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Amar Kaur And Others, v. Sadhu Singh And Others,

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Jul 28, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against an order of a learned single Judge dated 19-3-1958 in Execution First Appeal No. 174 of 1956. The decree-holder Ram Lal obtained a decree for Rs. 18,000 with costs against the estate of Udham Kaur; certain properties were attached in execution. The executing Court released half the properties by order dated 25-6-1956 after objections by one judgment-debtor. Ram Lal died on 27-10-1956. Unknown of his death, on 5-11-1956 an appeal was presented to the High Court by an advocate purportedly acting for Ram Lal (on the basis of a power of attorney from Ram Lal's wife, Amar Kaur). On 19-3-1958 the respondents objected that the appeal had been filed in the name of a deceased person; the learned single Judge dismissed the appeal without costs. The present appeal challenges that dismissal. The narrow question is whether an appeal filed in the name of a person who was dead on the date of institution can be continued by substituting his legal representatives as appellants.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal filed in the name of a person who was dead on the date of institution can be continued by permitting substitution of his legal representatives as appellants.
  2. Whether substitution in such circumstances can be effected by invoking Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., or the court's general/inherent powers (Sections 151 and 153 C.P.C., and the appellate powers under Section 107 C.P.C.).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's counsel (Shri Harbans Singh Gujral) did not dispute that Ram Lal had died before the appeal was instituted but contended that the appellate court has all the powers of the original court under Section 107, C.P.C., and therefore, acting under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., the court should have allowed substitution of Ram Lal's legal representatives (Amar Kaur and Sohan Singh) for the deceased appellant.
  • It was urged that the appeal had been filed in the name of Ram Lal through sheer ignorance of his death, and that the defect should be cured by substitution under Order 1, Rule 10 or under Sections 151 and 153, C.P.C.
  • The appellant relied on several authorities (including Alabhai Vaisurbhai v. Rhura Bhaya; Mehar Singh v. Labh Singh; Karimullah Khan v. Bhanu Pratap Singh; and the Full Bench Madras decision A. Gopala Krishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao) as supporting the power to substitute legal representatives in such circumstances.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents objected that the appeal could not be entertained because it had been filed in the name of a dead person and therefore was a nullity.
  • By implication, respondents contended that neither Order 1, Rule 10 nor Sections 151/153 could be used to resuscitate an appeal that was a nullity from its inception.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Alabhai Vaisurbhai v. Rhura Bhaya, AIR 1937 Bom 401 Allowed substitution of legal representatives of a deceased respondent under Sections 151 and 153 to prevent injustice. The court treated this decision as distinguishable because in that case the appeal had been properly presented and a respondent (not the appellant) was dead; the present case involved an appeal instituted in the name of a deceased appellant (a nullity).
Mehar Singh v. Labh Singh, AIR 1932 Lah 305 Held that substitution of legal representatives could be allowed and delay excused under Section 153 relying on ILR 49 Mad 18. Regarded as conflicting authority; distinguished on facts because that case involved discovery that a respondent was dead (not an appellant dead at institution).
Karimullah Khan v. Bhanu Pratap Singh, AIR 1938 Nag 458 Held that a suit filed in the name of a dead plaintiff could be treated as wrong- person joinder and cured under Order 1, Rule 10. The court disagreed with this reasoning for appeals instituted in the name of dead persons, rejecting the proposition that Order 1, Rule 10 can be used to substitute when the original plaintiff/appellant did not exist at institution.
A. Gopala Krishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao, ILR 49 Mad 18 (AIR 1925 Mad 1210) (Full Bench) Full Bench permitted amendment/substitution under Section 153 where a respondent was wrongfully named (question partly addressed as one of amendment and court-fees). This Full Bench decision was the foundation for several authorities relied on by the appellant; the court distinguished it because that case concerned a deceased respondent discovered after institution, not a deceased appellant at the time of institution.
Roop Chand v. Sardar Khan, AIR 1928 Lah 359 Decision relating to abatement (context in which substitution/abatement issues arose). Distinguished by the court on the ground that it dealt with abatement rather than the present factual situation.
Mt. Boondu v. Moti Chand, AIR 1923 Lah 652(1) Held that where a plaint was presented on behalf of a minor who was dead before the suit, the court had no jurisdiction to allow substitution of representatives. The court cited and accepted this decision as supporting the proposition that suits/pleadings instituted in the name of deceased persons are nullities and cannot be amended by substitution.
Hazarimal Bholaram v. Shriramchandraswami Dewasthan, AIR 1934 Nag 55 Held that "wrong person" in Order 1, Rule 10 does not mean a dead person; substitution of legal representatives is not permissible where appellant was dead at institution. The court accepted this view and relied on it in concluding that Order 1, Rule 10 could not cure an appeal instituted by a dead person.
Bai Pani Vankar v. Madhabhai Galabhai Patel, AIR 1953 Bom 356 Chagla, C.J., dissented from ILR 49 Mad 18 and preferred authorities holding that a suit/appeal instituted by a dead person is a nullity and cannot be amended by substitution. The court expressed respectful agreement with Chagla, C.J.'s observations and adopted the same approach in this matter.
Rampratab v. Gourishankar, AIR 1924 Bom 109 One of the authorities preferred by Chagla, C.J., supporting the view that proceedings instituted by dead persons are without jurisdiction. The court noted that this line of authority was preferred in Bai Pani and found those perspectives persuasive for the present case.
Veerappan Chetty v. Tindal Ponnen, ILR 31 Mad 86 Held there is nothing in the C.P.C. to authorize the institution of a suit against a dead person; substitution not permissible. The court relied on this reasoning (and related authorities) to support its conclusion that the appeal was a nullity and could not be amended by substitution.
Sudhir Kumar De v. Amritlal Seal, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 611 Authority aligned with the view that proceedings instituted by dead persons are not authorized under the Code. Cited as part of the group of authorities the court preferred (via Bai Pani) in support of the conclusion that no substitution could revive a nullity.
Mura Mohideen v. V.O.A. Mohd., (S) AIR 1955 Mad 294 Division Bench observed that the principle of correcting misdescription by amendment cannot be applied to suits by or on behalf of dead persons. The court cited this decision approvingly as consistent with its reasoning.
Rangrao Vyankatesh Deshpande v. Kashinath Dhondu, AIR 1947 Nag 73 Held that if one of multiple plaintiffs was later discovered to be dead at the time of institution, substitution of his representatives under Order 1, Rule 10 could be allowed where the plaint was not a nullity. Distinguished by the court because in that case the plaint was not a nullity (another plaintiff remained alive); hence not analogous to the present case where the appellant was dead at institution.
Sankaran v. Sayarimuthu Pillai, C.M.P. No. 2807 of 1923 Cited in ILR 49 Mad 18 for the proposition that the matter often resolves into one of court-fees and that amendment may be simpler than ordering fresh proceedings. Noted by the court as part of the Full Bench reasoning in ILR 49 Mad 18, but the present court distinguished the Full Bench's applicability to the facts here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first identifying the undisputed factual premise: the appellant Ram Lal had died on 27-10-1956, before the memorandum of appeal was presented on 5-11-1956. The court analyzed both the formality of instituting an appeal and the legal effect of instituting proceedings in the name of a person who was dead at the time of institution.

