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Puran Chand Sant Lal v. Nitya Nand

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 22, 1958
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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit seeking a prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendant from making constructions on a site described as joint property of the parties (a joint courtyard of the Chaudhry family). The defendant pleaded that a chabutra had existed on the site for about 30 years, alleged that the plaintiff had made a similar encroachment elsewhere on the joint sehin, and asserted that the suit was barred by time; he also contended that, in the absence of any allegation of special damage, the plaintiff could not maintain the suit.

The trial Court framed three issues: (1) Whether the suit is within time? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for? (3) Relief. The trial Court found that the defendant could keep three blocks of steps in front of his three doors but was not entitled to build the chabutra; it also found that the chabutra had been constructed after institution of the suit. The trial Court granted a mandatory injunction directing demolition of the chabutra and restraining construction of any chabutra on the joint courtyard.

On appeal, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff's claim so far as it related to encroachment of three former chabutras was time-barred, but that the remainder of the claim was within time. Although the finding that some constructions were made during the pendency of the suit was not disturbed, the appeal Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had not applied to amend the plaint to seek a mandatory injunction (the plaint had prayed only for a prohibitory injunction).

The plaintiff challenged that dismissal and the matter reached this Court in a second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is within time (as framed by the trial Court).
  2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for (as framed by the trial Court).
  3. What relief should be granted (as framed by the trial Court).
  4. Whether a Court may, in the circumstances where constructions are made during the pendency of a suit, mould its decree and grant a mandatory injunction even though the plaint originally prayed only for a prohibitory injunction (i.e., can mandatory relief be granted without amendment of the plaint).
  5. Whether, in the case of co-owners, one co-owner who builds on joint property (in particular a courtyard) can be ordered to demolish the construction without proof of special damage to the other co-owners, or whether special/substantial injury must be shown before a mandatory injunction for demolition can be granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (for the plaintiff)

  • The plaintiff should not have been non-suited merely because he had not amended the plaint to pray for a mandatory injunction; the Court has a duty to grant appropriate relief and to take subsequent events into account.
  • Counsel relied on the principle that courts must take notice of events occurring after institution of suit and mould decrees according to circumstances at the time of decree (citing Meghaji Mohanji v. Anant Pandurang).
  • It was contended that no co-owner can make construction on such joint property and, once one co-owner does so, the other co-owners can ask for demolition without proving special injury.

Respondent's Arguments (for the defendant)

  • Unless special damage or injury to the other co-owner is proved, a mandatory injunction for demolition should not be granted.
  • Plans produced showed other chabutras similar to the disputed one constructed by other co-owners; if all co-owners had exercised a similar right and the disputed chabutra caused no damage to the plaintiff, then no injunction should be granted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Meghaji Mohanji v. Anant Pandurang, AIR 1948 Bom 396 Courts should take notice of events occurring after institution of the suit and mould their decrees according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made. The Court noted this principle in addressing the appellant's contention that subsequent construction during pendency justified granting a mandatory injunction or at least permitting amendment; the principle supports taking subsequent events into account when framing relief.
Vishxam Arjun v. Irukulla Shankariah, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 784 The primary duty of Courts is to do justice; procedural rules exist to advance justice and the Court should grant relief warranted by circumstances even if not expressly asked for. The Court relied on this reiteration to consider the duty of the Court to mould relief according to changed circumstances, although it also distinguished practical limitations in the context of mandatory injunctions.
Manji v. Ghulam Muhammad, ILR 2 Lah 73 : AIR 1921 Lah 157 Earlier Lahore High Court view that mere fact of encroachment (even if plot is small or no special damage) is not a ground for upholding wrongful appropriation; special damage need not be proved. Referenced as part of earlier authority supporting the proposition that demolition may be ordered without proof of special damage; used to show one strand of authority on co-sharer rights.
Kunj Lal v. Ramji Lal, AIR 1927 Lah 416 Same Lahore High Court view: no legal necessity to prove special damage when a co-sharer appropriates joint land or builds thereon. Used to demonstrate historical judicial support for granting relief against a co-sharer without proof of special damage.
Ahmad Gul v. Rahim Khan, AIR 1926 Lah 52 Dissenting view in which Moti Sagar, J. held that mere erection without consent is not enough for demolition unless material and substantial injury is shown which could not be remedied on partition. Cited to show divergent authority requiring proof of material/substantial injury before granting demolition; the Court noted this as part of conflicting case law.
Bhagwan Singh v. Hari Singh, AIR 1929 Lah 73 Held that in suits for mandatory injunction it is necessary to prove special injury or substantial damage before the suit can be maintained. Referenced as an authoritative decision supporting the need to prove substantial injury in mandatory injunction suits; the present Court considered this when weighing whether demolition should follow automatically.
Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal, AIR 1951 All 199 (Full Bench) Distinguished the right of a co-sharer to object to exclusive appropriation from the question of what relief should be granted; relief (demolition/injunction) depends on the circumstances of each case. The Court gave particular weight to the Full Bench observations that the question of relief must be decided according to circumstances; these observations were treated as central guidance for the present case.
Darshan Lal v. Harkesh Singh, AIR 1951 All 338 Division Bench appeared to assume an injunction would be automatically granted against a co-sharer who built on part of joint land. The present Court observed that this Division Bench decision did not correctly state the law as it failed to refer to the Full Bench decision; thus it cannot be followed as laying down the law correctly.
Khimji Mulji v. Popatlal Bhanji, AIR 1951 Sau 85 Division Bench summary following the Full Bench: a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner absolutely and simply on the ground of co-ownership without reference to amount of damage to be sustained. The Court expressed its inclination to follow this view (and the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court) and applied this principle to conclude that mandatory injunctions should be granted only after considering the circumstances and damage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis focusing on two interrelated questions: (a) whether a mandatory injunction could be granted in the absence of an amendment of the plaint where the construction was carried out during the pendency of the suit; and (b) whether, in disputes among co-owners, demolition of a construction by one co-owner on joint property must be ordered without proof of special or substantial injury to the other co-owners.

