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Tara Singh And Another v. Gurdial Singh And Another
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Harbans Singh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises out of a sale of a one-third share in 588 kanals and 15 marlas of land in village Bahri, Tehsil Thanesar, District Karnal, by a registered sale deed dated 20 December 1955 (purchase price Rs. 3,000). Tara Singh pre-empted that sale by a suit dated 18 December 1956; a decree for possession by pre-emption in his favour was passed on 11 December 1957 and the decree-money (Rs. 4,300) was paid on 9 January 1958 within the time fixed by the decree. No appeal was filed and the decree became final.
An application for execution of the decree was filed on 15 January 1958 and warrants for possession were issued on 11 March 1958. On 16 April 1958 the Girdawar Qanungo executed the warrants and gave malkana (symbolic/pointed-out) possession of the one-third share to Gian Singh (decree-holder's mukhtiar), in the presence of some judgment-debtors and witnesses; a formal report (Exhibit P.A) was made and the execution was filed as fully satisfied on 24 June 1958.
On 5 June 1958 Tara Singh lodged a police report alleging fear of breach of peace from Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh, leading to proceedings under sections 107/151 Cr.P.C. When Tara Singh attempted to cultivate the land and the judgment-debtors interfered, the judgment-debtors applied on 22 July 1958 to the Magistrate (where sections 107/151 proceedings were pending). The Magistrate ordered attachment of the land and directed parties to file claims for 12 August 1958. After affidavits and evidence (including the Girdawar's testimony), the learned trial Magistrate declared that Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh were in actual possession of the land. The Station House Officer was directed to restore possession to them. Tara Singh's revision before the Sessions Judge was dismissed; he obtained a further revision to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Who must be deemed to be in physical possession of the land following execution of the decree and the delivery of malkana (symbolic) possession by the Girdawar Qanungo?
Arguments of the Parties
Tara Singh (decree-holder) — position and material facts relied upon
- Tara Singh relied on the decree for possession by pre-emption, payment of decree-money and the execution of warrants that resulted in the Girdawar giving malkana possession (pointing out and proclamation) of the one-third share to his mukhtiar, Gian Singh.
- Tara Singh reported interference to the police (5 June 1958) and attempted to cultivate the land, which led to police proceedings under sections 107/151 Cr.P.C.
- He maintained that the execution report (Exhibit P.A) and the Girdawar's conduct amounted to delivery of possession and that, as decree-holder, he must be deemed to have been put in physical possession of the land.
Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh (judgment-debtors) — position and material facts relied upon
- They stated in affidavits that they had never been dispossessed by the Girdawar Qanungo and that they had been “in possession since long.”
- At the spot when the warrants were executed they objected that two judgment-debtors (Harbans Singh and Sohan Singh) had not been informed (Harbans being employed abroad and Sohan in the army), and they also raised a point about a dispute relating to boring charges, urging that possession should not be given.
- They did not claim that, after the date of execution of the warrants, they had legally regained possession or exercised any right over the land (for example by ploughing) up to the time of the Magistrate's order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mst. Mewa v. Amar Singh (1958, 60 P.L.R. 249) | That delivery of possession in execution under Order 21, Rule 35 is as effective as actual physical possession. | The Court relied on this principle to treat the malkana (pointed-out) delivery of possession to Tara Singh as equivalent to physical possession, especially because actual physical delivery could not be made for a share in the whole land. |
| Shri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur (A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 197) | Support for the proposition that formal delivery of possession in execution can be equivalent to actual possession. | Used alongside other authorities to affirm that possession given under execution is effective against the judgment-debtor. |
| Juggobundhu Mukerjee v. Ram Chander Bysack (I.L.R. 5 Cal. 584 F.B) | Authority supporting the legal effect of delivery of possession in execution being equivalent to physical possession. | Applied to support the general proposition that execution-based delivery of possession (even if by proclamation/pointing out) operates as actual possession in law. |
| Rajendra Narain v. Chintamani (A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 151) | Headnote: where symbolical possession is given to a decree-holder and interference occurs, the Magistrate cannot refuse proceedings merely because actual physical possession was not obtained from Civil Court; once delivery of possession is proved, presumption is that that state continued unless the contrary is shown; if decree-holder sleeps and allows judgment-debtor to regain possession, the situation differs. | The Court adopted the reasoning to hold that once possession was duly delivered to Tara Singh by execution formalities, the presumption was that Tara Singh remained in possession until Gurdial and Sewa proved otherwise by clear overt acts of regaining possession. |
| Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 344) | Case where delivery was ineffective because the peon's acts were limited (reading the writ and planting a bamboo) and homesteads remained occupied; example of insufficient symbolic delivery. | The Court distinguished this case: here the land was vacant, and possession was given by pointing out and proclamation with attestation; therefore Ambar Ali did not control the present facts. |
| Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 610 F.B.) | Case where actual possession of homestead was not given and only scattered plots were pointed out; Full Bench emphasized recognition of possession under section 145 in certain situations. | The Court treated this case as distinguishable on the facts, noting that in the present case the land was vacant and the manner of delivery was appropriate to the nature of the interest being executed upon. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a fact-focused analysis and applied settled execution-law principles. The key factual findings (as stated in the opinion) were these:
- Actual physical possession by ploughing could not be delivered to Tara Singh because the decree entitled him only to a one-third share in the whole area rather than to specific field numbers.
