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Janardhan Bhagwan Dass v. Sham Lal Nand Lal And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aug 27, 1958
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties were joint owners of considerable landed property (some ancestral, some not). In 1902 and 1904 two mortgages were created over portions of the land, and in 1906 the second mortgage was converted into a usufructuary mortgage, placing the mortgagees in possession of the combined lands (139 kanals and 6 marlas). Between 1914 and 1932 fifteen additional charges were created on the land, totalling Rs. 11,183.

A redemption application under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act was earlier dismissed. In 1947 a suit for redemption was filed by the four branches of Gobind Ram; a preliminary decree for redemption dated 16 July 1948 required payment of Rs. 25,339/11/3 by 14 January 1949. Janardhan (defendant No. 1) alone paid the entire amount (depositing Rs. 10,000 on 14 January 1949 and the balance on 24 January 1949). A final decree for redemption was passed on 11 March 1949 and Janardhan obtained possession.

Two plaintiffs, Sham Lal and Salig Ram, subsequently applied for redemption of their shares but the Collector dismissed that application. Thereafter, on 16 January 1951 the plaintiffs filed the present suit seeking redemption of specified one-fourth and one-third shares of portions of the mortgaged land, claiming they were entitled to redeem those shares on payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8 (their share of the mortgage money).

Janardhan contested, asserting subrogation to the mortgagees' rights on payment of the preliminary decree amount, claiming that he held mortgagee rights as to the other three-fourths and that the plaintiffs could not redeem only their shares but must redeem the whole; he also sought costs and interest. The trial Court framed nine issues, heard evidence, and held in favour of the plaintiffs, granting them a decree for redemption of their shares on payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8 plus interest of Rs. 189/13/6, and leaving costs to be borne by the parties themselves. Janardhan appealed to this Court; the plaintiffs filed cross-objections.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the redemption decree and what is its effect?
  2. Whether at the time of redemption it was agreed that every co-mortgagor would be entitled to redeem on payment of his share?
  3. If issue No. 2 is not proved, whether the plaintiffs are legally entitled to redeem their share on payment of the amount due from them?
  4. On payment of what mortgage amount are the plaintiffs entitled to redeem their share?
  5. Whether the costs of the previous suit were borne by defendant No. 1 alone and he is entitled to payment by the plaintiffs to the extent of the plaintiffs' share? If so how much?
  6. Whether defendant No. 1 is entitled to claim interest on the further charges? If so, how much interest is payable by the plaintiffs?
  7. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from suing?
  8. Whether defendant No. 1 at the time of redemption admitted that the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem their share on payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8 and cannot now object that they cannot do so?
  9. Relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant No. 1 — Janardhan) Arguments

  • On payment of the mortgage money under the preliminary decree, Janardhan had been subrogated to the rights of the previous mortgagees and thus succeeded to the mortgagee rights in respect of the remaining three-fourths of the property.
  • Because of this subrogation, a fresh mortgage qua the three-fourths had come into existence by operation of law and the plaintiffs could not redeem only their shares; they were bound to seek redemption of the entire mortgaged property.
  • The appellant relied on the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act to support his claim to the rights of the original mortgagees by subrogation.
  • He also contended he had incurred costs (Rs. 800) in previous litigation and was entitled to recover these costs (or the plaintiffs’ proportionate share) and to interest as provided in the original mortgages.