First, the Court acknowledged the principle (supported by cited authorities) that courts should take account of events occurring after institution of the suit and may mould relief accordingly; procedural rules should serve justice and not obstruct it. However, the Court observed that considerations applicable to granting a mandatory injunction differ in important respects from those governing a prohibitory injunction, and therefore it was "difficult to accept" that a decree for a mandatory injunction could always be granted without amendment of the plaint.

Second, the Court reviewed conflicting authorities on whether proof of special/substantial injury is required before a mandatory injunction for demolition can be granted against a co-owner who appropriates part of common property. The Court recited earlier Lahore High Court decisions holding that no special damage need be proved, but it also noted contrary decisions (including a view that demolition requires material and substantial injury). The Court gave particular weight to the Full Bench reasoning in Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal and to the Full Bench approach followed in Khimji Mulji, which emphasize that the right of a co-sharer to object is distinct from the remedy to be granted, and that relief depends on the circumstances of each case.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that a mandatory injunction is not to be granted automatically against a co-owner simply because he built on joint property; instead, the Court must consider whether circumstances justify demolition or other relief — with appropriate attention to whether substantial injury has been shown and the equitable considerations involved.

The Court found that the trial Court had failed to apply the correct principles, and that the mandatory injunction could not properly have been granted without amendment of the plaint. It also found that the lower appellate Court erred in non-suiting the plaintiff on the mere technicality that the plaint had not been amended to ask for mandatory relief. Given the uncontested finding of the Courts below that the disputed chabutra had been constructed during the pendency of the suit, the Court considered amendment of the plaint to convert the prayer to a mandatory injunction to be justified.

Accordingly, rather than endorsing the non-suit, the Court allowed an amendment at the stage of second appeal to the limited extent of changing the relief sought to a mandatory injunction, set aside the judgments and decrees below, and remanded the case to the trial Court for fresh decision according to law.

Holding and Implications

SET ASIDE AND REMANDED

Holding (direct outcome): The Court set aside the judgments and decrees of both the trial Court and the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint to the limited extent of seeking a mandatory injunction in place of a prohibitory injunction (because the chabutra was constructed during the pendency of the suit), and remanded the case to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with law. The parties were directed to appear in the trial Court on 20-5-58. The costs were ordered to abide the event.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the plaintiff is permitted to amend the plaint and the matter will be reheard by the trial Court applying the principles identified by this Court (in particular, that relief for demolition or injunction among co-owners depends on the circumstances and is not automatic). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, sweeping precedent beyond endorsing the view that courts must consider changed circumstances and that mandatory relief among co-owners depends on circumstances and potential damage; the decision's direct effect is the remand and permission to amend for this specific case.