Key elements of the court's reasoning:

  • The expression "person" in Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. contemplates a person in existence (either a natural person or a legal person); it does not include a person who is dead at the date of institution. A dead person lacks legal existence and therefore cannot institute a suit or appeal.
  • If an appeal or suit is instituted in the name of a person who was dead at the time of institution, the act of instituting the proceeding is a nullity. Where a proceeding is a nullity, there is nothing before the court upon which it can exercise amendment or substitution powers.
  • Order 1, Rule 10 addresses mistakes of identity or the joinder of the wrong person in place of the real party; it permits correction where a wrong person was impleaded in place of a real party who in fact exists. It does not permit substituting for a person who had no legal existence at the time of institution.
  • The court distinguished authorities where substitution had been permitted: in those cases the mistake typically related to a respondent who was dead or an incorrectly named respondent discovered after institution (i.e., the appeal itself was not a nullity). Those authorities (including certain Lahore and Bombay decisions) relied on the court's general/amendment powers under Sections 151 and 153 C.P.C., not on Order 1, Rule 10.
  • Section 153 empowers courts to amend defects in proceedings, but those powers presuppose that there are proceedings before the court. Where the appeal memorandum is a nullity (as here), Section 153 cannot be invoked to validate an otherwise non-existent proceeding.
  • Order XLI, Rule 1 C.P.C. requires that every appeal be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the court. In this case the memorandum was presented by counsel on the basis of a power of attorney from the appellant's wife; because the principal (Ram Lal) was dead, the wife's authority to act for him had ceased, and therefore the presentation and signature formalities necessary for proper institution were absent.
  • The court observed that an earlier ex parte order of substitution granted by a single Judge "subject to just exceptions" could not assist the appellant because it was conditional and, in any event, an order founded on a proceeding that was a nullity could not validate that proceeding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The court concluded that an appeal filed in the name of a person who was dead on the date of institution is a nullity and cannot be cured by substituting the legal representatives of the deceased under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., or by invoking Sections 151 or 153 C.P.C., because there was no valid proceeding before the court to amend. The court affirmed the order of the learned single Judge and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's attempt to continue an appeal instituted in the name of a deceased person by substituting legal representatives fails; the appeal is dismissed and the earlier single-Judge order is affirmed.
  • Legal principle applied in this opinion: Where a suit or appeal is instituted in the name of a person who did not exist at the time of institution (i.e., was already dead), the proceeding is a nullity and cannot be validated by amendment or substitution under Order 1, Rule 10 or by recourse to the court's general powers under Sections 151 and 153, C.P.C., because those powers presuppose an existing proceeding.
  • The opinion distinguishes between (a) cases where a deceased person is discovered to be a respondent after valid institution of proceedings (which may be amenable to substitution under the court's amendment powers) and (b) cases where the proceeding itself was instituted in the name of a person who was already dead (which are nullities).
  • The judgment did not purport to create a new rule beyond its application to the facts; it adopted and preferred lines of earlier authority that hold proceedings instituted by dead persons are without jurisdiction, and disapproved the opposite approach as inapplicable to the present facts.

