had tried to ascertain defects from time to time. Mast Ram, the driver of the vehicle, did not choose to appear as a witness and we are left with no explanation as to how the car got out of control. The burden that the law places upon the defendants in such a case has, therefore, not been discharged. The circumstances clearly show that the accident could have been avoided if proper care had been taken before starting the journey from Banjar.
15. The lower appellate Court has believed the evidence on the record that the vehicle was overloaded as alleged by the plaintiff's witnesses and I think rightly.
16. Defendant Sohan Lal, D.W 8, has admitted that the vehicle could not be steered at the place of the accident where there was a bend in the road. After giving careful thought to the arguments of the learned counsel, I am satisfied that the lower appellate Court came to a correct conclusion. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The court-fee paid in excess may be refunded.
17. Appeal dismissed.
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