V.R.B

Case remanded.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises out of a suit for a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from making constructions on the site in dispute which is said to be joint of the parties. The defendant pleaded that the chabutra existed in the site in dispute for the last 30 years, that the plaintiff had already made similar encroachment on another part of the joint sehin and that the suit was barred by time. It was also asserted that in the absence of any allegation regarding special damage, the plaintiff could not maintain the suit. The following issues were framed by the trial Court:

1. Whether the suit is within time?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled, to the injunction prayed for?

3. Relief.

2. The trial Court found that the defendant could only keep three blocks of steps in front of the three doors of his house and was not entitled to build the chabutra. It was also found that the chabutra had been constructed after the institution of the suit. A decree for a mandatory injunction was, therefore, passed directing the defendant to demolish the chabutra and to maintain only three blocks of steps in front of three doors of his house not exceeding width of the three doors and the defendant was further restrained from building any chabutra on the joint courtyard of the Chaudhry family.

3. The matter was taken in appeal to the Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge who found that the suit of the plaintiff in so far as it related to encroachment of the site of the three chabutras that formerly existed in front of the three doors of the defendant's house was clearly barred by time but that the rest of the claim was within time. The finding that certain constructions were made during the pendency of the suit was not disturbed but the suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had not made any application at any stage for seeking an amendment of the plaint with a view to add the relief for the grant of mandatory injunction.

4. The relief which had been claimed in the plaint was for a prohibitory injunction and the learned Senior Subordinate Judge considered that unless there was an amendment of the plaint a decree for a mandatory injunction could not have been granted. The plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision of the Senior Subordinate Judge and has come up to this Court in second appeal.

5. The first point that has been raised on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff could not have been non-suited purely on the ground that he had not sought amendment of the plaint so as to add the relief for the grant of a mandatory injunction. It is submitted that it is the duty of the Court in such cases to grant an appropriate relief and take subsequent events into consideration as admittedly the constructions in dispute had been made during the pendency of the suit.

6. It is argued that the trial Court had rightly granted a decree for a mandatory injunction in spite of the fact that the prayer in the plaint was only for the grant of a prohibitory injunction. My attention has been invited to Meghaji Mohanji v. Anant Pandurang, AIR 1948 Bom 396 (A), which had laid down that there are cases where it is incumbent upon a Court of justice to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made.

7. This principle will be applied where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate, or that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. In Vishxam Arjun v. Irukulla Shankariah, (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 784 (B), the general principle was reiterated that the primary duty of the Courts is to do justice and rules of procedure are intended only to advance the cause of justice rather than to impede the same. It is the duty of the Court to grant a relief as the circumstances of the case would warrant even though it may not be asked for.

8. It seems difficult to accept the contention that in the present case a decree for a mandatory injunction could be granted without amendment of the plaint. The considerations which apply to the grant of a mandatory injunction are somewhat different from the considerations which govern the grant of a prohibitory injunction although the general principles for the grant of both types of injunctions are essentially the same.

9. The main question, however, that arises before any mandatory injunction can be granted is whether in case of co-owner the injunction must be granted for demolition of constructions made by one co-owner on joint property particularly when the joint property happens to be a court-yard. The contention of Mr. Dwarka Nath Aggarwal on behalf of the appellant is that no co-owner can make any construction on a joint property of this nature and once he does so the other co-owners can ask for the demolition of those constructions without showing any special injury or damage that may be caused to them.

10. On the other hand it is urged by Mr. Chiranjiva Lal Aggarwal on behalf of the respondent that unless any special damage or injury is proved to the other co-owner it is not open to him to obtain a mandatory injunction. Mr. Chiranjiva Lal Aggarwal has invited my attention to the plans which have been produced in the present case which show that there are other chabutras similar to the one in dispute which have been constructed by other coowners and he submits that if all the co-owners have exercised a similar right and if the construction of the disputed chabutra has caused no damage or injury to the plaintiff then no injunction should be granted at all.

11. There has been a good deal of conflict on the question whether injury or damage should be proved in case of appropriation by one co-owner of certain part of the common property before an injunction can be issued directing that the constructions be pulled down. The view that prevailed at one time was that the Court would grant a perpetual injunction to restrain one of the several co-sharers from appropriating to himself land in which each of his co-sharers had an interest & from building upon it and it was not necessary to prove any special damage or injury. But even some earlier decisions which have been followed in the latest rulings show that there is no such broad proposition as

“that one co-owner is entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his lights absolutely, and without reference to the amount of damage to be sustained by the one side or the other”.