Opinion authored by Khosla, C.J.; concurrence recorded ("I agree.") at the end of the judgment.

Show all summary ...

1. In this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 19-3-1958 in Execution First Appeal No. 174 of 1956, the sole question for decision is whether an appeal filed in the name of a person, who was dead on the date of the institution, could be continued by permitting his legal representatives to be substituted in his place as appellants. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows:

2. Ram Lal, husband of Shrimati Amar Kaur (the appellant before us) obtained a decree for Rs. 18,000/- with costs against the estate of Udham Kaur in the hands of respondents Sadhu Singh and others. In execution thereof certain properties situated in village Ganeshpur were attached. Objections to the attachment having been preferred by Dhanna, one of the judgment-debtors, the executing Court released one half of the properties from attachment; vide its order dated 25th June, 1956.

3. On 27-10-1956, the decree-holder Ram Lal died in Africa. In ignorance of his death on 5th November 1956 an appeal against the order of the executing Court dated 25-6-1956 was presented to this Court by Shri Harbans Singh Gujral, advocate, who purported to act as counsel for the decree-holder, Ram Lal on the strength of the power-of-attorney given to him by the decree-holder's wife Shrimati Amar Kaur. When the appeal came up for hearing on 19-3-1958 before a learned single Judge of this Court, the respondents objected that the appeal could not be entertained having been filed by a dead person. This objection prevailed and Bishan Narain, J., dismissed the appeal without making any order as to costs.

4. Shri Harbans Singh Gujral, the learned counsel for the appellants, in assailing the order of the learned single Judge has not disputed the fact that the execution appeal was filed in the name of a dead person as Ram Lal, appellant, had died a few days earlier on 27-10-1956. He has, however, urged that since an appellate Court has all the powers of the original Court, as laid down in Section 107, C. P. C., the learned Judge acting under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C., should have allowed the names of Shrimati Amar Kaur and Sohan Singh to be substituted for the deceased appellant Ram Lal, being his legal representatives, as it was on account of sheer ignorance of the death of Ram Lal that the appeal was filed in his name and not that of his legal representatives. In support of this contention be relies upon Alabhai Vaisurbhai v. Rhura Bhaya, AIR 1937 Bom 401, Mehar Singh v. Labh Singh, AIR 1932 Lab 305, and Karimullah Khan v. Bhanu Pratap Singh, AIR 1938 Nag 458.

I, however, find that even the decisions of the Bombay, Lahore and Nagpur Courts are conflicting and an appeal filed in the name of a dead person being a nullity cannot be resuscitated either under Order 1, Rule 10, or Ss. 151 and 153. C. P. C. In AIR 1932 Lah 305, Johnstone, J., relying upon A. Gopala Krishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao, ILR 49 Mad 18: (AIR 1925 Mad 1210) (FB), held that in an appeal filed against a dead person bis legal representatives could be substituted and the delay in such substitution must be excused in exercise of genera] powers of amendment that vested in a civil court under Section 153, C. P. C. The decision of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court reported as Roop Chand v. Sardar Khan, AIR 1928 Lah 359, was distinguished on the ground that it related to the question of abatement. An earlier decision of that Court reported as Mt. Boondu v. Moti Chand, AIR 1923 Lah 652(1), was not cited before Johnstone, J.

