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Shiv Dayal And Others v. Karam Singh .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 28, 1959
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Factual and Procedural Background

On 8 December 1949 Shib Dayal (the donor) purportedly made a gift of the land in suit in favour of his brother's daughter's son (defendant No. 3). Mutation of the gift was sanctioned on 26 September 1950. On 9 December 1950 Karam Singh (the plaintiff-respondent), described as a third degree collateral of the donor, instituted a suit seeking a declaration that the gift was not binding on him. The plaintiff claimed the suit land to be ancestral and alleged that Gurdial (defendant No. 2), a brother of defendant No. 1, had consented to the gift, which, it was contended, entitled the plaintiff as a remoter reversioner to challenge the gift.

All three defendants contested the suit, denying the ancestral character of the land and the plaintiff's locus standi. The defendants asserted the gift was valid, made in lieu of services rendered by the donee. The trial Court held the plaintiff to be a collateral within five degrees (a point conceded by the defendants at argument). The trial Court found part of the land ancestral and part non-ancestral and, in relation to the validity of the gift, observed that the donor's next heir (his brother) having consented, the gift became valid and unassailable (relying on Faqir Chand v. Mt. Bishan Devi).

The plaintiff appealed. The learned District Judge (lower appellate Court), relying on Fateh Mohammad Khan v. Gurbux Singh, held that because the nearest reversioner had colluded with the donor, the remoter reversioner (the appellant here) was entitled to the declaration sought. The District Judge also observed that the donee, Dharam Singh, being a minor of 12 years, could not have rendered services to the donor (although it had been pleaded that services were rendered by the donee).

On second appeal (the present appeal), the appellant assailed the District Judge's judgment chiefly on the ground that the donor's brother and his brother's daughter were alive, making the plaintiff's suit speculative and incompetent. Arguments were advanced about the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (particularly Section 8, and Sections 4 and 14) on the plaintiff's locus and the speculative nature of his claim. The High Court considered the arguments, relevant authorities and statutory provisions and allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge, restored that of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff (a remoter reversioner / third-degree collateral) had locus standi to bring a suit to impeach the gift made by the donor.
  2. Whether the gift could be treated as valid or unassailable in view of (a) the alleged consent of nearer reversioners and (b) the custom permitting gifts in lieu of services rendered by the donee.
  3. Whether, in the light of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (notably Section 8 and Sections 4 & 14), the plaintiff's claim is speculative and therefore not deserving of discretionary declaratory relief.
  4. Whether services allegedly rendered by a minor donee (said to be 12 years old) could justify the gift.
  5. Whether the discretionary relief by way of declaration should be refused where the decree would be speculative or futile (i.e., would have little or no practical effect).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Hem Raj Mahajan)

  • The suit is speculative and incompetent because the donor's brother and his brother's daughter were alive; therefore the plaintiff's claim to succeed is remote.
  • Relied on AIR 1947 Lah 185 (Faqir Chand) and Khuda Yar v. Imam Din (AIR 1927 Lah 521) to support the contention that where nearer heirs exist and the circumstances permit, remoter reversioners cannot maintain such speculative claims.
  • Invoked Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to show the donor's brother and his brother's daughter fall into preferential classes of heirs (Class II sub-clauses) and thus the plaintiff's claim is speculative in view of the statutory scheme.
  • Relied on Section 4 and Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act to argue that the Act alters earlier rules of succession and confers proprietary rights (not limited rights) on women, thereby affecting the plaintiff's prospects of success.
  • Relied on Dayal Jawala v. Buja Biru (1958-60 Pun LR 543 : AIR 1959 Punj 326) as authority where discretionary relief in the nature of declaration was refused because the relief would be speculative or ineffectual.

Respondent's / Opposing Arguments (Mr. D.K. Mahajan)