12. In the Lahore High Court the former view prevailed and it has been held in Manji v. Ghulam Muhmmad, ILR 2 Lah 73 : (AIR 1921 Lah 157) (C) and Kunj Lal v. Ramji Lal, AIR 1927 Lah 416 (D), that the mere fact that the plot encroached upon by one proprietor is small in size or that no special damage has been caused to the other proprietors is no ground for upholding the wrongful act of the former. In such a case it is not legally necessary to prove special damage, nor is there any force in the contention that, the plaintiffs' remedy is by way of a suit for partition. Even in the Lahore High Court, however, there was a divergent opinion expressed in Ahmad Gul v. Rahim Khan, AIR 1926 Lah 52 (E).

13. Moti Sagar, J. held that the mere circumstance of a building erected on common land without the consent of the co-sharers was not sufficient in itself to entitle the aggrieved co-sharers to claim the demolition of the building so erected unless it could be shown that the erection of that building had actually caused such material and substantial injury as could not be remedied on a partition of joint land. In Bhagwan Singh v. Hari Singh, AIR 1929 Lah 73 (F), Addison, J. laid down that in suits for mandatory injunction it was necessary to prove special injury or substantial damage before such a suit could be maintained.

14. In that case also a suit had been brought for removal of three obstructions in the shape of small, tharas which had been made on joint shamilat land inside the village abadi. It was found that the tharas caused no serious obstruction or interference with the passage of the plaintiffs and the suit was dismissed with regard to the same. The entire case law has been fully discussed in Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal, AIR 1951 All 199 (FB) (G). The following observations made in that case at page 204 deserve particular notice:

“As a result of the foregoing discussion, it appears to us that the question of the right of co-sharer in respect of joint land should be kept separate and distinct from the question as to what relief should be granted to a co-sharer, whose right in respect of joint land has been invaded by the odier co-sharers either by exclusively appropriating & cultivating land or by raising constructions thereon. The conflict in some of the decisions has apparently arisen from the confusion of the two distinct matters. While therefore a co-sharer is entitled to object to another co-sharer; exclusively appropriating land to himself to the detriment of other co-sharers, the question as to what relief should be granted to the plaintiff in the event of the invasion of his rights will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The right to the relief for demolition and injunction will be granted or withheld by the Court according as the circumstances established in the case justify”.

15. The above observations are followed by other considerations that the Court must take into account before deciding whether an injunction should be granted or not. Mr. Dwarka Nath Aggarwal invited my attention to a ruling of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Darshan Lal v. Harkesh Singh, AIR 1951 All 338 (H). In that case the learned Judges seemed to assume that an injunction would automatically be granted against a co-sharer who built on a part of the joint land. That case, however, cannot be regarded as laying down the law correctly as the decision of the Full Bench referred to before is different and the Division Bench has not referred to the Full Bench ruling. In Khimji Mulji v. Popatlal Bhanji, AIR 1951 Sau 85 (I), the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court was followed and a Division Bench of that Court summarised the position as follows:

“The position thus is that a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exercising his rights in the common property absolutely and simply on the ground of his co-ownership and without reference to the amount of damage to be sustained by the one side or the other from the granting or the withholding of the injunction”.

16. After giving the matter full consideration, I am inclined to follow, with respect, the view expressed above by the Bench of the Saurashtra High Court which is in accord with some of the decisions of the Lahore High Court also referred to before. Moreover I consider that the principles which should be followed in granting mandatory injunctions should be the same as have been stated in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court.

17. In the present case the trial Court failed to apply correct principles, nor could a mandatory injunction have been granted without amendment of the plaint. The view of the lower appellate Court also with regard to the correct principles and the circumstances in which a mandatory injunction should be granted was erroneous. At the same time it should not have non-suited the plaintiff on the mere technical defect in the plaint with regard to the absence of a prayer for a mandatory injunction.

18. It has been urged before me that amendment of the plaint can be allowed even at the stage of second appeal and that such an amendment should be allowed by this Court. As according to the findings of the Courts below, which have not shown to be wrong, the chabutra in dispute was constructed during the pendency of the suit, I consider that an amendment of the plaint to the limited extent of changing the relief to one of grant of a mandatory injunction in place of a prohibitory injunction would be perfectly justified. I, therefore, set aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below and remand the case to the trial Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. The plaintiff will be allowed to amend his plaint to the extent indicated above. The costs will abide the event. The parties have been directed to appear in trial Court on 20-5-58.

V.R.B

19. Case remanded.