5. The decision in AIR 1937 Bom 401, is again based upon ILR 49 Mad 18: (AIR 1925 Mad 1210) (FB). In that case their Lordships allowed the legal representatives of one o£ the respondents, who was dead, to be substituted acting under Ss. 151 and 153, C. P. C., "in order to prevent injustice being done".

6. Both the Lahore and the Bombay cases referred to above are clearly distinguishable on facts. There the appeals were properly presented but it was discovered that one of the respondents was dead. Thus, the appeal could not be considered a nullity. It may further be pointed out that even in those cases for the substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased respondent resort was had to the general powers of amendment and inherent powers under Sections 151 and 153 and not to the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C.

7. In AIR 1938 Nag 458, Niyogi, J., was dealing with a suit that had been filed in the name of a dead plaintiff and he took the view that it was a case of wrong person who was made a plaintiff and the defect was capable of being cured under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C., by permitting his legal representatives to be substituted in his place. In dealing with this matter, his Lordship observed;

"It appears to me that the distinction drawn between a suit filed by a dead plaintiff and one filed in the name of a wrong person as plaintiff is without any difference. The suit filed in the name of a dead plaintiff is manifestly one that is filed in the name of a wrong plaintiff."

With all respects I find myself unable to agree with these observations. In my opinion the powers under Order 1, Rule 10. C. P. C., cannot be exercised to substitute a different person for a dead plaintiff or appellant. The "person" referred to in this rule means a person in existence who may, of course, be either a human being or a legal person capable of suing or being sued, but it docs not include a fictitious person or a person who having died is no longer in existence on the data of the institution of the suit or appeal. A person who is dead has no existence, either in fact, or in law, and he is incapable of instituting a suit or an appeal or performing any act. For the same reason no attorney or counsel of his would be competent to file an appeal or institute a suit, as no one can act for, or on behalf of, a person who is dead and has lost his existence.

8. The mistakes of identify that can be corrected under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C., are those where through inadvertence or bona fide mistake a wrong person is made a party in place of the one who is the real party. By substituting the name of the correct party the Court merely permits the person wrongly impleaded to walk out and his place to be taken by the right one. But where an appeal or a suit has been instituted in the name of a person who is not in existence, the very act of instituting the suit or lodging the appeal is a nullity and thus there can be no question of putting in his place another as a plaintiff or an appellant.

9. The view that I have expressed above was accepted in some decisions of the Courts from which the appellant has cited the above noted authorities. In Hazarimal Bholaram v. Shriramchandraswami Dewasthan, AIR 1934 Nag 55, it was held that the expression ''wrong person" used in Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C., does not mean a dead person and before Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C., can be applied the plaint or the memorandum of appeal must be in existence and the legal representatives of the appellant who is dead at the time of the institution of the appeal cannot be substituted.

In a recent decision of the Bombay High Court reported as Bai Pani Vankar v. Madhabhai Galabhai Patel, AIR 1953 Bom 356, Chagla, C. J., has expressed the same view, dissenting from ILR 49 Mad 18: (AIR 1925 Mad 1210) (FB), AIR 1938 Nag 458, and AIR 1932 Lah 305. His Lordship preferred the view taken in Rampratab v. Gourishankar, AIR 1924 Bom 109, Veerappan Chetty v. Tindal Ponnen, ILR 31 Mad 86, and Sudhir Kumar De v. Amritlal Seal, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 611, and observed:

"An effective order under Order 1, Rule 10, can only be made provided there is a suit or an appeal before the Court, but if the suit or the appeal is a nullity, then any order made in that suit or appeal is equally a nullity."

10. I am in respectful agreement with the above observations which are in consonance with the decision of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1923 Lab 652(1), where a Division Bench of that Court, of which Shadi Lal, C. J., was a member, held that where the plaint was presented on behalf of a minor by his mother as his next friend and it turned out that the minor had died long before the suit, the Court had no jurisdiction to allow the plaint to be amended by substituting the names of the representatives of the deceased.