  • Relied on 1948-50 Pun LR 314 : AIR 1949 EP 210 (Fateh Mohammad Khan v. Gurbux Singh) for the proposition that if the nearest reversioner is a minor or has colluded in the alienation, a remoter reversioner can challenge the alienation.
  • Argued that the brother's daughter's son (donee) as an heir comes after the plaintiff, so the plaintiff's suit is not speculative but permissible under custom.
  • Distinguished Dayal Jawala on the ground that it concerned acceleration of succession and is therefore different in principle from the present case.
  • Cited Madho Das v. Mukand Ram (AIR 1955 SC 481) and Dhivan Singh v. Jugal Kishore (AIR 1952 SC 145) for the submission that consent by a reversioner binds that reversioner only and does not preclude other reversioners from impeaching an alienation to which they did not consent.
  • Noted that the District Judge had held the donee was a minor incapable of rendering services, which supported the plaintiff's challenge to the gift.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court / How It Was Used in This Opinion
Faqir Chand v. Mt. Bishan Devi, AIR 1947 Lah 185 Authority for the proposition that where the next heir (nearest reversioner) has consented to an alienation, the alienation may become valid and unassailable. The trial Court relied on this decision to hold that the donor's brother's consent made the gift valid and unassailable. It was also relied upon by the appellant in argument before the High Court.
Fateh Mohammad Khan v. Gurbux Singh, 1948-50 Pun LR 314 : AIR 1949 EP 210 Authority for the proposition that if the nearest reversioner has colluded in the alienation, a remoter reversioner can bring a challenge; also applied where the nearest reversioner is a minor. The lower appellate Court (District Judge) relied on this authority to hold that the nearest reversioner had colluded (or was a minor) and therefore the remoter reversioner (plaintiff) was entitled to the declaration. The respondent counsel relied on this authority before the High Court.
Khuda Yar v. Imam Din, AIR 1927 Lah 521 Decision cited in support of principles regarding alienations and rights of reversioners under the customary law applied in the region. Counsel for the appellant drew the High Court's attention to this authority; the opinion records the citation but does not elaborate a detailed application beyond noting it was relied upon.
Dayal Jawala v. Buja Biru, 1958-60 Pun LR 543 : AIR 1959 Punj 326 Illustrates refusal of discretionary declaratory relief where the gift made by a widow in favour of her next heir was held not binding on reversioners and the Court refused a declaration as a discretionary relief because of speculative effect. The appellant relied on this authority to argue that a declaration should be refused where the claim is speculative; the High Court considered this line of authority in deciding whether discretionary relief should be granted.
Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, (1955) 2 SCR 22 : AIR 1955 SC 481 Principle that consent given by a reversioner is binding only on that reversioner and does not bind other reversioners who did not consent. Cited by the respondent's counsel for the submission that a consenting reversioner cannot bind other reversioners; the High Court noted this principle in considering the competing contentions about the effect of consent.
Dhivan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, (1952) 3 SCR 478 : AIR 1952 SC 145 Holds that other reversioners who do not claim through the consenting reversioner are not bound by such consent. Cited by respondent's counsel and noted by the High Court as authority supporting the view that non-consenting reversioners may challenge an alienation.
Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyer, AIR 1916 PC 117 Cited for the concept that a decree may be futile or stamped with futility if it will have no practical effect. The High Court invoked this authority when observing that the plaintiff's decree would be largely ineffectual or futile because nearer heirs existed and the donor was still alive and could accelerate succession, rendering a declaratory decree of little practical value.
Bhagwana v. Mt. Pritam Kaur, 1955-57 Pun LR 279 Authority that recognition of the possibility of acceleration of succession by stages exists. The High Court cited this decision to support the proposition that the donor could accelerate succession by stages and therefore a declaratory decree granted now might become ineffectual later.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court reviewed the facts, the findings at trial and on first appeal, the statutory provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (notably Sections 4, 8 and 14), and the authorities cited by the parties. The Court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the content of the opinion:

  1. Identification of the succession order under Section 8: The Court observed that neither the donor's brother nor his brother's daughter falls within Class I heirs except insofar as, upon the donor's death, the brother would be the immediate heir and thereafter his daughter (and her son) would occupy positions under the Schedule referred to in Section 8. The Court emphasised that the nearer reversioners would have a clear and direct claim on succession.
  2. Assessment of the plaintiff's prospects: The Court concluded that, given the position of the nearer reversioners under the statutory scheme, the plaintiff had a remote and faint chance of succeeding. His interest was described as speculative and merely theoretical.
  3. Consideration of practical effect and futility: Relying on the principle exemplified in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyer, the Court held that granting the declaratory relief would have little practical effect and would be stamped with futility, because the presence of nearer heirs and the donor's continued life meant the decree would likely be ineffectual at the material time.
  4. Risk of acceleration of succession: The Court noted that it was open to the donor to accelerate succession (including by stages) in favour of his brother or the brother's daughter or the donee with required consents, and that such possible actions by the donor could render any present declaratory decree wholly ineffectual. The Court referred to Bhagwana v. Mt. Pritam Kaur on the possibility of acceleration by stages.
  5. On the question of services by the donee: The Court expressed doubt whether a minor of 12 years could not have rendered services, noting that the donee by now might be capable of such services. Even so, the Court concluded that, having regard to the speculative nature of the plaintiff's interest and the potential futility of a declaration, it would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to grant the discretionary relief sought.
  6. Conclusion on discretionary relief: Balancing the statutory position, the practical consequences, and the discretionary nature of the declaratory relief, the Court found that the declaration should not have been granted by the lower appellate Court.
  7. Result: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the District Judge's judgment and decree, restored the trial Court's decision, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, with each party to bear its own costs.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court (District Judge) are set aside; the trial Court's decision is restored; the plaintiff's suit is dismissed.