Plaintiffs' (Sham Lal and Salig Ram) Arguments

  • The Transfer of Property Act does not apply to the Punjab; instead the principles of justice, equity and good conscience govern the matter in the Punjab.
  • Those principles do not prevent the plaintiffs from redeeming only their respective shares of the mortgaged property by paying the proportionate part of the mortgage money actually paid by Janardhan.
  • The integrity of the mortgage had been broken by redemption of the original mortgages and the mortgage qua Janardhan’s own share had become extinct; the plaintiffs relied on the last clause of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act to argue they could redeem their own share.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pliula Singh v. Harnaman, AIR 1941 Lah. 421 That the literal words of Section 92 (subrogation) cannot be read in the most literal sense where a co-mortgagor redeems and the integrity of the mortgage is broken; a co-mortgagor succeeds only partially to the rights of the original mortgagee. The Court relied on Beckett, J.'s observations to support the view that Janardhan could not be subrogated to all rights of the original mortgagees and that the mortgage had become divisible so that co-mortgagors could redeem their shares proportionately.
Sarfaraz v. Mohammad Salim, AIR 1934 Oudh 348 Supportive authority for the proposition that a co-mortgagor who redeems does not succeed to all the mortgagee's rights as to the redeemer's own share; the mortgage can cease to be indivisible when its integrity is broken. Cited as corroborative authority for the equitable principle limiting subrogation of a co-mortgagor.
Ali Akbar v. Sultan-ul-Mulk, AIR 1923 Lah. 129 Another supportive precedent with similar conclusions about the limited scope of subrogation for co-mortgagors. Used as additional authority to show courts have previously restricted the rights acquired by a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage as a whole.
Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad, AIR 1953 SC 1 (Supreme Court) Explains the equitable doctrine of subrogation: the subrogee may demand reimbursement only to the extent justice and equity require; where co-debtors exist the payer is principal debtor for his share and surety as to the rest, and can seek contribution for the excess he paid. The Court treated this Supreme Court exposition as settling the point regarding interest and the extent of subrogation: the subrogee cannot claim more than he actually paid, and may only seek reimbursement proportionate to what he paid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded first by examining the factual position and then the applicable legal principles as expressed in equity and the authorities cited. The key steps in the Court's analysis, drawn from the opinion, are:

  1. Establishment of factual consequence of redemption: the Court found that the "integrity" of the original mortgages no longer existed — the mortgages that originally covered 139 kanals and 6 marlas now operated only on three-fourths of the property because Janardhan's one-fourth share's mortgage rights merged with the equity of redemption and thus became extinct.
  2. Applicability of statutory provisions: the Court held that Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (which deals with subrogation) does not apply to the Punjab. Hence, the matter is to be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience as applicable in Punjab.
  3. Scope of subrogation under equitable principles: applying those equitable principles and relying on prior judicial authorities (including Pliula Singh v. Harnaman and the Supreme Court decision in Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad), the Court reasoned that Janardhan could not be treated as subrogated to all the rights of the original mortgagees insofar as those rights would apply to his own share — he succeeded to the rights of the mortgagees only to the extent necessary to reimburse himself for amounts he had paid on behalf of the other co-mortgagors.
  4. Consequences for co-mortgagors' redemption rights: consistent with equity, each co-mortgagor (other than Janardhan) may redeem his own share by paying the proportionate amount of the mortgage money actually paid by Janardhan. The Court found this approach to accord with justice, equity and good conscience and supported by cited authorities.
  5. Costs and interest: the Court agreed with the trial Court's finding that costs of the previous litigation were incurred jointly by all co-sharers (supported by witness evidence accepted by the trial Court). As to interest, relying on the Supreme Court exposition, the subrogee (Janardhan) cannot claim more than what he himself has paid; this point was accepted by the appellant's counsel.
  6. Relief: based on these legal conclusions, the Court upheld the trial Court's decretal order allowing the plaintiffs to redeem their shares on payment of their proportionate amount (Rs. 5,879/2/8) plus the limited interest allowed (Rs. 189/13/6) and confirmed the allocation of costs as decided below.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs (granting them redemption of their shares upon payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8 plus Rs. 189/13/6 interest and leaving parties to bear their own costs) stands. The plaintiffs' cross-objections were also dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs are entitled to redeem their respective shares of the mortgaged property by paying the proportionate part of the mortgage money actually paid by Janardhan (Rs. 5,879/2/8) plus the specified interest (Rs. 189/13/6). Janardhan's broader claim to be subrogated to all rights of the mortgagees was rejected. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs in this Court.
  • On precedent and broader law: The decision follows and applies established equitable principles and existing authorities (as cited) on the limited scope of subrogation for a co-mortgagor who redeems; the opinion does not purport to establish a new rule of law beyond affirming those principles in the present factual context.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Cross-objections dismissed. (Per the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." and related decretal consequences as summarized above.)