Their Lordships followed the decision of the Madras High Court reported as ILR 31 Mad 86, where a Division Bench of that Court held that there was nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure to authorise the institution of a suit against a dead person and the Courts have no jurisdiction to allow the plaint in such a case to be amended by substituting the names of the representatives of the deceased, even when the suit is instituted bona fide and in ignorance of the death of the defendant. As observed in AIR 1953 Bom 356, this decision was not specifically overruled in the subsequent Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported as ILR 49 Mad 18: (AIR 1925 Mad 1210) (FB).

11. Since all the decisions cited on behalf of the appellants are based upon the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in ILR 49 Mad 18: (AIR 1925 Mad 1210), it is necessary to refer to that case. It was again a case in which the appeal had been instituted by a person who was alive but the respondent was dead at the time of the institution. Subsequently on discovering the mistake the appellant made an application for substitution of the legal representatives of the respondent which was allowed. Upholding that order the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench observed:

"Although the appeal may be incompetent owing to the wrong person being named as respondent, the Court which deals with it is acting in a suit and as such has full powers under Section 153, C. P. C., to direct an amendment of the appeal memorandum.

As was observed by Ramesam and Wallace, JJ., in Sankaran v. Sayarimuthu Pillai, C. M. P. No. 2807 of 1923, the question resolves itself into one of Court-fees only, and if the party has only made an unintentional error in inserting the name of the wrong respondent in his appeal memorandum, there is no reason to make him pay Court-fees twice over, and it is simpler for the Court to direct an amendment of the cause-title."

The authorised report of that case goes to show that though the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in ILR 31 Mad 86 was cited before their Lordships of the Full Bench, it was not referred to in their judgment nor was it expressly overruled. This decision is clearly distinguishable and does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the case before us as Ram Lal appellant was dead on the day the appeal was instituted in his name by his counsel, the appeal was itself a nullity and there was nothing before the Court on which any order for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased could be passed.

12. In a recent decision of the Madras High Court reported as Mura Mohideen v. V.O.A. Mohd., (S) AIR 1955 Mad 294, a Division Bench of that Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., observed (at p. 299) while dealing with the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. :

"Suits by or on behalf of dead persons stand in a different category. This principle that a misdescription could be corrected by amendment could not obviously be applied to such a case..."

13. The decision in Rangrao Vyankatesh Deshpande v. Kashinath Dhondu, AIR 1947 Nag 73, is again of Niyogi, J., who following his earlier decision reported as AIR 1938 Nag 458, held that where one of the two plaintiffs, in whose names the suit had been filed, was later discovered to be dead on the date of the institution of the suit, the plaint could be amended by allowing the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff to be substituted under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. This decision is also distinguishable, since it was a case in which the plaint could not be deemed to be a nullity as one of the plaintiffs was alive and was still capable of not only instituting the suit but prosecuting it as well.

14. Section 153, C. P.C., empowers the court at any time to amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit and to make all necessary amendments for determination of the real question or issue raised before it. Undoubtedly these powers can also be exercised by an appellate court, but before such powers can be invoked, there must be a valid suit or proceedings before the Court. Order XLI, Rule 1. C. P. C., lays down that:

every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant Or his pleader and presented to the Court Or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf.

For the proper institution of the appeal presentation by the appellant or his authorised agent is necessary. In the present case the appellant neither signed nor presented the memorandum of appeal and it was only a counsel authorised by his wife who presented the memorandum in the appellate Court. He purported to act on the-power-of-attomey given to him by the appellant's wife, whose authority to act for the appellant Ram Lal itself had come to an end by the death of Ram Lal prior to the presentation of the appeal.

Thus the memorandum of appeal was itself a nullity and as such there were no proceedings before the Court in which it could exercise its powers of amendment under Section 153, C. P. C., and allow the legal representatives of the deceased appellant to be substituted in his place. Therefore from whichever angle the matter be viewed, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of the learned single Judge is correct.

15. Before closing I would like to observe that though in the grounds of appeal filed before Us the appellant's counsel had urged that in view of the order passed by the learned single Judge on 19-2-1957 allowing the substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant Ram Lal, the appeal could not be dismissed as a nullity yet this contention was not advisedly pressed at the time of arguments. The record shows that an application for substitution of the legal representatives of the late Ram Lal was made while the appeal was pending for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court but the order on that application was: "Granted subject to just exceptions. Death certificate is filed today." The appellant cannot avail of this ex parte order as it was made subject to "just exceptions". In any case, since it is found that the annual was itself a nullity, such an order of substitution could not benefit the appellant.

16. For the reasons stated above, I find no force in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs.

Khosla, C.J.

17. I agree.