Direct consequences:

  • The plaintiff's declaratory relief is refused and his suit dismissed.
  • Each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Broader implications and precedent:

The opinion emphasises a discretionary approach to declaratory relief where a plaintiff's interest is speculative and where a decree would be ineffectual in practice. The Court relied on statutory succession rules (Hindu Succession Act, 1956) and existing authorities to conclude that where nearer heirs exist and the donor is still alive (with the potential to accelerate succession), a remoter reversioner's claim may be too remote to warrant a declaration. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond these applications; its effect is to resolve the present dispute by refusing discretionary relief on the facts and statutory context described.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; trial Court restored; plaintiff's suit dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

1. On 8th December 1949, Shib Dayal made a gift of the land in suit in favour of his brother's daughter's son, defendant No. 3. This mutation was sanctioned on 26th September 1950. On 9th of December, 1950, Karam Singh plaintiff-respondent, a third degree collateral of the donor instituted the present suit for the usual declaration that the said gift was not binding on him. The suit land was claimed to be ancestral and it was pleaded that Gurdial, defendant No. 2, who is a brother of defendant No. 1, had consented to the gift in dispute, with the result that the plaintiff as a remoter reversioner was entitled to file the suit. All the three defendants contested the plaintiff's claim denying the ancestral nature of the land as also the locus standi of the plaintiff. The gift was asserted to be valid having been made in lieu of services rendered by the donee to the donor. The trial Court held the plaintiff to be a collateral of the donor within five degrees. Indeed, this point was conceded by the defendants at the time of arguments.

2. Part of the land in question was held to be ancestral and part non-ancestral. With respect to the validity of the gift, the trial Court observed that the donor's brother who is the next heir having consented to it, the gift became valid and unassailable. For this view reliance was placed on Faqir Chand v. Mt. Bishan Devi, AIR 1947 Lah 185.

3. Karam Singh went up in appeal to the Court of the learned District Judge who relying on Fateh Mohammad Khan v. Gurbux Singh, 1948-50 Pun LR 314 : (AIR 1949 EP 210), held that the nearest reversioner having colluded with the donor, the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration sought. The lower appellate Court also observed that Dharam Singh donee being a minor of 12 years could not have rendered any services to the donor. It was urged before the learned District Judge that in reality it was the donee's father who had rendered services.

4. Repelling this argument the lower appellate Court observed that under Customary Law it was services rendered by the donee alone which could justify the gift; it was further observed that even in the written statement services were pleaded to have been rendered by the donee and not by his father. Reference was also made by the learned District Judge to the statement of Lachhman D.W 1 that Kirta, father of the donee, had been rendering services to the donor. The learned District Judge, while dealing with the objections raised on behalf of the defendants-respondents before him to the finding by which a part of the land was held ancestral, observed that no cross-objections had been put in by them.

5. Although the learned Dist. Judge is not right in thinking that cross-objections could or should have been preferred by the defendants, nevertheless the District Judge on the merits also upheld the finding of the trial Court with respect to the ancestral nature of a part of the land. Holding that the gift was not valid according to custom, a declaratory decree as prayed was granted to the plaintiff for the land found to be ancestral in nature.

6. On second appeal, Mr. Hem Raj Mahajan has assailed the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court on the ground that the donor's brother and his brother's daughter being alive, the suit by the present plaintiff was speculative and indeed incompetent. He has also placed reliance on AIR 1947 Lah 185, a Division Bench decision by Abdul Rashid, A.C.J and Achhru Ram, J. Head-note (b) of this judgment is in the following terms:

“Ancestral immovable property can be alienated either for necessity, or with the consent of male descendants, or, in the case of a sonless proprietor, of his male collaterals.

Where the alienation is valid by reason of its having been assented to by the alienor's descendants in case the alienor is not a sonless proprietor it cannot be contested by any one. The occasion to refer to Para. 67 of the Rattigan's Digest arises only where the concurrence of the next reversioner in the alienation has not the effect of making it absolutely unassailable. Where, however, it has the effect of making the alienation wholly unassailable Para. 67 cannot be taken to confer any right on the remoter reversioners to challenge that alienation.”

7. Khuda Yar v. Imam Din, AIR 1927 Lah 521, a decision by Jai Lal, J. was followed in this case. The counsel for the appellants has in this connection also drawn my attention to the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act No. 30 of 1956 which is in the following terms:

“8. General rules of succession in the case of males.—The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter:

(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule;

(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule;

(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and

(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.”