- Gurdial Singh, Sewa Singh and others also had legal entitlement under the original sale deed to that one-third share and were not entitled to possession of particular khasra numbers.
- By the decree for possession by pre-emption, Tara Singh was substituted for the judgment-debtors and acquired their right, title and interest in the land.
- At the time of delivery of possession (16 April 1958) the land was lying vacant (no rabi crop), so no person was in strict actual physical occupation; in such cases the person with a legal title to possession is to be deemed in physical possession.
- The Girdawar Qanungo delivered possession to Tara Singh by pointing out the one-third share, making proclamation (beat of drum), and the execution report was signed/attested; therefore possession was given in the manner appropriate to the nature of the right being executed.
- Legally, this mode of delivery is as effective as a physical ouster of the judgment-debtors; possession therefore passed to Tara Singh, and that presumption of continued possession remains unless the judgment-debtors show by definite overt acts that they regained possession.
The Court relied on Order 21, Rule 35 (execution procedure) and authorities (Mst. Mewa v. Amar Singh; Shri Radha Krishna Chanderji; Juggobundhu Mukerjee) for the proposition that delivery of possession in execution where actual physical delivery is not feasible is nevertheless equivalent in law to physical possession. Rajendra Narain v. Chintamani was treated as correctly stating the law that symbolical delivery, when appropriate to the nature of the property, is not a mere symbol but actual and binding against the judgment-debtor, with a presumption of continuity of that state of affairs unless the contrary is shown.
The Court distinguished Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali and Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin on the facts — those cases involved inadequate modes of delivery where occupied homesteads were not ousted or only scattered plots were pointed out — and therefore they did not control the present situation in which the land was vacant and possession had been effected by pointing out and proclamation with attestation.
Applying these legal principles to the record, the Court found that Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh had not shown any definite overt act after the execution of warrants by which they had lawfully regained possession; their affidavits asserted prior possession or non-notification but did not establish continued physical possession after delivery to Tara Singh.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Revision allowed; the order of the trial Magistrate and the Courts below is set aside; possession is declared to have been with Tara Singh (the decree-holder) on the relevant date and, if necessary, possession is to be redelivered to Tara Singh.
Consequences and implications drawn in the opinion:
- Direct effect on the parties: Tara Singh is declared to have been in possession as a result of the execution formalities and is entitled to have possession restored to him if it has been delivered to Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh under the Magistrate's order.
- The Court emphasized that where execution formalities appropriate to the nature of the right are carried out (pointing out/proclamation on vacant land), such delivery must be treated in law as actual possession and the presumption of continuity follows unless the judgment-debtor proves a lawful regaining of possession by definite overt acts.
- The opinion does not purport to announce an expansion of law beyond application of existing authorities; it applies and distinguishes prior decisions to the facts at hand and bases its result on established rules governing delivery of possession in execution.
Petition allowed.