Show all summary ...

1. The relationship between the parties to the present case is clear from the pedigree-table given below.

2. The parties owned considerable landed property, some of which was ancestral and the other non-ancestral. In 1902 Lal Chand, Bhagwan Das and Beli mortgaged 50 kanals and 11 marl as of land which Kalu Mal and others with possession for a sum of Rs. 2,000/-. In 1904 Lal Chand, Bhagwan Das, Beli and the sons of Naman made a simple mortgage of another 88 kanals and 15 marlas of land for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- in favour of the same mortgagees.

3. In 1906 the second mortgage was also converted into a usufructuary mortgage with the result that the mortgagees came into possession of the entire land covered by both the mortgages and measuring 139 kanals and 6 marlas. From 1914 to 1932, fifteen additional charges were created on the aforesaid land by documents, Exhibits D. 3 to D. 17, and the total amount covered by the aforesaid fifteen additional charges came up to Rs. 11,183/-.

4. The mortgagors made an application to the Collector for redemption of the mortgages under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act, and for reasons with which we are not now concerned, the said application was dismissed. In the year 1947 a suit for redemption was filed by all the four branches of Gobind Ram and on the 16th July 1948, a preliminary decree was passed for redemption on payment of Rs. 25,339/11/3 on or before the 14th of January, 1949.

5. Janardhan, defendant No. I, alone paid the entire amount by depositing Rs. 10,000/- on the 14th of January, 1949, and the balance on the 24th of January, 1949. On the 11th of March, 1949, a final decree for redemption was passed in favour of the mortgagors. In execution of the decree Janardhan, defendant No. 1, got the possession of the entire land. Sham Lal and Salig Ram, plaintiffs in the present case, then brought an application for redemption of their share of the mortgaged property but the same was dismissed by the Collector for reasons with which we are not again concerned in the present case.

6. The present suit was brought by Sham Lal and Salig Ram on the 16th of January, 1951, for redemption of their one-fourth share in land described in para (alif) of the heading of the plaint and one-third share of land described in para, (be) of the heading of the plaint. The plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to the redemption of their aforesaid shares on payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8, i.e, the mortgage money of their share.

7. Janardhan contested the suit on the grounds that on payment of the entire mortgage money found due under the preliminary decree he had been subrogated to the rights of the mortgagees, that qua his own share he had become owner of the same, that qua the rest three-fourths share he was the mortgagee and was as such entitled to all the rights of the original mortgagees in respect of redemption etc., and that the plaintiffs could not redeem only their share and were bound to redeem the whole.

8. He also pleaded that he had incurred Rs. 800/- as costs of the previous litigation and the plaintiffs could not redeem till they paid the same or at least their proportionate share of the same.- He further pleaded that he was entitled to the interest as due on the original mortgages. He took various other pleas also which are evident from the following nine issues framed by the trial Court—

(1) Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the redemption decree and what is its effect?

(2) Whether at the time of redemption it was agreed that every co-mortgagor would be entitled to redeem on payment of his share?

(3) If issue No. 2 is not proved, whether the plaintiffs are legally entitled to redeem their share on payment of the amount due from them?

(4) On payment of what mortgage amount are the plaintiffs entitled to redeem their share?

(5) Whether the costs of the previous suit were borne by defendant No. 1 alone and he is entitled to the payment of the same to the extent to the plaintiffs' share? If so how much?

(6) Whether defendant No. 1 is entitled to claim interest on the further charges? If so, how much interest is payable to the plaintiffs?

(7) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from suing?

(8) Whether defendant No. 1 at the time of redemption admitted that the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem their share on payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8 and cannot now object that they cannot do so?

(9) Relief.