8. Neither the donor's brother nor his brother's daughter nor her son fall in class I of the Schedule mentioned in S. 8. The donor's brother is an heir falling in sub-clause (2) of class II and brother's daughter in sub-clause (4) of class II. The counsel contends that in view of the new Hindu Succession Act the plaintiff's claim must be held to be speculative.

9. My attention has also been drawn to S. 4 of this Act which abrogates any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law with respect to any matter for which provision has been made in this Act. Section 14 confers full proprietary rights on Hindu women and abrogates the rule which used to confer on them rights of limited ownership only. The counsel in the light of this provision submits that the plaintiff's suit must be held to be wholly speculative and the plaintiff should not be granted the discretionary relief in the nature of declaration. In support of this contention he has also placed reliance on Dayal Jawala v. Buja Biru, 1958-60 Pun LR 543 : (AIR 1959 Punj 326), where Gurnam Singh, J. on second appeal set aside the order of the Court below and refused to grant discretionary relief in the nature of declaration that the gift made by the widow in favour of her next heir was not binding on the reversioners.

10. Mr. D.K Mahajan has on the other hand placed reliance on 1948-50 Pun LR 314 : (AIR 1949 EP 210) where it is observed that if the nearest reversioner is a minor or has colluded in the alienation, the remoter reversioner can bring a suit to challenge the alienation. Where the alienor's sons are minors and his father has colluded in the alienation, a third degree collateral can maintain an action to challenge the alienation. With respect to 1958-60 Pun LR 543 : (AIR 1959 Punj 326) Mr. Mahajan contends that was a case of acceleration of succession and would, therefore, be clearly distinguishable.

11. He has also submitted that brother's daughter's son as an heir comes after the plaintiff, with the result that it is only the donor's brother and his brother's daughter who are preferential heirs as against the plaintiff. On this ground he submits that the suit is not speculative but is permissible under the rule of custom. Mr. Mahajan has also made a reference to Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, (1955) 2 SCR 22: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 481) for the submission that the consent given by a reversioner would only be binding on him and not on the other reversioners, who are entitled to impeach the alienation, to which they have not given consent.

12. In this connection my attention has also been invited to Dhivan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, (1952) 3 SCR 478 at p. 488 : (AIR 1952 SC 145 at p. 148) where again it is observed that other reversioners who do not claim through the one who has consented are not bound by such consent. Mr. Mahajan has also contended that the declaration granted in the present case would not in any way affect either the donor's brother or the donor's brother's daughter because if they are alive at the time of the death of Shiv Dayal then they would indisputably be entitled to succeed.

13. It is only if, at the time the succession opens, the donor's brother and his brother's daughter are not in existence that the declaratory decree would, become operative and the plaintiff would be entitled to take advantage under it. Mr. Mahajan has further submitted that the gift being of a part of the estate does not amount to acceleration of succession and therefore the legal fiction which, is sometimes applied to the gift being construed as incorporating two transactions, one in favour of the consenting reversioner and the other by the consenting reversioner in favour of the donee, cannot be pressed into service in the present case.

14. After giving my most anxious thought to the contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties, in my view, in the present case, the declaration should not have been granted. On the donor's death the immediate heir would be his brother after whom it would be the brother's daughter who becomes the absolute owner of the property. As a matter of fact if the donor's brother succeeds, then his daughter and a son of his predeceased daughter would both fall under class I of the Schedule mentioned in Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act.

15. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the present plaintiff has a very remote and a faint chance of succession to the donor's estate. His claim, therefore, is purely speculative, his interest merely theoretical, and the decree in his favour would hardly have any practical effect. It would be stamped with something in the nature of futility, Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyer, AIR 1916 PC 117. It is also legitimate to keep in view the fact that the donor is still alive and it is open to him still to accelerate the succession by making a gift of his entire estate in favour of his brother or his brother's daughter with the consent of his brother or to the donee with the consent of the former two.

16. There can be acceleration by stages: Bhagwana v. Mt. Pritam Kaur, 1955-57 Pun LR 279. If it is so open to him, the decree passed in the present litigation would obviously become wholly ineffectual. The learned District Judge could not possibly have considered this aspect of the case because the Hindu Succession Act has come into force after the decision of the appeal by the learned District Judge.

17. I am also doubtful if the learned District: Judge was right in observing that a minor who is 12 years old is incapable of rendering services to the donor. In any case by now the minor must be fairly grown up and capable of rendering services. If the donor can even now make a valid gift in favour of his brother's daughter's son in lieu of services rendered by him, it is hardly a proper exercise of judicial discretion to grant the discretionary relief by way of a declaration to the present plaintiff.

18. For the reasons given above, this appeal succeeds and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, I restore that of the trial Court and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to boar their own costs throughout.

V.B.B

19. Appeal allowed.