Harbans Singh, J.:— The facts giving rise to this criminal revision may be stated in some detail for the proper understanding of the point involved. Gurdial Singh and his three brothers—Harbans Singh, Sohan Singh and Sewa Singh—together with Dal Singh purchased one-third share in an area measuring 588 kanals and 15 marlas comprised in khewat No. 52, Khatauni No. 53 of the jamabandi of 1951–1952 of village Bahri, Tehsil Thanesar, District Karnal, by a sale deed registered on 20th of December, 1955, for a sum of Rs. 3,000/-. This sale was pre-empted by Tara Singh by a suit dated 18th of December, 1956, which was decreed on 11th of December, 1957, on payment of Rs. 4,300/-. This amount was finally paid on 9th of January 1958, within the time allowed by the decree. No appeal was filed against this decree, and thus, the decree for possession by pre-emption of one-third share in the land detailed above became final. On 15th of January, 1958, an application for execution was filed and warrants for possession were issued by the civil Court concerned on 11th of March, 1958. The Girdawar went to the spot on 16th of April, 1958, for the execution of these warrants. In the presence of Wadhawa Ram, member Panchayat, Sohan Singh Chaukidar and one Gian Singh, the judgment-debtors were summoned. Out of them, Gurdial Singh, Sewa Singh and Dal Singh appeared at the spot and they raised objection that out of the judgment-debtors Harbans Singh and Sohan Singh had not been informed of this execution of the warrants because Harbans Singh was employed in Malaya State and Sohan Singh was employed in the army and was posted in Mathura. This objection was noted, but as this was no impediment against the delivery of the possession, the Girdawar gave malkana possession of one-third share of 588 kanals and 15 marlas, by pointing out all the khasra numbers at the spot, to Gian Singh son of the decree-holder who was his mukhtiar in the village. The report, Exhibit P.A (on the civil file) was signed by Gurdial Singh and thumb-marked by Sewa Singh and Dal Singh judgment-debtors who were present. It was also attested by the other witnesses present. On receipt of this formal report of the execution of warrants, the execution was filed as fully satisfied on 24th of June, 1958.
2. Later on, when Tara Singh decree-holder tried to plough the land, Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh, out of the erstwhile judgment-debtors, tried to interfere and on this, a report was lodged by Tara Singh on 5th of June, 1958, at Police Station, Thanesar, that he feared breach of peace at the hands of the aforesaid Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh and proceedings were consequently taken against both the parties under sections 107/151, Criminal Procedure Code. On 22nd of July, 1958, Gurdial Singh made an, application before S. Sher Singh, Magistrate 1st Class, before whom proceedings under sections 107/151 were pending, that the police had prevented Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh on 21st of July, 1958, from cultivating the land, and prayed that the police should be directed not to interfere in their cultivation of the land. After inviting a report from the Station House Officer, Thanesar, the learned Magistrate ordered that the land be attached forthwith and parties be directed to file their claims on 12th of August, 1958. This order was duly got served on the parties and the land remained attached thereafter. Affidavits were filed on both sides. On the side of Gurdial Singh affidavits were filed only by the two persons concerned, and in these affidavits they had stated that they had never been dispossessed of the land by the Girdawar Qanungo and that they had been “in possession since long”. On the other side, Dal Singh, of the judgment-debtors in the original pre-emption case, who had one-half share in the land in dispute, stated that the land at the time of execution of the warrants of possession was lying vacant and that he had given over the possession of his share to the decree-holder and that the possession over the remaining share of the other judgment-debtors was also taken over by the decree-holder who had continued to be in possession thereof. To the same effect were the affidavits of Tara Singh, his son Gian Singh and Wadhawa Ram, member Panchayat, who was one of the attesting witnesses of the report, Exhibit P.A The Girdawar Qanungo was the only witness examined by the learned trial Court. He fully supported the affidavits filed by Tara Singh and his son. Inter alia he stated that the objections raised by Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh were noted and one of points urged by them was that there was some dispute still outstanding with regard to the boring charges and that for this reason possession should not be given, that symbolical possession was given of the land in suit, which was one-third share in 588 kanals and 15 marlas by pointing out, and that actual possession by ploughing could not be given because the warrants of possession were in respect of a share in the whole land. He also confirmed that at the time of the execution of warrants, the land was lying absolutely vacant because the rabi crop had already been cut. The learned trial Magistrate declared that Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh were in actual possession of the land, and observed as follows:—
“I have found from the report that he gave malkana possession of one-third share of the fields mentioned above. There is no report to show that party No. 1, i.e, Tara Singh etc., were put in actual possession of the fields mentioned above. I being satisfied by due inquiry * * * without reference to the merits of the claim of either of the said parties to the legal right of possession and having considered Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali(1) and Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin(2), that the claim of actual possession by Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh is true.