9. After recording the evidence of the parties the trial Court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the redemption decree, that there was no agreement at the time of redemption, that every co-mortgagor would be entitled to redeem on payment of his share, that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to redeem their share on payment of the proportionate amount due on their share of the property, that the amount payable by the plaintiffs by calculation came to Rs. 5,879/2/8, that the costs of the previous suit were incurred by all the parties jointly, that defendant No. 1 was entitled to claim interest on the further charges but only to the extent of Rs. 189/13/6, that the plaintiffs were not estopped from suing, and that defendant No. 1 at the time of redemption did not admit that the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem their share on payment of Rs. 5,87,972/8, (Plaintiff No. 2).

10. As a result of the aforesaid findings the trial Court granted a decree to the plaintiffs for redemption of their share of the mortgaged property on payment of Rs. 5,879/2/8 proportionate share of the amount paid by defendant No. 1 plus Rs. 189/13/6 interest allowed on the same. The parties were left to bear their own costs. Defendant No. 1 feeling aggrieved against the said decree has come up to this Court in appeal, while the plaintiffs have filed cross-objections.

11. Mr. F.C Mital, learned counsel for the appellant has urged only the following three points:

(1) that the plaintiffs were not entitled to redeem their share only and that they were bound to bring a suit for the redemption of the entire mortgaged property,

(2) that the finding of the trial Court with regard to the costs of the previous litigation was erroneous and that it should have been held that the entire costs were incurred by defendant No. 1, and

(3) that defendant No. 1 was entitled to interest as provided in the original mortgages.

12. With regard to the first point the contention raised by Mr. Mital is that on payment of the mortgage money under the preliminary decree dated the 16th of July, 1948, defendant No. 1 had been subrogated to the rights of the previous mortgagees and although with respect to his own share, i.e one-fourth, the mortgagee rights had come to be merged with the equity of redemption of the mortgages and had thereby become extinct, a fresh mortgage qua the three-fourths share of the property had come into existence by operation of law and the plaintiffs could redeem the said mortgage only as a whole and not qua their share. The learned counsel relies for this proposition on the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant part of the aforesaid section reads as under—

“92. Any of the persons referred to in Section 91 (other than the mortgagor) and any co-mortgagor shall, on redeeming property subject to the mortgage, have, so far as regards redemption, foreclosure or sale of such property, the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor or any other mortgagee. The right conferred by this section is called the right of subrogation, and a person acquiring the same is said to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems.”

13. Mr. D.N Aggarwal, learned counsel for the plain-tiff-respondents, urges that the Transfer of Property Act as such is not applicable to the Punjab and that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience which do apply in the Punjab do not stand in the way of the plaintiffs from redeeming their share of the mortgaged property. He further contends that the integrity of the mortgages must be deemed to have broken inasmuch as the original mortgages have been redeemed and qua the share of defendant No. 1 no mortgage is now in existence. He draws our attention to the last clause of section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act and urges that his clients are entitled to redeem their share of the mortgaged property under the said provision of law. The last clause of Section 60 reads as under—

“Nothing in this section shall entitle a person interested in a share only of the mortgaged property to redeem his own share only, on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage except only where a mortgagee, or, if there are more mortgagees than one all such mortgagees, has or have acquired, in whole or in part, the share of a mortgagor.”

14. After giving our careful consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we have come to the conclusion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot prevail and must be repelled. There can be no doubt that the integrity of the original mortgages is no longer in existence and the mortgages which were originally for 139 kanals and 6 marlas of land now operate only on three-fourths of the aforesaid property, the mortgagee rights of the rest, having merged with the equity of redemption and the mortgage on the same having thereby become extinct.

15. There can also be no doubt that the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to the Punjab, and the case is therer fore to be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Janardhan, defendant No. 1—appellant, in the present case —cannot be taken to have been subrogated to all the rights of the original mortgagees' because he can in no case be regarded to hold a mortgage at least on his own share of the mortgaged property.

16. By redeeming the previous mortgages the defendant—appellant (Janardhan) became entitled to reimbursement of the amount paid by him in respect of the shares of his other co-mortgagors and succeeded to the rights of the previous mortgagees only to this extent. It will be in accord with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience that each of the other mortgagors may redeem his share of the property by payment of the proportionate amount actually paid by Janardhan. A similar view on this matter was taken by Beckett, J. in Pliula Singh v. Harnaman, AIR 1941 Lah. 421. The following observations were made by the learned Judge at page 422 of the report—

“It is true that Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, lays down that a co-mortgagor on redeeming the property shall have the same rights as the original mortgagee as regards the redemption, foreclosure or sale of the property; but these words can hardly be read in their most literal sense. One of the present mortgages may be taken by way of example. Tehl Singh could have insisted on redemption of Bhana's land on payment of the full amount of Rs. 600/- after it had passed into the hands of the persons who became co-mortgagors; but it is obvious that Harnama does not possess exactly the same right. His own share is now free from the mortgage, so that there is no question of redeeming the land as a whole and there is certainly no question of paying a sum of Rs. 600/. Once the integrity of the mortgage has been broken up by the person assuming the position of a mortgagee in respect of the rest of the property it seems to me that the mortgage can no longer be regarded as indivisible.

In this respect the position of a co-mortgagor is quite different from that of the sole mortgagor when it comes to subrogation. With a sole mortgagor the question of subrogation only arises if the property passes out of his hands, and it is possible for him to assume the position of the original mortgagee in all respects, since he is regarded as holding a mortgage over the property as a whole against the third person. When a co-mortgagor redeems-the property as a whole, it is hardly possible to regard him as holding a mortgage against himself in respect of his own share so that he only succeeds partially to the rights of the original mortgagee, and this makes the position quite different.”

17. Almost the same view was also taken by a Division Bench of the Oudh Chief Court in Sarfaraz v. Mohammad Salim, AIR 1934 Oudh 348 and by a Division Bench of the Lahore High [Court in Ali Akbar v. Sultan-ul-Mulk, AIR 1923 Lah. 129. In. Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Pershad, AIR 1953 SC 1 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed at page 2 of the report as under:—

“If we remember that the doctrine of subrogation which means substitution of one person in place of another and giving him the rights of the latter is essentially an equitable doctrine 111 its origin and application, and if we examine the reason behind it, the answer to the question which we have to decide in this appeal is not difficult. Equity insists on the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice and good conscience is bound to pay it, and it is well recognised that where there are several joint debtors, the person making the payment is a principal debtor as regards the part of the liability he is to discharge and a surety in respect of the shares of the rest of the debtors. Such being the legal position as among the co-mortgagors, if one of them redeems a mortgage over the property which belongs jointly to himself and the rest, equity confers on him a right to reimburse himself for the amount spent in excess by him in the matter of redemption; he can call upon the co-mortgagors-to contribute towards the excess which he has paid over his own share.”

18. There is no doubt that the facts of the Supreme Court case were somewhat different from those of the present case, but the controversy there also related to the extent of the rights of a comortgagor who had redeemed the previous mortgage and claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights of the original mortgagee.

19. We, therefore, find that it will be in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to allow the plaintiffs to redeem their share of the property on payment of the proportionate amount of the mortgage money.

20. With regard to the costs of the previous litigation, we entirely agree with the finding of the trial Court that the same were incurred by all the co-sharers jointly. The evidence of P.W 1, 2 and 3, which has been believed by the trial Court, fully supports the said finding and there is nothing shown to us why we should not rely on the said evidence.

21. Regarding the amount of interest] the point is settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to above. The subrogee cannot according to the rules of justice, equity and good conscience as applicable in the Punjab claim anything more than what he has himself paid. In fact this point was conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant.

22. In the result, we dismiss this appeal but, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. As regards the cross objections filed by the plaintiffs no arguments at all were addressed to us and we do not find any force in the said objections and dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

D.H.Z

23. Appeal dismissed.