I do decide and declare that they are in possession of the said field numbers which are given above and are entitled to retain such possession until ousted by due course of law * * *”
The Station House Officer, Thanesar, was sent a copy of the order with the direction to restore possession of the attached land to Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh. The revision filed by Tara Singh before the learned Sessions Judge was dismissed and he has come up in revision to this Court.
3. The facts established on the record and the law applicable to such facts are:—
(1) That actual physical possession by ploughing was not delivered to Tara Singh because under the decree he was entitled only to one-third share in the entire area measuring 588 kanals and 15 marlas;
(2) that Gurdial Singh, Sewa Singh and others were also entitled under the sale deed to this one-third share and were not entitled to the possession of any specific numbers;
(3) that by the decree for possession by pre-emption Tara Singh must be deemed to have been substituted for Gurdial Singh, Sewa Singh and others and he must be deemed to have been granted the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors in this land;
(4) that at the time of delivery of possession the land was lying vacant and no crops were standing thereupon and consequently no one was “in actual physical possession of the land” in the strict sense of the term; however, in case of vacant land, the person who has a legal title to the possession of such land must be deemed to be in actual physical possession thereof;
(5) that possession was delivered to Tara Singh by the Girdawar Qanungo of this vacant land by giving him malkana possession by pointing it out at the spot in the presence of Gurdial Singh, Sewa Singh and Dal Singh and by making a proclamation by beat of drum; and
(6) that this delivery of possession must, in the eye of law, be deemed to be as effective as if the judgment-debtors have been physically ousted from the land and after the execution of the warrants, the legal title being with Tara Singh and the land being vacant, Tara Singh must be deemed to have been in physical possession of the same.
Now, according to the affidavits filed by Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh, they claim that they were never dispossessed by the Girdawar Qanungo and that they have been in possession of the land since long. In other words, Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh do not claim to have regained possession of the land legally or otherwise from Tara Singh after the date of the execution of the warrants. It is also not claimed by them that they have exercised any right over the land after the date of the execution of the warrants by actually ploughing the land or otherwise. In fact, it appears that as soon as Tara Singh tried to cultivate the land, Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh tried to interfere, and Tara Singh immediately approached the police authorities who took proceedings under section 107/151, Criminal Procedure Code. Thereafter, when Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh tried to plough the land, they were prevented from doing so by the police and they came to the Court with their application dated the 22nd of July, 1958, mentioned above, whereupon the Magistrate attached the property.
4. Thus, the sole question for determination is as to who must be deemed to be in physical possession of the land. As already stated, on 16th of April, 1958,—the date of the execution of the warrants—the land was lying vacant and nobody was in actual physical possession thereof. Similar state of affairs seems to have continued till 5th of June when a report was lodged by Tara Singh with the police and also till 29th July, when the learned Magistrate attached the property and on 16th September, 1958, when the trial Court finally passed the orders declaring Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh to be in possession. There can be no manner of doubt that delivery of possession, under Order 21, rule 35 in execution of a decree, to the decree-holder as against the judgment-debtor, is as effective as actual physical possession (Mst. Mewa v. Amar Singh . 1958 60 P.L.R 249., Shri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur . A.I.R 1917 P.C 197. and Juggobundhu Mukerjee v. Ram Chander Bysack . I.L.R 5 Cal. 584 F.B.). This would particularly be so where under the circumstances of the case actual physical possession cannot possibly be given.
Rajendra Narain v. Chintamani . A.I.R 1939 Pat. 151., was a case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and the relevant head-note runs as follows:—
“Where symbolical possession of the judgment-debtor's zamindari property is given to the decree-holder who afterwards finds that his possession is being interfered with by the judgment-debtor and initiates proceedings under section 145 for retaining possession, the Magistrate cannot refuse to entertain the proceedings on the ground that the decree-holder had not got actual possession from the Civil Court.
If, however, circumstances show that the decree-holder or auction-purchaser has slept over his right and has allowed the judgment-debtor to regain possession of the property and he is at the time of the proceeding in peaceful possession of it, the matter stands on a quite different footing. But in such cases the Magistrates must take it as an indisputable fact, once delivery of possession is proved, that on the day of the delivery of possession the party to whom possession was given was in possession as against the man who was party to that delivery of possession and was bound by the writ. He must start with the presumption that the state of things which existed on that day continued to exist thereafter unless the contrary is established. The judgment-debtor can only succeed if he establishes beyond doubt that be had completely ousted the man who was put in possession by the Court and was in peaceful possession of the property in dispute.”
While dealing with the question of actual or symbolical possession it was observed that the manner of delivery of possession is according to the nature of the possession of the man who is to be dispossessed and not that its effect in law is different as against the judgment-debtor. The relevant portion of head note (b) then runs as follows:—
“If the property is in actual physical occupation of the judgment-debtor, for instance, if the property is a house and the judgment-debtor is residing in it he must be dispossessed of it by being bodily removed from it * * * But if the property is zamindari or a tank or mineral rights in indirect possession of the judgment-debtor, though the delivery of possession will be by ousting the judgment-debtor from it, it is obvious that the judgment-debtor cannot be physically removed from it and the decree-holder * * * put in physical occupation of it. The delivery of possession in such case is by proclaiming that decree-holder has been put into possession. This delivery of possession is not symbolical but actual and is as effective against the judgment-debtor as his physical removal from a house.”
5. With respect, I feel that the observations of the learned Judge in the above-noted case represent the true state of law. If it were to be held otherwise, it will put at naught the formal proceedings of a civil Court and would deprive the decree-holder of the valuable rights acquired by him under the decree and as a result of the execution of the warrants issued by the Court. As already explained, in the present case, the judgment-debtors were in possession of a share in the area measuring 588 kanals and 15 marlas and the only way in which they could be ousted, and the other party put in possession, was by giving the decree-holder possession by pointing out and by proclamation. There might have been some difficulty if the judgment-debtors had been in actual physical possession of the land by their crops standing thereupon, but as the land was lying vacant, as already discussed, no one was in actual possession of the same. The judgment-debtors were ousted from whatever possession they had by legal formalities carried on by the Girdawar Qanungo. After the execution of the warrants in the manner detailed above, in the law the possession passed on to the decree-holder and that state of affairs must be deemed to have continued thereafter unless Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh can show that by some definite overt act they regained the possession from the decree-holder.
6. The cases referred to by the learned trial Magistrate are clearly distinguishable. In Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali . A.I.R 1928 Cal. 344., the property consisted of 14 bighas of land and two homesteads in occupation of the other party and the latter were not removed from the homesteads at the time the delivery of possession was given and all that the peon did was to read his writ and plant a bamboo on the agricultural land. It is obvious that this type of delivery of possession was not the delivery of possession which the nature of the property was capable of. Similarly, in Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin . A.I.R 1928 Cal. 610 F.B., actual possession of the homestead was not given and possession of only scattered plots was given. The Full Bench merely stressed the point that even if a person is in possession of the land not under a legal title, that possession must be recognized under section 145. There is no dispute with this propostion of law. In the present case, as already discussed, Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh, judgment-debtors cannot be said to have been in actual physical possession of the land after 16th of April, 1958. The learned trial Magistrate has been misled by the words “symbolical possession” as distinguished from “actual possession” and he failed to notice two things, first, that as between the parties to a decree symbolical possession and actual possession are equally binding, and secondly, that the land was lying vacant and by delivery of the so-called symbolical possession to the decree-holder of the vacant land, actual possession must, in law, be deemed to be with the decree-holder, who as a result of the execution, became legally entitled to the possession.
7. For the reasons given above, therefore, I feel that the order of the learned trial Magistrate declaring Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh to be in possession of the land cannot be sustained and I, therefore, accept this revision, set aside the order of the Courts below and declare that the possession on the relevant date when the property was attached was with Tara Singh who is the legal owner. I further direct that the possession be redelivered to Tara Singh if the same has already been delivered to Gurdial Singh and Sewa Singh under the orders of the learned Magistrate.
Petition allowed.
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